►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 37
Description
The theme for this call will be 'Collateral Risk'.
- Rich will recap recent votes and risks around 'the new normal'.
- Cyrus will review Collateral Risk and help prepare us for new collateral types.
- Vishesh will present his analysis.
- Matthew Rabinowitz will present his Weekly Narrative.
We'll then spend the rest of the time in a general Q&A session.
Discussion Thread: https://redd.it/buoqhv
Podcast version: https://soundcloud.com/makerdao/sets/governance-and-risk
Transcripts (Delayed by 48 hours) : https://github.com/makerdao/community/tree/master/governance/transcripts
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 1: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-governance-risk-framework-38625f514101
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 2: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-governance-risk-framework-fc8939f3d4e9
Foundation Proposal: https://medium.com/makerdao/foundatio...
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 3: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-governance-risk-framework-part-3-7a4c620f4077
Website: https://makerdao.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/makerdao
Reddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/
Chat: https://chat.makerdao.com/home
Email: info@makerdao.com
A
That
red
light
turned
on
for
anyone
else.
Now
there
hello
everyone
welcome
to
the
mais
30th
edition
of
the
scientific,
governs
and
risk
meeting
with
maker
Dow.
My
name
is
Richard
Brown
I
am
going
to
moderate.
The
call
today
talk
a
bit
about
governance
and
the
recent
votes.
After
that
we
will
talk
to
Cyrus
Yoon
se,
who
represents
the
risk
team
at
maker
down.
A
We
need
to
have
as
an
entire
community
over
the
course
of
the
next
week's
months,
leading
up
to
multi
collateral
die
and
then
afterwards,
if
there
is
significant
interest,
we'll
have
a
Q&A
session
that
could
possibly
run
past
the
top
of
the
hour,
we'll
stick
around
until
so
energy
begins
to
wane.
You
generally
we've
been
hanging
up
for
a
half
hour
after
these
calls,
and
just
during
a
general
Q&A
and
there's
been
a
lot
of
interest
and
calm,
interesting
conversations.
A
So,
if
you're
interested,
please
hang
up
for
that
mic,
preamble,
I'm,
going
to
jump
into
again
is
that
we
are
intensely
intensely
interested
in
getting
as
much
feedback
and
questions
comments
and
concerns
from
the
community.
As
you
possibly
can.
We
have
an
enormous,
Lee,
talented
group
of
people
in
these
calls,
and
we
want
to
know
what
they're
thinking
and
get
as
much
RAM
as
we
possibly
can
sorry
decrypted
for
a
second
there
I'm
digging
up
a
link,
so
I'm
gonna
paste
this
in
the
chat
on
the
side.
A
If
people
have
questions
or
comments,
please
type
them
out
in
the
chat
and
we
will
attempt
to
get
to
those
and
when
there's
a
quiet
moment,
we'll
read
them
out
for
you.
If
you
have
access
to
a
microphone,
please
jump
in
and
just
start
talking,
there's
no,
no
rules
against
interruptions
here.
If
you
have,
if
you
think,
there's
a
thread
that
we
picked
up
or
drops
that
needs
to
be
explored
more
completely.
A
Please
jump
into
the
reddit
thread:
they
just
post
it
and
let's
continue
the
conversation
there,
because,
as
always,
this
is
forum
for
us
to
discuss
and
to
debate
and
to
explore
things
and
to
surface
new
issues
and
to
discuss
memes
and/or,
educate
ourselves
in
the
rest
of
the
community.
I
don't,
but
we
don't
really
make
decisions
here.
We
make
decisions
through
the
voting
portal
and
we
have
deeper
debates
in
reddit's
over
the
course
of
the
week,
and
so
please
make
sure
that
your
thoughts
and
concerns
are
known
and
recorded
in
those
threads
generally.
A
We
have
Stephen
come
in
and
give
us
the
thought
of
the
week,
but
we're
one
of
the
the
main
themes
of
these
calls
is
that
we're
iterating
every
single
time
trying
to
improve
things,
trying
to
tighten
things
up
a
bit
and
one
of
the
things
we're
trying
to
do
is
to
war
one
of
the
ideas
of
a
wrestling
with
or
how
how
much
information
will
be
packed
into
these
one
calls.
This
thing
go
call
how
many
calls
do
we
need
to
have
in
the
future?
What
should
the
agenda
of
those
calls
be?
A
Who
should
we
advertise
them
to
there's
a
lot
of
questions
that
we
need
to
answer?
Do
we
need
a
separate
risk?
Call
three
three
or
four
different
separate
risk
calls
we
need
one
governance
call
for
monetary
policy
to
be
another
gun,
prints
call
for
things
like
the
DSR,
the
stability
fee.
There's
all
kinds
of
questions
need
to
be
addressed,
but
in
the
short
term,
it's
my
preference
that
we
keep
these.
This
one
primary
call
is
optimized
as
we
possibly
can
and
as
focused
as
we
can
and
as
it
becomes
absolutely
required.
A
To
be
ratified
or
whether
they're
happy
with
the
old
executive
in
the
past,
we
got
passed
about
two
months.
We
got
used
to
this
idea
of
a
we
got
wrapped
up
in
this.
This
thing,
which
I
call
sometimes
the
new
normal.
Where
because
something
had
happened
a
few
times
in
a
row,
we
assume
that
that's
the
way
the
world
is
going
to
be
from
this
point
forward
and
that's
a
risky
thing
to
fall
into
and
that
new
normal
assumption
was
that
every
Friday
maker
holders
would
immediately
jump
into
the
voting
portal.
A
They
would
pick
whichever
the
new
vote
was,
because
new
is
obviously
better
than
old,
and
then
we
would
proceed
to
enjoy
the
success
of
our
government
system
and,
on
one
day,
we'd
have
a
poll
that
was
based
on
that
very
clear
picture
of
the
system
that
we
all
understood,
which
was
clarified
the
previous
Friday
the
last
two
weeks.
Some
interesting
things
happened
a
bunch
of
interesting
things
happened
this
the
peg,
largely
stabilized.
A
You
know
air
quotes
and
canopy
that
supply
I'm
not
really
qualified
to
figure
out
whether
it
has
or
not,
but
it
seems
like
ass
and
one
of
the
voters
seem
to
have
shared
that
same
opinion,
and
there
was
there,
wasn't
a
mad
rush
to
raise
and
or
lower
the
fee
on
the
on
the
Friday
to
weeks
ago.
There
wasn't
one
on
the
weekend
either,
and
it
wasn't
one
during
the
course
of
the
week
and
we
rented
this
situation,
we're
having
polls
that
didn't
reflect
the
current
state
of
the
system.
A
They
reflected
what
potentially
the
future
state
of
the
system
might
look
like,
irrespective
of
what's
the
main
voters
were
doing
with
the
actual
stability
fee
itself,
so
we
had
the
stability
fee
at
nineteen.
There
was
a
significant
amount
of
signaling
that
wanted
it
to
go
to
seventeen,
so
we
saw
a
disconnect
between
signal
layers
in
the
polling,
infrastructure
and
actual
voters
in
yeah
people
staking
their
weight
against
the
actual
executive.
That
was
something
that
we
need
to
learn
about.
A
It
also
surfaced
some
issues
we
have
with
the
system
in
general,
which
is
that
it's
our
our
requirements
are
evolving
faster
than
the
governance
portal
is
evolving
and
one
of
the
things
we've
run
into
which
obviously
we
all
knew
we
would
is
that
you
can
only
vote
for
one
thing
at
a
time,
and
that
includes
a
poll.
So
if
you
have
your
maker
staked
in
a
poll
that
says
you
want
to
lower
the
fee,
you
need
to
take
it
out
of
a
current
executive
that
is
lowering
the
fee
or
in
vice
versa.
