►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk Call Special: Onboarding USDC as collateral to mitigate liquidity risk
Description
Please join us and help shape the future of the MakerDAO.
Links
- [Video/Voice](https://zoom.us/j/697074715)
- [Dial-in](https://zoom.us/u/acRbIMDvK)
- [Calendar](https://calendar.google.com/calendar/embed?src=makerdao.com_3efhm2ghipksegl009ktniomdk@group.calendar.google.com&ctz=America/Los_Angeles)
B
A
What
I
thought
we'd
do
to
this
call
is
walk
through
a
little
bit
of
current
status
around
where
we
are
today
market
uncertainty,
the
liquidity
crunch
that
that's
introduced,
then
I
was
going
to
hand
it
over
to
long
for
wisdom
to
talk
through
the
pros
and
cons
and
syrus
to
give
us
a
little
bit
more
info
around
the
risk
parameters.
And
if
we've
got
some
smart
contract
team
on
line,
it
would
be
great
to
talk
through
some
of
the
technical
challenges
and
we'll
take
it
from
there.
A
So
in
terms
of
sort
of
where
we
are
today,
I
think
it's
pretty
clear
everyone.
The
crypto
prices
are
crashing
along
with
traditional
markets
and
that's
led
to
a
liquidity
crunch
and
so
we're
seeing
that
as
a
result
of
people,
investors
trying
to
acquire
dye
to
pay
back
their
vaults
number
one.
They
also
want
to
participate
in
flip
auctions
and
they
also
want
to
participate
in
flop
auctions.
A
So
that's
really
introducing
a
crunch,
and
this
is
where
US
DC
comes
in
as
a
as
an
opportunity
to
give
us
more
liquidity
and
try
and
stop
that
increase
in
device
that
we're
seeing
going
up
at
the
moment.
So
I
don't
think
any
of
that's
new
to
anyone,
but
super
quick
intro.
So
long
for
wisdom,
if
you
were
around
and
would
like
to
go
through
some
frozen
ponds
or
I
can
as
well
see
there
yeah.
C
I
guess
maybe
we'll
start
with,
like
sort
of
super
brief
explanation
of
why
US
DC
DC
helps
us
Clairol,
so
the
key
like
mechanism
that
makes
it
really
useful
to
have
stable
point
in
specifically
as
collateral
in
this
situation.
It's
because
you
can
essentially
do
the
following.
Like
loop
of
things
you
couldn't
you
can
so
in
the
case
of
us
DC,
you
can
lock
us
DC
in
your
vaults.
You
can
mint
a
similar
amount
of
dye
depending
on
liquidation
ratio.
C
You
can
then
immediately
sell
that
dye
for
more
US
DC,
and
then
you
can
repeat
that
cycle.
How
much
so
in
this
way
you
FCC
is
essentially
directly
converted
into
like
dye
and
people.
Creating
the
vaults
can
take
advantage
of
the
of
on
dye,
so
selling
die
when
it's
like
1.04,
for
example,
ink
in
your
person
and
this
guy's
actually
happened
up
to
the
debt
ceiling
that
we
which
have
on
us
these
u.s.
DC.
C
C
Yep
thanks
David
cool,
ok,
so
I
guess:
let's
go
through
the
pros
and
cons.
So
there
is
a
forum
post
about
this
where
all
this
is
written
down,
so
you
go
there
and
read
along
if
you
want
or
just
read
at
another
time
cool.
So
the
main
Pro
is
that
we
get
dial
acridity,
which
it
looks
like
it's
pretty
important
right
now.
C
So
it's
sort
of
elaborate
on
this.
The
main
reason
dial
quiddity
is
useful.
It's
because
allows
what
holders
to
close
their
thoughts
without
taking
the
loss
on
the
diaper
egg
on
die
being
off
peg
like
if
a
hot
ass
after
by
diet
above
$1
to
close
their
bolts,
then
that
leaves
the
money
so
annoys
them
fairly.
Naturally,
it
will
also
allow
keepers.
Well,
assuming
liquidity
is
an
issue.
It
will
allow
more
keepers
to
participate
in
the
ongoing
collateral
auctions.
C
C
It
also
prevents
more
keepers
for
participating
more
like
disincentive,
Isis
keep
us
from
speaking,
and
then
we
have
the
similar
shoe
with
keepers
that
want
to
participate
in
flop
options.
They
need
dieters
participate
in
the
auction
because
we
need
to
get
died
in
order
to
burn
it,
so
they
need
to
so
those
options
are,
since
you
didn't
die,
they
can't
participate
in
that
they
don't
have
died,
cool,
so
another
throw
is
that
the
so
is
like
people
are
not
oblivious
to
the
fact
that
die
is
off
pic.
C
So
there's
also
a
PR
like
pro
I
guess
so.
I'm
boarding
this
if
it
fixes
liquidity
and
returns
the
peg
to
closer
to
$1.00
cool.
So
in
terms
of
cons,
most
of
the
information
of
familiar
to
most
people
but
main
well,
first,
one
is
that
it
reduces
the
perceived
purity
of
die
as
a
decentralized
stable
coin.
Die
would
no
longer
be
back
to
entirely
by
decentralized
assets.
C
So
that's
important
ideologically
to
some
subset
of
them.
If
people
in
the
etherium
community,
potentially
some
subset
of
or
possibly
subset,
of
maker
holders
as
well,
another
con
is
that
it
also
comes
with
regulatory
risk
and
blacklist
blacklist
risk,
so
regulatory
risk
because
US
DC
has
a
blacklist
function.
If
the
US
government
decides
that
it's
that
it's
not
cool
to
have
200
banks,
they
were
going
to
anymore,
then
that's
we're
kind
of
out
of
luck
or
potentially
out
of
luck
in
that
in
that
situation,
anything
a
site
that
relative
likelihood
and
I've.
D
D
C
C
If
some
anti-money
laundering
concern
or
kyc
concern
comes
up
with,
like
specific
addresses
being
blacklisted
by
circle,
if
those
if
the
assets
on
is
if
assets
belong
to
those
addresses,
addresses
they
use
this
collateral
in
the
Udo
system,
then
that
leaves
us
with
the
problem
and
then
the
fourth
column,
just
again,
PR
responds
choose
to
die
no
longer
being
backed
hundred-percent
by
to
centralize.
Assets
could
also
be,
and
so
I
guess,
maybe
pause,
pause
there
and
sort
of
get
some
what's
going.
A
D
So
I
guess
my
thing
is
is
like
in
principle
what
why
would
circle
care
if
people
are
borrowing
against
their
USD,
see
in
compound
or
borrowing
against
their
US
DC
in
maker
down
like
I,
don't
think
we
would
ever
really
have
this
conversation
if
it
wasn't
an
absolute
emergency.
So
if
Jeremy,
a
lair
is
like
or
any
of
the
coin
base,
people
are
on.
This
call
like
like
this
is
a
this
is
a
we.
D
We
don't
know
what's
gonna
happen
in
the
next
few
days
and
like
now
is
like,
if
there
was
ever
a
time
to
be
brave
and
and
do
this
like
now
is
the
time
like
like
we
should
not,
we
shouldn't
hesitate,
and
we
should
just
you
know
if
circle
or
Center
like
once.
They
ask
questions
about
this.
