►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 82
Description
Please join us and help shape the future of the MakerDAO.
Agenda
- Richard Brown: General Q&A
- LongForWisdom: Review Signal Thread. Do we compensate vault holders that were completely liquidated? - https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-thread-do-we-compensate-vault-holders-that-were-completely-liquidated/1713
- Kurt: Discuss the flop unblocking - https://forum.makerdao.com/t/1748 and the possibility for an immediate Executive Vote
Links
Podcast version: https://feeds.soundcloud.com/playlists/soundcloud:playlists:623643288/sounds.rss
Summaries: https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-and-risk-meetings/summaries
Foundation Proposal: https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/core-principles
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 1: https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-risk-framework/part-one
Website: https://makerdao.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/makerdao
Forum: https://forum.makerdao.com/
Chat: https://chat.makerdao.com/home
Email: info@makerdao.com
A
Hello,
everyone
welcome
to
March
24th
edition
of
the
scientific
governance
and
risk
meeting.
My
name
is
Richard
Brown
I
am
the
interim
governance
facilitator.
Last
week
we
had
in
the
week
before
I,
don't
even
know
what
day
it
is
anymore.
All
right,
I
think
it's
been
10
days
since
Black
Thursday
ish,
it's
been
a
furious
reactive
week
for
the
foundation
for
the
ecosystem.
In
general,
we've
had
a
ridiculous
amount
of
work
and
I
know
that
there
is
a
sizable
contingent
at
the
foundation
that
has
not
stopped
working
since
Black
Thursday.
A
My
heart
goes
out
to
all
of
them
because
I
know
what
that
feels
like.
But
now
it's
it's
time
to
we're
getting
to
that
point
where
it's
time
to
take
a
breath,
or
at
least
it's
possible
to
take
a
breath
and
try
to
figure
out
what
the
f
just
happened
and
that's
going
to
be
a
long
discussion
to
have
it's
going
to
require
we've
already
seen
it.
It's
not
going
to
require
we're
already
at
the
foundation
we're
already
working
on
this
there's
numerous
teams.
A
There's
external
consultants,
there's
domain
experts
that
are
reviewing
all
kinds
of
information,
so
they're,
going
through
code
they're
going
through
processes,
they're
looking
at
analysis
is
being
done.
People
are
making
models
to
try
to
figure
out
it's
what's
what
the
market
downturn
did
to
the
T
5
space,
what
it
did
to
the
protocol,
how
the
protocol
responded
in
ways
that
it
needs
to
be
improved
in
the
future.
A
The
first
is
having
something
with
a
substance
and
some
veracity,
some
science
behind
it
and
I
think
that
we've
chosen
the
second.
So
information
is
coming
soon
about
what
happened,
but
there's
other
issues
in
the
ecosystem
that
needs
to
be
addressed.
So
we've
we've
made
some
changes
to
the
protocol.
The
government's
ecosystem
has
come
together
to
adapt
rapidly
to
an
environment,
that's
adversarial,
which
is
the
one
that
was
designed
in
the
one.
A
But
more
specifically,
we
have
other
issues
to
deal
with.
One
of
those
issues
is
related
to
the
flop
options.
There's
technical
issues
that
need
to
be
addressed
there,
I'm
not
going
to
speculate
and/or
describe
what
that
might
be
because
I'll
get
the
words
wrong
and
look
foolish
in
front
of
everybody
I'll.
Let
Kurt
picked
that
up.
The
other
major
discussion
we
need
to
talk
about
today
is
the
impact
of
the
zero
bid
auctions.
A
This
is
a
huge
conversation
and
its
implications
is
going
to
have
for
our
community
and
for
the
ecosystem
are
pretty
wide-ranging
and
also
hard
to
predict,
but
I'm,
looking
forward
to
this,
like
you
wouldn't
believe,
which
might
be
hard
to
imagine,
but
it's
this
is
going
to
be
a
tremendously
valuable
teaching
woman
for
our
community
and
for
our
government's
ecosystem,
because
we
have.
We
have
a
bad
situation
here
and
the
community
is
at
a
point
where
it
has
the
levers
and
it
has
the
sophistication
it
has
the
process
as
to
self-organize.
A
It
has
the
the
human
resources
to
pull
that
together,
which
is
unbelievably
heartwarming
and
encouraging
so
I'm
going
to
hand
the
discussion
actually
actually
maybe
I
figured
ordering
in
a
second.