A
If
you
want
to
vote
for
a
lower
fee,
you
need
to
go
to
the
poll
and
that
changes
the
signal.
So
we
have
all
kinds
of
issues
were
addressing
there
and
we've
spoken
about
in
previous
calls.
Chris
was
he
not
from
product
was
in
the
call
last
week
to
give
us
solicit
some
information.
It
shows
how
the
portal
will
be
evolving,
but
anyway,
so
we
ran
into
some
issues
about
weak
executives
and
confusing
poles
halfway.
That
ambiguity
was
cleared
up
this
week
and
there's
some
very
interesting
things
that
happened
here.
A
A
But
the
interesting
thing
is
that,
instead
of
choosing
to
leave
the
fee
where
it
was
under
the
understanding
that
potentially
is
just
working
the
way,
as
opposed
to
maker
voters
chose
to
lower
the
fee
a
couple
days
ago,
and
that's
to
me
is
very
interesting
for
a
few
reasons.
It
sends
a
signal
beyond
whether
they
should
have
been
lowered
or
or
shouldn't
have
been
I
don't
know.
A
But
the
great
thing
about
that
change
was
its
signal
to
the
community
that
our
fees
are
not
marching
in
ever
upwards
that
the
the
voters
are
more
than
willing
to
lower
those
fees
when
they
feel
that
it's
required
that
takes
the
steam
out
of
a
lot
of
or
the
windows
of
a
lot
of
people's
sales
in
the
contrarian
maker,
deaf
community,
which
I
enjoyed
seeing.
It
also
goes
towards
dispelling
the
myth
that
there's
a
correlation
between
the
stability
fee
and
the
price
of
maker,
which
is
sort
of
a
pernicious
myth
and
one.
A
It
particularly
annoys
me
because
it's
so
immediately
and
obviously
disprovable,
because
if
you
look
at
the
stability
fees
and
you
look
at
the
price
of
maker-
and
you
overload
the
straps
together,
you
can
see
that
raising
instability
fees
is
generating
deleterious
to
the
prices
maker.
But
this
this
also
provides
some
very,
very
interesting
signals
to
the
community.
A
So
those
are
some
of
the
things
that
I
want
to
leave.
People
with
governance
has
survived
some
hiccups
and
some
money
for
seen
largely
unforeseen
situations.
It's
recovered.
We
have
a
new
governance
portal
coming
very
soon.
That
will
solve
some
of
these
issues,
but
in
the
meantime,
I
just
want
to
thank
all
the
voters
who
did
both
and
the
people
that
are
sitting
on
the
fence.
Please
come
out
to
vote
because
it's
critically
important
that,
even
if
you
don't
think
that
your
maker
is
going
to
make
a
difference,
trust
me
it
does
make
a
difference.
A
I
need
to
convince
myself
of
that
quickly
because
I'm
not
a
whale
either,
but
I
do
vote
and
I
hope
that
every
else
gets
out
there
and
does
it
do
I.
Think
that's
where
I'm
going
to
leave
it
I
think
let's
continue
to
think
about
some
of
the
edge
cases
with
governance
and,
let's
think
about
how
that
signaling
works
in
the
community
and
I
thought
yeah
I'll
leave
it
there
now
so
sorry,
I'm
gonna
hand
that,
off
to
you.
A
B
I
I'm
not
I'm,
not
saying
it
just
to
be
petty,
but
more
along
the
lines
of
there
will
be
times
where
the
governance
decisions
may
appear
unpopular
or
there
may
be
other
incentives
at
play
for
people
not
wanting
policy
to
go
a
certain
direction,
and
we
just
have
to
be
aware
of
that
and
trust
in
the
scientific
governance
process.
Yeah.
A
Okay,
that's
great
and
I
wish
that
I
brought
that
point
up
good,
so
good
that
and
it's
a
risk
that
we
ran
into
in
the
past.
Where
sentiment
just
crypto
sentiment,
I
began
to
be
concerned
that
I
was
actually
moving.
Voters,
behavior
and
I
think
that
they've
largely
been
resolute
and
what
shouldn't
should
not
be
done
so
yeah.
It
was
a
great
pointers
thing.
That's
one
of
our
takeaways
here
is
that
I'm
sure
the
subreddit
may
explode
with
trolls
and
people
that
are
synthetically
enraged
for
some
reason.
A
B
B
C
C
It's
usually
centered
around
one
dollar,
or
at
least
it
has
been
for
the
past.
That's
a
couple
of
weeks
lasts
four
or
five
days
it's
been
pushed
up
slightly,
actually,
which
is
very
contrary
to
what
we
would
expect
and
I
think
this
kind
of
speaks
to
what
rich
was
alluding
to,
which
is
dye.
Price,
is
actually
fairly
well
supported
compared
to
what
we
would
have
expected
with
what's
been
going
on
with
price.
C
C
The
majority
of
the
volume
has
been
on
Oasis,
there's
a
slightly
higher
bump
for
DDX
right
now,
that's
just
a
blip
and
then
Eunice
WAP
has
actually
been
holding
fairly
steady
as
a
pretty
big
place
for
your
tie
to
be
treated
as
well,
so
to
just
touch
on
what's
been
going
on
with
the
price.
So
you
know,
like
I,
said.
C
C
Sorry
about
that
yeah
so
where
I
just
kind
of
left
off
was
the
dye
price,
as
mentioned,
had
been
coming
up
fairly
steadily,
and
there
is
that
significant
event
a
couple
weeks
ago
and
since
then
things
have
actually
been
pretty
quiet,
which
is
interesting
because
things
have
been
all
but
quiet
with
eath
price
I
feel.
So
this
decision
to
drop
the
stability
fee
was
very
recent
and
usually
we
don't
see
the
effect
of
the
stability
fee,
change
on
price
and
supply
until
a
little
bit
afterwards.
C
So
we
do
have
to
still
wait
and
see
to
make
any
conclusions
from
that,
but
initial
signs
are
actually
much
quieter
than
expected.
So
that's
good
news
I
feel
a
little
bit
noisy,
so
I'll
just
take
off
a
couple
of
these
lines,
so
you
know
the
volume
weighted
average.
The
simple
moving
volume
weighted
average
has
been
kind
of
consistently
rising
over
time,
as
dye
is
now
kind
of
proof
that
it
can
punch
up
about
the
peg.
C
Similarly,
eath
price
has
been
making
like
basically
tracking
those
exact
movements.
So,
what's
really
interesting
is
a
lot
of
the
relationship
that
we'd
seen
in
the
past
between
eath
and
dye
has
actually
fairly
reversed
over
the
past
few
weeks,
and
that's
something
else
that
that
I
think
we
should
discuss
in
terms
of
what's
been
going
on
with
drawers,
wipes
and
supply.
C
C
Around
81
million
the
there's
been
a
lot
of
movement
in
dye,
but
the
supply
has
not
changed
significantly,
so
that's
something
that
I
want
to
touch
on
in
a
bit
because
just
scroll
back
up
for
a
second
the
volume,
the
sort
of
daily
volume
has
been
significantly
higher
in
the
past
two-three
weeks
than
it
had
been
for
the
past
two-three
months,
but
the
supply
is
held
relatively
steady
and
I.
Think
a
lot
of
a
lot
of
the
activity
that's
been
on
die
recently
has
actually
been
on
all
of
these
secondary
markets.
C
So
I
think
that's
a
topic
for
us
to
explore
further
and
start
to
talk
about
a
bit
more.
The
age
of
debt,
as
mentioned
prior,
has
come
down
significantly
in
the
past
couple
of
weeks.
This
speaks
to
an
increased
circulation
in
loans.
