►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 100
Description
## Governance
- Richard Brown: General Q&A
- LongForWisdom: Governance at a Glance
## MIPs
- Charles St. Louis : Weekly MIPs Update
- Gov-Facilitators: Submission Review
## Smart Contracts
- Mariano Conti: Liquidations 1.1
- Mariano Conti: TUSD Updates
- Wouter: Peg STability Module - Advantages and Discussion
## Oracles
- Nik Kunkel: New oracle Proposals
- Nik Kunkel: Winding Down ETHUSD V1.
## General Q&A
We’ll open the floor for any questions about Scientific Governance and Risk.
Please join us and help shape the future of the MakerDAO.
## Links
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 1: https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-risk-framework/part-one
Website: https://makerdao.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/makerdao
Forum: https://forum.makerdao.com/
Chat: https://chat.makerdao.com/home
Email: info@makerdao.com
A
Hello,
everyone
welcome
to
the
July
ninth
edition
of
the
scientific
governance
in
a
risk
meeting.
This
meeting
is
going
to
be
special
for
two
reasons.
One
of
them
is
we
have
some
weighty
concepts
to
discuss,
and
the
second
is
that
this
is
the
hundredth
governance.
Call
we've
done
for
a
big
100.
Our
Centennial
is
out
business.
How
did
we
get
here?
What
are
we?
Where
are
we
going?
What
does
that
mean?
We're
not
gonna
get
into
any
of
those
topics.
Today,
I
was
hoping
to
do
skits,
perhaps
a
virtual
cake
retrospective.
A
The
ecosystem
has
not
given
us
that
latitude
so
we'll
put
off
the
congratulations
and
celebrations
till
next
week.
Possibly
this
week
we
are
going
to
talk
about
everyone
said
glance
we're
going
to
talk
about
the
weekly
MIPS
update,
we're
going
to
have
long
for
wisdom,
jump
in
and
tell
us
about
the
submission
reviews
for
this.
This
most
recent
cycle,
Mariano
is
going
to
talk
briefly,
very
very
briefly.
A
book
of
liquidations.
The
TU
is
the
updates.
A
Nick
is
going
to
come
in
and
give
us
some
updates
about
the
Oracles,
and
then
we
are
going
to
spend
the
bulk
of
the
meeting
talking
about
the
PSM,
which
I
believe
is
probably
the
main
draw
today-
I'm
not
going
to
dig
into
that
too,
because
that
there's
we'll
get
into
the
introductions
and
preambles
and
context
setting
when
we
get
through
those
sections.
But
it's
important
that
we
get
this
show
on
the
road,
so
I
am
going
to
immediately.
A
Actually,
if
you
know,
I
can't
resist
some
preambles,
we
desperately
desperately
want
to
hear
from
the
ecosystem.
Lots
of
smart
people
in
this
call
do
not
be
shy.
Jump
on
the
mic.
If
you
have
a
question
type
your
questions
in
chats.
Please
keep
in
mind,
though,
that
the
conversations
that
happen
in
the
sidebar
don't
make
it
into
the
public
record
or
the
historical
memory
of
maker
down.
So
if
you
have
something
smart
to
say,
please
consider
asking
it
on
the
microphone,
so
we
can
try
to
minimize
the
number.
A
That
we're
having
during
this
call,
so
we
can
all
join
in
the
same
combo.
That's
yeah!
That's
the
end
of
the
preamble,
so
I'm
going
to
hand
it
off
to
you
long
for
wisdom
for
government's
at-a-glance.
You
know
one
second,
preamble,
sorry,
man
there's
going
to
be
a
shot
clock
for
each
one
of
the
presentations.
So
please
try
to
keep
your
segments
to
5
minutes
or
less.
If
you
can
alright
with
that
warm
welcome
currents,
a
but
sure.
C
C
In
addition
to
that,
we've
had
Derek
as
posted
a
post
on
the
forum
talking
about
the
D
s
chief
contract
redesign
fairly
soon,
there's
gonna
be
a
chance
where
we
got
to
replace
D
s
chief
Derek's,
going
to
talk
more
about
that
in
a
future
meeting,
but
there's
a
third
on
the
forum.
If
anyone
is
interested
prior
to
that,
we
also
had
a
Seth
from
source
credit
post.
C
C
They've
heard
something
on
the
peg,
so
both
of
those
worked
in
the
forum
currently
and
first
and
additionally,
the
it's
not
really
used,
I,
don't
hear,
but
the
previous
didn't
requests
to
adjust
the
WBC
debt
ceiling
at
riskier
moving
past
and
the
debt
ceiling
has
already
been
used
up,
but
just
giving
me
a
summary
of
that.
All
right,
so
I
think
that's
everything.
Keeping
with
the
quickness.
That's
huge
I.
A
D
D
B
So
last
week
was
quite
calm,
but
this
week
we
had
the
formal
submission
period
from
July
6
to
July
8
ending
yesterday,
and
we
saw
seven
proposals
come
in
I'll
review
them
over
the
next
slide,
and
we
also
saw
two
new
prima
discussions
opposed
to
the
proposal
idea
subcategory
and
that
was
for
the
pigs,
stabilization
modules,
the
PSM
and
a
governs
chief
contract
redesign,
so
I
urge
everyone
to
go
and
check
those
out
or
constantly
review
them.
I
know
the
peg
stabilization
module
forum
thread
is
quite
busy.
B
These
will
eventually
lead
into
the
Clairol
on
boarding
discussions
later
on
on
Thursday
we're
gonna
rule
today,
starting
rich
and
long
I.
Think
along
is
going
to
do
today,
we'll
do
the
submission
review
for
the
seven
proposals
to
determine
which
of
them
can
be
included
in
the
inclusion
polls
on
next
Monday.
B
So,
as
for
the
proposals
that
have
been
formally
submitted,
we
saw
seven
come
through
four
of
which
are
MIPS
and
three
of
which
are
supposes.
It
basically
covers
the
formalization
of
the
weekly
governance
cycle,
MIPS
16.
We
saw
him
up
17,
which
is
a
weekly
actual
debt
ceiling
and
actual
risk
premia
adjustments,
and
we
had
a
meta
parameter
justments
and
lastly,
19,
which
is
the
liquidation
systems
1.1
upgrade,
which
I
believe
Mariana
will
be
speaking
briefly
to
later
on.
B
In
the
call
the
sub
proposals
are
for
modifying
the
meta
parameter,
adjustments
related
to
MIT
18,
which
basically
aims
to
remove
the
DSR
spread
from
weekly
polls,
and
we
also
saw
in
terms
of
Clairol
onboarding,
a
formal
proposal
for
onboarding
a
mana
collateral
type.
And
lastly,
we
have
mid
12
amendment
proposal
for
improving
the
efficiency
of
overall
Claro
onboarding
for
both
the
domain
teams
and
just
the
overall
process.
B
Finally,
clearing
up
everything
that
should
allow
us
to
use
all
the
monthly
cycles
for
Clairol
onboarding
going
forward
in
terms
of
the
myths
that
are
still
in
requests
for
comments,
phase
and
kind
of
covering
over
their
feedback
periods.
We
have
the
mid
15
dark
fix
mechanism,
that's
still
I
believe
a
month
away
from
entering
a
governance
cycle.
B
B
So
next
week's
activity
will
have
the
inclusion
polls
go
out
on
Monday
for
all
the
proposals
I've
officially
approved
by
the
government's
facilitators
today
and
they'll,
run
until
July
16th
at
noon
and
then
on
Thursday
we'll
have
the
governance
facilitators
performed
that
inclusion
for
review
to
determine
which
of
the
proposals
should
actually
be
included
in
the
governance
pulled
the
following
Monday
terms
of
other
news.
Like
I
mentioned,
we
will
be
seeing
man
I
go
through
the
governance
cycle
this
month.