But
so
the
discussion
to
be
had
is
the
zero
bid
auctions.
A
lot
of
people
were
impacted
by
that
and
the
community
has
a
decision
to
make
about
how
to
respond
to
the
situation.
There's
been
a
few
threads
in
the
forum.
One
is
more
of
a
testimonial
type
thread
of
who
is
impacted.
A
There's
been
two
other
threats:
I
believe
one
about
technical
potential,
technical
solutions
and
the
other
one.
The
reasoning
behind
it
escapes
me,
but
I'm
sure
long
for
wisdom
will
fill
us
all.
You
know
in
a
minute,
so
what
we
want
to
do
today
is
have
sort
of
a
public
discussion
of
what
what
was
in
those
threats.
A
What
this
looks
like
for
our
protocol
and
what
the
community
wants
to
what
actions
the
community
feels
best
to
take.
This
is
going
to
be
one
of
the
I
think
that,
from
my
perspective,
this
is
gonna
be
one
most
important
activities
that
the
community
is
engaged
in
so
far.
We've
we've
we've
hit
a
lot
of
milestones
and
a
lot
of
really
amazing
work.
A
So
we
placed
a
lot
of
trails
and
the
brand-new
world
of
protocol
governance,
but
this
is
going
to
be
one
of
the
first
tests
of
what
happens
when
things
go
wrong
and
I'm
very
much.
Looking
forward
to
that
conversation,
I
think
I
am
going
to
stop
there
and
I'm
undecided
about
which
one
of
these
two
issues
we
should
dig
into
first,
it
feels
like
the
compensation
or
the
zero
bit
discussion.
C
Reforms
I
do
I.
Do
let
me
quickly
drop
some
links
in
the
chat
here
before
I
launch
into
it,
so
the
first
link,
I
drop,
is
going
to
be
a
link
to
a
forum
post
I
made
where
you
that
base
gives
a
basic
summary
of
the
issue.
The
slides
are
linked
from
that
forum
post,
but
I
will
also
just
drop
the
link
to
the
slides
I'm
about
to
present
into
the
chat
as
well
and
I
will
say,
while
I'm
presenting
I
won't
be
able
to
see
the
chat.
C
So
if
there
are
questions
in
the
chat,
I
would
much
appreciate
somebody.
Anybody
would
like
shout.
Those
out
feel
free
to
interrupt
me
at
any
time
for
questions.
So
long
as
the
question
is,
is
relevant
I'll
try
to
answer
it
immediately,
but
on
the
other
hand
we
have
a
lot
to
go
through
the
day.
So
if
the
question
is
kind
of
a
tangent,
let's
take
it
offline,
you
can
ping
me
in
rocket
shaft
or
something,
and
we
can
yeah
I'll
tell
you
everything
you
want
to
know.
That's
a
big
promise.
C
C
C
This
talk
is
to
teach
you
some
of
that,
but
so
client
20-block
debt
auctions,
which
corresponds
to
about
a
million
died
and
on
back
debt
in
the
short
term.
The
system
stability
is
not
threatened
by
this,
but
it
is
kind
of
a
important
issue
to
deal
with.
The
good
news
is
that
governments
can
unblock
all
the
flops
or
debt
auctions,
be
an
executive
action
and
I'll
also
cover
kind
of
three
timescales
over
which
to
address
the
issue,
the
immediate
short
term
and
the
longer
term.
C
So,
in
order
to
understand
exactly
what
happened,
I'm
going
to
have
to
teach
you
a
little
bit
about
how
the
system
does
its
accounting
and
we're
going
to
go
through
this
one
step
at
a
time
very
slowly,
like
I,
said,
stop
and
interrupt.
If
you
have
questions
I
love
to
answer,
questions
with
that
said,
let's
dive
into
it
so
kind
of
the
most
central
piece
of
the
die
credit
system
is
a
contract
called
the
vac,
which
is
essentially
just
the
central
ledger.
It
stores
you
know
the
data
of
who
has
what
within
the
system.
C
It
also
contains
the
logic
for
vault
operations,
leverage
and
all
that
we
won't
worry
about
its
logic
today,
just
what
information
is
in
there
and
not
even
all
of
that,
so
the
most
important
first
piece
of
information
that
it
stores
is
something
called
the
total
debt,
which
is
just
the
total
die
supply.
