►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 78
Description
Please join us and help shape the future of the MakerDAO.
Agenda
- Vamsi's presentation on Debt Auctions(flop auctions)
- Dockerized auction keeper presentation overview by Marc Andre
- Potential executive vote to lower minimum bid on Debt Auctions
- USDC overview/recap
- Circuit breaker discussion
Links
- [Video/Voice](https://zoom.us/j/697074715)
- [Dial-in](https://zoom.us/u/acRbIMDvK)
- [Calendar](https://calendar.google.com/calendar/embed?src=makerdao.com_3efhm2ghipksegl009ktniomdk@group.calendar.google.com&ctz=America/Los_Angeles)
A
You
know
shoes,
hello,
everyone
welcome
to
the
March
17th
daily
edition
of
the
scientific
governance
and
risk
meetings.
This
is
the
second
in
a
hopefully
brief
series
of
calls
we'll
be
having,
on
a
daily
basis,
to
discuss
the
rapid
emergence
of
a
bunch
of
measures
that
the
maker
governance
ecosystem
is
taking
to
combat
market
instability.
Recently
we
found
well,
it
comes
as
no
surprise.
We
all
know
this.
The
ecosystem
can
move
rapidly
one
year
and
crypto
is
ten
years
into
the
traditional
world.
A
So
if
this
is
part
of
a
learning
experience,
this
is
gonna,
be
a
tough
teaching
moment
for
all
of
us,
a
teaching
them
for
the
ecosystem
as
well.
The
point
is,
at
the
very
end
of
this
thing:
I
hope
that
we've
learned
a
lot
of
really
important
lessons,
and
these
are
gonna,
be
the
calls
when
we
read.
We
walked.
A
And
then
we
record
them
for
posterity.
Today
we
have
a
lot
of
domain
experts
on
the
call,
so
I'm
not
going
to
do
my
usual
philosophizing
vamsee
is
going
to
be
giving
us
a
presentation
about
flop,
auctions
and
locking
experiments.
Some
of
the
technical
aspects
is
that
they
might
have
been
missed.
We're
going
to
talk
about
whether
the
flop
auction
mechanism
needs
to
be
tweaked.
A
This
is
going
to
be
another
theme
that
I
want
people
to
internalize
over
the
course.
The
next
week
is
that
the
ecosystem,
the
community,
the
governance
moved
rapidly
over
the
course,
the
last
four
or
five
days,
but
these
the
things
that
we've
done
or
to
stabilize
the
system
and
shored
up
in
the
face
of
adversity.
None
of
this
is
permanent.
We've
seen
obviously,
historically,
that
our
governance,
our
our
protocol,
evolves
rapidly
and
it's
nothing
is
permanent.
A
A
I
know
that
can
be
a
challenge.
Marc
Andre
is
going
to
talk
to
us
about
auction
keepers,
how
to
get
those
things
fired
up
and
bring
them
in
docker
container,
which
I
will
be
in
very
close
attention
to
the
the
the
this
frothiness
has
raised
a
bunch
of
other
issues
that
probably
gonna
be
one
of
the
major
things
when
he
comes
time
in
the
next
few
days
or
weeks,
if
you
post
Mormont's,
and
what
back
that?
What
actually
happened,
but
we've
accelerated
as
a
group.
Lots
of
ideas
also
plans
we've
had
from
the
very
beginning.
A
The
USBC
is
obviously
one
of
those,
but
a
plan
that
we've
had
we've
been
talking
about.
For
since
the
day
that
MCD
launches
was
what
are
we
gonna
do
with
SED
in
windows,
I
shut
down
and
that's.
This
is
going
to
be
a
question
that
becomes
far
more
urgent
as
this
is
mercury.
So
we
need
to
talk
about
sed,
shut
down,
we're
going
to
talk
about
what
thresholds
and
metrics
and
what
data
we
need
to
have
available
to
us
in
order
to
make
an
informed
decision
as
a
as
a
as
an
ecosystem.
A
We're
gonna
have
a
chat
about
the
u.s.
DC
edition.
What
that
means,
what
the
parameters
implied,
what
benefits
that
brings
to
our
protocol,
what
risks
it
brings
as
well
and
then
we're
gonna
talk
about
the
circuit
breaker.
This
is
gonna,
be
another
very
popular
topic
in
the
ecosystem
over
the
court
coming
months
weeks
or
months,
I'm
going
to
predict
one
of
the
flavor
of
a
month
ago,
two
months
ago
or
flash
loans
that
the
new
flavor
is
known
to
be
circuit
breakers.
A
We
need
to
as
an
ecosystem,
understand
how
to
put
some
checks
in
place,
because
we
have
we've
all
built
this
pleasingly
adversarial
games
here
at
economy
that
is
designed
to
reward
the
strong
and
weed
out
the
weak.
Let's
make
sure
that
we're
not
the
weak
and
so
making
sure
that
there
we
have
the
adequate
defenses
in
place.
Again,
it's
going
to
be
a
topic
for
many
players
in
the
defense
Basin
and
the
circuit
breakers
are
going
to
be
one
of
those
I
think
I
am
going
to
stop
there.
A
We
don't
have
an
order
of
operations
here
in
the
call
today,
and
so
it's
primarily
going
to
be
a
risk
and
smart
contracts
led
discussion,
so
maybe
Cyrus
you're
kind
of
the
hero.
What
is
it
the
hero
we
didn't
deserve,
but
we
got
anyways
or
the
hero.
We
need
potentially
one
of
those
things
suicides
as
their
risk
team
hit
at
the
wrist
Department.
You
want
to
do
give
us
a
heads
up
which
one
you
think
we
should
take
into
first.
Oh.
C
Yeah
I
I
mean
I
structured
the
agenda
in
a
way
that
I
thought
made
sense,
so
I
know
there's
a
lot
of
people
interested
in
in
the
flop
auction
and
because
that's
that's
such
a
that
that's
coming
in
two
days
right.
So
it's
very,
very
short-term
thing.
So
I
think
that
should
be
it
should
be
taken
care
of.
C
After
that,
I
think
we
can
jump
into
any
order.
I
think
the
US,
DC
and
circuit
breaker
discussion
are
kind
of
actually
the
big
ones.
So
it's
one
to
make
sure
that
the
the
discussing,
SCD
and
and
auction
keepers
wasn't
forgotten
about
so
I
I
kind
of
sandwich,
those
in
the
middle
for
what
it's
worth
sounds.
A
A
If
you
have
questions,
please
feel
free
to
get
on
to
a
microphone
and
ask
those
questions.
We
are
comfortable
with
interruptions
if
you
don't
have
access
to
a
microphone.
Please
type
your
chat
in
this
sidebar
and
David,
or
one
of
the
other
people
in
the
call
will
identify
those
questions
and
then
we'll
read
them
out
and
then
we'll
have
somebody
answer
them
for
you,
I
wanna,
actually
Kosh
mccoshen
ask
if
there's
there's
a
lot
of
it
going
a
lot
things
going
on.
There's
gonna
be
a
lot
of
discussion.
A
So
let's
try
to
minimize
I
guess
having
two
or
three
sub
calls
going
on
in
the
chat
that
are
unrelated
to
the
thing
that
people
are
actively
talking
about.
So
if
there's
interesting
things
happening
in
the
chat,
please
bring
them
to
the
attention
of
the
call,
because
these
chats
don't
traditionally
make
it
into
the
historical
record
and
I
would
like
for
this
all
to
be
recorded
for
posterity.
So
if
there's.
B
That,
like
just
a
apples,
II
vote
by
10
minutes
back.
So
this
is
the
current
state
of
the
system.
You
might
seem.
You
might
have
heard
about
the
number
five
million
in
Baghdad,
like
being
like
that
number
is
not
stored
anywhere
like
how
we
end
up
at.
