►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 99
Description
# Governance
- Richard Brown: General Q&A
- LongForWisdom: Governance at a Glance
# MIPs
- LongForWisdom: Weekly MIPs Update (on behalf of @MIP-Editors)
# Oracles
Nik: Oracle proposals update
# Risk
Cyrus Younessi: COMP Liquidity Mining Impacts
Vishesh Choudry: State of the Peg
# General Q&A
We’ll open the floor for any questions about Scientific Governance and Risk.
Please join us and help shape the future of the MakerDAO.
## Links
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 1: https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-risk-framework/part-one
Website: https://makerdao.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/makerdao
Forum: https://forum.makerdao.com/
Chat: https://chat.makerdao.com/home
Email: info@makerdao.com
A
Hello,
everyone
and
welcome
to
the
mecha
doubt
scientific
scientific
governance
and
risk
meeting
number
99
taking
place
on
Thursday
July,
2nd
I'm
long
Kristen,
one
of
the
mega
Dale
governments,
facilitators
and
I'm
joined
with
a
bunch
of
makeup
people
cool,
so
I'll
go
through
the
agenda
in
just
a
second
but
I.
Think
the
the
main
event
today
we'll
be
discussing
the
discussing
the
comp,
the
crudity
mining
impacts,
so
I
think
we're
trying
to
leave
that
to
push
to
the
end,
because
I
don't
want
to
get
it
interrupted
too
badly.
A
A
So
if
anyone
has
at
some
time,
I
would
say
it's
just
reading,
that's
I'm
gonna
go
one
signal
thread
currently
just
finished
actually
think
about
it.
This
was
the
adjusting
the
WBT
sea
debt
ceiling
and
the
risk
premium,
which
I
actually
haven't
checked.
The
results.
Does
nobody
know
I
found
for
free
two
years
to
become.
A
Cool,
so
that
about
covers
it
forgotten
to
the
glance
as
I
said.
Mister,
the
discussion
has
been
focused
around
company,
so
I'll
just
briefly
go
for
Charles
and
stuff.
Essentially,
this
week
is
kind
of
in
between
two
monthly
government's
cycles
for
MIPS.
So
there's
no
like
sort
of
specific
content
today,
the
governor
cycle
anyway,
but
as
briefly
go
into
what's
come
up
so
I
believe
Charles
has
submitted
MIPS,
sixteen,
which
it's
works
towards
codifying
the
weekly
government
cycle.
A
So
that's
now
an
RFC
and
mail
well
probably
be
submitted
from
the
submitted
for
to
the
July
government
cycle,
which
starts
formal
submission
period
to
which
starts
next
Monday
until
next
Wednesday.
So
next
week,
we'll
be
able
to
kind
of
tell
everyone
what's
what's
happening
in
July,
hopefully
right
so
I
think
that
pretty
much
covers
governance
and
MIPS.
So
Nick.
Do
you
honor
to
it
brief
updates
on
the
Oracle
for
business.
B
Sure
so
the
we
had
a
bunch
of
Oracle
proposals
go
through
point
votes
last
month
right.
So
there
were
a
bunch
of
whitelisting
proposals
from
defy
Sabre.
There
was
from
MC
decks
and
there
were
a
bunch
of
light
feed
proposals.
So
I
think
we
had
a
pure
Bitcoin
khyber
and
any
terse
can't
so
I've
been
assisting
those
those
teams
with
setting
up
their
their
new
feeds
and
looks
like
everyone's
ready
to
go
so
we'll
be
batching.
Those
into
tomorrow's
a
executive
proposal
for
kind
of
final
ratification
from
from
the
community.
B
B
Yeah
so
so,
there's
not
an
explicit
boundary,
but
it's
kind
of
just
implied
right
where
I
I
think
I
talked
about
this
on
a
previous
call,
where
kind
of
one
of
my
little
sub
missions
was
to
balance
the
research
we
recently
collaborate
between
this
bounce
of
power
between
dark
feet,
not
host
identity
feeds
and
light
feeds,
but
the
the
public
identity
once
and
and
I
think
you
know,
I've
heard
some
people
say
that
you
know
well.
Why
do
we
even
want
an
even
number
like?
B
Why
don't
we
just
go
super
hard
on
the
light
feed
once
but
I
think
it's
kind
of
a
double-edged
sword
right.
You
know
you
don't
want.
You
know,
maybe
one
day
like
turn
against
maker
and
have
the
power
to
actually
like
you
know
completely
screwed
over.
If
you
know
just
based
off
of
like
sentiment
right.
B
So,
in
that
sense,
the
the
dark
face
can
be
really
useful
and
the
idea
is
basically
that
if
you
have
sort
of
an
equilibrium
between
dark
and
light-
and
you
set
the
quorum
higher
than
what
anyone
kind
of
isolated
group
can
attain,
then
it's
kind
of
just
overall
makes
the
Oracles
much
more
secure.
So
that's
kind
of
why
we've
been
you
know,
adding
so
many
light
feeds
lately
and
I.
B
Think
we'll
kind
of
continue
to
to
add
light
feeds
at
like
an
accelerated
pace
until
we
kind
of
reach
that
that
equal
area
but
you're
absolutely
right
that
there
are
diminishing
returns
right.
You
know
each
of
these
people
it's
paid
every
month
right
they
get
paid
a
thousand
I,
that's
currently
at
least
or
that's
the
parameter
set
my
governance
right.
We
could.
D
A
E
E
Okay,
so
compound
launched
their
governance
token,
maybe
roughly
three
weeks
ago
now,
and
they
had
a
very
novel
distribution
mechanism,
where
the
token
was
allocated
to
sensibly
enough
users
of
their
platform
or
users
of
their
protocol.