Let
me
point
out
a
thing
in
the
slide
here
you
see
I
write,
total
debt,
which
is
the
plain
English
term
for
this,
and
then
I
have
a
forward
slash
and
then
in
a
different
font
and
different
color.
C
The
word
debt,
so
that's
the
jargon
term
and
I'm
going
to
as
I
go
try
to
build
up
sort
of
a
rosetta
stone
between
the
plain
English
words
and
the
jargon
words
in
this
fashion
of
just
always
showing
them
to
you
together
and
as
the
as
the
talk
goes
on
and
we
get
more
complicated,
slides
with
more
things
on
the
slide
at
once.
I'll
use
more
of
the
the
jargon
terms.
C
I
think
you'll
still
come
to
appreciate
having
short
names
for
these
things,
but
for
now
so
total
debt
is
the
I
supply
and
that
can
be
broken
down.
As
a
sum
of
two
different
contributions,
one,
we
call
the
backed
debt
and
that's
the
sum
over
the
death
of
all
vaults.
There's,
no
individual,
there's
no
variable
that
stores
this
directly.
C
But
if
you
take
a
sum
over
all
the
dead
of
all
the
vaults,
that
would
be
the
back
debt
and
then
the
other
term
in
the
sum
is:
what's
called
the
unpacked
debt,
and
this
does
have
a
jargon
name,
a
code
name
and
that's
the
vise,
and
that
that
is
a
pretty
easy
one
to
remember.
I.
Think
because
you
know
what
is
vice,
you
know
it's
something.
That's
you
know
not
really
a
great
thing
and
unpack.
C
That
is
not
really
a
great
thing
either,
although
it
does
accrue
normally
during
the
operation
or
the
protocol,
but
just
to
help
you
remember
it,
and
that
comes
from
things
like
liquidations,
where
the
CDP
Versailles
fold
I
still
use
the
old
terminologies,
and
that
comes
from
liquidations
every
time.
There's
a
liquidation.
You
get
someplace,
you
know
later
on.
C
The
collateral
auction
might
cover
it,
but
initially
there's
vice
created,
DSR
interest,
as
it
gets
paid
out,
actually
creates
on
back
to
dad
to
advise
then
a
few
more
things
that
the
VAT
stores
that
SAP
or
that
are
important
to
know
about
it,
stores
the
died
balance
of
every
user.
That's
just
a
mapping
from
addresses
to
some
amount
of
die
and
then
the
mirror
image
of
that
is.
It
stores
something
called
sin
which
is
the
unpacked
that
balance
of
each
user.
C
So
this
is,
you
know
the
depth
that
isn't
covered
by
CD
piece
or
vaults,
I'm
going
to
make
that
mistake
so
many
times
all
right
and
then
so
there
are
some
identities
that
apply
here.
If
you
take
the
sum
over,
all
of
the
individual
user
die
balances,
you'll
get
the
total
debt
or
die
supply,
as
you
should,
and
then,
if
you
take
the
sum
over
all
the
Becht
debt
balances
over
all
the
sin,
you
get
the
vise
right.
C
So
the
sum
of
all
the
sin
in
the
world
is
the
vise
kind
of
poetic,
if
you
think
about
it.
So
that's
everything
I
wanted
to
say
about
the
VAT
like
I
mentioned:
there's
a
lot
more
to
it,
but
this
is
all
you
need
for
this
to
understand
this
issue
and
maybe
before
I
move
on
from
this
slide,
I'll
take
like
a
10
or
15
second
pause
and
see
if
anybody
wants
to
speak
up
with
a
question.
B
C
Does
that
look
like
in
practice?
Well
we'll
discuss
that
more
on
the
next
slide,
but
there's
no
association
between
sin
balances
and
vaults
whatsoever,
I,
who
is
sort
of
assigned
as
being
responsible
for
that
unpacked
debt?
So
so,
if
you
have
a
vault,
you
have
backed
debt
and
that
is
assigned
to
you.
But
it's
not
sin
because
you've
got
collateral
in
there
and
that's
a
key
net
show
and
I'll
I'll
tell
you
on
the
next
slide
very
soon,
exactly
who
has
nonzero
sin
balances?
So
it's
a
good
leading
question
to
to
move
the
log.
C
So
the
next
thing
I
want
to
talk
about
is
the
system's
balance
sheet
and
the
jargon
term.
Slash
code
name
for
this
is
the
Val
you've
probably
heard
of
this.