That
number
is
that
we
have
about
18
million
and
system
debt,
and
the
system
also
have
about,
as
you
know,
not
every
single
world
like
hide
like
a
low
bed.
So
the
system
collected
like
dead
some
auctions,
like
30
every
collateral
auctions
pretty
efficient.
B
He
also
collected
a
lot
of
like
liquidation
penalties
on
on
on
those,
so
we
did
end
up
with
like
a
significant
surplus
to
so.
The
entire
system.
Debt,
like
we
all
know,
is
in
a
blocked
state
and
it
will
unblock
like
sometime
early
Thursday,
Eastern
Time,
which
is
when
you
start
getting
processed
and
I.
Don't
think
I
need
to
touch
upon
like
how
why
it's
our
liquidated.
B
We
all
know
that
during
a
normal
liquidation,
when
competitive
bids
come
in
both
like
keepers
re
in
by
collateral
at
a
discount,
but
still
leave
collateral
for
Walter
furnace
to
withdraw.
We've
seen
that
the
this
did
not
happen.
What
happened
was
when
a
Walt
got
liquidated,
both
the
debt,
as
well
as
the
collateral
got
seized
either
by
the
maker
pro
tip
and
it
got
transferred
the
debt
got
transferred
to
the
system,
so
which
is
the
number
that
we
see
in
system
debt.
B
The
collateral
got
transferred
to
a
slope
to
a
collateral
auction
and
because
those
collateral
auctions
ended
up
with
like
very
low
bids,
the
entire
collateral
got
transferred
to
those
furs
in
return
for
a
very
little
die
or
almost
like
no
die.
That
meant
the
debt
queue
or
the
system
that
increased,
but
we
didn't.
The
system
did
not
see.
The
surplus
levels
also
increase
at
the
same
rate,
which
is
why
we
are
in
this
situation.
B
B
Previously
we
had
a
bit
duration
of
like
10
minutes,
so
that
got
change
to
six
hours.
The
auction
expiry
itself
stays
at
three
days,
so
that
did
not
change
that
did
change
for
collateral
auctions,
but
it
did
not
change
for
data
options.
So
bids
are
like
six
hours
and
the
entire
auction,
like
in
lots
for
like
three
days.
B
There
are
like
two
distinct
steps,
so
the
first
step
is
dead
processing
and
this
can
be
done
by
governance.
Participants
need
not
be
done
by
those
participating
in
debt
auctions
and
once
this
data
stressed
that
auctions
can
be
kicked
off
before
we
get
into
that
process
that
processing
we
need
to
understand
how
these
numbers
are
stored
in
the
system.
So
a
quick
recap
of
that.
Whenever
you
want
to
understand
the
total
the
system
debt
number
you'd
have
to
find
out
the
acid
balance.
B
Specifically,
this
sin
asset
balance
of
the
NGO
contract
address.
So
let
me
explain
that
a
little
bit
so
just
like
how
dye
exists
in
the
system,
we
have
another
asset
called
sin,
and,
although
it's
not
available
as
in
the
Aussie
20,
it's
used
by
the
system
to
keep
track
off
of
date
that
it
or
any
address
holds
the
only
address
that
who
will
this
asset
balance
today?
Is
the
liquidation
module?
Oh,
so
it
look
up
inside
the
VAT
contract.
B
If
you
look
up
the
BOE
contract
address
and
if
you
look
up
the
sin,
balance
of
that
address,
you
can
always
can
always
find
out
total
system
date.
This
is
the
total
system,
tech
number.
It
doesn't
tell
us
how
much
of
it
is
blocked
and
how
much
of
it
is
unblocked,
ready
to
be
processed
so
bla
every
time
cool.
Every
time
a
Walt
gets
liquidated.
B
What
happens
is
a
second
variable
like
two
other
variables
are
also
updated,
so
one
is
capital
sin
as
capital
I
sign
it's
a
variable
inside
the
liquidation,
module
and
like
it
gets
updated
and
that
tracks
the
total
block
system,
and
this
is
like
how
data
enters
the
system.
There
is
also
a
mapping
called
smallest
sin,
and
what
this
does
is
every
block,
the
total
that
that
got
total
system
debt-
let's
see
total
loss,
all
the
world's
got
liquidated
in
that
block,
that
amount
of
debt
gets
attached
with
time
stamp
and
it's
stored
in
a
queue.
B
B
So,
as
we
know,
the
governance
updated
the
feed
the
later
six
and
a
half
days
and
the
flog
function
is,
will
start
removing
each
chunk
off
like
block
debt
from
the
queue
as
and
when
in
their
six
and
a
half
days
of
wait
time
lapses
when
it
comes
to
unlock
debt.
This
is
like
crucial
rate.
This
is
how
we
find
out
how
much
needs
to
be
processed
to
at
at
auction.
This
is
not
a
stored
number,
so
you
always
have
to
calculate
this.
B
Excuse
me.
You'll
always
have
to
calculate
this
number
by
looking
at
the
total
system,
debt
and
looking
at
the
remaining
blocked
debt
amount
on
the
system.
So
once
you
like
subtract
these
two
numbers,
you
get
the
unlocked
it
and
if
it's
a
more
amount
of
debt
is
being
under
licked
up
debt
auctions,
there's
another
variable
that
is
called
so
so,
let's
say
governance
keeper
has
a
gig
executive
log
removed
some
of
the
block
that
from
the
queue
and
moved
it
to
the
unblocked
State.
B
So
you
still
can't
kick
off
a
debt
auction,
because
the
system
also
has
a
surplus
and
died.
So
what
first
needs
to
happen
is
the
like:
again,
governance
or
anyone
can
execute
the
heal
function
and
can
cancel
out
equal
amounts
of
surplus
and
unblock
debt.
So
that's
the
first
step.
The
surplus
has
to
go
to
zero
before
it
can
be.
B
This
unlock
that
can
be
dealt
with
so
he'll
like
right
now
would
cancel
about
the
thirteen
million
and
surplus
that
we
currently
have,
and
it
will
put
it
at
a
state
where,
like
there
is
no
no
more
unblocked
debt
and
there's
no
more
surplus
now
when
slog
continues
to
remove
more
blocked,
it
then
we'll
hit
a
threshold.
I
think
it's
fifty
thousand
died
and
then
once
this
threshold
once
there's
at
least
50,000
Dyne
unblocked
it
no
surplus
in
the
system
to
cancel
that,
then
a
debt
auction
can
be
kicked
off.
B
So
when
the
debt
auctions
are
running
and
ash
is
positive,
like
kiss
takes
care
of
like
cancelling
using
a
surplus
and
canceling
of,
and
then
once
this
is
done
once
all
the
debt
auctions
are
done,
the
system
just
goes
back
to
equilibrium
without
no
system
that
no
system
surface
what
happens
in
a
so
that
was
the
stage
and
then
like
when,
once
a
date,
auction
is
kicked
off.
Like
I
said,
the
amount
is
recorded
by
increasing
the
variable
ash
like
when
we
usually
think
about
an
auction.
B
B
The
auction
itself
when
it
kicks
off
so
it
starts
off
by
say,
starts
off
with
these
numbers,
where
the
initial
ntr
amount
offered
by
the
auction
is
250
and
it
it
requests
like
fifty
thousand
five,
so
the
first
bit
if
a
first
bit
comes
through
the
50,000
eyes
immediately
sent
to
the
surplus
and
that
can
like
cancel
out
the
system
debt.
While
the
auction
still
continues
and
other
participants
can
choose
to
reduce
the
anger
among
that
the
requests.
B
So
they
do
that
by
lowering
the
anger
lot
size
and
they
could
like
they
can
lower
it
by
3%
every
time.