So
you
know,
as
we
said,
more
loans
being
paid
back
and
some
newer
loans
being
taken
out,
but
as
you
can
see
from
the
supply,
that
kind
of
effect
has
balanced
out
between
the
two.
So
that's.
C
I
would
call
it
healthy,
I
think
you
need,
and
and
I've
kind
of
championed
this
idea
a
few
times.
I
think
you
need
that
circulation
of
debt
to
a
it's
just
good,
for
setting
expectations
in
terms
of
fees
that
have
been
realized
versus,
not
which
is
always
just
a
risk
to
keep
in
mind
and
then
B
I
think,
as
those
kind
of
costs
are
realized
and
affected
in
the
short
term.
C
I
think
that's
healthier
in
the
sense
that
if
there's
a
19.5%
stability
fee
and
people
are
kind
of
ignoring
it
and
putting
it
out
of
mind
because
their
long-term
leverage
and
they're
not
worrying
about
it.
You
know
until
two,
three,
four
or
five
months
later,
you
can
potentially
get
into
some
dangerous
economic
scenarios.
Well,.
E
E
D
E
C
So
there
is
the
potential
sign
of
this
like
starting
to
slow
and
level
out
now,
which
I
think
is
to
be
expected.
So
I
don't
want
to
make
too
many
conclusions
off
of
tiny,
tiny
data
windows,
but
what
I
would
start
to
expect
and
I
think
you
know
we
might
see-
is
that
this
age
will
kind
of
level
out
into
roughly
like
an
equilibrium
point
and
so
I
think
there
will
be
this
moving
equilibrium
point
for
a
given
supply
level
right,
so
481
million
died.
C
We
would
expect
over
time
there
shouldn't
be
significant
movements
in
the
average
age
of
die.
There
should
be
some
sort
of
rough
equilibrium
for
how
often
people
draw
out
loans
and
pay
loans
back
I
think
what
we've
seen
is
a
lot
of
just
experiment
scale,
a
lot
of
choppy
movements
in
the
age
of
debt
and
a
lot
of
increases
and
sudden
drops
that
to
me
is
what
I
would
consider
unhealthy
behavior,
because
that's
kind
of
the
system
constantly
in
flux
and
a
lot
of
major
stage
changes
yep.
What's.
C
C
And
I
think
that's
a
good
point
to
consider
and
probably
more
of
a
decision
point
unless
of
a
data
point
is
what's
the
right
relationship
between
price
movements
and
the
state
of
maker
Dow,
because
in
the
past
I
think
a
lot
of
the
state
has
been
kind
of
bullied
by
price
movements,
but
what's
happening
recently,
which
is
odd,
but
potentially
healthy
is
a
little
bit
more
immunity
to
some
of
those
price
movements
in
terms
of
what
these
equilibrium
points
are
for.
I
supply
ford.
C
So
I'm
gonna
skip
over
the
compound
section
here
for
a
second,
because
I'll
talk
about
that
in
a
different
context,
but
the
percentage
of
new
versus
old
died
I
mean
a.
We
can
talk
about
this,
but
I
think
just
the
amount
of
die
being
drawn
out
has
been
relatively
low
lately,
and
this
is
this
line
is
kind
of
dropped
down,
but
to
a
fairly
stable
level
so
effectively.
C
So
the
collateral
is
another
really
interesting
topic,
especially
with
regards
to
a
lot
of
the
eath
price
movements,
because
you
know
there
have
been
a
few
large
sort
of
collateral
removal
events
that
have
coincided
with
a
few
large
increases
in
eath
price,
which
is
kind
of
an
interesting
relationship.
If
you
think
about
it,
because
what
we
would
generally
expect
is
this
collateralization
ratio
to
hold
relatively
steady
in
the
past.
It
has
held
relatively
steady,
but
with
the
May
sort
of
crypto
spring
or
whatever.
C
The
proper
term
is
that
collateralization
ratio
shot
up
and
is
actually
kind
of
wavered
around
this
530
percent
line,
despite
a
few
large
events
in
terms
of
eath
being
taken
out.
So
you
know,
as
eath
price
appreciates
people
decide,
hey
I,
don't
need
to
keep
as
much
collateral
in
the
system.
I
feel
fairly
safe.
So
I,
can
you
know
back
out
of
some
of
that
capital
cost
as
opposed
to
what
had
happened
in
the
past,
a
bit
which
is,
as
eath
price
had
run
up.
C
People
had
kind
of
kept
that
buffer
and
then
taking
that
as
a
signal
to
draw
more
dye
out
of
the
system.
So
what
I'm
just
saying
is:
that's
a
slightly
different
response
to
the
same
same
stimuli,
so
that
suggests
that
the
nature
of
the
system
has
changed
a
bit,
and
so
what
I
think
this
actually
speaks
to
a
lot?
More
is
the
actual
effect
of
the
stability
fee
and
some
of
the
economics
that
have
been
discovered,
I
guess
I
would
say,
with
a
lot
of
these
secondary
lending
markets.
C
I
mean
you've
heard,
probably
anecdotally,
that
dy/dx
has
experienced
significant
volume
and
there's
been
a
lot
more
refinancing
to
some
of
these
secondary
platforms
and
I.
Think
people
are
starting
to
see
them
as
more
of
a
viable
place
to
get
dye
and
I.
Think
as
the
demand
for
dye
increases
like
those
are
basically
an
efficiency
function.
So
let's
say
the
demand
for
dye.
Is
you
know,
roughly
70
million
and
there's
sort
of
this
10
million
buffer
over
supply?
C
If
that
can
get
eaten
up
through
a
lot
of
lending
on
secondary
markets,
then
what
you
could
actually
see
is
a
more
close
tracking
between
dye
supply
and
dye
price.
So
you
know
if
the
demand
for
dye
significantly
increased,
you
would
have
less
of
this
buffer
of
living
on
maker
and
I
think
a
lot
more
on
these
secondary
lending
platforms,
and
so
you
could
see
a
more
immediate
effect
from
changes
in
demand.
C
B
C
Not
the
high
collateralization
ratio,
but
the
increased
activity
of
people
moving
a
lot
of
these
loans
to
secondary
markets
when
the
rates
are
cheaper.
That
because
that's
that
sensible,
behavior,
that's
efficiency,
and
so
it
doesn't
make
sense
to
me
why
you
would
draw
dye
from
maker
when
the
rate
is
higher
and
so
there's
always
been
kind
of
this
buffer
between
the
maker
rate
and
the
rate
on
these
secondary
lending
platforms.
C
B
B
C
B
C
Currently,
yes,
so
what
I
was
saying
was
in
the
past,
there
was
kind
of
a
more
risk
seeking
behavior
and
then
B
I
think
this
was
just
kind
of
once
burned.
Twice
shy,
type
of
situation
where
there
were
and
I
can
I
had
shown
this
in
the
past,
but
I
took
it
off
of
here,
so
the
site
would
load
faster,
a
fair
amount
of
liquidations,
and
so
when
eath
price
volatility
is
significant
and
then
there
is
a
large
quantity
of
liquidations.
C
Naturally,
you
would
see
a
rise
in
collateralization
ratio,
because
people
sort
of
smarten
up
or
get
scared
of
getting
liquidated
or
what's
entry
is
more
recently.
This
kind
of
relationship
between
the
stability
fee
increases
the
dye
supply
coming
down
a
bit
and
the
collateralization
ratio
increasing
and
an
eighth
price
running
up
only
in
the
last
month
or
so
right.
So
this
this
kind
of
rise
has
predated
the
the
most
recent
bull
run
in
eath
crisis.