This
is
another
pretty
talked
about
one,
but
the
two
most
important
numbers
associated
with
the
Val
aren't
even
stored
in
the
bow
itself,
they're
actually
in
the
VAT.
The
first
of
these
is
the
system
surplus,
which
is
really
just
the
die
balance
of
the
bow.
Remember
how
I
said
every
address
can
have
a
die
valance.
C
Well,
the
Val
itself
can
have
a
die
valance
and
that's
the
system
surplus.
You
know
you
get
this
through
stability
fees
or
liquidation
penalties,
it's
basically
income
that
comes
into
the
protocol
and,
in
addition
to
sort
of
the
standard
name
and
the
code
for
this
is
just
the
die
balance
of
Val
there's
a
another
jargon
term.
That's
not
used
in
the
code
itself
anymore,
but
you'll
run
into
it
in
other
places
like
pie
maker
and
that's
joy,
and
they
I
like
that
term
because
it
has
positive.
C
A
lence
surplus
is
generally
another
term
that
has
positive
valence,
it's
good
to
have
a
surplus.
It's
good
to
be
joyful.
There's
your
little
mnemonic
to
remember
that
and
then
the
flipside
of
surplus
is
the
system
deficit
which
it's
just
the
sin
balance
of
the
bow,
and
we
have
an
additional
jargon
term
for
this
as
well,
which
is
aw
with
a
capital
A
I
I
personally,
like
to
think
of
it
as
instead
of
a
we8
WW
like
aw.
You
know,
because
this
is
some
deficit
that
the
system
has
taken
on
and
in
the
current
implementation.
C
The
vow
is
actually
only
a
dress
that
has
a
nonzero
sin
balance
ever
so,
in
fact,
the
system
deficit,
the
sin
of
the
valve,
the
aw
that
is
always
equal
to
the
vise
in
the
current
implementation,
I
think
that's
a
bit
of
a
holdover
from
earlier
designs
of
the
system
where
you
know
there
it
was
envisioned.
Maybe
you
would
have
a
couple
different
vowels
or
the
the
system
would
have
a
more
complicated
debt
management
strategy,
but
in
fact
the
vowel
is
the
only
is
responsible
for
all
of
the
sentence
of
the
system.
C
Do
you
want
to
be
poetic
about
it,
and
I
will
mention
that?
Maybe
these
aren't
the
best
terms,
calling
them
surplus
and
deficit,
because
really
what
you
should
do
is
you
should
subtract
the
deficit
from
the
surplus,
and
that
would
give
you
like
the
actual
balance
of
the
system
and,
if
that's
positive,
you
have
a
surplus.
If
that's
negative,
you
have
a
deficit,
so
maybe
these
should
be
called
like
system,
credit
and
system,
debit
or
death,
or
you
know,
system,
income
and
system
shortfall
or
something
like
that.
C
But
unfortunately,
surplus
and
deficit
have
kind
of
become
very
entrenched
in
the
kind
of
vernacular
and
the
documentation,
so
I
think
it's
less
confusing
just
to
stick
with
the
terms
that
people
are
already
using
for
these,
then
what
does
the
vow?
Actually,
you
know
keep
track
of
besides
these
two
things
that
are
already
tracked
for
it
and
that
well
it
keeps
track
of
different
kinds
of
deficit.
C
C
You
know
one
of
these
gets
created
or
added
to
and
then,
after
a
certain
amount
of
time,
they
can
be
taken
out
of
that
q
and,
of
course,
the
the
total
capital
SN
is
the
sum
of
the
the
lowercase
sins
from
the
q.
Yes,
there
is
a
bit
of
a
again
a
naming
collision
between
these
send
huge
chunks
and
the
sin
of
the
valve.
C
That's
another
reason
why
I'm
going
to
use
aw
aw
e
to
refer
to
that
system
deficit
so
that
we
don't
get
it
confused
with
these,
and
then
we
have
what's
called
unpacked
debt
sent
to
auction,
or
maybe
one
auction
debt
a
little
shorter
and
the
code
word
for
this
is
ash.
You
know
you
can
think
of
it
as
debt
that's
been
dealt
with
in
some
sense
ashes,
a
by-product
from
burning,
something
right.
So
this
is
dead.
That's
in
some
sense
been
burned
away,
so
we
have
the
Q
debt.