So
the
second
way
to
reduce
it
by
3
percent
to
forty
two
point,
five
and
so
on
and
every
time
that's
done.
Like
extends
for
another
six
hours
until
three
days,
assuming
some
point
like
the
bids
Woodstock.
If
the
bid
stop
before
three
days,
the
auction
ends,
the
last
bidder
gets
to
gets
the
MK.
B
If
no
beds
come
for
the
first
three
days,
which
is
the
auction
expiry,
then
a
function
called
tech
can
be
executed
and
tech
resets
the
auction.
The
number
240
is
wrong:
it's
250
increased
by
20
percent
and
it
sets
the
initial
MK
offered
to
a
higher
number
and
further
again
for
the
same
fifty
thousand
time.
This
increase
would
continue
every
three
days
until
at
least
one
but
comes
to
fifty
thousand
died.
C
F
F
G
B
B
A
couple
of
couple
points
that
I
just
wanted
to
make
were
like
submitting
deal
finalizes
the
bid
and
gives
the
debt
auction
participant
the
MKR,
but
nobody
can,
after
either
lick
one
or
after
the
auction
expires.
If
the
bed
is
bit
expiry
or
auction
expiry,
nobody
can
sneak
in
another
bed
before
deal
is
executed.
So
as
long
as
the
time
is
done
like
the
last
bit
or
who
would
get
the
wood,
and
these
are
not
sequential.
D
B
A
All
right,
thanks
see,
that's
there's
a
lot
to
absorb
in
there
and
I.
Think
that
there's
some
there's
some
good
questions
in
the
sidebar
most
one
of
them
primarily
or
a
comment
at
least
I'm,
not
sure
that
at
least
I
personally
think
in
text
and
numbers
as
well
as
you
do.
Don't
you
so
maybe
if
we
could
get
some
floats
of
at
some
point
in
the
future
of
how
value
is
moving
through
the
system
where
the,
where
the
break
points
are
and
all
the
rest
of
these
super
useful.
A
C
H
Good
so
so
vamsi
president
presented
what
happens
with
with
a
flop.
I'll
just
go
over
a
very
quick
presentation
of
what
an
auction
keeper
is
and
what
the
role
in
action
keeper
does
in
the
ecosystem
for
a
flip,
a
flap
and
a
flop
that
we
just
mentioned.
Is
that
we'll
keep
talking
about
today,
so
I
think
auction
keepers
are
they're,
not
new,
but
a
lot
of
people
were
not
paying
attention
until
last
Thursday.
So
I'll
just
explain
that
an
auction
keeper
is
a
piece
of
software
that
participate
automatically
to
all
me
to
protocol
auctions.
H
So
the
flip
for
basically
liquidating
the
the
vaults,
the
flap
to
to
acquire
and
burn
system
surplus
and
burn
MKR
and
the
flop
where
we
meant
MKR
to
cover
for
system
debt.
So
a
auction
keeper
will
launch
action.
It
will
bid
on
to
the
auction.
So
there's
the
dent
intent
names
that
we
are
getting
familiar
with,
and
it
will
eventually
finalize
the
action
in
a
deal.
So
if
you
want
you
to
run
your
own
auction
keep
well.
The
maker
foundation
made
software
to
make
this
possible
to
make
it
easier.
H
I've
put
in
the
presentation
links
for
an
auction
keeper
software,
which
is
a
Python
software
that
runs
Keeper.
Unfortunately,
the
software
doesn't
work
out
of
the
box.
You
need
to
get
the
few
pieces
and
until
it
works.
So
that's
why,
in
the
past
few
days,
we
had
people
working
on
a
the
garage
auction,
keeper
I,
think
Canton
and
is
on
the
call
that
cannot
speak,
I
think
he's
busy
right
now,
but
he's
listening.
H
It
was
you've
put
in
a
lot
of
effort
in
getting
this
working
and
we're
evolving
to
have
something
that
is
that
works
more
or
less
out
of
the
box,
but
I'll
come
back
to
it.
So
what
do
you
need
in
your
software?
You
need
funds
in
capital.
You
need
dye
for
flip
and
flop
actions.
You
need
MKR
for
flap
because
of
the
recent
lot
size
increase.
These
capital
requirements
are
a
bit
bigger
and
more
capital
that
you
have.
It
means
more
simultaneous
actions
you
can
participate
in.
You
need
also
eat
for
gas.
H
Of
course,
don't
underestimate
it
make
sure
your
keeper
has
enough
funds
to
pay
for
its
transactions.
You
needn't
parity
note
right
now.
We
have
some
dependencies
on
some
in
parity.
Specific
functions
are
another
bill
enough
insurer
or
get
so
make
sure
you
have
an
inferior
node.
You
also
need
a
gas
station
API
token
a
gas
station,
but
yeah.
You
need
an
API
token
for
gas
pricing
strategy
and
you
need
to
come
up
with
your
strategy
script,
which
we
call
the
pricing
model.
H
So
basically
pricing
model
decides
when
the
keeper
wizz
and
then
which,
which
price
so
what's
new,
is
the
darker
eyes
auction
keeper?
So
basically
it's
get
the
goes
to
have
something
that
more
or
less
self
campaigned.
It
comes
with
the
default
pricing
model,
defaults,
credit
bidding
strategy
more
or
less.
You
still
need
to
provide
your
repair
to
know
your
API
keys
and
so
on,
but
it
speeds
up
the
initial
configuration,
so
you
can
get
something
done
very
working
very
quickly,
but
it's
not
optimal.
H
If
everyone
uses
the
same
default
piece
of
software
software
well,
everyone
will
be
on
the
same
Auctions
at
the
same
price
and
your
keeper
won't
be
very
competitive
so
using
the
karez
action
keeper
to
get
going.
So
you
get
something
bidding
you
have
something
going
on,
but
then
we
find
it
try
to
find
an
edge,
something
somewhere
to
be
able
to
win
auctions
at
better
price
prices
and
get
a
oxygen
keeper
that
will
be
profitable.
H
Things
to
consider
III
random
nodes
will
often
limits
the
pending
transactions
for
specific
addresses.
So
if
you're
I
have
a
lot
of
light
to
bid
and
you're
trying
to
bid
on
multiple
auctions
at
the
same
time,
well,
you
won't
be
able
to
send
more
that
you
won't
be
able
to
have
more
than
50
pending
transactions
and,
after
that
they
will
start
dropping.
H
Also
make
sure
you
had
a
pure
strategy
for
the
six
hour
auction
duration.
Your
bidding
strategy
should
use
the
it
should
take
into
account
the
remaining
time
of
the
action
the
of
the
auction
and
in
some
cases
we
had
to
report
from
keepers
that
had
trouble
with
resources
on
server
and
node.
So
consider
there's
a
configuration
possible
that
will
not
kick
in
auctions.
It
will
only
participate
on
existing
actions
and
that's
something
that
is
much
less
resource-intensive.
H
A
A
quick
question
remark:
there's
you
mentions
the
strategies
that
are
built
into
this,
and
that's
implies
that
people
would
be
using
this
for
profit
motive.
What
if
there
was
an
altruistic
user
and
wanted
to
get
engaged
with
the
system
and
all
I
wanted
to
do-
was
ensure
that
no
zero
bits
went
through
or
that
they
wanted
to
delay
the
possibility
of
lowball
bids
their
strategy
for
that
yeah.
H
So
busy
the
bidding
strategy
determines
at
what
price
the
auction
keepers
keeper
is
ready
to
to
win
the
auction.
So
if
you
want
to
be
out
wrist
altruistic,
you
can
go
with
the
market
price,
so
if
you're
not
higher,
if
you're
very
altruistic,
altruistic,
but
usually
just
usually
keeper.