Like
you
know,
I'm
gonna,
like
I'd,
love
to
be
involved
in
those
those
conversations
and
just
really
get
to
like
part
of
kind
of
why
it
would
somehow
be
different
or
or
why
we
should
be.
D
D
A
I
I
think
you're
absolutely
right
and
in
that
yeah
I,
don't
think
this
is
as
big
of
an
issue,
but
in
the
interest
of
transparency,
making
sure
the
people
are
aware
of
this.
This
I
guess
you
know
risk
or
this
philosophical
difference
from
the
way
we
have
other
assets
and
other
collateral
on
board
is
worth
raising
up
just
to
make
people
aware
yeah.
C
E
C
Yeah,
so
clayton
brings
up
a
good
point
in
the
chat,
and
there
is
every
option
like
that,
like
there's,
every
possibility
for
this
to
be
temporary,
like
we're
not
necessarily
agreeing
that
we
should
always
have
us
dcs
collateral,
we're
saying
at
least
I
hope.
What
we're
gonna
say
is
that
we
want
it
now
for
this
to
fix
a
liquidity
issue
and
then
further
conversations
about
how
long
it
stays
like
what
the
parameters
like
long-term
parameters
are.
That
can
potentially
be
decided
later
when
it's
not
like
I,
like
lots
of
stuff
going
on.
B
C
E
F
Think
to
be
clear,
the
the
version
of
the
collateral
adapter
that
is
currently
publicly
available
on
on
github
it
at
the
DSS
deploy
repo.
This
couple
is
collateral.
Adapter
is
just
like
all
the
others
and
that
it
pulls
all
the
collateral
into
one
etherion
account
and
there's
no
real
way
for,
for
the
admin
of
the
token
to
try
to
freeze
out
individual
individual
addresses,
I.
Think
so
I
think
that's
that's
the
model
that
we
should
be
working
with
for
now.
C
G
I'll
I'll
step
in
here
the
current
plan
is
to
use
gem
join
5
adapter,
which
was
pre-built
long
before
the
deployment
of
MCD,
because
US
DC
has
six
decimals,
so
that
code
is
available
in
DSS
now
but
yeah.
It
does
pool
everything.
So
if
it
were
to
be
blacklisted,
it
would
basically
freeze
up
to
get
the
adapter.
C
G
G
A
C
E
The
the
con
with
the
PR
is
that
the
like
people
will
point
to
this
as
saying
that
the
maker
system
doesn't
work
without
like
a
Fiat,
stable
coin,
because
it's
being
added
in
this
moment
of
weakness
rather
than
at
a
different
time
when
it's
just
miss
strawberry,
so
yeah,
that's
a
consideration.
It
will
just
be
like.
It
will
be
meand
that
you
know
it
doesn't
work
without
this
kind
of
backstop
yeah.
You
know
it's,
it's
really
no
different
than
the
crowd.
E
E
C
E
E
B
People
joining
late,
I'm,
gonna
repost,
the
forum
thread
that
the
notes
on
this
call
are
going
to
be
in
and
all
the
pros
and
cons
for
considering
us
DC
as
collateral
that
long
frozen
was
working
on
so
just
for
freshness
on
the
con
kind
of
elaborating
a
little
bit
more
can
weed
I
assume
the
gym
join.
Five
didn't
include
this
one-to-one
peg
is
that
is
that
something
that
we're
gonna
have
to
add
on
or
or
how
does
that
fit
into
the
system?
Yeah.
G
G
G
B
C
A
A
H
This
this
chat
has
been
incredibly
fascinating
so
far,
and
I
mean
it's
kind
of
cool
to
see
that
the
community
has
already
put
so
much
thought
into
all
this,
so
I
mean
kind
of
in
that.
In
that
light,
I
kind
of
would
like
to
see
this
discussion
evolve.
Organically
we've
done,
we've
done
some
analysis
on
kind
of
like
heuristics
or
considerations
that
we
might
want
to
take.
H
When
we
do
you
select
a
final
set
of
parameters
and
I'm
happy
to
talk
about
those
but
I
kind
of
think
that
the
way
the
community
has
been
has
been
taking.
This
has
also
been
pretty
neat,
so
yeah
I
haven't
I,
have
a
number
of
discussion
topics
too,
that
we
should
just
hit
upon
at
some
point,
I'll
kind
of
give
like
a
brief
overview
of
the
of
the
different
topics,
and
then,
hopefully
we
can
get
through
all
of
them
by
the
end
of
this
call.
H
H
However,
this,
while
this
is
obviously
beneficial
in
a
few
ways,
it
doesn't
it's
important
to
remember
that
it
doesn't
completely
erase
our
liquidation
risk
because,
due
to
accruing
stability
fees,
these
vaults
still
can
one
day
be
liquidated
based
on
some
kind
of
rough
estimates
like
it
could
take.
You
know,
months
before
the
stability
fees
themselves
generate
enough
enough
dye
debt
that
the
vault
would
have
to
be
liquidated,
but
nonetheless,
because
that
is
a
possibility.
H
H
H
The
issue
is,
though,
that
it's
sub
110,
the
recursive
leverage
ends
up
becoming
so
high
that
we
could
end
up
in
a
situation
where
just
one
or
two
parties
may
end
up
eating
up
the
entire
debt
ceiling
and
then
we're
kind
of
where
we're
dependent
on
them
to
use
that
wisely.
So
as
an
example
at
110%
liquidation
ratio,
that
offers
you
roughly
10x
leverage,
and
so,
if
we
put
in
say
a
20
million
debt
ceiling,
for
example,
one
guy
with
two
million
u.s.
H
DC
could
come
in
and
and
max
it
out
and
then,
if
he
doesn't
use
it
for
what
we
really
need
it
for,
which
is,
which
was
the
auctions
and
I
should
talk
about
that.
A
little
bit
later
as
well,
then,
were
we're
in
a
bit
of
trouble.
Then
all
we
did
bong-soon
we
do
is
just
raise
the
debt
ceiling
again.
So
there's
definitely
some
arguments
for
having
kind
of
a
less
capital,
efficient,
collateralization
ratio,
something
along
the
lines
of
liquid
dydx
or
compound
has
in
this
kind
of
125
two
hundred
thirty
five
percent
show.
H
I
F
Record
I
would
just
say
that
this
is
an
unprecedented
measure
when
those
other
platforms
like
compounded,
dy/dx
added
US
DC,
they
were
not
doing
it
under
the
same
circumstances
and
just
in
general
maker
is
a
is
a
larger,
is
a
larger
platform
than
both
of
those
that
spends
more
time
on
governance
and
risk
decisions.
In
my
opinion,
so
I,
don't
I,
don't
see
a
strong
argument
why
we
should
be
following
their
lead.
Rather
than
leading
with
these
sorts
of
decisions
to
me,
it
seems
a
little
bit
arbitrary.
E
Taking
from
taking
from
first
principles,
I
guess
I
mean
it
really
would
be.
The
facts.
I
mean
it's
hard
to
have
this
conversation
without
a
discussion
about
the
debt
ceiling
right
because,
given
what
Cyrus
just
described
a
single
party
or
a
few
at
a
low
enough,
collateralization
ratio
could
eat
up
the
entire
pool,
which
would
still
not
solve
our
problem.
So
I
guess
yeah
I
mean
I,
think
the
sweet
spot.