C
We
have
the
unbag
debt,
that's
been
sent
to
auction,
and
then
we
have
the
Third
Kind,
which
is
not
stored
explicitly
anywhere,
but
we
call
it
the
free
unpacked
debt
or
the
whoa,
and
that's
just
the
total
deficit,
the
cute
debt,
the
debt
sent
to
auction
so,
in
other
words,
all
bad
debt
in
the
system.
That's
not
queued
up,
and
it's
not
in
an
auction.
That's
the
free
unbag
debt
or
the
whoa
before
I
move
on
from
here.
Let
me
pause
for
questions.
C
Alright
I'm
gonna
move
on
now
you
might
be
asking
why
exactly
do
we
have
these
different
kinds
of
dad
like?
Why
do
we
queue
debt
from
liquidations?
You
know
why
do
we
have
this
tracking
of
the
debt?
That's
been
sent
to
auctions?
Oh,
that's,
actually,
a
slide
ahead.
Let
me
first
show
this
visualization.
C
You
can
see
they're
stored
in
the
fat.
You
have
the
system
surplus,
which
is
just
the
dye
valence
of
the
bowel.
We
call
it
joy
and
then
we
have
the
total
unbag
debt,
which
is
equal
to
the
unpack
debt
assigned
to
the
vow,
which
is
the
sin
of
the
bow
or
the
all,
and
then
in
the
vow.
You
have
this
break
down
into
the
sin
queue
which
all
the
little
chunks
added
up
make.
C
The
big
sin
you
have,
the
ash,
which
is
the
debts
of
two
oxen
and
then
everything
left
over,
is
the
free
unpacked
debt
or
the
walk,
and
then
so
what
I
was
about
to
launch
into
before
I
forgot
that
I
had
that
other
slide
in
there
is.
Why
do
we
have
these
things
so
the
unpacked
debt
queue
that
gives
collateral
auctions
a
chance
to
cover
unpack
debt,
so
you
can
avoid
unnecessary.
You
know
debt
auctions
or
floss
right
like
when
you
have
a
liquidation.
C
You
put
this
chunk
of
unpacked
debt
straight
into
the
send
queue,
but
then
the
collateral
auction
might
raise
enough
surplus
dye
to
cover
that
debt,
and
if
the
system
is
working
properly,
it
should,
and
so
the
existence
of
if
I
go
back
here,
all
those
little
sin
chunks
at
different
times.
That's
to
give
the
collateral
auctions
a
chance
to
cover
that
debt.
C
Before
you
start
an
actual
debt
auction
for
it
and
then
why
do
we
have
this
unpack
debts
into
action
or
ash
and
that's
simply
to
prevent
auctioning
the
same
debt
twice
and
that's
a
quantity
we're
going
to
focus
so
on
a
lot
going
forward
in
this
presentation,
and
so
let's
talk
a
little
bit
about
ash
and
how
that
interacts
with
debt
auctions,
so
debt
aka,
flop,
auctions.
You've
probably
heard
a
lot
about
these
recently,
so
I'm
not
going
to
cover
them
in
a
lot
of
detail.
C
There's
a
detailed
overview
and
another
presentation,
I'm
just
gonna,
go
ahead
to
a
quick,
well
I'm
gonna
go
ahead,
though,
and
say
what
are
the
requirements
to
started
that
auction?
So
you
have
to
have
your
free
unpack
debt
exceed
the
minimum
bid
size
for
the
sump,
so
what
greater
than
somethin
the
system
surplus
also
has
to
be
zero?
In
other
words,
if
you
have
surplus
you're
required
to
cancel
out
as
much
debt
using
that
surplus
as
possible
before
you
can
have
an
auction.
C
So
let's
look
at
a
picture
of
those
requirements
that
I
was
just
describing.
So
if
you
want
to
have
a
debt
auction,
you
must
have
0.84.
The
valves
is
your
joy
and
then
in
the
valid
self,
you
have
to
have
whoa
greater
than
the
bid
size
of
the
debt
auction
itself
and
then,
if
you
were
to
start
a
debt
auction,
if
you
were
to
flop,
then
what
would
happen
is
you
would
take
some
amount
of
whoa
and
convert
it
into
ash
like
this.
So
this
is
before
you
start
a
debt
auction.
C
C
Summarizing
again,
if
you
want
to
have
a
debt
auction,
you've
got
to
get
your
surplus
to
zero.
How
do
you
do
that?
There
are
two
ways
to
do
it.
One
is
called
healing
and
the
other
is
called
kissing
or
healing
kiss.