Well,
what
try
to
do
or
when
auctions
work
well
option
keepers
usually
win
by
a
few
percent
at
point:
B
a
little
market
price
and
that's
perfectly
fine.
G
Is
there
a
version
of
this
keeper
software?
That's
like
read-only,
basically
for
just
surfacing
information
on
pending
auctions
and
that
you
could
then,
rather
than
actually
submitting
you,
have
your
own
pricing
model
and
all
that
that's
made
transactions,
it's
more
just
for
watching.
What's
going
on.
H
There
are
also
a
couple
like
community
based
things
that
are
like
friends
that
monitor
that
kind
of
stuff,
pretty
actively
like
dye
options.
Yes,
that
you
can
use,
but
if
you
want
something,
that's
actually
on
like
a
script
running
on
a
node
I,
don't
think
there
is
anything
like
that
right
now,
although
I
have
thought
about
dab
going
into
that
space
a
bit.
If
there's
enough
demand
for
it,
I
could
try
to
spin
something
up.
G
Cool
thanks
I
just
wanted
to
make
a
quick
note
on
the
last
slide
of
mark
andreas,
great
great
presentation,
and
the
last
point
was
that
they,
if
you
wanted
to
lower
your
node
and
server
constraint,
you
would
pass
in
a
bid
only
argument
and
I'm
happy
to
say
that
the
recent
github
commit
actually
includes
that
by
default.
And
so
we
assume
that
anyone
using
that.
F
D
H
F
C
C
Okay,
so
then,
let's
sorry
to
continue
to
shift
gears
so
quickly,
but
let's
talk
a
little
bit
more
about
the
flop
auctions.
So
vamsee
gave
us
a
presentation
of
how
they
work,
I
believe
currently
they're
scheduled
to
begin
at
10:30
a.m.
Eastern
on
this
Thursday,
but
that
is
a
that
is
actually
subject
to
change.
C
If,
if,
as
the
system,
the
crews
more
surplus,
potentially
through
further
liquidation
penalties,
that
time
could
be
pushed
further
backwards.
So
a
few
days
ago
the
auctions
were
scheduled
to
start
I,
think
at
6:30
on
Thursday
and
then
due
to
yesterday's
surge
in
liquidation
penalties,
I
mean
it
kind
of
it.
On
the
accounting
side
of
the
system,
it
clears
out
some
of
the
earlier
chunks
of
bad
debt
and
so
the
auctions,
as
a
result,
I'll
get
back
a
little
bit
one.
C
C
C
But
now
we're
actually
in
a
situation
that,
if
so
there's
two
things.
One
is
that
we
did
not
see
that
crisis
of
confidence
and
I.
In
fact,
the
dye
price
has
been
extremely
strong
ever
since
Thursday.
This
reflects
the
community's
belief
that
makers,
long-term
prospects
are,
are,
are
fine,
and
so
there
there
is
a
really
this
urgency
to
clear
out
that
bad
debt,
as
so
long
as
it
just
gets
taken
care
of
eventually,
and
so
that's
partly
why
the
extension
from
48
hours
to
six
point
five
days
was
was
suggested.
C
But
now
there's
there's
a
case
where
the
if
the
MKR
price
is
below
that
two
hundred
starting
bid,
we
may
see
no
bids
and
if
that
were
to
happen,
the
entire
auction
cycle
would
be
pushed
back
72
hours
or
three
days
and
the
price
would
in
the
first
three
days
the
price
would
drop
from
two
hundred
to
one
hundred.
Sixty
six
died,
/
MKR.
So
now
the
question
is:
do
we
want
to
intervene.
C
That's
not
that's
not
really
a
reasonable
amount
to
to
buy
at
spot
price
on
any
exchanges
right
now,
as
far
as
I
can
tell,
but
certainly
there
have
been
plenty
of
questions
about
about
using
an
executive
vote
to
to
basically
either
increase
the
lock
size
or
decrease
the
bidding
amount
such
that
the
starting
price
is
decreased.
A
bit.
C
No
I
can't
say
that
there
has
been
much
stock
put
into
that,
but
that's
definitely
something
that
we
can
discuss
as
well.
So
if
that,
if
the
maximum
auction
duration,
potentially
that
the
the
price
pricing
parameters
could
stay
the
same,
but
the
auction
duration
may
may
be
reduced
to
say
two
days
or
one
day
and
then
if
the
price
was
you
know
not
optimal,
then
it
would
only
take
a
day
or
so
to
to
recycle.
That's
actually
an
interesting
idea.
C
So,
certainly
from
the
governor
effective
doing,
nothing
is
just
the
easiest
right
to
not
have
to
rally
a
fourth
executive
vote
on
short
notice
in
the
last
week,
but
I
think
this
comes
down
to
a
price
of
kind
of
a
liquidity
analysis
of.
Is
there
a
huge?
Will
there
even
be
a
huge
difference
in
in
the
debt
auction
if
the
starting
price
is
200
versus
150,
given
that
the
public
exchange
spot
price
of
200
isn't
really
very
meaningful,
when
dealing
with
a
quantity
of
5
million
died
worth
of
them,
care
can.
H
C
I
think
it's
maybe
just
as
far
as
I
can
tell
it's
primarily
branding
optics
having
that
debt
sit
in
the
queue
for
longer
than
anybody
would
like
if
the
200
starting
bid
price
is
too
high
for
the
keepers
and
they'll
simply
just
wait
three
days,
and
you
know
there.
Obviously,
some
annoyance
and
friction
on
the
keeper
site
as
well
just
introduces
a
bit
of
uncertainty
to
the
whole
to
the
whole
situation.
There's
there's
certainly
no
there's,
there's
no
issue
with
with
doing
an
executive
vote
and
lowering
the
bid
price.
C
C
One
of
the
one
of
the
original
motivations
for
this
minimum
bid
price
was
that
we
well
I'm
kind
of
speculating
here,
but
I
think
the
idea
was
that
we
don't
want
somebody
to
basically
zero
bid.
The
debt
auction
and
say
I'm
I
want
a
trillion
MKR
for
zero
dollars
and
then,
if
there
was
a
liquidity
crisis,
all
of
a
sudden
I'm
care
is
diluted.
C
C
A
F
We
agree
with
Cyrus's
point
on
the
optics
of
probably
being
preferable
for
the
auction
to
clear
without
any
wait
three
days
for
the
price
reduction
I
mean.
Obviously
you
know
in
an
ideal
world,
it
kind
of
just
gets
done
cleanly
and
there
aren't
any
questions
raised.
I
could
also
see
there
being
some
anxiety
or
negative
reaction
worried
by
the
community.
You
know
through
that
period
that
it's
not
clearing,
especially
it
just
kind
of
starts
that
way,
so
I
think
we'd
be
marginally.
F
F
D
F
Great,
so,
to
be
honest,
I
I
see
a
price
reduction
are
very
interesting
opportunities
for
speculators.
I
mean
that
you
create
a
precedent.
I
mean
that
if
we
to
an
executive
edition
for
reducing
to
150,
why
not
reducing
to
100,
because
I
mean
any
speculator,
can
short
maker
may
be
selling
drop
in
the
price?
And
then
we
should
take
another
executing
vote
to
lower
the
price,
because
we
may
be
scared
and
along
to
that,
we
we
know
that
we
already
have
in
some
sense
some
sort
of
Tata
action.
F
F
Or
may
be
speculators,
this
could
be
a
not-so-good
signal
and
an
opportunity
for
speculator.
So
from
from
for
me,
a
good
idea
be
reducing
the
time
between
faded
actions
in
a
way
that
we
can
react
fast
Lee.