C
Now
what
I'm
saying
is
in
part,
there
is
a
bit
of
a
risk
aversion
in
the
sense
that
as
eath
price
comes
up
people
imagine
the
you
know:
potential
energies
higher,
there's
a
greater
height
to
fall
from,
and
so
they
do
want
to
keep
to
some
extent
that
buffer.
But
what
we
had
kind
of
been
scared
of,
I,
think
or
would
have
been.
A
potential
concern
in
the
past
couple
of
weeks
was
with
this
significant
buffer
of
collateralization
ratio
and
a
large
quantity
of
dye
that
we
know
was
purchased
in
exchange
for
eath.
C
What's
interesting
is,
and
it
may
be,
a
function
of
the
fact
that
if
price
has
been
increasing
and
the
other
shoe
is
not
yet
dropped,
that's
entirely
possible
or
it
may
be
a
function
of
these
like
loan
refinancings,
it's
very
hard
to
say,
but
we
have
not
seen
that,
like
large
quantity
of
dye
getting
flooded
into
the
market
and
dye
price
dropping,
which
was
definitely
a
concern
and
the
the
other
piece
is
that
this
sort
of
buffer
and
collateral
has
been
maintained.
But
as
eath
price,
like
I
said,
as
these
prices
come
up.
C
B
Another
interesting
aspect
is
that
the
lending
market
for
eath
is
not
nearly
as
active
or
profitable
as
it
is
for
dye.
So
I
mean
all
this
all
this
all
this
surplus
eath
that
CDP
owners
have
locked
and
locked
into
the
system.
It's
not
like
they
can
take
it
out
and
earn
kind
of
that
10
to
15%
that
you
could
get
for
dye
on
other
platforms
when.
B
C
But
but
I
think
that's
that's
exactly
what
I
was
gonna
say
was
yes,
you're
not
gonna,
get
a
huge
yield
for
eath,
but
you
could
totally
dump
it
into
another
platform,
use
it
as
collateral
and
draw
out
US,
DC
or
Die,
or
something
else,
and
then
try
to
construct
another
trade
off
that
to
get
some
yield
so
a.
Why
aren't
people
doing
that?
C
A
great
question
I
think
to
some
extent
there's
a
lot
of
uncertainty
in
what
that
potential
yield
by
might
be,
especially
when
people
have
to
go
through
multiple
steps
of
exchanging
currency,
a
to
currency,
B
to
currency,
C
and
then
B
I
think
to
some
extent
people
want
to
maintain-
and
it's
you
know,
kind
of
hard
to
explain,
demand
mechanics,
especially
when
we
don't
have
like
a
lot
of
spotlight
on
the
demand
sources
at
the
moment,
but
like
why
would
you
maintain
80
million
died
in
maker
at
a
nineteen
point?
Five.
C
Seventeen
point
five
now
percent
interest
rate
when
you
could
maintain
roughly
the
same
thing
in
compound
for
fourteen
or
fifteen
percent.
That's
an
important
question
for
us
to
consider
is:
why
is
there
even
the
dye
supply
that
currently
exists?
What
is
it
about
maker
that
is
the
differentiator
that
people
prefer
dye
from
maker
versus
dye
from
another
source
and
I?
Think
whatever?
C
So
it
seems
that
compound
v2
is
one
source
where
and
they
don't
have
dy/dx
in
here,
which
is
another
platform.
That's
been
on
the
rise
in
the
past
week
or
two,
but
what
we
seen
is
you
know
roughly
the
same
amount
of
dye
being
pulled
out
of
maker
versus
compound,
so
it
seems
that
some
of
the
new
dye
that
would
normally
have
been
drawn
out
in
this
particular
type
of
market
scenario
is
being
drawn
out
from
other
platforms
and
not
maker,
which
contributes
to
part
of
the
reason
why
some
of
that
supply
has
held
steady.
A
E
E
The
fact
that
it's
cheaper
in
a
secondary
lending
platform,
at
least
from
my
perspective,
implies
the
maker
rate
is
overpriced
for
where
it
should
be
today
and
what
we
see
it
kind
of
on
a
synthetic
number
that
it's
we're
trying
to
get
to
the
peg,
we're
at
the
peg,
we're
at
19
and
a
half
or
17
and
a
half
and
1
a.m.
and
there
are
secondary
markets
that
are
cheaper,
so
that
Delta
that
$10,000,000
Delta,
the
theoretical
10
million
dollar
gap.
E
It's
a
question
of
when
not
if,
but
when
people
decide
to
refinance
their
CVPs
with
more
cost
cheaper
loans
per
se,
but
it
still
can
only
be
created
and
destroyed
with
one
system.
It's
it's
it's
a
natural
arbitrage.
We
will
get
to
that
harmony
of
70
million.
If
that's
actually
the
demand
number
and
then
once
we
do
yeah
and
once
we
do,
the
maker
rates
will
be
on
par
with
the
secondary
lending
platform.
E
It's
almost
it's
kind
of
the
corollary
of
having
of
having
Oh
Al
Groh
algorithmic
trades,
where
they
in
effect
put
each
other
out
of
business,
because
you
have
everybody
trying
to
fight
to
capture
a
millionth
of
a
pen,
a
ten
thousandth
of
a
penny,
and
then
it
turns
into
1/100
of
thousandth
of
a
penny.
It's
the
same
model
except
this
is
so
slow,
at
least
to
my
eyes,
could
be
totally
wrong.
E
A
It's
also,
ultimately,
it's
a
question
of
supply.
Right,
like
oh,
the
dye
only
comes
out
of
a
CDP,
and
this
secondary
lending.
The
dye
available
to
be
dropped
into
compound
will
dry
up
at
some
point
and
the
only
place
to
get
more
dye
will
be
a
CDP
right.
So
we're
going
to
hit
that
lower
bound
where
the
premium
on
pulling
it
out
of
the
maker
Dow
is
going
to
be
unavoidable.
A
C
So
that's
that's
actually,
a
point
that
I
wanted
to
touch
on
is
I
agree
with
what
Matthews
saying
in
terms
of
the
relationship
is
always
going
to
be
that
kind
of
generator
point
and
these
secondary
lending
platforms.
What
I
was
saying
earlier
do
create
kind
of
this
efficiency
buffer,
in
the
sense
that
if
dye
is
overpriced
on
maker,
there's
that
arbitrage
opportunity
on
the
secondary
lending
platforms,
and
so
it
helps
people
obtain
dye
at
the
rate
that
they
really
want
to
obtain
it.
But
there
is
definitely
a
like
structural
question
of.
C
Kind
of
being
this
almost
UI
layer
to
consumers
where
they
go
and
get
that
cheaper
rate.
I,
don't
think
those
two
scenarios
are
the
same
thing
and
in
the
event
that
you
just
have
maker-
and
you
don't
have
kind
of
these
significant
buffer
volumes
on
these
secondary
lending
platforms,
you
could
run
into
the
potential
scenario
where
you're
kind
of
exposed
to
the
price
movements
again
and
age.
Significant
change
in
each
price
bullies
the
dye
supply
on
labor
again
and
that
could
have
serious
ramifications
for
dye
price
I.
E
C
I
totally
agree
that
soon
so
there's
a
question
of
like
and
I
agree,
I
think
it's
a
really
good
point
to
point
out
that
it's
kind
of
a
makeshift
macgyvered
version
of
the
DSR,
which
is
I,
think
a
very
interesting
take,
but
yeah
there's
a
question
of
whether
or
not
that's
a
bad
thing.
I,
don't
think
it
necessarily
is
I.
Think
it
in
the
absence
of
a
savings
rate,
does
lend
an
additional
stability
layer
to
maker
and
I.
Think
it
is,
you
know,
from
a
biological
standpoint,
I
think
it's
cropped
up
for
a
reason.
C
A
lot
of
these
platforms
have
popped
up.