These
are
just
the
functions
and
the
contracts
he'll
will
reconcile
whoa
with
whoa
we
run
backs
free
unpack
debt
into
surplus.
Kiss
will
reconcile
the
system
surplus
with
the
unbag
debt.
That's
been
sent
to
auction
or
ash.
So
let
me
show
you
in
pictures
how
that
works.
C
So
here's
how
you
heal
you
have
some
of
you
specify
some
amount
and
that's
going
to
take
some
joy
and
it's
going
to
cancel
it
out
with
whoa
like
that.
So
let
me
go
back
and
forth
a
couple
times,
so
you
heal
for
an
amount,
and
then
you
just
cancel
out
some
whoa
the
surplus
decreases.
Of
course,
the
total
unpacked
debt
is
also
decreasing
and
not
pictured
here,
but
the
total
died
supply
also
decreases
when
you
do
this
operation.
So
that's
healing
kiss
is
very
similar,
except
you
are
destroying
ash
instead
of
whoa.
C
So
it
works
like
that
exactly
the
same
as
heal,
except
instead
of
whoa,
it's
ash
that
goes
away
so
that
debt
that
was
sent
to
auction
is
cancelled
out
by
kisi
all
right.
So
now
we
get
to
the
interesting
part
of
how
to
block
and
debt
auction
how
to
block
a
flop.
So
let's
say
we're
really
close
to
being
able
to
debt
auction.
We
have
more
woe
than
our
bid
size
and
we've
got
some
ash
and
some
joy
and
we
could
cancel
out
that
auction
debt
with
that
surplus
and
get
to
debt
auction.
C
C
Now
we
have
no
joy
and
lots
of
whoa.
What
was
us
and
we
can
do
a
flop,
but
what?
If
we
accidentally
or
intentionally
or
whatever
called
heal
instead?
Well,
remember:
what
heal
does
heal
takes
whoa
and
gets
rid
of
it,
and
now
we've
got
zero
joy,
but
we
can't
flop
because
we
got
rid
of
all
the
woe
that
we
needed
to
do
that
and
remember
in
this
example,
we
should
have
really
been
able
to
flop.
The
system
was
in
a
state
where
it
should
have
had
a
dead
auction
to
cover
that
extra
whoa.
C
We
should
have
kissed
to
cancel
out
the
ash,
but
instead
to
be
healed,
and
now
we
can't
have
another
flop
auction.
So,
let's
think
through
the
consequences
of
this,
so
we
can't
flop
or
have
another
dead
auction
until
we
get
enough
free
unpack
debt,
but
even
worse
than
that
is
every
time
you
have
a
dead
auction,
remember
you're,
adding
to
ash
when
you
kick
that
off
and
your
bid
amount
will
only
get
you
the
amount
of
ash
that
you
created
in
kicking
that
off.
C
C
C
All
right,
no
burning
questions,
let's
run
through
this,
so
just
summarizing
again,
so
he'll
got
called
during
bidding
on
the
19th
and
the
22nd.
The
upshot
is
about
a
million
debt
is
locked
as
ash
and
can't
be
auctioned.
So
that's
about
20
debt
auctions.
Further
further
debt
auctions
can
occur,
but
more
ash
may
become
stuck.
I
should
have
mentioned
that
right
now
there
you
know
we've
kind
of
processed
through
the
whole
sin
hue.
So
there's
really
not
more.
There
aren't
more
flop
auctions
expected
to
occur
in
the
near
future.
C
We
were
just
kind
of
at
this
point
dealing
with
this
debt.
That's
stuck
as
ash,
so
there
are
some
mitigation
remediation
strategies
immediately.
You
know
you
can
update
Keepers
and
raise
awareness
to
try
to
avoid
this
problem
short
term
governance
can
unblock
the
20
flops
and
then
the
medium
to
long
term.
We
can
make
smart
contract
updates
so
that
this
can't
happen
anymore.
C
That
debts
ends
auction
that
stuck
back
into
free
unpacked
debt
that
you
can
then
have
an
auction
for
the
technical
details,
uses
functions
in
the
VAT
called
a
function
on
the
back
called
suck,
and
then
it
uses
the
kiss
function
from
the
valve.
There's
an
appendix
where
you
can
read
all
about
it.
It
just
exchanges
the
ash
for
low.