So
everything
that
could
allow
to
be
more
agile
in
this
sense
would
help,
but
changing
the
price
I
can
understand
that
the
context
when
the
price
was
chosen
was
when
the
maker
was
higher
and
so
on,
but
lowering
in
a
situation
when
we
already
have
issues.
It's
not
a
good
signal.
I
mean
that
every
signal
that
we
represent.
C
Interesting
point:
if,
if
we
were,
if
we
lowered
it
to
something
like
150
or
a
hundred,
then
we
could
you
know
we
could
be
there
in
a
day
and
then
what
and
then
what
do
we
have
to
push
back
again
right?
There's
there
really
isn't
a
good
rationale
for
any
minimum
price,
and
then
so
does
that
mean?
Maybe
we
should
just
look
you
know,
then,
if
we
were
to
lower,
it
probably
should
be
lower
to
one
dollar.
C
But
then,
if
we
lower
to
one
dollar,
we
run
that
massive
inflation
risk
with
die
liquidity
problems
and
network
congestion,
and
you
know,
then
it
really
increases
the
incentive
for
an
attack
where,
if
somehow
people
could
scurry
away
with
one
dollar
MKR
five
million
of
them
right.
That
would
be.
That
would
be
a
huge,
huge
issue.
Well,
I
know
kind
of
some
of
the
some
people
feel
that
that's
fine,
because
it's
I
guess
I,
don't
know
more
free-market
approach.
G
100
100
died
for
one
maker
seems
like
a
really
nice
showing
point
and
something
that
has
pretty
broad
consensus.
Now
you
have
you
have
three
categories.
You
have
people
that
are
actually
interested
in
acquiring
maker
and
would
be
willing
to
pay
a
higher
price,
to
which
there's
already
been
discussions
of
deploying
multiple
backstops
and
to
get
contracts
with
different
thresholds.
G
For
if
you're
more
interested
in
trying
to
get
in
at
a
higher
price,
then
you
have
the
people
that
are
trying
to
scalp
maker
at
very
low
prices
that
aren't
really
interested
in
the
continued
health
and
success
of
the
broader
ecosystem,
but
are
really
just
opportunistic
about
yeah.
I
would
buy
up
a
big
chunk
of
this
if
the
price
was
low
enough
and
I,
don't
think,
there's
anything
wrong
with
either
of
those
those
categories
of
actors.
G
But
then
this
third
group
is
just
we
want
to
just
all
come
together
and
say,
like
I'm
willing
to
pitch
in
and
if
it
comes
to
that.
So
from
the
perspective
of
this
backstop
syndicate,
project
I
think
the
the
idea
of
auctions
that
begin
higher
and
then
trend
down
if
no
one's
bidding
on
them
is
actually
preferable
because
it
gives
a
community
that
doesn't
have
a
sophistication
to
participate
in
or
just
the
capital
to
participate
in
the
auctions
directly.
G
As
a
keeper
cannot
to
give
some
time
to
review,
to
share
information
about
it
and
to
contribute
to
enlist
in
the
backstop
syndicate
so
that
we
can
basically
enter
the
auction
if
it
comes
that
on
their
behalf
and
the
real
goal
is
not
to
buy
maker,
you
know
in
our
case
it's
to
make
sure
that
all
of
the
maker
gets
sold
and
if
other
people
are
then
encouraged
to
come
in
at
a
higher
price.
That's
that's!
G
D
G
G
There's
100
concurrent
auctions
at
once.
Yes
right,
the
backstop
syndicate
can
collect
the
entire
outstanding
debt
and
bid
on
all
of
them
at
a
hundred.
Then
it
would
make
more
sense
to
then
spread
it
out
across
all
the
different
auctions
hope
you
win,
some
that
becomes
much
more
sort
of
game
theoretic
and-
and
that's
not
the
intention
of
this-
it's
to
really
signal
support
for
the
die
eco
system
and
help
prevent
a
huge
chunk
of
maker
being
sold
off
at
potentially
very
low
prices
and
centralized
in
a
few
hands.
G
You,
but
obviously
we'll
we'll
go
with
whatever
or
whatever
direction
we
decide
in
this.
This
process
we'll
make
it
we'll
make
it
work
and
figure
it
out,
but
yeah
I
do
I
do
think
that
it
it
doesn't
make
a
lot
of
sense
from
an
optics
perspective
to
have
nobody
bidding
at
a
price.
It's
unrealistic
if
the
illiquid
nature
of
the
spot
market
right
now
for
maker
is,
is
not
accurate.
C
Just
another
parameter
that
we've
overlooked
is
the
step
size
in
between
failed
options.
So
right
now
it's
set
to
20%.
So
currently
it
would
drop
the
current
200
price
down
to
166
that
could
be
dropped
to
say,
I
mean
that
could
be
increased
to
say,
50%
or
100%.
Even
and
then
the
price
would
just
drop
in
half
every
three
days
and
so
just
more
aggressively
lower
the
bid
price
just
another.
Just
another
idea.
F
I
mean
that
the
risk
is
you
want
your
keepers
to
be
able
to
recapitalize.
If
they
really
want
to
buy
this,
they
might
be
stuck
in
other
options
so
going
down
to
50.
They
may
not
be
able
to
recapitalize
to
buy
more
in
that
time,
so
I
think
20
is
actually
a
decent
parameter
because
it
doesn't
allow
too
much
slippage.
I,
don't
know
about
the
three
days,
though,
there's
a
lot
of
chatter
in
the
sidebar
I,
don't
know
anyone
want
to
try
and
or
articulate
that,
and
it
seemed
like
you
had
a
position.
F
Sure
I
just
kind
of
wanted
to
mention
that,
like
you
know,
changing
the
auction
model
right
now
substantially
is
it's
not
really
feasible
right,
like
smart
contracts,
is
not
something
that
you
just
kind
of
whip
up
on
an
adderall
binge
overnight
and
then
you
know
send
off
to
an
auditor
and
they
come
back
the
next
day
and
like
to
play
it.
So
we
kind
of
this
is
kind
of
the
constraints
that
we
have
right
now
is
the
current
auction
model,
but
I
think
it
would
be
like
much
more
productive
to
talk
about
okay.
F
Well,
what
are
the
parameters
that
we
can
change
right?
We
can
change
the
starting
price.
We
can
change
the
auction
duration.
We
can
control
when
it
starts
and
and
focus
on
those,
because
that's
really
the
matter
at
hand
that
we're
trying
to
deal
with
here
and
that
any
discussion
about
oh
well.
We
should
change
to
this
type
of
auction,
or
this
other
thing
I
think
that's
a
great
discussion
to
have,
but
for
the
future,
not
for
now.
So,
let's,
let's
kind
of
stay
stay
focused
here.
C
D
So
it
sounds
like
the
priority
is
to
not
have
the
first
round
of
flop.
Auctions
need
to
get
reinitialized
right,
so
would
it
make
sense
to
perhaps
like
the
day
before
they're
supposed
to
go
out?
I
know
they're
just
gone
the
19th
on
Thursday
the
day
before,
since
we
have
a
four
hour
GSM,
we
could
vote
on,
like
maybe
2020
or
like
some
percentage
below
whatever
the
current
spot
prices.
I
mean
that'll,
allow
for
organic
price
discovery,
it'll
allow
for
yeah
I,
don't
know
for
four.
Basically,
those
first
flops.
F
F
D
C
G
Second,
that
this,
the
the
proposal
of
a
hundred
is
its
anchored
in
the
fact
that
it
is
significantly
below
the
market
price
and
that
there's
not
not
even
an
intention
to
be
purchasing
maker
at
100.
It's
a
willingness
to
purchase
maker
at
100
right
if
it
comes
to
that,
and
so,
if
anything,
starting
the
auctions
at
a
hundred
and
one
would
make
more
sense.
But
I
want
to
just
sort
of
second
fit.