And
specifically,
it
was
weighted
more
towards
users
who
were
paying
a
higher
percentage
of
interest
on
their
borrows
and
similarly
earning
a
higher
percentage
rate
on
their
on
their
assets
supplied
and
as
a
result.
In
order
to
earn
the
maximum
amount
of
comp.
E
Additionally,
you
could
kind
of
loop
through
or
recycle
through
these
assets
by
continuously
borrowing
and
resupplying
the
same
same
asset
with
the
limit
being
the
their
collateral
factor
for
that
asset.
So
opportunists
went
in
search
of
the
asset
on
compound
that
would
pay
the
highest
rate
of
interest
and
these
rates
are
determined
by
each
assets,
individual
interest
rate
curve.
E
So,
for
example,
if
the
USD
see
interest
rate
curve
caps
out
at
fifteen
percent,
but
the
bat
interest
rate
curve
caps
out
at
thirty
five
percent,
then
you
would
want
to
borrow
as
much
fat
as
possible
instead
of
a
instead
of
USD,
see
this.
This
opens
up
to
there's
fairly
little
price
risk
involved
because
you're
borrowing
in
resupplying
the
same
asset
more
or
less,
but
this
does
open
up
users
to
bit
of
liquidity
risk,
and
so
we
did
see
some
distortions
in
the
bat
market
over
the
weekend.
E
The
bat
market
blew
up
as
a
result
of
these
incentives,
and
we
saw
I
think
as
high
as
like.
Three
hundred
fifty
million
bats
applied
versus
three
hundred
twenty
million
back
borrow.
Of
course,
a
large
portion
of
this
was
mostly
recycled
back.
So
it's
a
little
bit
hard
to
kind
of
quantify
the
reason
about,
like
the
total
amount
of
leverage
that
was
embedded
in
the
system.
E
E
E
E
E
E
D
D
E
Not
necessarily
so
increasingly
so
yeah,
one
of
the
one
of
the
ways
to
maybe
disincentivize
die
is
to
increase
maker
as
a
primary
generator
of
die.
So
if
the
USD
see
rate
were
to
go
up,
then
well,
we
wouldn't
have
seen
that
that
large
mint
last
night
right,
but
but
basically
for
that
person
who
is,
it
was
cheaper
to
borrow
that
dye
from
maker
than
to
just
borrow
it
off
of
the
compound
platform.
E
E
That's,
you
know,
could
be
potentially
potentially
dangerous
if
we
see
both
large
influx
of
demand
to
get
into
this
external
DSR
and
refinancing
from
maker
to
compound
requires
sourcing
dye
on
the
secondary
market
as
well,
so
that's
kind
of
where
the
the
primary
demand
concerns
come
in.
So
really
you
know
the
question
to
governance
could
be.
E
Very
simply,
if
demand
is
going
up,
then
you
would
want
to
increase
supply,
and
so
most
of
the
solutions
that
have
been
put
forth
to
to
governance
over
the
on
the
forums
over
the
past
few
days
have
been
kind
of
variants
of
how
do
we
increase
dye
supply
dramatically
and
maybe
drastically
in
a
short
time
kind
of
what's
the
safest
way
to
do
that?
What's
the
most
sensible
way
to
do
that,
what
concerns
do
we
have
if
any,
on
kind
of
increasing
the
amount
of
collateral
in
the
system?
E
For
example,
you
know
the
from
a
price
standpoint:
the
easiest
way
to
increase
dye
is
through
US
DC.
So
if
the
US
DC
were
to
expand
significantly,
then
well,
maybe
maybe
maker
could
actually
maybe
the
large
mint
that
we
saw
last
night
and
you
know
more
to
come
if
the
debt
ceiling
were
to
go
up,
there's
a
really
good
chance
that
the
community
could
turn
this
into
a
very
positive
outcome.
If
they
kind
of
tinker
with
the
creek,
you
know
if
they
find
a
right
stability
fee
and
a
right
debt
ceiling.
E
E
That's
I
mean
I.
Think
that's
probably
been
like
at
the
forefront
of
the
discussions
is
the
is
some
change
to
the
u.s.
DC
parameters,
in
addition
to
increasing
the
debt
ceiling
and
the
stability
fee,
a
really
common,
a
really
common
suggestion
has
been
to
decrease
the
liquidation
ratio,
which
would
allow
basically
smaller
market
makers
to
leverage
up
into
even
more
dye
putting
further
downward
pressure
on
the
peg.
E
You
know
there's
kind
of
this
weird
question
of
what
happens.
If
what
happens,
if
farmers
mint
die
off
of
the
US
DC
from
maker
and
just
stuff
it
into
compound,
instead
of
instead
of
selling
dye
like
we
would
hope-
and
that's
that's
of
course,
what
we
saw
last
night
right,
20
million
dye
generated
and
I
think
all
went
into
compound
right,
wasn't
necessarily
used
to
push
the
peg
down.
E
So
this
is
where
this
is,
where
governance
really
needs
to
start
to
normalize,
significantly
larger
amounts
of
collateral
and
dye
supply
in
the
system
if
they
want
to
go
down
that
route.
So
you
know,
if
you
could,
you
know
if,
if
you're
worried
about
centralization
risk
with
US
DC-
and
you
know,
I-
think
a
reasonable
assumption
is
that
beyond
some
small
threshold,
say
30
million
or
50
million
is
probably
already
too
much
centralization
risk
to
handle
for
maker.
E
Other
other
supply
focused
actions
are
a
second
eath
collateral
type.
So
if
B
certainly
there's
going
to
be
all
sorts
of
kind
of
eath
eath
denominated
market
makers
trying
to
get
in
on
the
farming
activity
and
that
could
kind
of
be
both
another
source
of
supply
generation
and
potential
stability.