C
So
it
just
turns
your
your
dem
you're
stuck
get
back
into
free
unpacked
debt
and
yeah
I
would
propose
that
we
we
do
that
soon,
but
we
should
talk
about
that
as
a
community
and
then,
of
course,
in
the
long
term,
you
have
smart
contract
fixes.
There
are
a
few
things
under
consideration.
I
list
them
here,
I'll
skip
talking
about
them.
We
can
we
can
debate
their
merits
offline,
since
we
might
be
running
short
on
time
so
yeah.
Then
it's
time
for
questions
and
discussion.
D
A
Of
the
things
I
want
to
ask,
but
is
next
steps
like
immediate
action
right
there's
been
some
discussion
about
the
urgency
of
this
and
the
steps
that
can
be
taken
to
mitigate
that
urgency
and
obviously
in
the
governance
world.
When
we
talk
about
agency,
that
means
we
vote
now
to
revote
later
right
and
so
there's
been
some
discussions
about.
C
Well,
I'll
frame
the
discussion
a
little
bit
and
by
laying
out
the
arguments
for
kind
of
doing
this
promptly,
the
first
this
that,
with
these
flop
auctions,
not
complete
anyone
interested
in
bidding
in
those
auctions,
is
going
to
be
collecting
or
holding
on
to
die.
You
know
with
a
multiplicative
effect
for
the
number
of
parties
interest
in
the
bidding,
and
this
comes
at
a
time
when
demand
for
die
is
high.
When
the
peg
is
breaking
upwards,
we
don't
know
how
big
an
effect
participant's
holding
on
to
dye.
C
Is
we
don't
know
how
much
impact
that
has
on
the
peg,
but
it's
definitely
in
the
wrong
direction,
so
it
might
help
the
peg
if
we
could
complete
these
sooner
and
even
even
if
it's
not
a
larger
factor,
even
without
knowledge
of
how
large
the
effect
is.
If
we
complete
these
auctions,
we
at
least
reduce
the
number
of
variables
we're
trying
to
balance
in
our
considerations
of
you
know:
what
do
we
need
to
do
to
get
the
dye
peg
back
to
$1
or
as
close
as
we
can
get
it?
C
You
know
we
also
the
sooner
we
do
it,
the
less
chance
we
take
with
market
conditions,
changing
and
also
you
know
if
we
have
a
HEPA
in
particular,
if
we
do
it
before
Friday's
executive,
we
avoid
mixing
these
kind
of
high-priority
technical
fixes
with
monetary
policy,
so
that
would
be
my
summary.
What
are
the
arguments
to
do
it
sooner.
B
C
B
C
Such
waiting
period,
depending
how
the
spell
is
on
you
could,
for
example,
you
know,
start
the
flops
immediately
as
part
of
the
spell
you
could
also
put
in
the
spell
some
logic
to
have
them
start
at
a
deterministic
time.
So,
even
if
the
spell
got
voted
in
in
the
middle
of
the
night,
you'd
know
they
were
going
to
start
at
say
like
some
reasonable
time
in
the
morning,
you
know
whatever
it
is
some
predictable
time,
so
that
it's
not
totally
random,
but
there
there
is
no
delay
in
terms
of
the
six
point.
Five
days.
C
A
It
looks
like
what
I
wanted
to
erase,
though,
is
that
we've
we're
running
into
some
issues
with
continuous.
We
were
loading.
We've
been
run
to
those
issues
for
a
long
time,
and
one
of
these
issues
is
that
we
have
urgency
apathy
cycles
and
then
denial
cycles.
We
talk
about
one
of
these
calls
at
the
end
of
an
urgency
cycle.
A
We
have
a
significant
amount
of
MKR
securing
the
system
which
is
great,
and
then
we
get
into
an
apathy
cycle
once
these
disasters
pass
and
it
becomes
extremely
difficult
to
get
regularly-scheduled
executives
ratified
because
there's
a
tremendous
amount
of
maker
in
the
system,
it
needs
to
be
overcome,
weathers,
yeah,
well,
there's
all
kinds
of
other
confounding
factors.
So
the
flip
side
of
this
is
that
we
have
to
hope
that,
sometime
after
9:00
p.m.
A
PST
on
Thursday,
massive
amounts
of
maker
begins
to
move
back
and
forth
within
24
hour
period
before
Friday's
executive
goes
up
and
bumps
this
emergency
one
out
of
the
cubes
there's
risks
associated
with
either
action.