B
It
will
indeed
go
through
the
monthly
cycle
and
will
also
see
Len
go
through
the
weekly
cycle,
and
this
is
due
to
an
issue
with
mid
12
requirements
that
are
actually
getting
fixed
this
month
with
the
mid
12mm
and
that
I
mentioned
earlier,
ultimately
allowing
Clara
onboarding
to
use
the
monthly
cycle
going
forward,
and
this
month,
Clara
onboarding
community
green
light.
Poles
will
go,
live
on
Monday,
July
20th.
B
This
will
happen
in
the
third
week
of
government
cycle
ending
by
the
end
of
the
cycle,
as
opposed
to
the
former
process
that
we
use,
which
made
it
carry
over
to
governance
cycles
and
reduce
the
efficiency
of
overall
Clara
onboarding.
So
that's
my
bit
for
today
again.
I
urge
you
to
check
out
all
the
proposals
that
have
been
formally
submitted
in
the
forums
and
I
will
be
posting.
My
weekly
mix
update
this
week
as
well
recapping
everything
I
just
spoke
about.
A
Exhales,
as
I
mentioned
at
the
top
of
the
call,
we
have
a
super
aggressive
schedule
today,
but
there's
also
going
to
be
a
lot
of
interesting
or
points
that
are
worthy
of
discussion.
So
I
make
a
note
of
any
questions,
you'd
like
to
ask
and
we
can
potentially
get
to
them
at
the
end
of
them.
After
all,
the
presentations
are
over
very
well
I
gotta
hand
it
off
to
you
for
submissions
Ruth,
yeah.
C
C
So
again,
I
guess
not
to
repeat
kind
of
what
jaws
I
said.
It's
going
to
say,
I,
don't
think
there
are
any
issues
with
these
with
the
currently
proposed
nips.
That
would
prevent
them
from
being
continuing.
That's
the
inclusion
ball,
so
they'll
all
continue,
yeah
odo
to
Tyler
fringe
that
people
at
least
read
like
the
summaries
of
these
two
what's
proposed,
and
because
there's
a
few
that
changed
things
or
introduced
new
things
see
ya.
A
E
Thank
you,
so
yeah
liquidations
one
point
one
that
finally
got
into
the
monthly
governance
cycle,
so
that's
gonna
be
voted
on
at
the
end
of
the
month.
You
all
should
know
this.
By
now,
I've
talked
about
it
many
times
it
fixes
a
couple
of
things:
a
double
liquidity
needed
for
all
of
our
actions,
the
flip
flop
flop.
You
know
collateral
debt
and
surplus
plus
fixing
the
bug
that
we
saw
in
March
where
debt
auctions
could
be
stuck.
There
is
a
lot
more
information
in
the
MIPS
write-up
which
is
over
here.
E
E
So
we
are
gonna
have
like
a
more
aggressive
message
in
the
coming
weeks.
Giving
out
you
know
the
the
deployed
addresses
and
everything
so
people
can
can
switch
on
time
other
than
that
there
is
there's,
not
a
lot
more
to
say
about
it,
and
if
you
have
any
questions
like
ask
me
here
or
finally,
in
chat
or
in
the
forums
and
I
do
want
to
give
an
update
on
true.you
SD.
We
have
Lucas
Monroe
from
the
smart
contracts
team
working
on
reviewing
the
latest
implementation.
E
So
now
we
are
in
in
touch
with
the
trio
C
team
and
they
are
going
to
do
an
another
upgrade
to
their
token
in
less
than
two
weeks.
But
this
time
they
are
deploy
the
code
for
us
to
look,
give
it
a
look
before
and
give
our
recommendation
whether
we
feel
that
it's
safe
and
if
we
do
so
we
are.
This
is
ongoing.
If
we
do
we're
gonna
recommend
that
the
community
reactivate
through
USD,
using
a
weekly
governance
cycle,
so
maybe
next
week
or
the
week
after,
and
this
will
also
guide
us.
E
A
Thanks
marina,
really
interesting
to
watch
the
TST
situation
evolve.
It
has
implications
that
they're
not
going
to
be
the
first
nor
the
last
it
so
it
means
to
upgrade
their
contracts.
We
yeah.
Let's
you
know
what
I'm
going
to
rearrange
the
agenda
slightly
Nick.
Do
you
want
to
talk
briefly
about
the
Oracles
and
then,
after
that
we
can
get
into
the
PSM.
F
Sure
I'll
be
very
brief
and
since
I
know,
we've
got
a
lot
of
stuff
to
go
through.
So
I
wanted
to
give
a
quick
overview
of
what
what
two
of
the
oracle
proposals
that
we've
seen
come
in
on
the
forum
recently
that
we're
going
to
be
tackling
this
month.
Keep
in
mind
that
because
we
haven't
done
the
refactor
for
myth
10.
Yet
it's
a
similar
situation
to
what
we're
doing
with
with
Lent,
where
these
will
officially
be
going
through
the
weekly
cycle
rather
than
monthly.
F
But
we
will
try
to
align
them
timing,
wise
with
with
the
monthly
cycle,
just
to
kind
of
kind
of
keep
up
a
systematic
way
of
how
we
go
through
these
proposals.
So
the
first
is
that
we
have
an
application
from
argent
to
become
a
light
feed
so
I'll
be
doing
the
the
due
diligence
on
on
the
information
they
provided
in
that
proposal
and
posting
that
early
next
week.
F
The
the
other
thing
is,
we
have
a
proposal
from
khyber
to
create
a
can
see
eath
Oracle
for
them
that
they
will
use
for
their
kind
of
buy
and
burn
model
for,
for
the
KMC
token,
so
we're
gonna
be
doing
that
as
well
and-
and
the
third
is
a
proposal-
I
haven't
published
it,
but
that
I
also
want
to
publish
early
next
week.
Is
that
we're
starting
to
add
a
lot
of
feeds
right?
So
the
the
number
of
feeds
that
we've
you
know
had
has
gone
up
considerably
and
right
on
single
collateral
die.
F
So
right
now
quorum
is
at
13,
and
so,
if
we
add
that
quorum
of
13
right
with
20
feeds,
if
we
want
to
kind
of
keep
that
ratio
or
at
least
like
a
similar
ratio,
I'm
thinking,
we
should
at
least
raise
it
to
15,
possibly
even
17
kind
of
moving
forward.
So
so
I,
don't
think
that's
very
controversial.
But
it
is
something
that
that
we
kind
of
need
to
have
a
discussion
about
right,
so
yeah,
so
I'll
post
that
proposal
early
next
week,
along
with
you,
know
the
the
reasoning
and.
A
All
right,
thanks,
Nick,
looking
forward
to
those
discussions.
Maybe
when
you
kick
them
off
some
indication
of
the
urgency
in
would
help
us
to
determine.
But
thanks
for
the
update,
useful
Koresh
has
an
update
on
WB,
TC
liquidity
and
I'm
willing
to
allow
it
predicated
on
the
fact
that
he
promises
less
than
two
minutes
less.
D
Than
two
minutes,
thanks,
rich
so--but
Rex
is
launching
a
WBT
CBT,
see,
eat
and
USD
T
pers
I
think
later
today,
and
also
Alameda
research,
swipe
wallet
and
HDX.
Sorry,
three
arrows
capital
are
becoming
W
BTC
merchants,
so
we're
expecting
that
to
help
with
liquidity,
quite
a
bit
just
wanted
to
give
that
a
update
to
everyone.
Thank
you.
That's.
A
Ongoing
discussions
in
the
forum's,
so
it's
a
bit
stickier
than
this
call
that'd,
be
great
I
appreciate
the
update,
though
ladder
there
we
go
it's
on
to
the
big
show
I'll,
let
you
take
it
away
with
a
presentation.
If
there's
no
high
level
contest
in
the
presentation,
can
you
maybe
make
sure
every
understands
what
we're
talking
about?