Fee
generation.
E
E
As
I
said,
there's
been,
there's
been
quite
a
few
different
and
diverse
proposals
out
there,
and
unfortunately
we
are.
You
know
we're.
Time
is
a
little
bit
of
the
essence.
So,
as
I
said
that
that
proposal
goes
live
tonight,
you
know
I,
don't
expect
anything
to
happen
right
right
at
the
turn
of
the
clock,
but
certainly
over
the
based
on
the
activity
we
saw
with
that
a
few
weeks
ago,
certainly
I
think
over
the
next
three
or
four
days
our
situation
will
become
much
more
clear,
sorry,
I'm
going
to
stop
talking.
C
Just
wanted
to
say,
you
know
it's
very
hard
to
predict
some
of
the
long
return
or
not
really
longer
term,
but
you
know
what
will
actually
happen
over
the
next
few
days,
but
there
is
also
some
shorter
term
things
that
are
kind
of
more
clear.
So,
for
example,
current
you
know
already
yesterday,
someone
and
took
out
16
million
died
against
against
19
million
u.s.
DC
and
maxing
out
the
u.s.
DC
a
debt
ceiling.
So
this
has
two
important
implications.
Firstly,
the
u.s.
C
C
The
second
thing
is
that
you
know
this
is
potentially
you
know
an
example
that
we
can
look
at
to
try
to
understand
for,
for
what
people
might
be
doing
later
on
with
guy
and
in
compound,
but
I
just
thought
that
you
know
maybe
it's
worth
discussing.
You
know
starting
to
discussion
at
the
u.s.
TCA
angle,
just
because
it's
more,
you
know
it's
it's
it's
at
hand
now
given
given.
What's
actually
already
happened,
okay,.
C
Sure
so
some
of
this
is
speculating
about
the
intentions
of
this
of
this
trader,
but
so
so,
basically
like
we
have
to
what
we
have
to
ask
ourselves,
why
would
someone
you
know
put
up
USD
C
into
a
CDP?
You
take
out
a
bunch
of
guy
to
put
into
compound
and
I,
don't
think
the
answer
that
is
necessarily
straightforward,
because
you
can't
rule
out
reasons
like
you
know,
being
worried
that
in
the
future
the
debt
ceiling
might
get
exhausted,
so
they
just
kind
of
wanted
to
take
it.
While
they
had
the
chance
there's
this
dynamic.
C
Every
time
they
were
close
to
debt
ceiling,
someone
might
take
out
died
just
just
so.
They
have
this
option
because
you
can't
force
well
we're
unlikely
to
force
close
people
CDP's
going
over
the
debt
ceiling,
so
it
could
have
been
that
and
then,
of
course,
you
know
parking
into
compound
is
an
unreasonable
thing
to
do
once.
You've
got
this
position
and
the
interest
rate
is
very
low,
so
the
cost
of
doing
this
is
pretty
low.
All
things
considered,
that's
kind
of
the
most
sort
of
I
would
say
the
most
naive
option.
C
That
does
really
have
anything
not
much
to
do
with
con
farming.
This
is
quite
unlikely
because
this
user
is
a
huge
con
farmer
and
this
diamond
stranger
straight
into
compound,
and
they
have
a
huge
bat
recycling
been
going
on,
which
is
actually
the
main,
the
main,
the
main
source
of
income
for
this
compound.
C
So
the
second
option
is
that
for
some
reason
that
their
superior
economics
they're
to
putting
USD
cm2
into
into
maker,
then
taking
diet
and
putting
into
compound
instead
of
the
more
direct
route
of
just
putting
USD
straight
into
compound
and
then
doing
this
bat,
recycling
and
I
think
the
rest
for
that
is
actually
the.
Currently.
C
I
think,
the
reason
probably
is
is
the
ratio
of
of
the
of
the
total
amount
of
USD
see
supplied
to
the
total
amount
of
die
supplied
in
compound.
So
there's
way
way
more
us
DC
supply,
which
is
not
surprising,
because
you
know
it's
much
much
easier
to
get
that
kind
of
liquidity
just
dumped
into
compound,
which
means
that
on
the
comp
on
the
calm,
peeled
side
of
things,
you're
making
much
more
as
a
USC
supplier,
then
dye
supplier.
C
For
the
truth,
sorry,
you
have
every
right
you're,
making
much
more
as
a
dye
supplier
than
the
US
DC
supplier
for
the
same
amount
and
I
think
that
that
actually
dominates
the
actual
headline
interest
rate
I
I
think
I
mean
we
can
check
this,
but
I
believe
I
believe
so.
So
in
that
case,
it's
actually
the
fact
that
there's
so
much
you
HTC's
applied
to
compound
that
it's
driving
that
that
decision
to
go
into
die
instead
via
a
bio
maker,
and
then
you
know
I
think
the
the
practical
next
step
is
to
decide.
You
know.
C
Is
there
a
sensible
level
of
stability
fee
that
would
make
that
trade
no
longer
attractive
I,
then
the
user
would
just
go
to
do
the
direct
route
of
putting
us
DC
into
into
compound.
That
would
have
the
advantage
of
you
know.
Taking
all
this.
Taking
all
this
dye
against
us
to
see
how
freeing
up
some
debt
ceiling
so
that
you
know
that
that
Dutch
think
I
should
be
used
to
ease
you
know
potential
future
demand
shocks.
C
That's
that's
what
that's!
That's!
That's
what
I'm
thinking
about
so,
for
example,
and
I,
haven't
checked
the
numbers
on
this,
but
if
it
turned
out
that
you
know
it,
like
you
know
a
10%
stability
fee
for
us
DCA.