E
Is
you
want
this
to
help
alleviate
the
liquidity
problems
not
create
more,
and
you
also
don't
want
it
to
be
so
capital
inefficient
that
no
one
takes
advantage
of
this
at
all
and
it
doesn't
help
either
so
I
think
there's
a
middle
ground
there,
I
guess
so:
I'm,
not
I'm,
not
arguing.
We
just
go
with
what
compound
those
because
they
they're
compound
but
I,
think
it
is.
It
is
about
finding
the
middle
ground
well,.
H
C
B
C
B
C
But
I
mean
so
even
if
you're
not
moving
it
like
I,
don't
mean
thing
it
up,
so
you
wouldn't
liquidate
anyone
if
you're
moving
it
down,
then
it's
better
to
do
it
and
the
current
the
current
bolt
type
rather
than
at
any
vault
type,
because
otherwise
people
who
got
a
move
that
us
like,
unlike
D,
leverage
and
then
move
that
the
u.s.
DC
to
the
new
goal
type
rather
than
just
sprinting
or
die
right.
C
B
B
C
H
F
C
I
maybe
kind
of
try
and
explain
I
guess.
My
understanding
of
this
is
like
so
I
think
the
issue
is
not
really
the
recursive
leverage.
It's
the
fact
that,
like
one
entity,
might
use
of
the
entire
debt
ceiling
right
like
if
you
make
it
more
capital
inefficient
than
you
can,
it
makes
C
more
likely
that
multiple
and
multiple
entities
they're
going
to
take
advantage
of
if
they're
sitting
it
means
on
average,
you
should
better
average
for
the
ones
doing
what
you
want
them
to
do.
F
F
H
So
so
one
super
important
concept
that
we
should
all
kind
of
be
cognizant
of
is
that
are
we
trying
to
add
us
DC
as
a
single
target
use
case
where
we're
adding
it
with
a
specific
set
of
parameters,
with
a
set
of
parameters
of
this
specific
use
case
in
mind,
or
are
we
trying
to?
Are
we
trying
to
add
this
as
like
a
generalist
case
where
it's
available
to
everyone
under
the
kind
of
the
most
medium
set
of
assumptions,
and
so,
if
we're,
if
we're
going
to
use
this
option,
but
this
is
this,.
H
So,
if
we're
gonna,
if
the
whole
context
of
this
meeting,
is
kind
of
this
emergency
edition
of
us
DC
for
a
very
unprecedented
measure
with
these
with
these
auctions,
then
it
would
make
sense
to
me
that
we
target
these
parameters.
With
that
specific
use
case
in
mind,
and
so
in
that
case
that
that's,
where
I'm
kind
of
more
concerned
about
the
the
rationing
risk,
because
I
want
to
make
sure
that
we're
able
to
achieve
what
we
want
out
of
this
well.
H
But
so
so
when
it
comes
to,
I
was
going
to
talk
about
the
debt
ceiling
next.
But
if
we're
when
considering
the
stability
fee,
for
example,
you
know
if
you,
if
you
price
the
stability
fee,
super
high
like
super
super
high,
then
you
would
be
intentionally
pricing
out
kind
of
the
average
retail
user
and.
H
Yeah,
but
you
mean
you,
don't
have
to
do
that
right,
so
we
are
I
mean
it's
not
immediately
clear
without
stating
it
that
this
is
for
a
specific
use
case.
Right.
We've
come
together
on
this
governance,
call
to
add
USD
collateral
type,
but
I
think
we
still
need
to
establish
some
context
for
what
it
is
we're
trying
to
get
out
of
here.
H
So
with
that
being
said,
vishesh
if
you're
around
and
if
you're
up
for
it
I
think
we'd
all
like,
maybe
just
a
quick
walk
through
through
your
vaults
website
and
kind
of
maybe
describe
the
lay
of
the
land
for
for
liquidations,
if
you're
not
sure
I
can
handle
it
too.
But
since
it's
your
website,
I
think
it'd
be
awesome.
If
you
would
run
us
through
it.
Sorry
to
put
you
on
the
spot,
boys.
J
Not
the
first
time,
all
right
cool.
So
if
you
can
see
my
screen
here,
this
is
a
simple
little
tool
that
I
put
together
the
other
day
so
in
the
top
left
here,
basically,
you
can
see
just
every
vault.
Currently
the
amount
of
debt,
the
amount
of
collateralization
and
the
collateral
amount
in
nominal
terms,
and
then
there's
sort
of
color-coded
a
bit.
J
So
you
can
have
a
little
visual
layer
over
here
is
just
a
distribution
of
CPS
in
there
collateralization
ratio,
so
you
can
see
here
like
the
most
are
about
250
to
300
percent
Kuato
eyes.
Usually
we
see
this,
like
you
know,
3
to
350,
so
it's
it's
down
a
bit.
Obviously
this
is
kind
of
that
massive
wall
that
you
want
to
be
careful
of,
because
if
these
get
liquidated,
that's
a
huge
chunk
of
debt,
so
this
is
kind
of
like
a
more
granular
visualization.
J
Basically
you
can
do
the
math
of
for
any
vault,
given
the
amount
of
cloud
all
the
amount
of
debt
and
the
collateralization
ratio.
What's
the
price
at
which
it
would
get
liquidated,
so
every
vault
ever
has
a
liquidation
price,
and
so
you
can
see
here
like
a
table
of
each
of
those
faults
under
liquidation
prices.
If
you
were
to
look
at
this
in
graphical
form,
it
looks
like
this,
so
this
is
basically
ordered
by
liquidation
price,
just
each
vault
and
then
accumulative
sum
of
the
amount
of
debt
by
that
point.
J
J
That's
expected
to
be
liquidated
and
then,
basically,
if
you
adjust
this
slippage
parameter,
which
is
the
percentage
efficiency
effectively
of
percentage
inefficiency
in
the
auctions.
So
point
three
means
the
auctions
are
recovering:
seventy
percent
of
the
debt
and
so
on
and
so
forth.
You
can
see
basically
expected
gains
or
losses
if
all
auctions
function
perfectly
efficient.
You
actually
make
money
if
these
auctions
are
incredibly
inefficient,
you're
underwater.
J
H
How
can
we
use
what
are
the
takeaways
from
this
chart
in
terms
of
trying
to
estimate
how
much,
how
much
credit
we
might
want
from
this
USD
C
collateral
type
right
so
I
mean
the
way
I'm
thinking
about
it
is
if
we
know
it
at
various
price
points.
Keepers
might
need
a
certain
amount
of
died
to
bid
on
the
auctions.
Then
there
should
possibly
be
some
sort
of
correlation
there.
Obviously
you
can't
just
say
the
entire
amount
just
to
be
also
minted
through
US
DC,
but
somes,
some
reasonable
approximation
right.
So,
for
example,.
J
Your
goal
is
to
make
up
swart
fall,
then.
Essentially,
the
question
is
going
to
be:
what's
the
amount
of
inefficiency
in
these
auctions
that
you
need
to
make
up
for
it
right.
So
if
these
auctions,
you
expect
to
recover
half
of
the
dye
debt,
then
essentially
you
could
see
what
the
expected
surplus
is
from
liquidations
that
were
not
completely
underwater,
and
then
you
can
see
what
the
amount
of
shortfall
is
net
and
then
you
could
essentially
say:
okay.
J
H
J
Yeah,
that's
the
most
qualitative
part
of
this.