They've
gained
significant
traction
because
there
is
a
real
place
for
them
in
the
market
and
there
is
a
need
for
it,
especially
in
the
absence
of
the
stability
stability,
savings
right,
okay,
sorry
and
I.
Don't
want
to
eat
up
too
much
time,
so
I
just
want
to
punch
through
the
the
secondary
lending
stats.
Real
quick,
so
what's
interesting
to
also
note
is
repayments,
so
this
speaks
to
a
lot
of
what
I've
been
talking
about.
C
There
are
more
repayments,
so
you
know
if
there
are
similar
amounts
of
draws
from
maker
versus
compound
and
there
are
more
repayments
on
maker
versus
compound.
Then
that
tells
you
you
know
what's
going
in
is
coming
out
the
other
end,
and
there
is
this
kind
of
measurable
refinancing
from
maker
to
compound
at
the
very
least,
and
this
is
not
updated
to
include
UI
DX,
but
when
we
look
at
the
UI,
DX
I
think
you'll
see
a
similar
effect.
There.
C
A
That
we
have
Matthew
coming
in
for
his
third
of
the
week,
but
there
was
a
significant
number
of
questions
for
you
fish.
Maybe
we
should
tackle
those
at
the
top
of
the
hour
and
syrus.
How
do
you
actually
want
to
play
it?
The
last
15
minutes
we
have
left.
You
want
to
do
the
risk.
The
collateral
stuff
after
10
looks.
D
B
D
B
E
I
mean
so
basically
it.
This
is
just
a
continuation
from
you
know
the
four
actually
from
last
weekend.
Its
relates
back
to
how
we
can
start
putting
together
a
machine,
learning
and
PID
pieces
of
this
so
I'm,
starting
to
work
starting
to
kind
of
assemble
a
community-driven
movement
are
a
team
about
what
we
can
do
to
put
together
a
working
group
to
optimize
this
and
it
you
know
it's
in
many
ways.
It's
very
similar
and
I
kind
of
wrote
about
this.
E
Whether
or
not
it's
a
stability
fee
that
causes
or
destroys
supply
and
the
same
thing
with
the
DSR,
both
of
them
have
corresponding
effects
and
how
that
can
be
treated
to
the
corollary
of
you
know,
wind,
and
how
that
what
other
pieces
cause
a
correction
to
cause
an
algorithm
to
keep
the
car
more
or
less?
In
the
lane-
and
we
have
all
sorts
of
I
guess
data
points
and
you
know
there's
no
shortage
of
the
data.
E
The
question
really
is:
what
is
the
correlation
on
the
data
and
how
we
can
pull
those
in
on
both
the
dye
price,
the
eath
price,
anything
that
could
be
corollary
that
can
cause
wind
per
se
that
can
include
Bitcoin
and
this.
This
kind
of
this,
this
notion
of
how
how
many
inputs
you
put
in
there
allow
us
to
kind
of
abstract
away,
not
necessarily
predict,
because
I
don't
want
to
get
in
the
mode
of
forecasting.
E
It's
more
of
you
know
historic
associations
that,
let's
just
for
as
an
example,
you
know
if
we
can
find
a
way-
and
this
is
you
know
hypothetical,
but
if
we
can
get
the
data
from
on
from
fiat
on
ramps
that
are
pulling
data,
excuse
me
pulling
fiat
into
an
exchange,
let's
say
coinbase
or
send
wire
just
of
the
gross
dollar
amounts.
It's
kind
of
the
corollary
of
saying
you
know.
E
Is
there
a
storm
building
doesn't
mean
anything's
going
to
happen,
but
then
we
can
start
to
see
if
there's
wind
and
what
kind
of
impact
that
would
have
on
keeping
the
car
in
the
lane
all
of
those
things
if
we
optimize
them
and
that
that
stuff
takes
time.
So
this
is
a
full-on
shout
out
to
any
AWS
engineer
that
understands
AWS
inside
and
out
that
does
machine
learning.
Please
contact
us
put
it
in
reddit
and
let's
start
the
discussion
of
how
we
can
implement
that.
A
Okay,
cool
thanks,
Matthew
yeah,
and
let's
continue
that
discussion
in
the
link
that
I've
hosted
in
situ
and
and
the
discussion
thread
for
the
call,
because
this
is
part
of
a
larger
initiative
that
we're
exploring
and
that's
Cyprus
I'm,
not
gonna,
speak
for
you,
but
I
just
said:
I'm
not
going,
but
I
going
to
wear
intensely
interested
in
attracting
talent
from
the
community.
That's
it's
been
pretty
filtered
and
pre-selected
and
presort
it's
and
we
have.
We
have
the
talent
here.
A
B
I
think
just
maybe
the
main
takeaway
for
me
was
the
static
dye
supply.
It's
been
some
stuck
at
80
million
for
quite
some
time
now,
despite
the
huge
ether
alley
and
so
I
think
warrants
some
revisiting
of
our
earlier
hypothesis
from
a
few
months
ago
about
the
negative
correlation
between
guy
price
and
eath
price
and
potentially
looking
at
some
alternative
indicators
such
as
eath
price
sentiment,
which
is
more
of
a
relative
relative
metric,
as
opposed
to
an
absolute
number
and
I.
Think.
B
D
Thing
one
thing
up:
David's
one
thing
I
just
want
to
put
out
there
is
that
on
the
OTC
angle,
which
we
don't
have
a
lot
of
stuff
on
here,
is
that
it's
getting
a
little
harder
to
source
big
blocks
of
dye,
and
this
is
coming
from
some
of
the
major
OTC
desk.
Where,
where
you
want
to
buy
two
million,
three
million
die
it's
getting
a
little
more
difficult.
B
C
Go
ahead,
I'm,
not
100%
sure
that
that's
concerning
so
what's
what's
I
think
is
a
good
data
point.
It's
helpful
to
understand.
What's
going
on
in
the
OTC
side,
I
think
that
lines
up
with
what
I've
been
observing
on
unis
walk,
for
example
where-
and
this
is
a
bit
anecdotal
I-
don't
have
the
data
on
this
just
yet,
but
I
think
smaller
trades
than
prior
effect.
More
changes
in
the
exchange
rate
on
you
know
swap
so
I
think,
there's
less
liquidity
and
that
I
could
I
can
go,
look
at
the
liquidity
pool
and
check
on.
C
If
you
kind
of
think
about
that,
there's
this
margin
or
this
buffer
that
exists
between
where
the
supply
is
and
where
the
demand
is
and
I
think
what's
been
going
on
lately,
is
that
the
demand
has
been
able
to
rise
and
that
margin
has
been
able
to
narrow
with
the
same
supply
levels.
Whereas
in
the
past
there
is
a
larger
margin
between
those
two
and
so
changes
in
demand.
Levels
affected
greater
changes
in
supply,
and
so
that's
that's
kind
of
my
sense
of
what's
going
on
at
the
moment.
C
So
if
this
continues
and
I
think
that's
not
necessarily
bad
is
my
point,
because
what
that
means
is
you
can
have
a
theoretically
more
efficient
supply
that
tracks
to
demand
a
bit
better
now,
as
demand
in.
If
demand
continues
to
increase,
then
you
would
see
an
increase
in
supply.
If
that
hypothesis
is
correct,
so
I
would
just
say:
I'm
I,
don't
think
it's
necessarily
a
bad
thing.
D
E
E
In
a
world
where
the
secondary
lending
rates
are
lower
than
the
stability
fee,
if
we
get
to
be
the
other
way
around,
then
it
is
concerning.
If
we
have,
for
whatever
reason,
the
secondary
rates
would
be
higher,
which
I
can't
imagine
that,
but
imagine
they
were,
and
we
had
a
underlying
price
rally
in
the
collateral
and
we
didn't
see
a
die
outstanding
increase
and
yeah
there'd
be
an
issue.