If,
at
that
point,
this
trade
was
no,
you
know
this.
Wasn't
it
longer
preferable
to
going
directly
into
u.s.
DC
and
compound
then
I
would
I
would
think
that
that
might
be
worthwhile,
because
the
primary
function
of
u.s.
C
DC
as
a
to
ease
ease
to
meet
demand
is
probably
still
going
to
be
served
at
10
percent,
or
rather
like
you
know,
maybe
maybe
we're
maybe
he's
gonna
be
less
effective
at
dot.
You
know
and
dies
at
1.0
one,
but
it's
definitely
gonna
be
effective,
once
dies
that
you
know
at
1.5
or
something
so
I
think
that
that
would
be
like
a
comfortable
comfortable
middle
ground
where
we
would
actually
get
our
us
DCA
back
as
a
tool
yeah.
E
That's
that's
gonna,
be
I,
think
too
hard
to
forecast,
because
I
think
that
the
distribution
is
going
to
change
dramatically
starting
tomorrow,
because
right
now,
every
you
know
most
everything
is
in
bat
and
we
know
that
the
annual
yield
is
like
between
70
around
70%
annual
yield,
depending
on
the
comp
price,
everything
with
a
new
distribution.
If
we
start
to
see
you
know
if
it
split
two
ways
or
three
ways
or
you
know
who
knows
how
much
dilution
there
is
within
a
particular
asset,
then
I
don't
think,
there's
any
way.
E
C
And
also
just
I
agree,
and
also
just
to
clarify
this,
this
trade
right
now
that
we
were
discussing
it
actually
makes
sense.
Given
the
current,
you
know,
pre
patch,
comp
distribution,
I
believe
right,
so
we
don't
even
know
if,
as
soon
as
this
contribution
goes
live
I'm,
currently
certain
this
users
actually
gonna
move
some
stuff
around
because
currently,
if
you
have
this
huge
recycled,
bat
farm,
which
is
gonna,
become
suboptimal,
so
they're
gonna
actually
switch
to
another
asset,
whether
they
actually
keep
guys
or
collateral
based
is
also
completely
unclear.
D
So
I'll
ask
a
potentially
stupid
question.
After
all,
that
leaves
feedback,
which
is
that
I'm
not
sure
that
I'm
clear
on
why
lowering
the
liquidation
ratio,
which
seems
to
be
prior
to
this
call
the
most
popular
option
to
do
first
sort
of
seems:
a
hierarchy
of
liquidation
ratio,
debt
ceiling
that
potentially
stability
feel
maybe
those
comments
change
those.
But
if
we
haven't
activated
liquidations
on
us,
DC
and
people
can,
in
theory,
go
below
120
percent.
Now
about
being
liquidated.
What
effect
is
dis?
Lowering
that
liquidation
ratio
actually
has.
D
E
So
so
my
my
preference
is
definitely
debt
ceiling
first,
especially
because
we
know
that
I'm
at
the
current
liquidation
ratio,
people
are
willing
to
take
out
are
willing
to
take
out
die
as
we
saw
last
night,
but
the
point
of
lowering
the
liquidation
ratio
is
just
to
accelerate
dye
generation
right.
So
if,
if
the
liquidation
ratio
goes
from
120
to
just
is
an
extreme
example
101,
you
know.
101
a
market
maker
with
1
million
USD
C
on
hand,
can
generate
a
hundred
million
die
of
cell
pressure,
which
is
which
is
enormous
right
now.
E
E
So
that's
one,
that's
was
gonna,
be
a
topic.
I
want
to
bring
up
towards
the
end,
but
we
can
just
do
it
now
is
basically,
you
know
I.
Does
the
maker
community
want
to
wait
and
see
what
happens
24
hours
a
day
two
days?
You
know
right,
like
I,
think
one
could
definitely
argue
that
doing
anything.
Preemptively
could
be
right.
It
could
be
smart
and
kind
of
ahead
of
the
game
or
could
also
be
kind
of
rash.
And
just
you
know,
if
we
put
ahead
a
pole,
it
increase
the
USD,
see
dead,
slinked
100
million.
E
Today
it
would
know,
maybe
be
a
bit
rushed,
but
it's
definitely
open
question
and
it
additionally,
you
know
over
the
next
few
days,
depending
on
how
things
turn
out.
You
know,
I
would
say,
there's
certainly
some
some
some.
It
might
be
worth
it
to
consider
skipping
governance
polls
as
well.
If
we
need
to
basically
ad
hoc
or
pseudo
emergency
executive
votes,
especially
given
kind
of
the
poll
turnaround
time
and
the
GSM
and
yeah
I'm.
D
E
D
What
one
thought,
if
I'm,
an
on
the
stability,
see
if
the
stability
see
and
I
is
increased,
but
the
demand
for
died
for
people
to
put
into
compound
kind
of
states?
They
is
the
same.
It
basically
transfers
the
pressure
from
people
who
are
minting
died
to
people
buying,
died
on
the
open
market
and
probably
pushes
up
the
died
priced.
It's
kind
of
pretty
significant,
potentially
significant
as
well.
Just
these
people
can't
make
Mord
died
and
kind
of
relieve
that
pressure.
E
E
A
Should
I
maybe
talk
briefly
about
like
the
governance
kind
of
like
the
ways
we
could
kind
of
go
forward
with
this
governance?
Wise
then,
please,
since
I
came
up,
yeah,
sure
cool,
so
obviously,
we've
had
like
emergency
polls
and
votes
before.
So
that's
fine,
but
in
order
to
be
kind
of
comfortable
doing
those
outside
of
the
weekly
cycle,
we
either
needs
well
like
as
ago
as
facilitator.