Is
you
essentially,
my
guess
would
be
from
a
risk
management
perspective.
You
want
to
pick
a
conservative
slippage
estimate
something
that's
in
the
realm
of
reason
or
safer
than
what
you
are
seeing
so
far
and
then
pick
that
as
the
amount
that
you
want
to
target
to
be
able
to
cover,
and
then
you
know
whatever
you're
able
to
do
is
what
you're
able
to
do.
But
that's,
theoretically
your
target,
at
least.
H
So,
like
just
hypothetically,
let's
say:
let's
just
use
60
as
an
example
and
you
put
in
thirty
percent
slippage
right,
that's
from
and
that's
from
the
dye
debt.
So
that's
already
after
after
counting
the
over
collateralization
ratio,
so
30
percent
slippage
here
would
be
equivalent
to
bidding
one
third,
roughly
one-third
of
the
total
collateral
that's
being
put
up
for
auction,
and
that
would
result
in
a
only
at
2
million
dollar
loss.
Is
that
right.
J
H
H
Okay
yeah,
so
this
point
I'm
trying
to
make
is
if
we
think
that
roughly
keepers
can
bid
for
one
third,
with
a
total
collateral
amount
being
put
up
for
auction,
given
their
current
keeper
liquidity,
then
at
a
price
of
sixty
there
would
be.
You
know
there
would
be
a
shortfall
of
18
million.
So
just
thinking
like
order
of
magnitude,
if
this
is
something
we
want
it
to
protect
against
debt
ceiling
should
be
say
higher
than
10
million,
maybe
lower
than
50
million
I'm.
J
Mean
what
the
debt
ceiling
should
be?
That's
not
that's
not
going
to
be
purely
spoken
to
by
what's
your
expected
losses,
that's
also
a
question
of:
do
you
feel
like
you're,
taking
on
any
risk
by
doing
this
right?
So
this
is
a
strategy
question
at
the
end
of
the
day,
because
you
probably
are-
and
in
an
ideal
scenario,
you
probably
don't
want
to
set
the
kinds
of
debt
ceilings
and
costs
for
doing
this,
that
you're
looking
to
do,
but
given
that
it's
a
highly
distressed
situation,
you're
not
dealing
with
normal
circumstances,.
H
F
C
F
Sorry
to
be
clear,
I
wasn't
suggesting
that
we
don't
set
the
debt
ceiling
initially
I
mean
that
if
we
initially
set
it
to
something
like
let's
say
five
to
ten,
which
I
think
was
the
range
that
brought
up
in
chat,
my
seems
like
the
range
that
were
anchored
to
now.
If
it
turned
out
that
we
actually
need
20,
because
that's
how
much
is
getting
liquidated
is
a
$50.
It
seems
pretty
reasonable
to
me
to
try
to
rush
that
through,
because
I
would
rather
see
10
million
u.s.
DC
added
to
the
collateral
pool.
F
H
Well,
so
so
maybe
now
is
a
good
time
to
talk
about
the
stability
fee,
because
I
think
I
would
prefer
it
if
the
debt
ceiling
started
out
high
higher
than
than
what
we
might
want.
But
we'd
have
a
prohibitively
high
stability
fee
as
well,
so
that
people
aren't
just
using
it
for
no
reason
whatsoever,
but
in
structure
in
such
a
way,
where
you're
only
incentivized
to
borrow
dye.
If
the
price
of
e
were
to
hit
60
and
then
so,
if
they
needed
it,
they
could
get
it
on
the
spot.
H
J
One
general
race
yeah
with
regards
to
stability
fees,
a
missing
part
of
the
conversation
in
general,
about
surly
fees
and-
and
this
is
stability
fees-
are
only
effective,
prohibitive,
encouraging
with
respect
to
specific
use
cases.
So
the
question
is:
how
are
people
going
to
be
using
it
and
I
would
guess
that
if
you
can
drop
in
your
sec,
take
dye
out
for
a
relatively
low
collateralization
ratio?
H
And
I
was
that's.
That
was
actually
moment
would
be.
My
next
point
is
that
we
do
have
secondary
use
cases
for
USD
Z
as
a
collateral
type,
which
is
just
helping
the
dye
pack
right.
So
so
far,
we've
kind
of
only
been
focusing
on
the
auctions
on
the
potential
auctions,
but
there
are
benefits
in
regulating
diet
price
as
well.
Well,.
H
Right
at
this,
at
the
same
time,
though,
so
you
borrowed
I
to
sell
to
sell
it
on
coinbase
to
make
5
percent
over
some
in
undetermined
time
period
versus
borrowing
dye
to
bid
on
an
auction
at
66
percent
of
the
collateral
value.
And
if
you
win
you,
you
get
an
ROI
of
50
percent.
So
we
definitely
want
to
keep
in
mind
that
that
it's
not
the
same.
It's
not
the
same
benefit
there's
like
massively
higher
up
side
through
the
auctions
and
there
are
through
dye,
peg
arbitrage.
F
E
E
H
I
Yeah,
so
it's
all
here,
I
think
it's
the
duty
fee
of
USD
see
what
exactly
the
injured
selling
of
died,
and
usually
you
could
sum
penalty
in
this
interest
selling
in
the
banking
operations
for
specific
purposes
or
for
specific
banks.
But
because,
since
the
system
died,
we
cannot
do
specific
lending
facilitate,
but
instead
we
have
a
general
interest
rate.
I
So
that's
not
a
option
for
us,
but
now
I
would
need
to
think
about
whether
we
want
to
use
a
a
a
penalty
interest
rate
in
this
case,
which
I
don't
think
we
should
do.
We
should
be
more
inclined,
belong
to
the
lower
solidity
so
that
we
encourage
you,
the
current
market
maker,
but
instead
of
to
pursue
a
high
one
to
basically
polishing
people
from
from
from
borrowing
time,
I.
F
Agree
with
with
the
child
that
we
shouldn't
use
that
measure
right
now,
it's
effectively
starting
to
apply
the
system
debt
to
die
holders,
and,
given
that
a
lot
of
people
in
the
community
prompt,
don't
even
know
that
that's
a
possibility.
That
would
probably
just
add
a
lot
of
uncertainty
that
we
don't
really
don't
want
to
see
right
now.
F
H
Just
it
does
but
I
think
it's
indirect
right,
because
if,
if
the
die
price
gets
pushed
down,
then
of
course
it's
easier
to
acquire
died
through
alternative
means
through
secondary
exchanges
through
through
compound
through
other
protocols.
It's
just
not
it's
just
not
as
immediate
as
getting
it
directly
through
maker,
so
I
I'm,
not
sure.
H
If
there's
like
a
clean
way
to
do
this,
but
potentially
you
could
make
the
stability
for
you
so
astronomical,
where
it's
only
profitable
for
people
who
are
willing
to
bid
the
66%
on
the
auctions,
and
it
would
actually
be
unprofitable
for
people
who
are
trying
to
take
the
the
5%
premium
out
of
diapers.
I
I'm
not
suggesting
that
as
like
a
good
idea
by
any
means.
H
I
just
think
at
the
at
the
very
least,
my
my
one
hope
for
the
stability
fee
is
that
it's
high
enough
that
it's
not
targeted
for
some
sort
of
just
generalist
use
case
versus
we
have
kind
of
a
that.