If
that's
already
covered,
feel
free
to
ignore
me,
yeah.
A
G
G
G
Yeah
so
before
we
talk
about
the
the
module
itself,
I
wanted
to
start
with
a
little
bit
of
background
as
as
suggested
so
the
place
where
this
this
came
from
really
is.
There's
you
to
the
long-term
goal
that
we
try
and
keep
in
mind,
and
the
long-term
goal
here
is
to
to
have
decentralization
at
scale
through
through
diversification,
and
that
means
we
need
to
scale
up
the
maker
protocol
to
the
point
of
critical
mass
and
to
to
make
itself
sustainable
and
yeah.
We
think
it's
always
very
important
to
keep
that
in
mind.
G
This
is
part
of
our
move
to
full
decentralization.
We
can't
be
centralized
if
we
can't
become
self-sustainable,
because
we
can't
scale
so
decentralization
through
diversification.
That
would
mean
a
diversified
collateral
portfolio.
So
we
know
that
in
the
future
the
real
world
assets
are
very
promising
area.
G
The
question
is:
how
do
we
get
there,
because
this
is
not
forced
tomorrow?
No,
this
work
is
still
very
much
going
on
and,
to
you
know,
to
make
it
grow.
Big
enough
will
take
some
time,
so
we
need.
We
need
the
necessary
tools
to
get
from
where
we
are
today
to
to
that
point,
and
we
are
facing
some
challenges,
so
the
state
of
the
pag
has
been
less
than
ideal,
so
the
back
has
been
struggling
since
the
the
market
crash
of
March
12th.
G
It
took
really
a
long
time
to
get
to
the
point
where
it
was
almost
restored
and
then
with
the
the
new
functionality
in
compound
that
actually
thinks
got
worse
again
before
they
got
better
because
we
experienced
this
is
the
mantra
and
the
question
really
is
how
how
can
we
develop
the
tools
that
allow
us
to
yeah
to
handle
these
things
just
to
press
the
point
a
bit
further.
The
broken
peg
really
inhibits
the
growth
of
the
protocol.
G
So
really
the
broken
bag
deters
users,
and
it
makes
is
it's
actually
making
a
bad
situation
worse
with
this
negative
feedback
loop,
it's
important
that
to
know
that
a
broken
bag.
It
often
destroys
the
use
case
for
verdi,
users
and
integrators,
so
we
we
know
that
there
are
companies
and
projects
that
were
working
with
they're,
losing
the
desire
to
integrate
the
I
as
a
result
and
their
use
their
losing
end
users,
and
this
has
been
going
on
for
some
time
as
I
mentioned,
with
a
broken
bag.
G
Not
I
see
me
to
move
in
the
wrong
direction.
This
this
is
becoming
urgent
surface
show
as
a
decentralization,
which
is
the
the
main
main
selling
point
here
of
the
I.
It's
very
important,
but
it
only
matters
if,
if
we
have
a
well-functioning
tag,
definitely
for
real-world
adoption.
If
you
know
if
the
this
the
currency
is
perceived
to
be
unstable,
then
really
doesn't
matter
a
lot
that
you're
decentralized
you
you
need
to
have
both.
G
So
the
the
concern
that
we've
heard
is
that
the
governance
community
is
is
not
taking
this
this
serious
enough,
because
it
has
been
quite
some
time
now,
since
the
bag
has
been
broken
and
yeah.
We're
we're
getting
a
lot
of
questions
like
what
are
we
doing
to
to
deal
with
this
so
enters
here
enters
the
the
pack
civilization
module,
it's
a
actually
quite
simple
concept,
but
the
the
consequences
are
sometimes
hard
to
wrap
our
heads
around
and
that's
where
that's
a
tricky
part
so
did
the
functionality
is,
is
quite
basic.
G
With
the
pack
civilization
module,
any
users
can
use
the
module
to
exchange
stable
points
for
died,
and
vice
versa,
up
to
a
certain
limit
that
would
be
set
by
governance
and
the
way
that
it
works
of
exchanging
die
for
stable
client
means
that
the
this
generates
dye
and
a
Pyxis
table
coin
as
collateral
and
in
the
other
direction.
People
can
take
out
this
table
coin
until
the
the
buffer
has
been
empty
and
yeah
we've
been
looking
into
the
implementation
of
this.
G
That,
logically,
is
possible
to
define
a
fee
in
either
direction,
not
necessarily
one
to
one.
We
can
also
define
not
just
one
bucket
with
a
limit
and
a
fee,
but
multiple
of
them
and
increases
these
bands
and
it's
possible
to
support
any
stable
point
really.
That
would
also
be
feasible
for
collateral
through
votes.
G
We
hope
that
it
can
help
create
these
buffers
to
deal
with
the
kind
of
demand
shocks
that
were
witnessing
today.
It
allows
for
a
low
friction,
arbitrage
between
dye
and
other
stable
coins.
More
so,
we
believe
then,
then
volts
with
us
DC
and
other
stable
coins
as
collateral,
and
it
can
even
potentially
replace
the
USD,
see
a
I
think
that's
the
the
biggest
candidate,
maybe
even
the
B
type
collateral,
and
ultimately,
what
this
is.
G
It's
a
lever
to
trade,
the
risk
that
is
the
result
of
the
broken
peg
for
collateral
risk
for
taking
on
these
the
the
stable
coins
in
the
system,
as
as
part
of
the
portfolio,
the
fees.
Of
course,
there
may
be
an
additional
income
for
the
protocol
and
it's
up
to
governance,
as
always
to
determine
the
right
risk
parameters
and
the
balance.
So
what
we
want
to
strike
that
balance
of
you
know
taking
risk
away
from
due
to
broken
peg
versus
the
the
diversification
of
the
collateral
in
the
system.
G
G
This
is
part
of
the
reason
why
it
removes
a
lot
of
friction
the
this
fees
they
can
be
compared
to
a
one-time
stability
fee
that
is
paid
in
advance
and
then
finally,
technical
technical
detail
under
the
hood.
It
can
be
implemented
as
a
module
that
we
already
have.
That
already
has
been
battle
tested,
which,
which
is
decide
to
dye
migration
module.
G
G
We
may
start
with
actually
a
few
bands
with
relatively
high
fees
so,
for
example,
5%
6%
and
then
see
if
that
can
act
as
a
buffer
to
keep
the
bag
below
that
fee
level
of
five
to
six
percent,
and
this
might
support
the
market
makers,
who
can
then
further
maintain
the
bag
within
that
five
to
six
percent
safety
zone
and
then
over
time.
As
we
get
to
know
the
tool
better
and
understand
the
consequences,
then
we
we
may
consider
reducing
not
the
bag
but
the
the
fee
and
bringing
it
closer
to
the
pack.
G
H
What
water
sort
of
hilariously,
while
you
were
making
that
talk,
I
was
making
a
diagram
of
where
I
thought
the
risk
of
the
system
was,
and
it
actually
speaks
to
this
last
slide.
So
I
don't
know
you
want
me
to
like
share
my
screen
just
so
that
we
can
kind
of
drill
home
this
last
slide
or
not,
but
we.
A
A
D
H
H
So
volt
holders
have
a
very
strong
market
incentive
to
rebalance
to
a
dollar,
and
the
PSM
allows
us
to
create
this
almost
emergency
mechanism
outside
on
the
edges
of
of
where
we
would
find
the
peg
to
be
so
far
out
of
bounds
that
we
want
this.
This
module
to
spin
up
and
kind
of
take
over
so
the
red
here
is
where
the
PSM
would
be
running
and
I
kind
of
flanked
it
in
green.
Just
to
indicate
like
the
PSM
has
a
debt
ceiling,
so
so
anytime
said
of
PEG
would
go
over
in
this
case.
103.