The
the
auctions
should
not
be
tailored
around
that
anchoring
price.
They
should
be
tailored
around
the
market
price.
C
Right
so
I
think
at
this
point,
I'm
gonna
hand
it
off
to
rich
and
long
for
wisdom,
because
I
think
we're
at
a
point
where
we
need
some
sort
of
like
governance,
governance
framework
here,
because,
if
we're
gonna
use,
something
I
think
this
needs
to
be
taken
to
I
mean
in
any
case
has
to
be
taken
to
the
forums
and
potentially
the
governance
poll,
for
something
it's
significant.
It's
this
as
well,
where
else
we're
just
gonna
be
going
in
circles,
yeah.
A
And
I
think
that
this
ties
into
the
things
I
was
touching
on
top
of
the
call,
so
we
have
urgency
expediency
agility.
All
these
great
issues,
but
ultimately,
where
this
comes
down
to
is
what
the
risks
are
that
are
increased
by
weighting
versus
the
benefits
of
moving
quickly
and
so
I'm,
not
a
risk
analyst,
and
so
it's
it's
difficult
for
me
to
make
those
kinds
of
calls.
Why
and
that's
obviously
I
should
be
very
careful.
It's
not
my
job
I'm,
just
I'm
just
talking
about
right,
so
I,
my
preference
would
be
that.
A
Obviously
this
isn't
we're
all
going
to
die
in
the
next
ten
minutes.
If
we
don't
do
something
kind
of
situation,
so
I
would
like
to
follow
the
process.
The
process
works
right.
Let's
get
a
forum
post
up,
let's
put
in
an
explanation
of
what
the
situation
is.
Let's
list
up
the
different
options:
let's
have
a
debate
over
the
course
of
the
next
day
or
two
and
just
pull
in
there,
and
this
was
taken
extent
long.
F
A
C
F
Can't
guarantee
it
but
like
they
lost
the
previous
ones,
we've
seen
have
been
fairly
problems
like
maybe
as
long
as
I'm,
like
a
day
before
we
probably
should
like,
and
it's
like
the
parameters.
People
actually
disagree
with
the
parameter
changes
like
we
should
be
fine,
there's
a
technical
risk
here
too.
If
we
do
end
up
changing
the
parameters,
it
changes
like
vetting
model
strategies.
Keywords
are
getting
ready,
I.
A
Here's
another
like
nothing
occurrence
is
easy.
So
here
we
have
a
cadence
right,
there's
there's
other
decisions
to
be
made
and
potentially
like
there's,
there's
other
clean
up
a
she
ation.
So
the
tweaking
there's
normal
Friday
vote
that
we
have
coming.
How
are
we
going
to
gonna
roll
all
this
stuff
up?
We're
gonna
have
an
executive
every
day,
Intel,
where
the
woods
there's
there's
cognitive
and
government
or
government
its
overhead.
They
need
to
be
considered
as
well.
A
So
I
think
that
here's
the
here's
the
summary
as
always
government's
needs
to
happen
in
the
forum
and
we
don't
make
protocol
level
decisions
in
these
calls.
We
just
set
some
direction
that
we
hash
out
in
the
forums
and
text
with
everybody
having
the
opportunity
to
follow
along
with
that
discussion.
So
we
understand
what
the
question
as
we
understand
what
the
protocol.
We
don't
understand,
the
timing.
A
We
don't
understand
the
reasoning,
we
understand
the
urgency
or
the
options
available
to
us,
but
that's
what
the
forums
for
so
Cyrus
I'm
actually
going
to
reform
effort
to
forced
onto
us.
So,
let's
work
together
after
the
call
to
get
that
floor,
closed
up
and
running
and
then
well
well
hash
out
as
a
community
urgency
and
the
impact
on
various
actors.
C
A
C
So
just
super
brief
recap:
this
isn't
any
sort
of
post-mortem,
but
basically
on
Thursday.
There
are
two
main
issues
that
we're
dealing
with:
one
was
network
congestion
and
the
other
one
was
dye
liquidity
I,
don't
feel
that
we've
really
had
a
chance
to
properly
discuss
these
two
issues
and
how
they
interrelate
with
each
other.
C
The
basic
idea
is
that
the
increase
in
the
TTL
that
was
passed
Thursday
night
was
primarily
to
hedge
maker
against
network
congestion,
so
obviously
keepers
were
struggling
to
get
bids
out.
They
were
struggling
with
node
infrastructure
and
all
sorts
of
aetherium
protocol
related
things,
and
that
six-hour
delay
gives
keepers
the
the
time
to
take
care
of
those
issues,
but
very
critically
what
the
6-hour
TTL
changed
did
not
give
us
was
a
proper
solution
to
the
dialer
quiddity
issue.
C
C
C
If
eath
gets
to
say
eighty,
then
six
million
runs,
six
million
dye
will
be
will
need
to
be
bid
on
by
keepers
if
the
price
hits
70
gets
to
its
to
eleven
million,
around
price
is
sixty
it's
starting
to
get
a
little
scary.
Twenty-Six
million
died
that
keepers
will
have
to
come
up
with
and
a
price
of
fifty
five
or
lower.
That
says,
fifty
five
million
died.
These
these
numbers
are
no
joke,
and
this
this
was
like.
In
my
opinion,
this
is
a
very
serious
risk
that
wasn't
properly
processed
by
by
the
community.
C
C
Right
so
first
point
that
I
want
to
make
sure
we
all
agree
with,
or
maybe
we
don't
but
the
the
TTL,
the
bit
duration,
whether
it's
10
minutes
or
6
hours
or
24
hours
I.
It
doesn't
really
affect
the
auction
keeper
liquidity
crisis.
If
the
price
hits
you
know
and
that
50
to
60
handle
just
just
a
personal
gut
feeling,
keepers
are
not
going
to
be
able
to
raise.
50
million
died.
C
It's
just
one
of
those
really
tricky
tricky
things
right,
and
it's
also
important
to
remember
that
this
isn't
a
function
of
exchange,
liquidity
for
eath
of
the
collateral
type.
So
even
if
you
know
swap
in
all
the
Dex's
and
all
the
centralized
exchanges
in
coinbase
could
likely
properly
handle
fifty
sixty
million
dollars
worth
of
eath
within
a
thirty
three
percent
slippage
buffer.
It's
it's
really
the
dial
aquitted
II!
That's
that's
the
issue
here.
So
you
know,
quick
solutions
were
needed
last
several
days.
The
basic
premise
was
to
slow
down
the
rate
of
liquidations.
C
Should
they
were
they
to
occur
so
if
I
deal
it
so,
for
example,
20
million
of
collateral
was
gonna,
go
up
for
sale,
some
sort
of
mechanism
where
it
could
be
liquidated
in
say
five
million
dollar
chunks
and
and
the
goal
of
this
is
that
keepers
could
have
the
ability
to
essentially
recycle
the
die
that
they
are
using
to
bid
on
auctions.
So
just
making
a
number
up,
let's
say
keepers
have
in
total,
they
have
say:
10
million
died
at
their
disposal.
C
But
the
current
auction
format
does
not
allow
such
a
such
a
privilege,
and
so
while
there
clearly
is
room
for
long-term
changes
to
the
auction
format,
that's
something
that
would
take
likely
months
if
I
had
to
guess
so
there
so
I
think
the
first
priority
was:
how
can
we
slow
down
the
rate
of
of
collateral
being
liquidated
and
I?
Think
that
was
the
the
main
impetus
behind
the
liquidation
freeze?
C
C
Certainly,
adding
USD
sees
a
collateral
type,
helps
with
the
with
the
dye
pack
and
will
show
some
data
after
this
that
we
tracked
some
of
the
UST
see
some
of
the
dye
that
was
minted
from
USD
C
over
the
last
12
hours,
and
a
lot
of
it
has
gone
to
kind
of
helping
push
the
dye
price
back
down,
but
we
we
need
to
be.