What
appears
to
be
a
very
specific
need
for
this
collateral
tea?
Otherwise,
if
we
were,
if
we
were
adding
US,
DC
and
kind
of
some
in
kamar
times,
I
think
we
would
come
to
significantly
different
conclusions
for
all
of
these
risk
parameters.
To
be
honest,.
I
It's
not
a
bad
thing
for,
for
this.
Arbitrage
is
to
borrow
dolly
and
to
see
only
to
take
the
5%
premium,
because
it
can
indirectly
benefit
the
person
who
want
to
buy
dye
with
which
they
cannot
do
at
current
premium.
So
the
is
now
a
direct
credit
to
the
to
the
city
owners
or
those
who
want
to
put
into
the
auction,
but
will
it
won't
directly
benefit
them?.
C
High
does
this
diversity,
for
you
need
to
be
on
you
SEC,
to
prevent
it
being
used
for,
for,
like
more
general
use.
Cases
like
if
we
well
yeah
I,
think
the
suitcases
we
want
are
like
bigger
too
pig
arbitrage
and
auction
availability
right.
So
can
we
limit
it
to
both
use
those
two
cases?
I
mean
become
perfectly
right,
but
if
that's
the
goal
then
like
what?
What
is
the
stability
for
you
look
like
in
that
situation,
I.
H
H
15
percent
twenty
percent.
Twenty
five
I
turn
I
at
that
point.
I,
don't
think
it
really
matters
as
long
as
you
kind
of
pass
this
mental
threshold
where
right
as
long
as
you
as
long
as
you
structure
the
parameters
in
such
a
way
where
the
collateralization
ratio
or
the
liquidation
ratio
is
not
so
low
that
you
have
rationing
risk,
the
debt
ceiling
is
high
enough
where
it
can
satisfy
your
specific
needs,
for
which
I
would
say.
H
Our
needs
are
twofold
here,
one
is
primary
need,
is
auction
bidding
if
the
price
dives
secondary
need
is
peg
arbitrage
to
alleviate
liquidity
and
then
set
the
stability
fee
so
that
borrowers
are
borrowing
to
satisfy
those
two
needs.
Then
I
think
we've
achieved
what
we've
set
out
to
there's
a
I'm
component
to
it.
G
Argue,
that's
not
very
long.
You
should
think
of
this
as
a
short-term
lending
facility
to
fulfill
this
immediate,
short-term
need,
and
accordingly,
it
should
be
priced
in
in
annual
terms
quite
high,
probably
north.
As
you
long
for
wisdom.
Just
added
that
supplier
Don
died
on
compound
is
18%.
Definitely.
C
C
B
E
D
B
H
F
It's
also
worth
mentioning
that
currently
there's
seventeen,
just
over
17
million
died,
borrow
on
compound,
which
is
that
I
think,
basically
at
a
hundred
percent
utilization
or
something
like
that,
I,
don't
I,
think
there's
there's
basically
none
there's,
basically
none
left
and
compound
is
talking
about
lifting
its
its
price
cap
on
on
die,
so
compound,
currently
uses
uses.
The
coinbase
die
USD
see
market
to
to
set
its
die.
He
said
it's
die
price,
but
it's
currently
capped
to
ninety-five
cents
in
the
dollar
and
five
cents
within
that
range.
They're.
F
Talking
about
possibly
lifting
this
cap
so
allowing
die
to
float
higher,
which
would
put
pressure
on
all
of
these
outstanding
dive
bars,
possibly
triggering
liquidations.
I,
don't
know,
I
haven't
done
the
numbers
on
on
what
how
much
collateral
there
is
against
that
die.
This
is
very.
This
is
very
bad,
because
there's
there's
there's.
Basically
a
lot
of
extra
die.
Penta
I
demand
on
compound
17
million
of
it,
which
is
which
is
huge
compared
to
the
you
know,
the
liquidity
that
we're
talking
about
that.
We
you
know
that
there
is
four
auctions
right
now.
F
I
I
F
All
right
to
extend
this
point
a
little
bit,
there's
it's
worth,
considering
that
we
would
much
prefer
if,
if
USD
see,
collateralized
die
borrows
on
compound
moved
to
to
maker,
potentially
because
we
have
no
control
over
how
compound
is
sending
their
Oracle's
in
their
their
risk
parameters,
they
could
potentially
trigger
a
trigger
died
demand
at
the
wrong
at
the
wrong
moment,
which
is
something
totally
totally
outside
of
our
control
right
now,
but
impacts.
That's
just
as
much
as
everything
else.
F
Just
saying
that,
if
CBP
borrows
against
us,
TC
are
very
expensive
compared
to
compound
and
that
compound
number
probably
isn't
going
to
go
down
that
much,
which
means
we
have
this.
We
had.
We
still
had
this
compound
pent
up
Penta
bomb
sitting
there,
which
I,
which
really
makes
me
uncomfortable
I,
would
much
prefer
it
if
that,
if
that
US
DC
and
I
Det
were
on
our
balance
sheet
rather
than
theirs,.
F
Just
remember
the
maker
doubt
doesn't
markup
died
when
dye
is
over
the
peg
right.
So
if
we
went
right
now
and
said,
we're
gonna
change
the
dye
price
in
the
system
to
1.05
to
better
reflect
market
conditions
or
something
like
that.
We
would
just
trigger
more
liquidations,
create
moral
dye
demand
and
basically
drive
ourselves
into
a
death
hole,
death
spiral.
We
don't
do
that.
We
have
the
ability
to
not
do
it
do
that,
which
is
very
important,
but
compound
is
already
marking
dye
up
to
1.05
and
has
expressed
an
interest
in
marking
it
up
higher.
C
H
F
F
Let's
start
with
that,
so
auction
grinding
is
actually
you
know
pretty
relevant
in
light
of
what
happened
recently,
it's
not
the
same
thing
at
all,
but
it's
a
it's
a
relevant
phenomenon.
Thankfully,
now
that
TTL
is
a
bit
it's
much
much
higher,
the
risk
of
it
is
also
is
also
reduced,
but
what
auction
grinding
is
is
basically
where
you,
where
you
open
a
CDP
and
then
trigger
its
own.
You
know
trigger
you're
on
liquidation,
basically,
so
that
you
can
then
bid
on
your
own
liquidation
auction
with
with
die.
F
So
it
means
that
you
essentially
have
to
have
collateral
and
you
have
to
have
died.
You
have
to
be
prepared
to
bid
on
your
own
liquidation
auction
and
the
the
trick
with
auction
grinding
is
basically
that
when
you
bid
on
your
own
collateral
auction,
the
game
theory
of
it
is
a
little
bit
different
too,
and
you've
been
on
someone
else's
liquidation
auction,
because
once
your
liquidation,
auction
liquidation
auction
goes
into
the
dentist,
that's
the
phase.
F
F
So
and
then
what
you're
hoping
for
by
doing
this
is
basically
triggering
loads
of
liquidations
that
are
of
your
own
CDP's
and
then
hoping
that
people
actually
don't
bother
bidding
on
them
and
that
they
end
up
clearing
at
a
clearing
at
a
discount,
which
means
that
the
the
difference
is
is
socialized
into
system
debt.
So
basically
what
happened
similar
to
what
happened
last
week,
which,
when
these
blended
auctions
clear
it
one
way
or
some
some
tiny
number.