A
A
A
Alternatively,
we
can
waits
and
do
some
polls
on
put
some
polls
in
on
Monday
and
it
makes
two
sessions
on
Friday
next
week
or
we
can
kind
of
wait
and
if
things
get
like
you
know,
obviously
worse
in
the
next
few
days,
then
we
can
do
emergency
actions
that
are
later
day
before
Friday.
But
after
today.
D
B
D
A
D
D
This
community
is
seen
as
doing
any
anything
and
everything
I
can
to
defend
the
peg
so
like
a
pre-emptive
small
raise
and
the
u.s.
de
caña
debt
ceiling
might
not
be
a
bad
thing
to
sort
of
Paul
for
at
least
at
the
forum's.
Now,
after
the
call,
you
know
just
as
sort
of
proof
that
this
is
something
that
we're
carefully
watching
and
considering
for
a
wider
community
outside
of
the
people
that
are
just
on
this
call.
E
Yeah
I
think
that's
I,
think
that's
a
very,
very
valid
point.
So
I
would
suggest
that,
after
the
after
the
call,
we
put
out
a
signal
request
for
because
at
this
point,
I'm
not
even
clear
what
specifically
we
want
to
be
pulling
for
and
what
types
of
options
we
want
to
put
on
the
table.
That
would
be
something
that
I
would
love
to
get
some
some
clarity
on
either
on
this
call
or
afterwards
in
the
forums.
And
then
we
can
start
working
on
a
on
a
governance
poll.
A
D
D
That
seems
like,
and
that's
like
the
type
of
action
that,
like
we're
very
kind
of
comfortable,
doing
I
guess
is
the
buzz
you
know
like
we
have
a
lot
of
like
history.
You
know
changing
stability
fees
and
lowering
and
raising
debt
ceilings
for
youth.
You
know
and
other
things
so
seems
very
natural
I
guess
swim
soon.
E
C
Would
say
that
I
would
actually
probably
lean
against
preemptively
increasing
debt
ceiling
without
changing
the
stability
fee.
Just
because,
if
we
increase
debt
ceiling
that
immediately
gets
eaten
up
by.
Maybe
if
in
the
saint's
trader
for
the
same
trade,
because
we
didn't
figure
out
that
what
stability
fee
it
actually
breaks.
Even
then
it
would
be
a
waste
and
it
would
be
wouldn't
have
achieved
much.
C
On
the
other
hand,
if
we
are
increasing
the
stability
fee,
then
it
could
be
appropriate
also
to
increase
increase
tonight,
but
it
seems
like
just
fee
just
feeding
this,
this
trade,
which
probably
exists
I'm,
assuming
that
this
behavior
isn't
irrational.
Just
feeding
this
trade,
without
which
we
know
is
just
eating
up
the
debt
ceiling
and
that
die
is
ending
up
getting
locked
in
combat
it
doesn't
help,
but.
E
Don't
you
risk
raising
the
stability
fee
high
enough
such
that
it's
no
longer
profitable
to
do
the
intended
function
intended
intended
function
which
is
ARP
the
peg
down?
We,
don't
you
almost
need
to
keep
it
low
enough
until
all
of
the
all
the
excess
demand
from
compound
is
diluted
away,
and
then
they
start
arming
the
peg.
E
C
If
we
come
to
the
conclusion
that
a
good
number
there
will
be
some
somewhere
in
the
kind
of
you
know,
let's
say
3
to
13
percent
range
or
something
where
you
could
only
imagine
people
still
using
that
for
for
peg
for
peg
ARB
at,
like
you
know,
died
of
you
know,
died
practice
at
one
point,
no
one
to
one
point.
You
know
and
higher
I
think
just
heuristically.
That
seems
that
seems
reasonable
and
the
basically
we're
in
a
much
worse
situation.
C
If
we
don't
have
any
us
DC
rope
at
all,
because
then
imagine
there
are
some
other
eggs
on
this
event.
Right
now
like
like
eath
getting
bearish,
we
have
no
rope
at
all
in
the
USDCAD
ceiling.
It's
not
a
good
situation
to
be
in
like
if
you
know,
if
die
starts,
to
go
to
1.05
and
higher.
We
have
very
few
mitigations
until
we
start
getting
into
the
into
the
range
of
where
us
DCPS
and
on
the
code,
which
will
be,
you
know
quite
far
off.
E
Okay,
so
what
about
a
signal
request
for
debt
ceiling
and
a
signal
request
for
stability
fee
may
be?
Maybe
we
put
those
out
today
and
then
we
put
out
a
governance
poll,
maybe
tomorrow,
so
that
people
have
maybe
a
chance
to
kind
of
see
what
happens
during
the
course
of
today.
We
can
take
it
from
there
or
long
prison.
Does
that
drive
with
your
yeah.
A
If
you
want
to
make
sure
they
both
happen
or
they
don't
happen
separately,
then
you
would
probably
want
to
make
them
a
combine
poll,
because
you
have
kind
of
a
problem
if,
like
the
debt
ceiling,
won't
pass
this,
but
then
the
stability
p1
doesn't
pass,
but
you
actually
the
people
who
voted
for
that.
So
you
know
only
one
state
with
the
stability
punic,
it's
a
bit
messy,
so
just
yeah,
I
guess
I
would
suggest,
like
I
said,
of
like
combined
rate
parameters,
including
debt
ceiling
and
still
believe.
D
F
F
All
right
so
first
first
thing
is
the
peg,
so
just
to
kind
of
put
things
in
perspective,
you
have
trouble
hearing
anything
or
seeing
anything.
Just
interrupt
me
for
to
put
things
into
perspective.