You
know.
C
That
would
be
a
very
strange
economic
situation
and
I
think
we
really
want
to
be
cognizant
of
that
buffer
for
not
for
the
purposes
of
setting
the
stability
fee,
but
of
just
understanding
the
dynamics
of.
What's
going
on
being
aware
of
how
thin
that
margin
is
between
secondary
lending
rates
and
the
stability
fee,
because
I
think
it
probably
and
is
very
hard
for
me
to
say
from
like
a
scientific
standpoint,
but
it
probably
tracks
fairly
close
between
the
buffer
between
demand
and
supply.
B
So,
as
you
guys
all
know,
cloud
or
risk
will
at
least
slowly
start
to
filter
its
way
into
these
discussions,
for
a
variety
of
reasons,
primarily,
obviously,
because
we
are
in
the
we're
on
the
cusp
of
multi
collateral
die,
and
there
is
a
lot
to
unpack
there
and
monetary
policy,
at
least
for
the
very
current
time,
is
doing.
Okay,
so
I'm
just
going
to
kind
of
give
a
brief
introduction
of
how
I'm
thinking
about
it
or
how
we're
all
thinking
about
it.
B
Internally
and
I
want
to
emphasize
that,
just
like
the
monetary
policy
discussions,
we're
hoping
that
these
primarily
take
place,
offline,
reddit,
social
media
and
so
forth.
We
want
to
just
try
to
seed
ideas
here
and
in
some
respects
it's
actually
more
important,
because
the
monetary
policy
is
somewhat
of
a
reactionary
process
where
we
are
just
looking
at
the
dye
price
and
adjusting
the
stability
for
you
one
way
or
another,
but
with
the
collateral
risk.
There
is
definitely
some
more
forward
thinking
that's
required.
We
definitely
want
to
jump
ahead
of
some
of
the
risks
involved.
B
So
to
start,
there's
gonna
be
a
lot
of
groundwork
that
we're
gonna
have
to
lay
here
on
this
call
and
basically,
over
the
coming
weeks,
a
lot
of
operational
aspects
to
discuss
we're
gonna
have
to
start
exploring
questions
such
as
what
kind
of
risks
specifically
are
we
looking
for,
and
how
do
we
quantify
them?
How
do
we
blend
a
fundamental
analysis
and
the
quantitative,
modeling
and
all
manners
of
how
to
build
out
the
collateral
portfolio
and
maintain
it?
Additionally,
there's
going
to
be
a
lot
of
governance
issues
at
play,
the
risk
teams
their
incentives?
B
As
a
primer,
I
would
suggest
everybody
rereads
Stephens
three
risk
documents,
they
were
phenomenal
and
they
really
set
the
tone
for
the
scientific
approach
that
we
have
been
emphasizing
for
the
past
year.
A
lot
of
our
risk
discussions
will
be
framed
in
that
context.
We're
also
working
on
some
follow-up
documentation
as
well
and
yeah
I.
Think
in
general.
We're
gonna
try
to
keep
this
as
an
open
discussion.
Maybe
have
a
light
structure
in
place.
I'm
gonna
pause
here
for
questions.
B
Okay,
cool
so
basically,
I
think
the
overarching
picture
here
is:
how
do
we
get
from
inputs
to
outputs
right?
How
do
we
take
a
collateral
and
then
figure
out
what
its
risk
parameters
are?
Debt
ceiling
stability
all
that
stuff
and
there's
issues
of
factoring
in
the
qualitative
aspects
of
the
collateral.
Essentially,
what
is
it?
B
E
Have
a
question
is:
is
the
is
it
planned
for
the
die
savings
rate
to
be
uniform
across
I
know?
You
mentioned,
the
stability
fee
will
be
different
depending
on
the
collateral
type.
If
I
understand
it
correctly
is
that
is
the
savings
rate
planning
to
be
uniform
across
all
assets,
all
collateral
types.
D
B
So
I
think
I
think
we're
gonna
have
to
start
releasing
some
high-level
overviews
and
outlines
of
kind
of
a
end-to-end
life
cycle
of
these
risk
models
and
then
just
approach
it
step
by
step.
I
think
it
makes
sense
to
actually
just
redo
an
analysis
on
eath
from
the
ground
up,
maybe
optimize
some
of
the
current
parameters
that
we
have
in
place.
I
think,
for
example,
the
collateralization
ratio
and
debt
ceilings
and
so
forth.
D
So
what
about
assets
like
the
difference
between
bringing
in
something
like
TUSD
versus
a
yuna,
swap
liquidity
pool,
like
ones
ones,
trust
lists,
and
we
can
see
all
the
contracts.
One
is
totally
opaque
unless
you
start
getting.
Lawyers
involved
and
looking
at
bank
accounts
and
stuff
like
that
right.
B
There
there's
there's
going
to
be
discussions
and
methodologies
in
place
for,
basically
all
all
manners
of
risk-
including
you
know,
one
of
the
one
of
the
primary
differentiators
between
a
lot
of
crypto
assets-
is
whether
or
not
their
bearer
assets
or
not.
Obviously,
eath
is
extremely
trustless
and
extremely
easy
to
fizzle,
facilitate
through
the
keeper
options
and
and
whatnot
and
there's
gonna,
be
some
extra
steps
involved
for
security
tokens
or
regulated
registered
assets
are.
B
So
security
tokens
is
probably
something
that
we
should
discuss
a
little
bit
further
down
the
line,
just
given
its
added
complexity
and
given
a
lot
of
the
legal
uncertainty
so
in
terms
of
implement
operationally
how
it's
done
is
actually
a
bit
of
an
open
question,
there's
obviously
a
lot
of
security.
Token
issuers
out
there
and
I
believe
they
all
have
kind
of
their
own
unique
way
of
handling
these
situations.
So
we're
just
gonna
have
to
kind
of
pour
through
it
carefully
and
understand
it
and
take
it
from
there.
B
C
Well,
question
you're
talking
about
kind
of
sort
of
a
fundamental
analysis
of
different
assets,
but
how
do
you
sort
of
think
about
not
like
an
asset
as
a
single
static
monolith,
but
also
is
kind
of
like
a
moving
sum
of
pieces,
so
in
particular
I'm
thinking
about
like
order
books,
trades
liquidity,
like
the
the
value
or
the
price
of
an
asset,
is
one
thing
and
then
what's
realized
on
the
market
through
actual
trades
and
through
like
real
life.
Real
time,
liquidity
on
the
order
books
is
a
very
different
thing.
C
B
B
And
yet,
if
you
have
that
long
tail
of
very
illiquid
assets
where
you
try
to
sell,
you
know
ten
thousand
dollars
of
XYZ
coin,
and
you
only
end
up
with
two
thousand
dollars,
then,
essentially,
what
what
that
builds
into
is
the
is
the
collateralization
ratio,
which
is
actually
primarily
a
function
of
how
much
slippage
you
will
you
will
incur
during
the
liquidation,
which
is
exactly
why
I
think
in
certain
cases
the
the
eath
parameters
can
be
optimized,
we've
had
hundreds
of
liquidations
and
they
never
once
went
below.
They
never
once
incurred
bad
debt
right.
C
That's
a
good
point
I,
so
this
kind
of
was
the
reason
that
I
originally
brought
up
some
of
the
asset
interactions,
because
the
liquidity
of
an
asset
is
not
like
specific
to
that
asset.
It's
specific
to
pairs,
and
so
you
know
like
dye.