H
Once
you
hit
that
debt
ceiling
you're
back
into
the
sort
of
basic
market
incentives
that
salt
holders
have,
which
appears
really
strong
right,
so
the
vault
holder
in
this
area
is
going
to
want
to
create
a
vault
and
try
and
push
the
thing
down
to
heart,
the
peg
and
and
then
on
the
low
end.
I,
don't
know
it.
You
know
we
kind
of
need
to
discuss
the
parameters
on
the
low
end,
but
this
is
where
it
would
sort
of
unload
the
PSM.
H
You
know
so
somebody
would
would
show
up,
would
die
and
and
get
us
to
CEO,
and
we
have
a
lot
of
mechanisms
to
kind
of
control
the
low
end.
So
you
know
we
probably
want
to
more
likely,
maybe
even
unload
this
thing
closer
to
$1.00,
so
that
you
know
we
can
use
our
other
mechanisms
down
in
this
area,
but
that
that
this
range,
this
sort
of
band
and
sorry
if
the
diagram
doesn't
really
convey
the
meaning
that
well
I,
could
have
just
made
it.
H
But
the
more
we
tighten
this
band
and
get
to
1
the
more
gripes
I
have
with
a
PSM.
The
more
I
think
it'll
remove
the
very
natural
market
mechanism
that
we
have
with
vault
holders
like
there's
an
inn,
there's
an
entire
mechanism
for
balancing
a
peg
that
we
would
would
snipe
out
the
closer
we
get
to
that
dollar.
Part
I
think
that
this
was
one
of
the
ideas
was
conveyed
as
empty
shelves
right.
H
Friction
permissionless
waver
to
do
that
to
like
get
us
back
down
to
like
an
acceptable
range,
but
I
still
I
still
believe
in
the
core
mechanism
of
the
maker
protocol,
which
is
vault
holders
or
being
the
ones
that
actually
art
the
peg
and
I
want
everyone
to
be
extremely
aware
that
if
we
kill
that
mechanism,
the
green
mechanism
that
could
be
disastrous
for
the
protocol
in
the
same
way
that
being
off
the
peg
is
disastrous
for
the
protocol.
So
that
was
you
know
and
helps
convey
the
idea
at
all.
H
G
A
This
the
mechanisms
were
discussing
here
are
they
have
a
great
deal
of
impact
on
a
protocol
and
I
think
that
I
know
that
there's
a
lot
of
questions
out
there.
A
lot
of
questions
haven't
shown
up
in
this
call
and
I'm
concerned
that
maybe
people
are
afraid
of
asking
a
dumb
question.
I
hope
they're,
not
because
there
aren't
any
and
to
prove
it.
A
I'm
gonna
ask
the
first
dumb
question
here:
I,
don't
I
try
to
wrap
my
head
around
how
much
upward
or
downward
pressure
the
PSM
could
possibly
exert
before
it
exhausts
itself
how
much
utility
can
be
brought
to
bear
here?
So
if
there's
a
significant
deviation
from
the
peg
people
are
piling
in,
and
we
don't
want
that
to
happen.
How
how
I
guess
I
can't
get
more
clear
than
that?
I
Okay,
so
so,
if
I
don't
lose
this,
my
Ranchin
was
have
a
read
of
PS
ohms.
It's
the.
Why
does
the
liquidity
provider
of
last
resort
write
the
the
Narrows
that
you
want
to
provide
some
liquidity
in,
like
the
0.995
to
105
or,
however,
you
want
to
bracket
it?
That's
the
one
you
put
the
lightest
DC
on.
You
expect
it.
You
don't
want
it
to
be
pegged.
I
Your
job
is
good
when
these
things
aren't
being
tapped
at
all
and
it's
living
in
the
narrowest
range
and
you
put
a
light
DC
on
there
to
provide
liquidity
right.
You
take
the
bet
if
you're
down
I'll
buy
it
because
we're
going
to
be
back
at
1
and
we
know
it
and
if
you're
high
you
sell
it
and
you
peg
it
and
you
know
and
you'll
get
back
eventually
right.
I
It's
the
wide
range
where
you
have
the
heavy
hand
and
you
go
look
if
we
hit
1.02
or
1.03,
somebody
was
showing
we
come
in
with
a
heavier
hand
and
go
we're
going
to
take
that
back,
because
we're
know
we're
going
to
be
back
to
one.
It's
our
job
to
do
this
and
we
need
to
provide
liquidity
to
markets
when
they
want
it
and
they're
being
a
little
crazy.
The
whole
question
then
becomes
well
how
much
do
we
do?
I
was
just
posting
I
put
a
post
up.
I
Someone
was
asking
me
about
what
Levin
I
thought
I
was
like.
Well,
we
talked
everybody
seen
that
I
talked
to
you
soon
as
I.
Think
50
million
here
would
be
interesting
and
question
is
how
do
you
get
it?
Nobody
really
said
the
numbers.
We
can
talk
about
it.
It's
becomes
a
question
of
tools
to
apply
to
the
system
and
I
like
the
idea
of
at
least
starting
with
a
wide
PSM,
maybe
at
10
or
20
million
u.s.
I
DC
as
an
experiment,
along
with,
like
maybe
reducing
rates
and
and
making
sure
our
DC's
are
high,
so
that
it's
used.
It's
like.
We
can
take
a
stab
at
this
market
with
50
million
died
somehow
and
all
across
the
board
see
what
happens.
I
think
the
consensus
is
and
I
just
posted,
so
I
thought
about
it.
Camp
was
offering
two
times
the
dye
market
camp
is
a
yearly
return
on
a
billion
dollars.
I
That's
a
big
fricking
driver
here
man,
it
beats
us
out,
hands
down
and,
like
the
question
becomes
so
much
camp,
do
you
have
to
have
to
be
able
to
absorb
this,
and
it's
basically
related
to
the
cap
that
they're
offering
over
the
time
they're
offering
it?
You
can
do
the
math
on
that
and
put
it
out
in
terms
of
a
monthly.
It's
been
decaying
other
people
sharper
people
have
info
on
this
from
what
I
see
because
I'm
in
it
it's
decaying,
and
so
this
whole
mechanism
is
just
another
tool
on
the
Arsenal.
I
I
I
mean
these
are
the
only
things
that
can
pull
like
10
or
20
million
around
cuz
I'm
in
these
markets
too
I
trade
them,
and
so
that's
the
that's
kind
of
where
we're
at
here
on
this
one,
and
so
we
can
debate
the
numbers
and
how
much
and
what
to
try
and
what
to
do.
But
you
know
I'm
back
to
trying
to
understand
what
peg
is
doing
to
everything
and
if
we
really
want
to
do
something
about
it,
you
have
to
do.
I
The
quiddity,
which
was
the
first
thing
I
came
and
talked
about
here,
was
like
how
do
you
deal
with
liquidity?
So
I
will
leave
it
to
the
rest,
and
that's
kind
of
my
comments
on
that
one.
One
thing
before
I
go
on
to
make
a
plug
for
the
poll
on
the
compensation
plan.
I
just
have
an
informal
pull
up
and
then
eventually
we're
going
to
do
one
unchanged,
so
I
just
wanted
to
do
a
plug
for
that
and
kind
of
get
that
out
of
the
way
just
so
that
we
can.
I
A
H
A
Sorry
I,
just
let
me
finish
it
up.
One
second
I'd
encourage
people
there's
if
we're
not
asking
questions
about
how
this
thing
works.
I
know,
there's
that
there's
strong
opinions
about
concerns
that
people
might
have
what
happens
if
this
thing
doesn't
work
so
ideally
love
for
the
con.
It
called
to
have
a
voice
here.
So
if
we
could
hear
some
concerns
after
chris
has
done
it
yeah.
H
I
mean
for
what
it's
worth
I'm
I
have
a
very
nuanced
love-hate
relationship
with
this
I
suggested
something
similar
back
in
April.
It
seemed
sort
of
instantly
amazing
and
then
I
fell
out
of
love
with
the
idea,
because
I
I
was
worried
about
it,
sort
of
chilling
effects
on
market
behavior,
but
yeah.