F
You
know
with
auction
grinding,
you
would
have
a
similar
or
the
attacker
would
hope
to
have
a
similar
kind
of
effect,
where
no
one
would
bother
bidding
on
the
bidding
on
these,
because
they
they
knew
that
the
auction
grinder
would
just
outbid
them
because
it's
their
own
CDP.
And
this
is
the
reason
why
we
need
to
have
a
liquidation
penalty
in
the
first
place,
because
the
liquidation
penalty
changes
the
changes.
The
economics
of
this
a
little
bit
means
that
the
grinder
is
guaranteed
to
lose
the
liquidation
penalty.
F
Every
time
they
try
to
do
this,
they
can
still
gain
from
it,
but
it's
no
longer
it's
no
longer
a
you
know:
it's
no
longer
zero
cost
or
the
cost
is
greater
than
simply
the
gas
price
of
doing
exoneration.
That's
the
short,
that's
the
summary.
There's
a
paper
on
this
that
you
can
check
out.
If
you
want
the
details.
F
Okay,
yeah
I
mean
I,
think
it.
Basically,
they
said
the
liquidation
penalty
to
open
auction
granny
can
still
be
worth
it.
If
you
think
that
there's
a
chance
that
people
people
won't
turn
up
to
your
to
your
auction,
so
you
can
still
do
the
grim
trigger
where
you
trigger
liquidations
in
your
own
CDP's
and
then
bid
them
all
the
way
up.
It's
just
that.
F
You
know
every
time
you
do
this,
you
have
to
pay
the
liquidation
penalty,
so
I
would
say
that
if
we
set
the
limitation
pelleted,
something
very
small
like
1%
I
can
imagine
an
attacker
willing
to
take
that
cost
in
order
to
have
a
shot
at
it,
and
that's
the
reason
why
I
would
I
wouldn't
hanker
near-zero
anchor
near
where
it
is
for
for
eath
for
eath.
Basically,
even
though
obviously
USD
C
is
a
much
less
volatile
asset
I
would
because
of
auction
grinding
concerns.
I
would
anchor
it
to
I.
F
C
You
yes,
Oh
baby,
that
my
main
thoughts
on
auction
parameters
are
probably
fine
to
use
the
ones
from
Meath
or
like
the
new
ones.
Unless
someone
has
like,
like
reasons
that
we
should
change
them
like
it
shouldn't,
be
something
that
happens
like
often
on
us,
you
see
anyway,
so
it's
gonna
be
less
impact
to.
F
F
Yeah
I
think
this
is
in
favor
of
having
a
high
one,
because
that
is
even
more
preventable,
because
basically,
that
means
when
you
take
out
a
vault,
provided
that
the
messaging
is
okay.
The
messaging
will
literally
tell
you
when
you'll
get
liquidated.
If
you
don't
pay,
it
doesn't
have
to
tell
you
you
know,
watch
the
watch.
The
Oracle
price
it'll
tell
you
specifically
that
this
date,
please
please
pay
I
mean
I,
don't
know
how
it
will
be
message,
but
I'm,
saying.
C
K
H
D
E
D
Is
it
I
know
that
there's
quite
a
bit
of
resources
around
participating
via
a
keeper
bot,
but
is
there
now
that
there's
a
longer
duration
in
place,
I
think
you
see
a
lot
of
additional
participation
in
these
things.
If
there
was
like
an
integration
guide
like
a
contract
level,
integration,
it
was
like
these
are.
The
steps
you
need
to
take
to
bid
manually
is:
is
there
anything
of
that
sort?
D
Speaking
from
the
perspective
of
our
work
on
this
backstop
syndicate
over
the
weekend,
it's
been
and
we've
had
a
whole
consortium
of
developers
that
are
highly
knowledgeable
and
defy,
and
we're
still
running
up
against
things
that
were
like
will.
We
need
to
do
this
so
that,
and
like
an
integration
guide
would
be
massively
valuable
on
the
liquidation
fronts
and
on
the
flop,
auction
yeah.
H
K
H
And
the
reality
is
for
us
DC
it
we
won't.
We
probably
won't
see
liquidations
based
on
stability
fee
accrual
for
several
months.
To
be
honest,
depending
on
on
on
how
keep
on
how
borrowers
use
it,
some
I'm
tempted
to
kind
of
look
to
the
eath
auction
parameters
as
as
precedent
right
now,
they
could
even
be
I
mean
there's
just
probably
gonna,
be
fairly
low.
C
C
F
Have
it
has
anyone
considered
if
you
know
if
you
SDC
is
being
enabled,
you
know
we're
in
these
emergency
times?
Turning
on
the
circuit
breaker
facility
for
for
us
DC,
or
at
least
having
it
deployed
for
us
to
see
where
we
could
actually
disable
us
DC
liquidations
until
we
thought
that
it
was
a
good
idea,
because
if
we
were
to
see
us
DC
minting
in
order
to
in
order
to
send
the
liquidity
problem,
really
don't
want
to
see
us
DC
liquidations?
That
is
completely
counterproductive.
F
H
F
I'm
not
seeing
a
strong
reason.
Why
not
so
just
to
talk
it
through
I
think.
What
would
then
happen
is.
If
you
became
liquid
a
table,
you
would
have
you
have
a
position
that
someone
can
still.
You
know
someone
can
still
pay
off,
but
but
it
would
just
sit
there
and
you
wouldn't
be
able
to
to
liquidate
it.
I
don't
see
any
incentive,
I
don't
see
any
I.
F
Don't
you
have
seen
any
perverse
incentives
that
that
arises
out
of
having
these
unliquidated
bull,
USD,
C
positions,
I,
think,
but
because
remember,
your
dad
is
still
gonna
be
growing
on
them.
We're
not
freezing
interest
payments
I'm
front
on
you
as
to
see
or
anything
it's
just
that
you
will
be
allowed
to
continue
to
accrue
interest
even
once
you're.
Once
you
start
going
below
the
the
collateral
ratio.
F
Obviously
it
starts
to
become
problematic
once
the
interest
is
accrued,
so
much
that
someone
could,
in
theory
have
have
gone
below
a
hundred
percent,
but
we
can
actually
calculate
based
on
the
stability
fee
that
we
end
up
choosing
and
how
long
that
will
be,
and
it's
going
to
be
like
they
don't
a
couple
of
years,
even
if
you
kind
of
aggressive
thirty
percent
a
pre-hearing
number
so
I'm
not
so
worried
about
that
right.
But.
H
F
H
F
We
have
the
circuit
breaker,
then
that
won't
trigger
anything.
It
will
just
mean
that
you
can't
take
out
more
and
your
debt
will
continue
to
to
grow,
but
basically
I'm
as
far
as
I
can
tell
right
now.
I,
don't
think
anything
bad
would
happen.
I
haven't
thought
about
this
for
long
enough
to
be
to
be
sure,
but.
F
C
C
Oh
sorry
and
I
says
we
should
we
should
deploy
it
with
the
with
the
US
DC
flipper
like
connected
to
the
US
DC
you
flippin,
such
that
we
can
turn
it
on.
If
we
need
to.
Maybe
we
don't
need
to
turn
it
on
immediately
like
we
get
like
the
notice
right.
Have
six
hours
of
Sun
gets
liquidated.
Sorry
else
doesn't
stop
I.