The
die
peg
in
the
last
I
would
say:
48
hours
has
come
up
a
bit.
I
think
nobody's
really
surprised
at
that.
A
couple
of
things
going
on.
F
F
Good
news
is,
prior
to
this.
You
know
shift
in
some
of
the
secondary
lending
interest
rate
models
for
verdi.
There
was
a
fair
amount
of
buffer
just
in
the
amount
of
supply
that
was
available
to
borrow,
and
so
in.
From
that
perspective,
the
the
impact
on
the
liquidity
crunch
of
this
was
initially
mitigated
a
bit,
but
I
do
think
that
that's
going
to
continue
to
have
a
potential
price
impact,
so
you
shouldn't
be
surprised
to
see
you
know
dye
prices
at
a
dollar
1
$1.
F
Yield
token,
which
in
this
case
is
compound,
so
what
that
means
basically
is-
and
we've
seen
this
situation
a
long
time
ago
in
a
very
different
context,
when
you
have
a
very
low
borrow
rate
and
a
very
high
supply
rate,
it
sort
of
incentivizes
that
rapid
refinancing
and
secondary
market
rewrapping
and
and
basically
pursuing
a
large
degree
of
leverage
very
quickly.
But
in
the
past
you
know,
we'd
seen
that
that
that
yield
for
those
rates
doesn't
necessarily
last
very
long,
goes
away
quickly.
Men
interest
kind
of
jumps
back
down.
F
So
that's
that's
the
scenario
that
I
think
you
want
to
try
to
consider
and
manage
against
so
for
the
peg
here.
I
think
that
that
price
could
I
could
potentially
continue
to
go
up.
So
that's
just
something
to
to
be
weary
of
to
put
this
in
a
little
bit
of
context
as
to
what's
going
on
behind
the
scenes,
so
total
die
is
at
146
million
died
from
eath,
however,
is
still
just
around
114
million.
So
what
we
seen
basically
is
and
died
from
bat
as
shrunk.
So.
F
To
each
one
individually,
so
here's
the
eath
dye
supply
basically
was
continuing,
tries
continued
rise,
a
few
dips
and
spikes
again
due
to
compound,
and
then
we
see
here
basically
in
the
last
48
hours
just
like
flat,
so
there
this
makes
a
lot
of
sense.
If
you
consider
it,
there
are
a
lot
of
things
you
can
be
doing
through
capital
right
now.
It's
not
necessarily
the
most
attractive
to
just
take
eath
and
quite
simply,
dump
it
into
maker
and
mint
die.
F
There
are
other
things
that
people
are
doing
with
their
capital
at
the
moment
and
that's
something
to
consider
and
and
I'll
go
into
the
collateral
in
a
moment,
but
you
can
see
here,
W
BTC,
so
this
is
just
continued
to
sort
of
stay
level.
Ground
maxed
out,
USD
CB.
There
were
a
few
that
were
used,
but
it's
really
not
been
used
right
now,
KMC,
you
know
again:
small
amount
has
been
used
because
it's
a
new
thing,
I
think
primarily
and
then
be
a
tea,
so
be
a
tea.
F
So
now
we
sort
of
come
to
us
DC
and
we
look.
The
utilization
of
this
has
been
sporadic
but
lower
since
May,
basically,
and
now,
all
of
a
sudden,
you
know
in
the
last
24
hours
this
just
completely
maxed
out
utilization
and
again
we're
not
necessarily
surprised
at
that
right.
So
if
we
look
at
some
of
these
compound
markets,
BT
we
talked
to
I
mean
and
again
you
know
sorry.
This
is
gonna
be
kind
of
dominated
by
compound,
but
that
is
a
large
topic
of
what's
going
on
right
now.
F
Eath
will
kind
of
save
that
and
go
back
to
it,
but
basically
the
amount
of
diamond
t'me
this'
also
slowed
it's
just
kind
of
steady
and
the
collateral
amounts
of
eath
have
reduced.
So
that's
something
to
talk
about,
but
US
DC
we
saw
you
know.
Basically,
a
large
amount
of
us
DC
has
been
supplied
and
even
greater
amount
has
been
borrowed
on
a
percentage
basis,
but
pretty
comparable
numbers
from
a
nominal
value
in
compound
and
so
climb.
E
Jump
in
for
a
quick
second
yeah
is
there
just
something
I
want
to
highlight
on
this
page.
That's
really
important!
So
it's
it's
definitely
not
a
foregone
conclusion.
That
dye
will
be
kind
of
the
highest
highest
utilized
asset
for
for
comp
farming.
So
what
we
want
to
focus
on
here
is
kind
of
the
oversupply
of
ethan
the
oversupply
of
the
u.s.
DC.
So
right
now
Heath
is
242
million
versus
3
million,
and
u.s.
DC
is
227
million
versus
34
million.
So
both
the
gross
borrow
for
the
gross
bar
for
eath
is
up
500%.
E
Basically,
a
few
days
ago
is
just
like
5
600
grand
in
the
u.s.
DC
gross
bar
is
up
21%.
Those
numbers
continue
to
increase
with
all
of
that
eath
supply.
That's
sitting.
There
starts
to
become
just
borrowed
by
its
owners,
reducing
that
spread,
then
that
would
be
definitely
very
beneficial
for
us.
That's
almost
like
the
rational
course
of
events
over
the
over
the
long
run,
so
this
kind
of
goes
back
to
loves
forum
post
from
from
yesterday.
The
issue
is,
though,
for
whatever
reason,
those
large
beef
suppliers
just
don't
start
borrowing
their
own
me.
F
So
there's
two
important
stats
to
mention
there.
One
is
so
you
can
just
see
the
amount
of
excess
supply,
pretty
huge.