It's
also
worth
noting
that
if
you
were
a
market
maker
with
this
I
currently
today,
we
expect
a
vault
holder
to
sort
of
see
the
market
incentive.
H
A
high
peg
means
in
an
arbitrage,
but
then
they
have
to
lock
their
capital
up
and
they
have
to
hope
or
have
faith
that
the
peg
will
eventually
return
back
down
so
that
they
could
realize
the
profits
on
that
arbitrage,
while
they're
doing
that
they're
the
ones
taking
all
this
risk.
So
it's
a
sort
of
I'd
almost
say
like
a
virtuous
sort
of
risk
reward
incentive
mechanism
in
with
it
the
new
mechanism.
H
Let's
say:
if
we're
in
the
outer
bands
you
know
no
longer,
you
know
this
thing
would
spin
up
for
market
makers
where
they
could
sort
of
instantly
turn
that
profit
right.
So
they
get
to
take
all
the
profit
away
instantly
and
in
the
protocol
itself
for
maker
holders
other
ones,
they
have
to
bear
the
risk
until
the
peg
drops
back
down,
which
is
why
I
I
want
to
highlight
these
because
I
am
concerned.
In
the
same
way,
we
added
USD
CA
as
an
emergency
facility
for
liquidity
for
liquidations.
H
H
So
so
this
that
that
sort
of
long
hold
mechanism,
the
sort
of
risk
of
that
is
borne
entirely
by
the
protocol
in
maker
holders,
and
we
give
the
profit
to
these
sort
of
market
makers,
and
so
the
closer
you
get
to
that,
one
that,
like
one
to
one
peg,
the
more
we
we
kill
our
existing
sort
of
incentive
mechanism
and
we
create.
You,
know
this
weird
kind
of
perverse
incentive
that
that
could
be
disastrous
for
the
protocol.
It's
it's
hard
to
say,
I'll.
Let
that
idea
stand
I
mean
I've
got
other
objections.
J
I,
if
I,
if
I,
can
hop
in
I
think
just
also
like
looking
at
other
entities
who
have
gotten
more
involved
in
market
making
like
an
example
that
hops
out
for
me
is
Japan
and
they
have
been
basically
making
markets
in
there.
They're
government
bonds.
It's
you
know
it's
tough
to
step
back
from
this
sort
of
market
engagement
once
you
you,
you
know,
start
it
so
yeah
I
would
just
kind
of
agree
on
that
point
that
you
know
it'll
be
really
tough
to
pull
back
some
of
this.
This
support.
A
J
Think
I
mean
this
is
kind
of
out
of
left
field,
but
perpetual
inflation
sin
theta
X
is
something
that
could
be
considered
like
collateral
that
we
we
want
more
of
eath
ease
a
you
know,
just
basically
minting
and
giving
these
people
at
MKR
to
to
to
meant
for
us.
You
know
I
think
it
can
create
some
supply.
K
So
I
have
a
comment
or
a
couple
of
questions,
and
again
this
is
my
own
personal
opinion,
but
I'm
just
going
to
throw
out
what
I
think
might
be
interesting,
but
again,
I
have
no
idea
if
this
is
correct,
so
I'll
throw
it
out
anyway,
I
think
having
the
USDA
DCA
vault
at
4%
is
interesting,
but
that's
for
people
who
want
to
mark
makers
want
to
take
on
risk
and
are
willing
to
ride
it
out
for
a
year
and
essentially
pay
4%
in
a
year.
The
problem
is:
there's
not
enough
market
makers
with
infinite
liquidity.
K
So
at
a
certain
point,
I
think
the
protocol
providing
liquidity
at
at
a
very
high
payment
rate
is,
is
maybe
okay.
So
what
I'm
suggesting
is
having
the
USDA
see
a
vault
at
4%
as
it
currently
is,
but
also
having
the
peg
PSM
there.
You
switch
one
to
one,
but
you
pay
a
4%
fee.
Let's
say
to
immediately
convert
your
you
USD
C,
to
die,
for
example,
and
that
4%
fee
is
immediate
and
goes
to
the
protocol.
So
now
you
have
kind
of
two
mechanisms
battling
to
get
the
peg
stabilized.
K
H
C
And
I
just
can
make
up
on
this
because
we
have
a
similar
problem
with
volts
right
in,
but
they
pay
folks
in
a
year,
but
they
pay
gradually
over
the
year
right
like
if
the
the
cultural
type
explodes
before
the
year
goes
out,
then
we're
still
like
on
the
losing
side,
so
it
kind
of
switches
that
from
long
term
to
short
term
relay
that's
like
that
sort
of
question.
I,
don't
think
it's
like
it's
not
fundamentally
different.
It
just
switches
it
round
and
it
might.
C
L
That
is
kind
of
an
open
question
in
the
community
as
to
what
level
we
are
comfortable
with
at
the
peg
price,
like
we
were
a
dollar
and
point
two
cents
for
a
few
weeks
there,
and
that
was
not
a
comfortable
place
for
many
people.
So
I
think
you
know
we
all
need
to
decide
where
we're
we're
comfortable
with
letting
that
that
peg
slide.
M
This
notion
that
we
went
from
one
model
where
we
incentivize
market
makers
to
mint
die
and
kind
of
wait
for
it
to
convert
back
versus
now,
which
is
kind
of
swapping
that
out
on
immediately
on
the
fly.
I,
don't
think.
That's
really
is
important,
because
the
end
state
for
maker,
in
both
situations
is
the
same,
which
is
a
baker,
has
a
bunch
of
collateral
and
there's
a
bunch
of
die
outstanding.
But
the
new
PSM
makes
that
more
profitable
for
people
who
interact
with
the
PSM.
M
L
And
so
you
know
in
like
this
were
a
forex
market
we'd
be
seeing
fluctuations
between
competing
currencies
and
I
think
we
need
to
understand
the
the
macro
situation
of
the
fact
that
we're
going
into
another
bull
market
and
people
are
just
trying
to
to
throw
dollars
into
aetherium
and
we're
just
a
more
desirable
place
to
be
right
now.
But
we
don't
have
the
supply
to
get
there
so
like
this.
This
may
be
a
great
way
to
go.
M
M
It's
once
you
go
above
what
you're
comfortable
with
is
when
you
start
asking
okay,
how
long
do
we
have
to
keep
this
on
the
books
for
and
then
you
start
getting
into
questions
like
truly
how
big
is
makers
capacity
to
to
take
on
US
DC
and,
if
they're
willing
to
hold
it
beyond
that
beyond,
like
a
reasonable
timeline
right,
but
I
really
I
just
think
the
first
question.
The
most
important
question
here
is
just
how
big?
C
Actually,
I'm,
actually
not
sure,
I
agree
with
you,
sir.
It's
like
I
think
the
kind
of
band
is,
is
one
of
the
more
important
issues,
because
I
feel
like
this
kind
of
a
difference
of
opinion
among
like
people
in
this
community
is
like
how
far
off
peg
is
too
far,
because
I
mean
we're
currently
1.0
1/5
or
something
which
is
you
know
it's
that's
like
what
a
half
percent
right
this
is
think.
Do
people
think
that
is
like
that
is
too
hard
too
much
or
like.
C
If
that's
fine,
because
the
kind
of
message
we're
getting
from
some
of
the
foundation
people
is
that
that's
too
much
based
on
like
what's
his
presentation,
things
where
is
I,
think
maybe
Chris
and
Brian
perhaps
think
that,
like
that,
that
is,
that
is
okay.
Right,
like
we're
like
that's
within
the
bounds
for
letting
the
market
sorted
out.
Okay,.
G
I
think
there
is
a
really
important
point,
which
is
that
you
can't
just
express
this
in
terms
of
like
1%,
assume
I
supercenters
too
much
it.