We
need
to
be
clear
that
well,
at
least
in
my
personal
opinion,
allowing
keepers
an
opportunity
to
mint
dye
for
auctions.
A
C
So
so,
let's,
let's
trip-
let's
just
also
one
last
time-
recap
did
two
problems.
One
is
the
dye
price
which
is
going
up.
It
reached
$1
10,
but
it's
a
secondary
in.
In
my
opinion.
More
important
concern
is
that
if
we
triggered
Vault
liquidations
at
an
8th
price
of
60
or
50,
the
keepers
would
be
almost
certainly
overwhelmed.
No
matter
what
the
auction
parameters
were,
there
would
be
no
set
of
option
parameters
that
would
allow
keepers
to
to
gather
the
necessary
by
liquidity,
to
properly
bid
on
those
auctions.
C
The
fact
that
keepers
are
using
us
DC
to
help
just
ARB
the
the
dye
price
downwards
is
just
a
you
know,
just
a
positive
by-product,
it's
just
an
additional
side
effect.
Now.
The
reason
I
say
this
is
important
for
risk
parameters
is
because,
obviously
there
is
a
lot
of
there's
a
lot
of
discussion
in
the
broader
in
the
broader
community,
about
having
us
DC
as
a
collateral
type
and
and
and
some
people
are
potentially
unhappy
with
it.
C
And
so
the
idea
is
that
if
we
only
wanted
to
target
auction
keeper
liquidity
but
not
have
us
DCB
kind
of
a
permanent
staple
of
the
collateral
pool,
then
you
could
you
could
you
could
put
like
a
thousand
percent
stability
fee
on
us
DC,
so
so
prohibitively
high,
then
on
a
day
to
day
use
on
a
day
to
day
basis?
Absolutely
no
one
would
borrow
us
DC,
because
it
would
just
make
absolutely
no
sense,
except
for
that
one
rare
instance
where
the
price
of
eath
does
nosedive
in
an
enormous
amount
of
liquidity.
D
I
just
want
to
read
this
one
thing
from
the
chat
that
Matthew
Lite
wrote
for
the
sake
of
the
recording,
but
he
said
it
might
be
worth
telling
everyone
on
the
call
that
people
can
immediately
generate
USD
C
from
USD
on
coinbase,
with
no
cost.
So
the
addition
of
USD
C
is
essentially
equal
to
adding
US
dollars
as
collateral.
F
C
D
C
C
C
Price
of
e
starts
to
drop,
and
it's
about
to
hit
I
think
something
like
$70
was
I.
Think
if
the
price
of
eath
were
to
hit
70
all
of
a
sudden,
there
may
be
30
million
dollars
worth
of
collateral.
That
will
be
liquidated
to
protect
the
system
to
protect
the
protocol
from
losses.
Keepers
would
have
to
bid
roughly
two-thirds
of
that
amount
to
protect
the
system
from
losses
which
is
2/3
of
30
million
is
20
million
dial.
C
C
F
C
C
C
The
keepers
spend
there,
they
use
their
10
million
for
the
auctions
and
then
the
price
then
drops
to
say
80
and
you
have
another
10
million
of
liquidations
on
its
way.
The
keepers
can
then
send
a
signal
to
the
community
and
say
hey
governance,
community.
If
we
had
time
to
get
our
our
10
million
die
back
from
the
round
of
auctions
that
was
just
initiated,
we
can
happily
bid
on
this
next
set
of
liquidations
as
well,
but
currently
our
our
die
is
tied
up
in
the
previous
round
of
auctions.
C
C
C
F
F
E
E
One
of
the
most
active
bits
actually
this
year
pretty
much
for
the
same
reasons
that
happened
on
MC
lean,
going
to
explain
it
later
on,
but
the
size
supply
dropped
for
four
point:
five
million
died,
Syme
aggression,
contract
dropped
for
only
about
2.5
million,
which
means
there
was
also
a
high
increase
of
SCI
flowing
into
migration
contract
and
also
had
some
liquidations,
but
not
as
many
as
as
an
MCD,
and
that's
primarily
because
fertilization
ratio
at
sed
was
historically
much
higher
that
than
an
MCD.
So
we
didn't
see
so
much
so
much
liquidations
happening.
E
So
here
is
just
an
overview
of
CDP
repayment
activity.
As
I
said
about
four
point:
seven
million
was
repaid
and
also
liquidated
about
hundred
seventy
CVB's
actually
repaid
or
were
liquidated
in
last
week,
and
you
can
see
here
the
jump
in
the
activity.
So
this
is
the
this
is
the
CDP
migration
activity
and
you
can
see
that's
on
13th
of
March
Friday,
one
day
after
the
Thursday
when
it
crashed
a
lot
of
CDP's
just
migrated
over
to
MCD.
E
So
why
wasn't
this
happening?
So
I
have
two
ideas:
probably
the
first
one
was
historically
or
in
the
last
few
weeks
they
were
defending
against
CDP's
for
defending
against
getting
liberated
by
the
posting
additional
later
now
it
sort
of
seemed
that
they
kind
of
capitulated
they
didn't
want.
You
know
to
have
this
long
exposure
and
if
you
want
the
closure
CDP,
the
only
way
out
is
actually
to
to
migrate
to
MCD,
and
then
you
can
close
your
your
world
so
I'm
guessing.
E
E
E
They
also
paid
some
significant
amount
of
interests,
I'm
still
running
the
calculations
there,
but
my
summation
is
around
three
hundred
thousand,
but
it's
actually
combination
of
penalty
fees
and
interest
rates,
interest
and,
of
course,
penalties
are
not
the
ones
which
are
collected
by
maker
system.
It's
collected
again
by
pool
Teeter
holders,
pool
heater
holders,
yeah
and
interests
about
two
hundred
thousand
I
guess
were
actually
paid
to
the
maker
system.
E
Here
you
can
see
also
on
the
side
holder
side.
They
were
also
very
active.
They
also
migrated
on
those
two
days
very
heavily
I.
Think
I
have
the
activity
here.
So
here
is
the
side
flowing
into
a
migration
contract
again
a
spike
on
Thursday
and
what
may
be
a
reason
for
that?
I
was
thinking
this
might
be
because
if
you
have
side,
there's
side
is
trading
holder
ban,
of
course
there's
a
premium.
E
But
if
you
want
to
sell
1
million
side
on
you,
don't
really
get
a
buyer
because
one
who
is
buying
is
most
likely
CDP
and
he
can,
you
know,
gets
a
liquidity
immigration
contract
for
for
one
dollar.
Here
he
hears
sigh
holders
would
most
likely
one
to
migrate
to
die
and
then
collect
the
premium.
That
was
available,
which
was
I.
Think
it's
almost
13%.
So
this
might
be
one
of
the
reason
that
the
tour
supports
and
this
liquidity
crunch
forced
psyche
holders
to
go
to
20
to
die
and
then
sell
it
or
they
might
be.
E
E
I
want
to
say
this:
there
are
still
bytes
that
were
happening
today,
actually
not
by
its
vice
for
OLED
already
made,
but
people
were
not
really
bidding,
and
this
was
most
probably
because
in
sed
you
have
three
percent
discount
and
of
course,
both
I
and
I
were
trading
well
over
one
dollar
and
nobody
was
really
incentivized
to
to
close
those
auctions.
Until
today,
I
saw
most
of
that
by
it's
getting
cleared,
but
we
still
have
a
few
CDP's
who
have
liquidation
ratio
actually
lower
than
150
percent.
E
E
Another
thing
I
want
to
mention
is
cyrus
showed
you
know
how
much
that
gets
liquidated
in
am
steve.