Eath
liquidity
may
be
fairly
strong,
but
dying
USD
liquidity
may
be
lower,
and
so
you
know
there's
there's
kind
of
that
question
of
how
do
you
then
start
to
think
about
what
are
the
pathways
for
exit
for
a
given
asset
and,
like
you
just
do
like
a
blended
weighted
average
er
right.
B
So
I
mean
obviously
all
of
our
options
are
against
the
dye
pair
right,
but
I
think
for
practical
purposes.
You
can
assume
that
that
arbitrage
situation,
you
can
use
the
USD
markets
as
a
proxy
for
liquidity,
whereas
you
probably
wouldn't
use
the
Bitcoin
base
pairs
as
a
proxy,
although
I
mean,
if
you
really
wanted
to
get
deep
enough
into
the
analysis,
we
could
but
I
just
suspect
that
for
most
assets
the
USD
pair
should.
B
C
D
B
B
You
can
envision
in
a
kind
of
a
distant
future
when
crypto
markets
are
more
mature
and
there
are
more
collateral
assets
than
maker
dower,
the
maker
risk
teams
can
reasonably
evaluate.
We
can
outsource
that
to
professional
services
or
actually
those
professionals
were
essentially
are
the
the
future
vision
of
risk
teams.
B
You
would,
in
the
traditional
world,
pay
these
ratings
services
for
their
analysis,
maker,
Dow
might
or
likely
will
have
the
ability
to
compensate
analysts
for
their
services
as
well,
so
so
it
becomes,
it
becomes
a
bit
tricky
with.
Do
you
just
want
a
an
objective
evaluation
of
a
collateral
asset,
or
do
you
also
want
a
kind
of
a
risk?
Evaluation
and
incentives?
Incentives
definitely
come
into
play
here,
because
you
want
everybody
to
be
on
the
same
page
for
sure.
B
C
That
kind
of
begs
the
the
next
natural
question,
which
is:
how
are
those
analyses
and
how's
that
information
presented
to
the
community?
How
does
the
information
disseminate,
especially
with
regards
to
like
presumably
a
very
long
term,
project,
around
building
these
collateral
asset
models,
to
what
extent,
if
the
community
kept
looped
in
and
how
does
that
information
shared
right.
B
So
the
way
I'm
looking
at
it
is
kind
of
a
just
some
sort
of
step
by
step.
Evaluation
process
typically
just
starts
with
the
classification
of
the
asset.
Basically,
what
is
it?
Is
it
o
bearer,
acid
or
security
token?
Is
it
a
work
token
governess
token
utility
token
right,
there's
some
pretty
decent
established
theory
around
various
token
models
and
the
value
that
they
subjectively
have
so
first
step
is
just
kind
of
pegging
it
down
on
what
kind
of
asset
it
is
I
think
the
next
step
is
creating
some
sort
of
due
diligence
model.
B
Fundamental
evaluation,
maybe
even
create
a
numerical
evaluation
model
to
give
em
care
holders.
Some
notion
of
what
this
asset
is
actually
worth
just
think
back
to
the
height
of
the
bull
market
and
in
2017.
Would
you
accept
the
collateral
asset?
That's
market
prices,
three
billion
dollars
when,
according
to
the
valuation
theory,
it
should
pretty
much
be
worth
zero
right
kind
of
no
risk
parameter
will
protect
you
against
situations
like
that,
so
yeah.
B
Technical
risk,
legal
risks,
operational
risk
from
the
team
contract
risk
bugs
back
doors,
all
sorts
of
all
sorts
of
things,
and
and
these
these
kind
of
edge
case
risks
will
basically
build
into
the
risk
premium
for
that
collateral
asset
just
think
about.
If
someone
were
to
someone
took
a
loan
from
you
and
they
put
up
tether
as
collateral,
you
probably
charge
them
a
pretty
high
interest
rate,
given
the
risk
associated
with
it,
and
that's
just
purely
qualitative
risks.
B
C
So,
just
one,
maybe
more
of
a
thought,
less
of
a
question
is
if
we
consider
kind
of
the
different
types
of
price
movements
that
lead
to
different
types
of
risks
in
the
system.
For
example,
if
an
asset
is
hacked,
there's
a
sudden,
immediate,
Black
Swan
event,
that's
a
driver
risk.
If
an
asset
we
know
is,
you
know
something
happens
to
the
dev
team,
etc.
It's
fundamental
value
drops
and
the
price
drops
slowly
and
consistently
over
time.
C
That's
a
different
type
of
risk
versus
if
it's
fairly
stable
over
time,
but
it's
very
volatile,
that's
again
and
yet
another
different
type
of
risk.
So
how
are
we
thinking
about
sort
of
building
a
taxonomy
of
these
different
types
of
risks
and
communicating
that
and
organizing
that
information,
yeah.
B
B
That's
that
has
a
reputation
or
credit
score
attached
to
it,
and
essentially
everything
comes
down
to
trying
to
model
out
the
probability
that
the
CDP
is
liquidated
and
then
a
conditional
loss
distribution,
given
that
the
CDP
has
been
liquidated
so
and
that,
then,
that
will
kind
of
factor
in
that
that
tail
risk
you're.
Just
mentioning.
C
C
E
C
That's
were
a
lot
of
the
like
order,
books
and
the
trades
and
liquidity
come
in
because
I
was
thinking
about.
You
know
if
asset,
a
50%
of
the
CDP's
are
liquidated
and
there's
a
huge
sale
in
asset,
a
denominated
in
dye
or
an
asset
B,
and
then
asset
B
is
also
liquidated
to
like
a
30%
extent.
What
is
that?
How
much
does
that
change
right?
We're
also
you're
able
to
get
yeah.
B
You
could
they're
they're
kind
of
several
different
ways
of
doing
it.
One
is
you
could
just
look
at
historical,
historical
data
if
you're
looking
at
loans,
if
you
look
at
historical
default
frequencies
drilling
it
claw,
toe
assets,
look
at
the
price
history
and
fourth
or
you
could
even
separately
approach
it
from
kind
of
an
options
framework
and
look
at
market
implied.
B
Cdf
spreads
market
implied
volatilities
and
build-out
models
that
way
the
bad
news
for
crypto
is
that
we
don't
have
any
of
that
stuff,
but
the
good
news
is
that
all
crypto
is
correlated
anyways,
so
we
don't
actually
for
as
long
as
we're
just
adding
kind
of
the
standard,
crypto
GRC
20
assets,
we
can
actually
abstract
a
lot
of
that
out
and
just
just
assume,
extremely
high
or
even
perfect
correlation
anyone.
Who's
ever
looked
at
coin.
B
E
I
suppose
at
the
general
request,
I
think
is
that
during
we've
you
know
we're
over
an
hour
into
this
call
and
we
haven't
even
gone
over
any
one
of
those
collateral
types
because
they
don't
meet
cuz.
We
don't
they
don't
exist
yet,
but
probably
when
we
actually
start
adding
them.
Just
in
general,
I'd
recommend
that
we
try
and
bifurcate
this
call
into
having
general
governance
and
then
collateral
calls
to
go
over
those
or
some.
B
E
B
D
I've
questioned
I
read
someone
posted
on
reddit
asking
if
it's
true
that
that,
whether
or
not
the
direction
that
bullish
news
with
the
bearishness
of
the
directionality
of
the
collateral
token
has
an
impact
on
stability
so
like,
but
they
would
example.
The
let's
say,
there's
a
token
that
we
think
is:
gonna
have
very
low
volatility
and
very
high
liquidity,
but
at
the
same
time
we're
very
bearish
on
it.
They'll
give
it
a
higher
stability
fear
as
I
keep
it
the
same,
because
you
know
we
think
we'll
give
a
liquid
it
properly.
Yeah.
B
It's
kind
of
not
great
explaining
it,
but
essentially
we
want
to
look
at
a
tail
risks
and
highly
unexpected
events.