It
also
depends
a
lot
whether
it
sometimes
drop
to
below
$2
or
not
right,
and
how
long
like,
how
yeah
what
the
average
price
is
over
a
longer
period
of
time,
I
think
one
or
two
percent
sometimes
I,
don't
see
that
that
could
be
a
problem,
but
that
is
assuming
that
it,
it
fluctuates
the
rantin
dollar
right,
which
currently
isn't
the
case.
Yeah.
C
Sure
I
parish
agree
with
that.
Even
if
we
turn
the
PSM
up
to
like
you
know,
like
200
million,
then
we
have
it
like
one
to
one
that
can't
push
it
below
peg
right,
like
maybe
push
it
to
the
back,
so
we're
never
gonna
drop
back
below
again
like
in
this.
You
know
nice
to
get
a
lot
more
and
supply
from
some
somewhere
else
right.
G
Yeah,
the
new
answer
is,
I
think,
that
you,
you
are
creating
improved
confidence
in
the
system
again,
so
people
will
start
acting
in
a
way
that
assumes
that
the
peg
is
is
fixed
again,
and
then
you
will
see
that
that
fluctuation
again,
it's
it's
really
a
matter.
I
think
it's
getting
away
from
that
negative
spiral.
The
negative
feedback
loop.
C
G
That's
that's
what
I
would
I
don't
think.
That's
the
case
like
a
system
that
is
out
of
balance
like
overall,
has
has
the
problem
with
confidence
like
it's,
not
just
that
the
dye
users
I
mean,
as
you
say,
if
it
were,
then
you
know
the
peg
would
be
restored.
Great,
so
I
think
the
general
confidence
in
the
system
it's
much
broader
than
just
our
users.
This
yeah.
This
is
not
the
same.
Okay.
N
G
N
In
there
just
with
context
so
long,
prison
I
mean
you're
referencing,
a
very
short
term
cycle,
where
we
have
these
levers
to
pull
that
affects
the
dye
peg,
but
I
think
the
the
spiral
that
routers
talking
about
is
much
more
long-term
and
and
much
more
systemic
to
what
we're
doing.
So.
If
you
look
at
the
way
that
dye
has
propagated
in
the
market,
it
very,
its
utility
is
very
much
derived
from
network
effects,
yeah
our
integration
partners.
Now
it's
so
I.
N
You
know
just
some
context
for
me
personally,
I
deal
with
the
majority
of
our
integration
partners
from
the
foundation
standpoint
and
since
March
we
have
seen
six
to
centralise
applications.
Not
just
you
know,
integration
partners,
we've
we've
had
many
more
that
have
dropped
since
then,
but
six
decentralized
applications
decide
to
use
us
DC
over
died.
Since
then-
and
you
know-
that's
really
troubling
to
me
so
when
I,
when
I
pull
them
and
I
asked
them
why
they
say
they
unanimously
cite
the
instability
and
die
and
when
I'm
really
worried
about.
N
Is
that
that's
tough
to
overcome,
but
not
impossible?
If
we
take
the
peg
seriously
when
I'm
nervous,
that
we
do
is
that
we
started
tapping
them
for
providing
demand
in
the
first
place
and
I
think
that's
a
really
dangerous
precedent
to
set
because
put
yourself
in
the
shoes
of
one
of
these
startup
founders.
Imagine
they're!
Choosing
your
product
they're,
taking
a
risk
on
you
and
then
they're,
they're,
very
successful,
and
you
come
back
to
them
and
say:
hey
you're,
providing
too
much
demand
for
my
product.
Stop.
N
C
Yeah
so
broadly,
I
grew
that
the
kind
of
point
I'm
making
is
that
as
the
demand
as
the
natural
demand
like
decreases
for
the
ripped
issues.
For
the
reasons
you
just
said
right,
because
the
peg
is
due
honey
man
is
in-state
unstable,
like
that
pressures
down
the
demand
for
dye,
which
then
allows
us
to
raise
rates
which
increases
the
DSR,
which
then
increases
demand
for
die
again
right,
like.
C
So
you
know-
and
at
that
point
at
that
point
we
can
then
charge
the
you
know
offer
the
DSR
again
and
all
these
integration
partners
are
integrating
this
coin,
which
has
you
know
a
benefits
holding
it
right,
as
opposed
to
holding
dye
in
like
in
the
things
where
they
can
use
the
DSR
and
offer
like
interest
in
addition
to
their
regular
functionality
right
so
again,
I'm
not
saying
I,
don't
think
you're
wrong.
I
agree
with
you.
C
It's
not
ideal
if,
like
the
natural
demand,
disappears,
what
I'm
saying
is
there's
a
chance
that
will
come
back
again.
I
guess,
like
the
system
is
sent.
It's
push
that
demand
to
come
back
again.
That's
how
it's
supposed
to
work
right,
like
the
reason
we're
having
this
problem
is
because
we're
extending
it
our
extended
other
demand
side
and
we
can't
keep
up
on
the
supply
side,
so
the
solutions
are
either
to
increase
the
supply
side
or
reduce
the
demand
side
until
we
can
keep
up
with
it
right.
So.
G
I
think
that's
that's
where
the
the
reality
is
a
little
bit
different
right,
like
you
need
integration
partners
you
need.
Business
partners
should
put
a
lot
of
work
a
lot
of
time
and
a
lot
of
their
investment
into
building
these
systems
supporting
the
product,
and
you
can't
go
to
them
and
say:
oh
well,
you
know
that
we're
currently
off
bag,
so
we're
gonna,
more
or
less
shut
down
your
product
because
it's
not
going
work
anymore
for
some
time.
G
The
use
cases
it'll
destroy
it
for
for
some
time,
but
you
know
come
back
in
come
back
in
January
and
things
will
be
fine
again.
That's
I
think
where
the
the
theory
of
the
economic
model
clashes
with
reality,
and
that
is
exactly
the
concern
that
we
fear
that
we,
as
a
governance
community,
were
not
enough
appreciative.
There's,
there's
practical
differences
with
the
theory.
I
think.
G
O
I
mean
every
big
cost
of
doing
these
kinds
of
integrations
from
like
a
just
like
engineering
and
logistics
perspective,
and
you
know
once
a
project
decides,
you
know
like
dive
versus
u.s.
DC
and
they
go
say
with
us
DC.
You
know
it's
not
like.
They
can
just
flip
a
switch
and
go
to
die
later.
If
they
want
to
it's,
it's
kind
of
a
very
sticky
thing,
and
then
you
started
to
get
those
network
effects
that
Walter
alluded
to.
It
becomes
nonlinear
yeah,
I.
G
Think
it's
also
I
mean
this
is
a
very
interesting
phenomenon
that
really
I
think
there's
thinking
about
more
because,
like
this
is
very
different
from
voltage.
For
example,
right
I
think
people
looking
for
leverage,
they
will
better
understand
and
their
tactics
will
be
more
just
you
know
they
will
know
like
today.
I
can
go
to
this
market
tomorrow.
I
can
refinance
in
that
market.
G
They
there
you
have
that
mobility
and
and
and
they
they
would
do
that
dye
integrations
and
dye
users
they're
very,
very
different
and
kind
of
points
do
the
same
thing
that
we
need
to
consider
yeah
these
use
cases
and
and
and
that
perspective
I,
wouldn't
say
more
seriously,
but
more
in
detail
and
and
realize
that
it's
not
the
same.
It's
not
a
symmetric
situation.
K
So
I
just
wanted
at
a
comment,
and
this
is
again
my
own
personal
comment
because
it
doesn't
represent
anybody
else
in
terms
of
positive
feedback,
loops
and
negative
feedback
loops.
So
right
now,
I
believe
we're
in
a
little
bit
of
a
negative
feedback.