The
other
thing
is
to
to
consider
die.
I
mean
as
far
as
I
understand
the
the
attractiveness
of
the
rates
is
I.
Think
the
name
of
the
game
here
now,
basically,
whatever
has
the
most
attractive
yield,
is
where
I
think
interest
moves
to
in
this
particular
market.
F
So
if
those
rates
are
not
as
attractive
as
say,
you
know
borrowing
your
own
e
on
compound,
then
you
can
definitely
see
you
know
a
scenario
where
a
lot
of
that
interest,
ships
to
a
different
asset
and
I
think
that's
that
was
sort
of
exemplified
with
that
right.
You
know,
as
the
attractiveness
of
that
yield
shifts.
So
too
does
the
the
interest
and
I
think
it's
potentially
gonna
be
a
continually
moving
target.
We
would
have
to
wait
and
see,
but
sorry,
since
it
just
kind
of
completely
thought
around
these
secondary
lending
markets.
F
F
So
that's
an
important
conversation
around
what
kind
of
debt
ceiling
you
want
to
manage
for
for
us
DC
and
then
you
know
saris
already
mentioned
it,
but
not
to
state
the
obvious
that
a
decent
amount
of
dye
has
been
both
supplied
and
borrowed
on
compound,
and
so
it's
important
to
keep
an
eye
on
the
fact
that,
from
a
risk
perspective
right,
so
we're
talking
sort
of
about
behaviors
pay,
supply
demand,
etc.
On
the
other
side,
just
what
is
the
underlying
risk?
That's
being
created
from
these
behaviors?
F
You
have
61
million
died.
Out
of
you
know
a
hundred
and
forty
million
that
is
sitting
as
supplying
on
compound
that's
a
large
chunk
and
the
larger
that
that
trunk
is
of
the
total
dye
supply.
I.
Think
the
larger
part
of
the
conversation
of
what
is
the
total
risk
of
the
system
for
maker
that
that
particular
application
is
and
and
I
think
that
that
share
is,
is
large
and
you
know
potentially
can
grow
further.
So
it's
it's
an
important
part
of
the
conversation,
undeniably
so
just
to
come
back
to
some
of
these
collateral
assets.
F
Sorry
I'm
running
so
many
scripts.
My
computer
is
going
to
complain
a
bit,
so
that
was
the
u.s.
CC
died
supply
to
touch
on
collateral,
real
quick.
So
for
eath,
though
we
didn't
see
a
large
movement
in
the
amount
of
dye
minted
from
eath,
there
has
been
some
movement
in
the
amount
of
collateral
in
that.
Currently
you
know
it
is
a
fairly
attractive
option.
You
can
see
from
the
the
relative
supply
rate
some
compound
to
be
supplying
the
ethan
compound.
F
Now
that
I
think
Shane
changes
the
mental
calculus
for
certain
users
around
how
much
eath
did
sleep
sitting
in
maker
and
and
though
they're
not
necessarily
ready
to
make
huge
changes
in
the
amount
of
dye
that
they've
minted
from
that
eath.
I
think
there
there
have
been
some
shifts
in
individual
users
and
the
amount
of
eath
that
they
leave
sitting
as
excess
collateral
versus.
F
Potentially
you
know
supplying
that
in
compound
or
you
know,
chasing
other
yields
with
it
and
I
think
that
has
had
a
small
to
moderate
impact
on
the
amount
of
eath
supplied
as
collateral
on
maker,
and
so
we've
seen.
Basically,
this
200
250
men
turn
50
a
300%
collateral,
collateralization
buckets
grow,
300
350
bucket,
you
know,
has
relatively
shrunk
and
then
the
500
plus
bucket
is
also
relatively
shrunk.
F
A
B
There
is
currently
podiatrist
model
vote
going
on
on
compound
that
that
is
pretty
contentious.
It's
the
first
time,
I've
seen
like
not
a
hundred
percent
go
away.
So
does
anybody
have
any
opinions
of
first
allowed
going
on
and
compound
and
how
it
will
affect
die?
That's
the
first
question.
The
second
question
is:
if
you
know,
if
the
interest
rate
difference
of
the
compound
was
larger
than
let's
say
us,
TC
between
the
borrow
rate
and
the
deposit
rate.
C
Akaash,
just
one
thing
to
just
comment
on
what
you
said
is
that
I'm
not
actually
convinced
that
post
patch,
the
spreads
between
the
displayed
supply
and
bar
interest
rates
are
actually
the
dominant
or
the
dominant
factor?
And
it's
because
post
patch,
the
interest
rate
per
se,
doesn't
go
into
the
compute
calculation
anymore,
like
it
does
now.
So
the
interest
rate
is
an
additional
cost.
You
have
to
pay
on
your
card
farm.
C
The
Campillo
themselves
are
just
like
huge,
so
unless
you're
really
paying
a
lot
of
interest
and
generally
when
you're
recycling
you're
you're
you're,
making
back
most
of
what
you're
paying
on
the
borrow
and
your
supply,
so
just
keep
in
mind
that
basically,
it's
just
from
numbers
that
I've
looked
at.
You
end
up
getting
something
like
80%,
APY,
Campillo,
obviously
at
current
prices,
etcetera,
etcetera
while
paying
5%
ATP.
Why,
on
the
actual
spread
between
the
supply
and
borrow
as
in
essentially,
the
supplying
borrows
right
ends
up
being
less
important,
and
what
dominates
the
comp
yield?
C
B
Write
I
mean
another
question:
that's
kind
of
also
unrelated
I,
don't
know
if
anybody
has
done
any
research,
which
is
all
the
guys
that
are
recycling
on
and
compound.