If
you
are
bearish
on
the
token,
that's
kind
of
something
you
can
plan
for
and
if
you
can
plan
for
it,
there
are
ways
to
handle
that
you
could
I
mean
you
sure
you
could
increase
the
stability.
You
could
also
increase
the
cloud.
Ization
ratio,
but
really
just
kind
of
standard
market
volatility
or
downward
bias,
isn't
necessarily
what
we
care
about
I.
Would
it's
correlated
with
what
we
care
about,
though,
for
sure
I.
C
Don't
think
you'd
have
to
do
much
of
anything
at
all,
I
mean
this
was
an
analysis
that
I
initially
ran
on
eath
when
first
getting
introduced
to
maker
was
okay.
What
happens
in
the
event
that
eath
price
just
consistently
deflates
and
let's
say
it,
doesn't
drop
thirty
percent
overnight,
but
it
drops
thirty
percent
over
the
course
of
a
year.
C
So
it's
all
I
mean
yeah
I
mean
it's
actually
kind
of
good
for
a
maker,
or
at
least
there's
an
argument
to
be
made
that
it's
good
in
the
sense
that
when
there's
a
lot
of
long
term
slow
price
depreciation,
you
actually
have
a
healthy
balance
of
liquidations
and
liquidations
are
not
bad
for
the
system.
It's
under
collateralized
liquidations
that
are
bad
for
the
system
and
so
like
when
liquidations
occur.
They
actually
just
keep
that
dead
circulation
up.
They
keep
realized
revenues
up
and
they're,
not
necessarily
a
bad
thing.
C
B
B
B
D
Is
there
any
thoughts
about
how
you
scale
up
government's
governance
to
manage
including
collateral
types,
because
I
feel
like
even
with
the
just
adjusting
stability
fees?
There's
lots
of
meetings,
there's
lots
of
drama
on
Reddit,
all
this
other
stuff
and
the
risk
team
is,
you
know,
has
limited
bandwidth.
So
we
add
not
just
you
know
the
first
five
collateral
types,
but
you
know
100
right
well,
the.
B
A
Well,
I
think
that's
kind
of
the
key
here.
Those
right
there's
a
model
that
applies
to
year,
C
20s
in
general
right
and
we
don't
need
to
reevaluate
that
model
for
each
one
that
comes
down
the
pipe
each
each
and
your
potential
collateral
type.
We
expand
or
augments
the
the
base
model
and
iterate
that
every
time
and
then
it
should
be
a
fairly
straightforward
process
of
just
determining
what
the
caps
are
on
each
on
each
collateral
type
right,
yeah,.
A
In
question,
I
think
that
and
Josh
thanks
for
asking
it
the
short
answer
is
we
have
no
idea
what
the
level
of
engagement
is
from
a
governance
and
risk
perspective.
When
we're
introducing
these
new
Takano
types,
it's
entirely
possible
that,
like
Cyrus
said
we
can
drop
a
package
and
everybody
says
yeah
that
looks
great
and
we
just
move
ahead
and
I.
Think
that
might
be
slightly
optimistic.
I
have
a
feeling
that
we're
going
to
need
to
figure
out
where
the
sweet
spot
is
between
decoupling.
This.
A
We're
sorry
I
think,
just
to
finish
that
thought
is
an
example:
we've
seen
the
level
of
coordination
and
effort
and
community
interaction
and
voting
portal
interaction,
it
took
to
move
the
stability
fee
number
up
and
down.
So
the
with
that
level
of
complexity
is
no
hard
to
extrapolate.
What
might
happen,
let
me
start
adding
15
20
different
collateral
types
in
the
future.
Yeah.
B
And
there's
gonna
be
I
I
actually
think
one
of
the
more
contentious
aspects
will
be
that
ceilings.
Debt
ceiling
is
the
ultimate
metric
for
scale
and
growth,
and
there
will
be
this.
This
divide
between
short-term
and
long-term
health,
where
people
want
to
see
the
system
scale
as
fast
as
possible,
and
a
lot
of
the
risks
associated
are
kind
of
latent
or
not
immediately
visible.
B
A
We're
also
kind
of
blessed
in
the
fact
that
we're
Ethan
died
maximalist
and
maker
Maximus
Lincoln.
These
discussions
leading
up
to
this
point
when
the
bus
had
named
some
of
the
more
rabid
projects
halfway
I
stopped
myself,
but
once
these
initiatives
as
a
cover
that
we're
considering
they're,
you
know,
religiously
devoted
coin,
is
being
considered
for
a
photo.
We're
gonna
see
an
entirely
new
segment
of
people
get
involved
with
this
process.
It's
gonna
muddy
the
waters,
a
bit
I
think
right.
D
B
It's
not
it's
not
up
to
us
right.
This
is
a
definitely
a
governance,
MKR
wide
decision
and
they
can,
they
can
ultimately
choose
to
add
in
as
many
as
they
want
on
our
end,
all
that
we
can
control
on
the
foundation
regime
is
how
many
assets
we
can
properly
evaluate
in
the
limited
time
span,
given
just
the
natural
overhead
that
goes
into
some
of
these
evaluation
processes
and
the
quantitative
modeling,
but
give
it
if
an
if
an
asset
will
generate
growth.
B
Growth
die
then
in
in
collateral
portfolio
and
we'll
have
to
kind
of
define
what
it
means
to
make
sense.
Then
anything
can
be
added
in
theory,
and
so
you
could,
you
could
have
you
know
multiple
different
risk
teams
tackling
different
assets,
and
then
they
all
get
submitted
and
voted
on
all
at
once
by
the
executive
book.
B
Yeah
I
was
just
about
to
answer
your
question.
Yeah
I
do
know
about
the
SPV
model
and
kind
of
a
brief
TL
DR.
Essentially,
certain
security
tokens
are
obviously
quite
a
liquid
and
they're
even
more
liquid
on
crypto
markets.
Right.
Imagine
trying
to
find
a
liquid
market
for
tokens
that
represent
some
obscure
real-world
asset.
So
the
SPV
model
goes
like
this.
B
There
so
SBB
is
created
and
there
are
ye
RC
20
tokens
minted.
That
represents
a
claim
on
the
liquidated
value
of
the
assets
in
the
real
world.
So
essentially,
if
there's
a
look
that
was
really
confusing,
but
if
there's
a
liquidation
occurs,
the
asset
gets
sold
in
the
real
world
and
then
the
SPV
is
legally
obligated
to
convert
the
proceeds
into
died
and
then
the
die
would
get
would
get
sent
to
the
ERC
20
holders
and
then
the
the
tokens
represent
a
claim
on
that
die.
B
So
in
the
and
the
keeper
auction
you
would
bid
on
$1
worth
of
die
that
hopefully
a
discount
right
and,
and
you
would
get
the
proceeds
of
the
auction
I'm,
not
sure
if
that
entire
limits
are
strictly.
The
goal,
is
to
source
liquidity
off
chain
and
then
flow
the
flow,
the
proceeds
back
to
token
holders
on
day.
D
B
E
D
A
All
right
I
have
to
jump
again
because
I
have
a
significant
amount
of
work.
I
need
to
do
so.
I
can't
record
this
anymore,
so
I
need
to
stop
the
recording
and
move
on
to
my
next
meetings.
If
anybody
wants
to
hang
out
and
continue
the
discussion
they're
more
than
welcome
to
do
so,
but
it
won't
be
the
recorder
for
posterity
once
again
thanks
everybody
for
the
amazing
discussion,
there
will
be
a
recap.
Summary
videos
and
audio
and
transcripts
will
be
posted
to
the
subreddit
and
to
Twitter
thanks
for
coming.
Everyone
thanks
iris.