Loop
in
terms
of
nobody
knows
when
to
sell,
died
right,
so
they
kind
of
step
out
of
the
way
and
then
die
can
just
keep
on
going
higher
and
higher
and
because
it
can
there's
these
two
negative
feedback
loops.
K
One
natural
market
makers
are
hesitant
to
sell
because
it
could
go
in
their
face
to
the
vault
owners
who
are
doing
leveraged
trading,
so
they're
they're
minting
dye
and
selling
it.
Those
people
are
a
little
bit
unsure
because,
when
they're
closing
out
their
vaults
they're
not
sure
where
their
worst-case
scenario
of
buying
dye
could
be
and
then
to
add
on
that
speculators
will
come
in
and
start
buying
dye
because
they
think
there's
a
probability.
They
know
the
downside
is
one,
but
they
don't.
K
They
know
the
upside
is
asymmetric,
so
speculators
will
come
in
and
buy
dye,
so
that
is
all
negative
feedback
loops
in
terms
of
controlling
dyes.
Price
now,
if
you
have
the
PSM
with
a
fee
at
5%,
people
would
actually
step
in
front
of
the
PSM
because
they
know
like
their
downside,
is
only
let's
say
what
you
know:
105
so
they'll
step
in
at
104,
knowing
that
it
could
come
down
to
a
dollar.
K
Those
are
asymmetric
risks
and
they
know
their
downside
is
only
a
penny
back
to
105
so
having
the
PSM
and
having
other
tools
where
people
are
confident
that
there
is
a
large
mark
maker
at
105.
Essentially,
the
maker
token
holders
creates
a
positive
feedback
loop
to
getting
the
price
back
down
to
a
dollar.
In
my
opinion,
so
I
just
want
people
to
kind
of
think
about
that.
I
Yeah
guys
I
had
another
thought
on
this.
The
other
thing
too,
if
we
take
the
outside
of
the
trade
around
one,
you
can
use
it
to
test
your
auction
system,
particularly
from
the
high
side
down.
You
can
buy
your
105
I,
don't
care
pick
the
number
and
then
you
basically
offer
the
auction
basically
take
anything
down
to
one,
oh,
and
do
it
periodically
like
to
throw
it
out
as
a
here's,
an
auction?
I
Oh,
you
could
literally
test
the
auction
by
basically
being
the
outside
bidder
in
the
market
and
yeah,
let
I
read,
everybody
will
sit
in
front
of
us
great,
let
them
we
want
them
to
ideally
will
they
sit
there
with
digest
holding
it?
And,
oh,
maybe,
is
that
whether
it
be
a
profitable
crate,
trade
I,
don't
know,
but
the
fact
that
it
gives
us
a
real
six
aguas
salute
soup
to
go
through
to
get
beyond
105
or
even
up
to
it.
I
think
that's
a
great
thing.
I
Whatever
number
you
pick,
it
kind
of
all
works
and
the
idea
of
using
the
auction
system
to
take
the
in
between
just
offer
it
whatever
market
will
give
you
in
there
and
wants
to
let
it
because
you
don't
care
you
want
to
recycle
that
trade
and
be
done
with
it
and
get
it
out
of
the
system.
Ultimately,
so
it's
a
perfect
way
and
just
don't
let
it
go
if
it
goes
below
one
be
like
I'll
keep
it.
Thank
you
we'll.
Try
again
later
they
move
on
yeah.
I
C
Okay,
so
we'll
remember
the
points
in
this
night
chats
saying:
if
we
use
this
as
a
tool
for
monetary
policy,
it
might
make
sense,
dad's
clear
boundaries
on
what
kinds
of
situations
this
could
be
used
for
purposes
and
what
disease
and
fees
saying.
This
is
a
risk
for
this
to
become
the
default
mechanism
for
price
regulation
stabilization
down
the
road,
because
if
the
system
gets
accustomed
to
easy
fixes,
which
is
reasonable
point
thing.
A
A
Wrap
my
head
around:
what
were
the
incentivization
mechanisms
go
in
this
protocol
when
there's
sort
of
this
soft
landing
or
doors,
some
kind
of
appeal
to
authority
back
to
the
protocol
where
people
might
yes,
I,
probably
should
have
organized
my
thoughts
before
I
jumped
on
the
mic,
but
here
here
it
is:
does
this
business
allow
actors
in
the
ecosystem
to
sort
of
exploit
the
fact
that
they
can
play
games
with
the
the
peg?
Knowing
that
the
protocol
is
potentially
going
to
pick
up
the
tab
at
some
point
or
am
I
completely
off-base.
A
Do
we
have
yeah
it's
so
maybe
I
also
loop.
It
back
to
this
I'm,
not
sure
that
there's
our
clear
model
here
that
explains
pain,
points,
ways
that
this
could
be
exploited,
how
it
can
go
wrong.
We've
discussed
a
lot
of
the
things
about
how
it
can
go
right,
which
I
think
are
becoming
more
compelling
as
we
talk
these
things
out.
But
sorry,
somebody
was
gonna,
add
something
it.
A
Yeah
I
suppose
I'm
just
trying
to
find
where's,
yeah
I,
don't
know
it's
it's
possibly
some
just
the
way.
I
think
I'm,
just
we're
changing
some
of
the
games
here
here,
and
so.
My
first
question
is:
how
can
this
be
exploited
for
gain
for
actors
and
the
ecosystem
to
take
advantage
of
this
I?
Don't
I,
don't
understand
it
well
enough
to
answer
that
question
you're
encouraged.
O
K
D
A
C
A
O
And
then
once
you
tap
out
that
that's
ceiling,
you
know,
there's
no
more
ammunition
left
and
the
pake
and
then
proceeded
to
deviate.
You
on
that
point,
and
there
now
becomes
the
sort
of
moral
hazard
where
governance
gets
very
tempted
to
expand
that
debt
ceiling
and
you
know
die,
becomes
more
and
more
a
wrapper
for
whatever
stable
coins
are
in
that
PSM
bucket,
and
that,
I
think,
is
the
scenario
that
a
lot
of
people
are
worried
about.
If
say,
no
and
I
just
becomes
a
US
DC,
rapper
or
whatever.
A
Some
kind
of
back
testing,
or
somebody
can
say
like
alright
in
a
situation
that
looked
like
black
thursday,
a
mechanism
like
this
would
have
benefited
us
for
approximately
two
weeks
or
seven
hours
or
something
so
like
there's
there's
a
risk/reward
scenario
here.
That
needs
to
be
understood
like
how
much
down
we're
gonna.
How
much
pressure
can
this
thing
absorb
and
does
that
additional
window
stability
allow
the
ecosystems
who
sort
of
come
back
to
sanity
and
begin
to
our
it's
the
peg
back
done
at
where
she'd
be?
A
D
A
A
Saying
I
know
if
this
doesn't
fix
all
our
problems,
then
we
shouldn't.
We
shouldn't
even
bother,
of
course,
not
like
we
I'm
fighting
against
binaries
thinking
like
that
all
the
time.
So
if
it
is
a
useful
tool
in
the
toolkit,
that's
great
I
just
want
to
get
a
sense
of
how
useful
it
is
and
for
how
long
that
utility
would
last
all
right
and
I'm
just
putting
it
out
there,
because
not
because
I'm
asking
leading
questions
is
because
I'm
literally
not
smart
enough
to
know,
and
so
I
would
like
for
somebody
to
tell
me.
D
D
N
N
How
much
dye
we
actually
need
to
satisfy
the
comp
demand
and
I
I?
Don't
think
it's
as
much
as
we
may
think,
because
you
get
so
much
I,
don't
want
to
use
the
word
leverage
because
it's
not
accurate,
but
no
cop
earning
leverage
with
dye
there
and
there
is
a
lower
bound
on
the
amount
of
yield
that
a
cop
farmer
will
accept
like
if
you
can
go
with
us
DC
to
block
by
and
earn
8%
you're,
not
gonna
yield
copy.