Price
drops
in
a
seedy
situation
might
be
a
bit
better,
but
then,
when
it
goes
down
to
$60,
for
instance,
we
saw
an
absentee
have
25
million
of
liquidations,
which
is,
I
think,
that's
a
bit
more
than
one-third
of
MC
depth.
But
here
you
basically
get
most
of
the
debt
actually
wiped
at
this
price,
which
is
a
problem
so
up
to
eighty.
E
E
This
number
really
doesn't
move,
so
it
seems
like
holders
who've
been
holding
side
four
for
more
than
six
months.
There's
10
million
of
holdings
they're
outside
and
they
don't
move
at
all
right.
So
even
the
this
Bremen
did
they
could
earn
in
the
last
week,
wasn't
enough
actually
to
to
move
the
side
to
MCD
and
you
know,
earn
extra
Ealdor
on
selling
it
with
a
high
premium.
E
So
it
seems
like
this
is
like
the
lower
bound,
and
it's
somehow
coincides
with
this
10
million
that
we
see
not
on
forums
and
then
on
the
CD
beside
the
CDP's
that
were
inactive
during
the
immigration.
The
number
dropped
a
bit
from
I
think
12
million
to
10
million,
but
we're
still
seeing
no
one
large
CDP
who
doesn't
do
not
drink
and
then
few
larger
ones,
as
well,
I'm
hard
to
say
when
we'll
be
incentivized
to
to
migrate
or
to
close
the
position,
especially
because
they
have
a
lot
of
a
lot
of
room.
E
I
think
the
biggest
one
has
liquidation
ratio
here,
it's
60
68
or
$60
Peter
price.
So,
just
to
conclude,
what
I
believe
might
happen
further.
Is
that
if
Enterprise
drops
again,
we
might
probably
see
the
same
same
thing
happening
again,
so
increased
migration
activity
and
sigh
migration
activity
of
both
science
EDP,
but
if
eater
rebounds
or
is
kind
of
stays
here,
this
levels
I'm
guessing
we're
gonna,
see
less
activity
pretty
much
similar
that
we
saw
in
last
few
weeks,
just
a
small
decline.
They've
been
sighs
supplying,
it
might
be
new
and.
C
Also,
just
to
just
to
point
out
I
think
the
the
situation
for
keeper
liquidity
is
even
worse
in
sed
than
MCD,
because
at
least
in
MCD
we
now
have
the
USD
C
collateral
type
and
the
ability
to
freeze
the
liquidations
if
necessary.
But
if,
if
the
price
drops,
all
these
massive
size
CDP's
will
be
will
be
on
our
water
and
they
will,
they
will
pretty
much
never
get
bitten,
because
the
the
keepers
will
just
never
be
able
to
come
up
with
the
with
the
necessary
liquidity.
C
E
F
F
It's
kind
of
related
to
that
City
discussion
in
the
sense
that,
in
the
sense
that
one
of
the
reasons
for
migrations
that
pretty
much
has
just
mentioned
was
actually
that
premium
that
actually
the
people
actually
could
get
on
time
on
the
13%
or
so
that
it
will
actually
mention
there
and
I
sell.
Actually.
If
then,
they
actually,
the
pag
calls
to
a
normal
level,
then
I,
guess
potentially
that
reason
for
migrating
actually
reduces
itself
you
it's
kind
of
like
it's
observation
on
that
relationship,
but
also
like
a
question
whether
we
have
thought
about
this.
F
F
Yeah,
because
at
the
moment,
or
at
least
over
the
last
week,
almost
kind
of
that
increase
in
the
dye
in
the
dye
price
is
almost
a
linear
like
linear
to
the
eath
drop.
So
you
wanna
anyone
will
join
just
like
logistic
regression.
There
would
actually
basically
say
actually
that's
a
predictor.
That's
a
predictor
of
Heath
price
dropping
at
the
moment
as
it
stands
right
now
and
I.
F
C
F
C
F
Just
to
touch
on
that
real
quick,
so
it's
not
just
a
past
problem
like
there
are
currently
still
some
small
CDP's
that
haven't
been
bitten
and
are
still
under
collateralized
and
there's
still
last
I
checked
a
fair
amount
of
path
to
be
sold
sitting
in
the
contractor,
get
the
exact
name
of
the
contract,
but
in
the
sed
contract
that
collects
collateral
after
fights,
there's
a
bust
transaction
that
goes
through,
which
is
the
actual
sale.
But
at
least
as
of
this
morning,
a
fair
amount
of
that
was
not
sold
yet.
D
What
is
it
sorry,
one,
second,
that
the
cat
it
doesn't
have
authority
on
the
US
DC
flippers,
so
you
as
DC
liquidations,
aren't
actually
possible
without
another
executive
vote
that
enables
them
so
I
just
wanted
to
throw
that
I.
Don't
know
if
it
was
already
mentioned
earlier
during
the
US
DC
section
of
the
call.
C
A
Don't
take
this
opportunity
to
do
a
little
bit
of
a
gut
check,
so
we're
coming
up
to
the
two-hour
mark
it's
busy
days.
We
have
a
lot
of
things
to
discuss
and
I.
Don't
want
to
get
necessarily
locked
into
a
never-ending
government
call
when
there's
forum
posts
to
be
made
and
pulls
to
be
written
and
actions
to
be
taken
so
Cyrus
were
there.
Other
beats
that
you
wanted
to
hit
specifically
for
this
call,
or
maybe.
A
Well,
you're,
using
your
suck,
we'll
have
continual
like
I,
said
at
the
talk,
we're
gonna
have
these
calls
tomorrow
and
the
next
day
and
probably
the
next
day.
So
this
is
not
the
only
window
for
debate.
So
if
you
had
a
question,
you
didn't
feel
it
was
explored
adequately
or
you
want
to
revisit
a
topic
conversation
either.
Consider
adding
that
to
a
forum
thread
and
putting
in
your
back
pocket
the
agenda
tomorrow.
A
C
If
that
is
kind
of
the
consensus
case,
then
the
stability
fee
could
be
dramatically
increased,
such
that
we
don't
see
dye
usage
for
peg
arbitrage
and
only
for
keeper
liquidity,
but
also
I.
Think,
of
course,
in
the
short
run,
these
are
definitely
benefits
right
now
as
well.
They
just
need
to
be
properly
balanced
against
the
risks
of
having
somewhat
of
a
perpetual
u.s.
C
A
Thanks
iris,
so,
like
I
said,
this
is
the
two-hour
mark
who
are
going
to
host
the
video
as
soon
as
oome
finishes,
processing,
which
is
canticle
all
these
days.
There
will
be
a
brief
summary
as
well.
It
takes
a
lot
of
time,
energy
and
resources
to
transcribe
these
things,
so
the
summaries
might
be
slightly
abbreviated,
but
we'll
catch
up
in
the
future
of
people
require
them.
Otherwise
the
video
will
be
up
soon.
Look
to
the
forum's
please
and
join
the
new
discussion
and
Syrus
will
have
some
interesting
things
for
us
to
consider.
A
At
the
very
least
and
let's
plan
to
reconvene
tomorrow,
I'm
I've
noticed
a
trend
that,
as
soon
as
the
recording
stops,
the
debate
gets
fairly
serious
and
interesting.
So
there's
a
little
bit
of
shyness.
There
I
encourage
people
to
potentially
think
about
that
for
tomorrow's
call,
because
there's
a
lot
of
conversations
that
we
should
be
having,
but
in
the
interest
of
that
I'm
fine
with
just
leaving
this
call
open,
so
people
can
hang
out
and
stuff,
but
I'm
reasonably
sure
that
there's
a
number
of
us
that
need
to
get
back
to
work.