F
Yeah
to
be
clear,
as
as
far
as
I
know,
the
the
the
flipper
moms
or
the
circuit
breakers
are
our
collateral
type
and
in
fact
I,
don't
even
think
I.
Don't
even
think
there
is
one
for
bat
right
now,
I
mean
I'm,
not
sure.
Maybe
maybe
there
is
but
I
didn't
hear
any
mention
it
I,
don't
think
so.
So
we
would
have
to
explicitly
add
that
to
the
to
be
collateral
spell.
J
H
Nope
that
that's
it
as
far
as
I
can
tell
we've
basically
covered
the
okay.
We've
basically
covered
thoughts
about
blacklists,
the
main
risk
parameters,
technical
token,
risk,
liquidation,
risk,
Oracle's
and
timeline
as
well
so
I
mean
for
me.
I
think
we
hit
upon
the
points
that
I
had
on
my
agenda.
So.
C
K
Jump
in
was
my
standard
quote,
so
the
we
all
have
to
act
fairly
aggressively.
We
need
to
balance
appropriate
reasonable
levels
of
community
interaction
and
communication,
but
also
with
the
Furious
activity
as
well.
The
best
tool
we
have
available
to
us
right
now
is
the
forum
so
immediately
after
this
call
lots
of
foundation,
members,
lots
of
consultants
and
experts
and
all
the
rest
are
going
to
break
off
into
groups
and
continue
to
brainstorm,
and,
let's,
let's
use
the
forum
to
maintain
a
thread
in
a
history
of
what's
going
on
today.
K
A
A
C
A
C
K
E
A
A
K
Let's
also
consider
trying
to
get
information
in
before
polls,
so
we
historically
we
do
polls
and
then
we
have
a
debate
afterwards
and
it's
it's
always
been
my
long-term
concern
that
people
are
voting
on
a
poll
and
then
they
read
through
the
rest
of
the
thread
and
we're
hoping
that
they
come
back
and
adjust
their
votes.
So
maybe
Cyrus
you're
going
to
publicly
throw
you
under
the
bus.
C
E
Concerns
like
opening
this
up
to
the
larger
community
like
a
lot
of
this,
is
very,
very
sort
of
technical
considerations,
and
we
have
like
a
short
timeframe-
I'm
more
inclined
not
to
have
forum
polling,
just
my
opinion
and
defer
to
the
risk
team
to
set
the
parameters
reasonably.
That's
my
view,
I
mean.
C
H
H
On
the
summer
yeah
I
mean
there
was
sufficient,
like
lack
of
consensus
on
a
few
things
were
right,
it's
not
entirely
clear
if
it
should
be
this
number
of
that
number
right.
It's
not
so
clear-cut
so
like
based
on
that
I'm,
not
really
super
enthused
about
just
picking
something
and
putting
it
out
there.
But
I
do
understand
that
this
is
obviously
difficult
time
for
governance
as
well.
I.
I
C
H
We
spend
I
mean
I
know
this
has
been
a
super
long
call,
but
should
we
spend
maybe
five
ten
minutes
rehashing
the
stability
feet?
Discussions
because
I
must
have
been
I
mean
even
I'm
a
bit
confused
because
there
appears
to
be
some
conflicting,
there's
some
trade-offs
here.
It's
not
necessarily
clear
that
high
or
low
is
better
so
Cyrus.
H
F
F
We
don't
want
this
because
that
just
takes
dye
out
of
the
market
again
and
doesn't
have
any
desired
effect,
and
we
do
want
to
limit
it
to
minting
by
those
people
who
will
be
participating
in
flip
auctions,
which
is
specifically
the
reason
why
we're
adding
this
emergency
measure
and
we
basically
don't
care
about
suppressing
the
price
dye
other
than
just
enough
to
to
do
this.
That's
your
right!
F
F
Then
a
lot
of
that
pent-up
dye
bolero
will
stay
on
those
platforms,
and
this
takes
a
lot
of
control
out
of
makers,
hands
and
leaves
it
in
the
hands
of
those
of
those
for
those
platforms
or
those
platforms
could
choose
to
do
your
risk
and
alter
their
their
risk
parameters
for
dye.
They
could
choose
to
mark
up
the
price
of
dye
further,
which
is
something
that
you
know
we
would
never
do
which
creates
a
which
creates
a
you
know,
a
negative,
a
negative
feedback
loop
for
dye
liquidity
again.
F
So
I'm
basically
saying
that,
because
of
this
pent
up
demand,
there
is
value
potentially
to
to
using
a
lower
stability
for
you
to
try
to
lure
dye
sorry
lure
dye
debt.
You
know
away
from
other
from
secondary
platforms
and
onto
and
on
to
maker
kind
of
all
else
being
equal
and
specifically
with
us
DC
as
the
collateral
right.
H
F
Be
perfectly
honest
with
you,
like,
there's
17
million
dye
bar
on
compound
and
compound
to
protect
their
their
platform,
I'm,
not
talking
about
what
is
in
their
best
interest
right
now.
They
could
choose
to
to
alter
the
risk
parameters,
to
basically
try
to
try
to
get
this
dye
paid
off
right,
and
this
could
cause
a
huge
liquidity
shock
that
we
have
no
way
of
influencing
really
and
this.
This,
to
be
honest
scares
me
so
I
think
that
there
is
value
to
consolidating
that
under
our
under
our
control,
but.
H
This
would
require
massively
larger
debt
ceiling
than
we've
been.
Then
we've
been
discussing
on
this
call
because
that's
that's
an
additional,
maybe
if
you
cut,
if
you
add
up
all
the
secondaries,
maybe
an
additional
20
30
million
of
debt
ceiling,
but
we'd
have
to
add
on
to
the
already
20,
maybe
ever
saying
we.
F
Need
to
consolidate
all
of
it,
but
I'm
saying
is
that
it
would.
It
would
help
I
think
to
defuse
that
situation
and
if
instead
we're
trying
to
target
the
opposite
policy
of
choosing
the
the
lowest
possible
stability
to
such
that
none
of
that
migrates.
So
if
we're
instead
like
trying
to
try
to
target
to
be
over
those
rates,
then
we
will.
We
will
attract
none
of
it,
probably
right
and
that's,
and
that
seems
not
so
good,
so
I'm
not
saying
that
we
need
to
aim
to
to
pull
in
all
of
it.
H
So,
okay,
so
maybe
there's
a
happy
medium
there
we're
somewhere
in
this,
like
10
to
15
range
right
that
we
can
like
trying
to
satisfy
both
sides.
I
know
wish
I
had
some
thoughts
on
the
efficacy
of
allowing
people
to
just
borrow
from
acre
and
immediately
deposit
in
secondaries
not
necessary
that
it's
bad,
but
just
some
thoughts
on
how
effective
that
is.
I'm,
gonna
chime
in
on
that
recession,
if
you're
still
around.
J
Sure
what
I
mean
I
was
just
saying
when
we
were
talking
earlier
about
what
you
want
to
have
this
dye
used
for
it's
just
going
to
be
less
efficient
when
that
dies
just
immediately
lent
out
on
secondary
markets
for
yield.
So
that's
why
I
was
just
saying
it's
important
to
maintain
that
rate
differential
between
what
you
set
the
stability
fee
to
and
what
supply
rates
are
on
secondary
blending
platforms,
which
is
really
tough
when
like
dy/dx,
has
such
an
attractive
rate
at
times,
and
so
it's
going
to
be
really
unpredictable.