N
C
C
D
B
D
K
In
my
opinion,
this
is
a
virtuous
cycle
right,
like
the
true
solution.
Is
we
don't
want
to
be
the
rapper
stable
coin
and
I
completely
agree
with
that?
But
you
kind
of
have
to
start
off
with
that,
so
that
you
can
raise
the
eat.
That
ceiling
the
WBT
see
that
ceilings,
because
those
people
will
have
more
confidence
that
when
they
need
to
close
out
they
can
get
a
good
die
price
right.
That's
super
important
to
them
too
so
yeah.
K
P
Yeah
I
want
I,
wasn't
one
to
make
couple
of
arguments
that
are
basically
echoing.
What's
already
been
said
right,
but
I
think
the
first
one
is
that
it's
very
important
to
distinguish
between
the
question
of
whether
the
PSM
is
a
useful
tool
for
maker
governance
and
then
what
needs
to
be
done
about
the
peg
sort
of
Anna.
P
Rather,
let's
call
it
the
minute:
the
pig
emergency
right,
the
pig
and
the
broken
pig
that's
been
broken
for
three
months
and
this
fundamental
imbalance
of
the
system,
because
there's
actually
a
lot
of
different
options
here
right
there
is
I
mean
there.
One
option
that
the
PSM
does
make
even
more
like
useful
of
rather
even
more
efficient,
is
the
just
like
massively
in
creating
creasing
the
stable
coin
debt
ceilings,
but
there's
a
lot
there's
other
options
as
well.
There's
like
adding
in
Karis
collateral,
there's
negative
rates.
P
But
what's
important
to
keep
in
mind.
Is
that
like,
even
if
you're
against
any
of
these
particular
options,
it
doesn't
make
sense
to
to
like
to
discount
the
PSM
as
a
tool
in
all
of
those
situations
unless
it
actually
like
an
is
there
actually
is
a
problem
with
it
as
a
tool?
But
that's
not
really,
you
know.
Ultimately,
that's
that's
not
really
what's
being
discussed
right
like
the
discussion,
the
discussion
is
like
we're
sort
of
we're
looking
at
the
PSM,
but
we're
actually
talking
about
stable
kind
of
ceilings
right
and
I.
P
Just
think
that
it's
very
important
to
keep
those
two
things
separate
right
that
you,
you
may
be
against
a
high,
stable
point
sealing,
but
there's
actually
still
cases
where
the
PSM
is
going
to
be
a
useful
tool
and
and
I
mean
I.
Think
I
want
to
make
like
I,
guess,
I
think
that's
one
specific
example
that
I've
made
a
lot,
unlike
the
chat
for
instance,
that
you
know
that
proportion
hasn't
been
much
engagement
with,
but
I
do
think
that
it's
like.
P
It
does
make
sense
to
me
right
and
that's
this
idea-
that
if
you
have
a
PSM
even
with
a
low
debt
ceiling,
let's
say
with
10
million
or
20
bit
like
basically
a
debt
ceiling.
That
is
not
enough
to
actually
like
fix
the
peg
right.
So
not
we're
not
talking
about
stable
current
expansion,
we're
just
talking
about
adding
a
PSM
and
shuffling
the
debt
ceilings
around
a
little
bit.
So
now,
there's
some
stable
coins
sitting
in
the
PSM.
P
It
still
has
a
very
remarkable
effect
on
the
entire,
like
structure
of
maker
and
the
entire,
like
you
know
what
you
you
know,
what's
called
the
paradigm
of
dial
acquittee
right,
because
it
does
mean
that
now
you're
always
able
to
cash
out
of
die
in
extreme.
You
know
at
extreme
levels
of
liquidity.
You
know
potentially
20
millions,
20
million
in
one
go
and
you
have
a
totally
guaranteed
price
for
it.
P
P
Think
from
that
perspective,
we
actually
like
it
just
objectively,
in
my
opinion,
improves
you
know,
basically,
the
the
the
user
experience
for
any
type
of
use
of
the
system
right,
but
it
particularly
is
important
but
improves
it
for
vault
holders,
because
that's
where
it
does
create
this
yeah.
This,
like
it's
just
like
this
positive
effect,
then
helps
actually
fix.
The
real
underlying
issue
is
the
imbalance
of
the
system,
and
so
the
last
comment
I
want
to
make
it's
just
on
the
imbalance
of
the
system
itself,
right
and
and
I.
P
P
So
basically,
because
at
that
point,
if
you,
if
you
actually
signal,
enter
the
market
and
it
you
know
and
the
volt
hole
is
truly
believe
it
then
you're,
basically
telling
them
to
just
run,
run
for
the
hills
right,
because
now
there's
no
guarantee
that
the
pig
will
even
hold.
So
you
have
no
idea
what
it's
going
to
cost
you
to
actually
pay
down
your
vault
and
also
you
know
it
obviously
just
generally
increases
uncertainty
and
even
like
Texas
on
the
Texas
system
on
the
path,
emergency,
shutdown
and
so
I.
Just
I
mean
I.
P
Just
think
that
that's
very
important
right
and
then
in
that
context
of
like
it's,
not
okay,
to
leave
the
pig
program
and
it's
kind
of
like
the
one
thing
the
system
is
supposed
to
do-
is
to
keep
the
pig
and
that's
just
always
been
the
case
right
and
like
I,
just
I.
Just
think
that
there's
you
know,
there's
a
number
of
arguments
to
be
made
for
four
different
approaches,
like
negative
rates,
is
kind
of
like
the
really
classic
idea.
P
If
this
is
that's
what
you
have
to
do
right,
but
then
that's
also
what
what
what's
been
pointed
out
earlier
is
that
in
this
early
phase
of
the
system,
that's
a
lot
more
disruptive
when
you're
kind
of
just
like,
if
roading
older,
all
the
faith
and
all
the
the
entrenchment
that
has
happened
so
far,
and
so,
when
you
look
at
things
like
adding
and
caris
collateral
or
adding
a
lot
of
stable
coins
to
the
system,
it's
kind
of
like
I
mean
it's.
It's
taking
a
risk
in
a
different
way.
A
Alright,
thanks
for
him
for
the
thoughts
we're
30
minutes
past
the
top
of
the
hour,
so
we
have
about
four
minutes
left.
This
is
a
long
and
very
complicated
discussion.
I,
probably
this
will
not
be
the
last
one.
We
have
about
the
PSM
there's
some
very
vibrant
threats
going
on
in
the
forums.
I
encourage
people
to
get
boned
up
on
those
particulars.
A
A
Thanks
for
thanks
for
that
far
more
detailed
recap,
you
know
when
I
wasn't
prepared
to
give
there's,
there's
things
to
be
explored,
though
the
pros
and
cons
there's
refinements.
We
need
to
think
about
and
talk
about
game
theory
in
sensitization
mechanisms.
We've
talked
about
the
toolkit
and
the
benefit
of
adding
incremental
improvements
to
the
protocol,
so
I
very
much
encourage
people
to
join
and
Chris
has
raised
his
hand
to
the
last
two
minutes
of
the
call
all
right,
yeah.
H
This
is
such
an
amazing
project
like
we're
on
what
the
hundreds
governance
call
and
we're
discussing
about
this.
It's
like
very
coveted,
good
problem
to
have,
which
is
that
there's
a
ton
of
demand
for
die
not
just
from
comp
but
from
all
over
the
market
and
most
startups
most
companies
would
would
die
to
be
in
this
position.
No
pun
intended!
H
Well,
maybe
pun
intended
so
I
just
wanted
to
sort
of
call
out
and
I
know.
You
know,
we've
got
hard
decisions
to
make
and
it's
it's
gonna
be
difficult
to
figure
out
how
we
scale,
but
this
is
the
right,
the
right
set
of
circumstances
that
we
want
to
grow
this
project,
and
it's
exciting
to
be
here.
It's
exciting
to
just
all
of
you
guys.