Are
they
completing
the
arbitrage
by
selling
the
comp
token,
or
is
this
a
way
for
them
to
accumulate
comp
tokens,
because
that
would
help
some
of
the
understanding
also
of
what
is
driving
this?
E
Do
you
know
that
III
don't
think
people
are
kind
of
or
I,
don't
think
people
are
speculating
too
much
on
the
price
of
combo?
To
be
honest,
I
think
that
just
kind
of
adds
an
additional
variable
to
the
kind
of
the
overall
business
model.
Sure
some
are
cuz.
You
know
they
they
have
opinions,
but
it's
I
don't
think
it's
like
a
core
part
of
the
entire
operation.
E
E
E
C
C
Well,
I
just
thought:
I'd
mentioned
an
idea
for
like
a
nuclear
option.
If
the
situation
gets
really
is
really
out
of
control
in
principle,
like
maker
Dow
can
do
a
kind
of
open
market
operation
where
it
mints
a
large
amount
of
die,
puts
it
into
compounded
supply
and
then
takes
the
seed
I,
essentially
as
collateral
onto
its
balance
sheet,
and
by
doing
this
you
can
essentially
flood
compound
with
an
arbitrarily
large
amount
of
dye.
C
It
could
be
like
one
trillion
die,
or
something,
and
essentially
cattle
the
seed
I
on
your
on
your
balance
sheet
instead
and
then
that
will
essentially
wash
out
everyone's
everyone's
calm
peeled.
So,
firstly,
it
would
make
the
it
would
make
the
size
of
the
dye
of
the
the
the
supply
side
of
the
dye
mark
is
so
big
that
no
one's
gonna
be
making
any
money
on
the
supply
side.
C
So
at
that
point,
I
think
that
could
really
tip
the
scales
in
favor
of
literally
any
other
asset,
and
it
will
also
mean
that
yeah
well,
essentially,
you
know
maker
actually
be
collecting
the
comp
for
the
for
the
for
the
dye
part.
So
there
be
no
way
of
no
way
of
making
money
the
involving
dye
on
content
anymore.
It
would
all
do
it
all
just
become
cooked
by
maker
down.
E
C
Yeah
I
just
I,
just
like
the
component,
where
we
can
take
the
seed
I
on
our
balance
sheet
to
avoid
taking
it
to
avoid
taking
additional
risk,
I
mean
it's
worth
thinking
about,
like.
Obviously,
if
you
flood
the
dice
apply
too
much,
and
it
actually
leaves
compound
venules
yeah,
but
you
have.
You
have
too
much
to
apply,
but
but
I
think
the
difference
between
what
I
suggested
to
be
suggested
is
that
we
can
actually
take
the
seed
I
as
as
collage
for
like
one
to
one.
Basically.
C
C-Dawg
it's
so
this
isn't
a
CDP
at
all.
This
is,
and
this
is
an
open
market
operation
where
the
maker
now
itself,
min-sun
back,
die.
Well,
it's
going
to
be
backed
by
the
CD
that
we
get
in
return,
essentially
so
maker
Dow
itself
acts
as
like
an
agent
to
put
a
large
amount
of
dye
into
into
compound,
and
the
reason
it's
not
completely.
Whack
is
because
we're
actually
getting
CDI
in
return.
You
know
just
like
when
you
do
QE,
it's
not
completely
whacked,
because
you're
getting
like
bonds
in
return.
A
C
C
B
C
Think
we
need
to
basically
post
patch
me
to
figure
out
whether
or
not
it's
actually
the
case
that
die
is
getting
sucked
up,
and
if
so,
you
know
what
parameter
makes
that
trade
attractive
like
what's
so
special
about
die
because
some
have
suggested
it's
the
it's
the
it's.
The
interest
rate
curve,
which
I
think
is
valid
because
die,
is
essentially
this
freak
asset.
On
compound
that
has
this
absurdly
low
interest
rate
curve
I
mean
you
know,
think
you
can
think
of
yourself
why
they
decided
to
do
that.
But
it's
it's
a
little
bit
weird.
C
C
B
E
D
E
C
Then
then
they
need
to
then
we
need
to
change
the
curve
if
it's
actually,
if
it's
a
question
of
relative
supply,
because
the
khan
field
dominates
then
comps
apply
a
scheme,
I
would
recommend
be
patched
again
in
order
to
not
put.
You
know
this
absurd
of
pressure
on
honest
on
the
smallest
market,
which
is
kind
of
what
what
is
doing.
E
D
C
It's
a
it's
a
somewhat
complicated
formula.
You
can
see
what
it
is
at
any
point
in
time.
Just
on
the
front
end,
you
can
actually
see
this
curve
and
just
roll
on
it,
but
if
you
want
to
actually
work
out
how
it
depends
on
the
stability
few
you
need
to,
you
need
to
look
at
the
code.
I
looked
at
it
this
morning.
It's
it's
like
I,
couldn't
describe
in
one
sentence,
what
it
is,
but
basically
it
it's
in
some
sense
peg
to
the
to
the
K
stability
fee.
So.
D
C
C
It's
not
even
inherently
obvious
that
if
you
just
manage
to
jack
up
compound
supply,
borrow
versus
just
using
the
stability
fee
as
a
backdoor
that
you
would
actually
make
the
situation
better
because
you
might
also
just
incentivize
a
bunch
of
supply
into
it.
If
you
see
what
I
mean
because
I
imagine
we
have
this
eath
bead,
which
is
very
cheap,
and
we
we
trick
compound
into
making
their
supply
and
borrow
rate
for
diarrhea
for
deferred
I,
really
high.
Then
we
might
just
end
up
incentivizing
more
of
more
of
a
getting
sucked
in.
So
it's
it's.