J
E
D
F
J
Yeah
I
mean
the
bigger
point
is
just
what
do
you
want
to
be
using
this
time
for
right?
So
if
you
have
a
certain
debt
ceiling
assigned
to
it,
you
want
theoretically
to
be
able
to
draw
on
that
debt
ceiling
to
get
the
die.
You
need
to
make
up
for
any
shortfall
or
to
bid
on
auctions
that
are
being
so
really
under
bid
on.
So
just
the
the
point
is
was
just
when
people
are
using
it
for
other
news
cases,
it's
taking
away
from
that
potential
uses.
I
We
should
actually
include
the
the
demand
and
the
the
shortage
on
the
secondary
market,
because
we
were
experienced
a
expansion
of
of
dye
borrowing,
and
now
we
are
in
a
serious
contractions,
which
means
that
we
need
part
of
the
magnitude
of
this
secondary
lending
leverage
trading,
for
example,
your
address
as
well,
so,
which
means
that
the
magnhild
is
definitely
three
times
or
four
times
than
the
actual
shuffle.
That
of
the
debt
in
the
system.
So.
J
When
I
clarified,
not
not
shortfall
and
maybe
I
misspoke
earlier,
but
the
the
point
I
think
of
what
I've
heard
of
why
you
know
the
community
is
looking
to
enable
this
use
case
is
in
the
event
that
liquidations
are
not
functioning
smoothly.
People
keepers
want
to
be
able
to
source
this
dye
so
that
they
have
the
ability
to
bid
on
these
options
and
like
basically
the
amount
that
you
you
know
realistically
worst
case.
J
If
eath
goes
to
save
56
you're
gonna
have
about
35
million
projected
die
eliminations
if
it
goes
to
55
that
jumps
to
52.
Those
are
I
think
the
numbers
to
watch
in
the
sense
that
looking
for
these
big
sort
of
waves,
because
if
there's
sort
of
a
gradual
eath
price
movement
and
there's
a
gradual
progression
of
liquidations,
that's
theoretically
something
that's
easier
for
the
system
to
manage
and
less
less
capable
being
abused
by
somebody
who's
severely
under
bidding
on
actions.
J
But
when
you
have
these
massive
walls
and
have
a
lot
of
liquidations
all
at
once,
those
are
I
think
the
high
risk
scenarios.
So
you
know
again:
those
prices
are
around
70,
with
about
10
million
around
60
with
another
10
million,
and
then
55
brings
you.
You
know
another
20
billion
or
so
so
you
know
all
in
all.
There's
about
40
million
in
these
walls.
That
I
think
are
the
real
risk
scenarios
and
then
you
will
progressively
like
the
situation
will
evolve.
J
If
you
hit
the
first
one,
then
the
second
one
of
them,
the
third
one
so
I,
don't
know
my
it's
hard
to
make
recommendations
on
action
based
on
that
data,
but
my
guess
would
be
if
you
prepare
to
have
enough
to
cover
the
first
two
walls,
or
so
you
could
theoretically
adjust
parameters.
If
you
really
need
to
just
source
more
dye
and
you're,
going
to
hit
that
third
wall.
H
H
We
can
always,
you
can
always
add
debt-ceiling
later
it's
not
ideal,
but
it's
maybe
the
safer.
Maybe
the
more
prudent
approach
is
to
start
off
with
a
nice,
reasonable
chunk
like
we
were
discussing
earlier
and
then
reevaluate
once
we
reach
a
point
where
it's
been
used
up
and
we
can
evaluate
the
new
dye
price
and
doctrine
situation.
H
C
H
C
C
H
Let's
do
let's
do
like:
let's
do
one
poll
with
a
few
different
options
and
then
and
then
we'll
see
if
the
polls
it's
like
the
right,
it's
the
right
notes
and
then
we
can
decide
from
there
or,
if
maybe
that
the
proposed
combinations
are
not
appropriate
at
all
and
we
can
reevaluate
there
because
I
still
think
there's
some
room
for
there's
room
for
some
different
options,
but
not
not
in
an
or
right
there's
an
enormous
amount
of
variability
such
that
we
need
a
different
for
each.
It.
K
Sounds
like
that,
but
I
don't
have
a
clear
sense
from
the
community,
but
there's
equally
loud
voices
for
let
the
domain
experts
do
what
they
need
to
do
and
then
there's
strong
opinions
about.
Let's
have
governance.
What
governance
needs
to
do
and
then
there's
like,
let's
find
a
point
in
the
middle,
so
perhaps
in
these
polls
one
of
the
options
could
be
let
the
domain
teams
to
do
what
they
need
to
do
in
their
executive
later
in
the
week.
Is
that
amenable
to
like
a
list
of
here's.
K
C
C
C
What
that's
forcing
them
to
to
carry
out
a
decision
made
by
someone
else?
It's
not
forcing
them
to
make
a
decision
when
they're
all
prepared
when
they
don't
want
to
do
that
right,
like
forcing
someone
to
decide
something
because
you
don't
want
to
do
is
worse
than
like
deciding
something
and
telling
someone
well.
C
K
Non-Passing
these
executives,
so
they
need
to
be
tightened
up.
So
I
just
want
to
make
sure
that
yeah
so
I'm
not
advocating
for
one
solution
over
the
other
I'm
trying
to
make
sure
that
we're
as
inclusive
as
possible.
So
there's
there's
plenty
of
people
saying
well,
I,
really,
obviously,
there's
people
that
just
don't
they
want
us
to
stop
talking,
start
dealing
and
there's
other
people
who
want
us
to
continue
to
talk
so
I
don't
want
to
push
people
down
the
funnel
without
providing
options.
C
H
I
think
there's
maybe
likely
there's
maybe
like
two
or
three
different
packages
that
could
work
in
this.
In
this
scenario,
based
on
based
on
today's
discussion
right,
there
wasn't
like
one
clear
set
of
parameters,
but
there
wasn't
20
sets
either
so,
maybe
okay,
we
just
put
out
a
few
of
the
most
logical
ones
that
are
slightly
different.
There's
some
slight
differentiation
that.
H
H
Yep
and
then
last
note
I
want
to
make-
is
that
there's
still
some
outstanding
governance
topics
to
discuss?
Not
you
SDC
related
things
about
keeper
keeper
software,
one
about
the
upcoming
flop
auction
and
it's
starting
price
and
then
another
one
actually
an
important
one
being
the
circuit
breaker.
That
was
that
it's
going
to
be
available
in
a
few
hours,
there
hasn't
really
been
any
discussion
on
potential
situations,
how
it
could
be
used.
What
are
the
criteria
and
all
that
stuff
so
I
would
I
would
not
be
against
having
another.
C
H
B
By
the
way,
I
think
right
now
would
be
a
good
time
to
shout
out
that
a
vamsee
from
the
integrations
team
is
going
to
be
on
the
community
call
that
is
tomorrow
and
he's
going
to
be
doing
once.
He
confirms,
by
the
way
so
I'm
kind
of
speaking
a
little
bit
preemptively,
but
there
may
be
a
presentation
on
flop
auctions
and
we
might
be
able
to
get
into
Keepers
a
little
bit
on
that
call.
So
just
heads
up.