So
there's
inaction
versus
the
operational
overhead
of
actually
having
that
action
push
through
the
system.
It
needs
to
be
considered
as
well.
A
Potentially,
if
it's
wrapped
up
on
Friday,
we
have
like
this
mix
of
technical
plus
monetary,
but
it
also
means
that
the
likelihood
of
something
going
through
this
far
higher
that's
something
for
the
community
to
consider
we're
40
minutes
into.
The
call,
though,
and
I
would
like
to
try
and
keep
this
thing,
because
we.
A
C
A
All
right,
I
think
then,
at
that
point,
then,
with
lists'
transition
over
to
Lanka
wisdom
segments
and
then
we'll
see
how
long
that
goes.
We
also
have
the
Q&A
session
the
top
of
the
hour
that
will
bite
into
that,
but
potentially,
depending
on
how
long
the
conversation
goes
well,
we
can
revisit
the
ballot
initiative
where
we
can
continue
to
discuss
the
zero
bid
issue
right
along
I'm,
going
to
turn
it
over
to
you
at
this
one.
Okay,.
B
Yeah
I
didn't
officially
titled
my
segment,
but
I
guess
so
I'm.
Imagining
most
of
your
aware
that
there
are
threats
in
the
forum
regarding
both
holders,
a
lot
of
them
are
expecting
to
be
compensated
based
on
the
failures.
Well,
the
apparent
failures
of
the
the
auction
and,
to
some
extent,
Oracle
system
in
with
its
with
a
sir,
with
their
personal
updating
lately
due
to
congestion.
B
A
B
Again,
I
don't
know
that
there
is
like
that
much
context
to
this
one
like
they're,
about
holders
that
will
liquidate
its
due
to
auction
something
at
0.
Well,
and
then
auctions
happened
at
$0
in
addition
to
the
Oracle
personal
dating
for
a
couple
of
hours.
During
those
days
crash,
there
are
kind
of
a
lot
of
points
on
either
side
as
to
whether
we
should
or
should
not
compensate
people
so
again
summarizing.
This
is
perhaps
dangerous,
but
I'll
sort
of
try
and
be
as
clear
like
I
mean.
B
So
one
of
the
points
that
brought
up
is
that
Oasis
Sparrow
defines
a
13%
liquidation
penalty
and,
due
to
that
were
led
into
the
assumption.
That's
the
most
they
could
lose
was
30
percent,
which
either
on
top
of
the
debt
or
maybe
at
all,
not
sure
which
is
obviously
not
correct,
considering
how
liquidation
works
so
there's
potentially
a
failure
of
messaging
there.
B
There's
also
a
lot
of
I
mean
there's
this
kind
of
lots
of
PR
reasons
or
we
might
consider
a
compensating
there's.
Obviously
there
are
arguments
that
can
be
made
against
compensation
as
well,
both
because
obviously
this
is
kind
of
blockchain
encrypt,
so
the
code
is
is
on
the
blockchain
right.
All
code
is
law
argument
and
the
fact
that
the
information
was
available.
It
will
just
wasn't
readily
presented,
I.
Suppose,
there's
perhaps.
B
E
B
B
So
it's
worth
kinda
noting
the
sort
of
drawbacks
of
forum
polls
in
this
situation.
Naturally,
all
the
ball
holders
that
are
complaining
on
our
forums
have
forum
accounts
and
conversion.
The
polls
and
so
I
think
this
is
probably
one
of
the
cases
where
we
will
need
do
you
have
multiple
options
available
on
chain
for
make
a
whole
debate
with.
A
Alright
well
I
know,
there's
I,
don't
know,
but
I
assume
that
there's
people
in
this
call
that
have
been
affected
by
the
situation.
So
if
you
have
thoughts
of
your
questions
or
comments,
please
add
them
to
the
discussion,
but
I
think
that
long.
You
touched
on
some
of
these
really
interest
doing
issues
that
the
community
is
it
like
mission
it
before,
but
I
think
this
is
gonna
be
one
of
the
most
important
discussions
that
the
government's
ecosystem
engages
with,
because
there
are
some
core
philosophical
principles
that
need
to
be
addressed
here.
Immutability.
A
There's
mechanical
and
implementation
issues,
depending
on
which
path
forward
the
community
decides
on
we,
we
should
start
brainstorming
in
earnest,
though
so
I'm
imagining,
based
on
the
how
vocal
some
of
the
members
of
this
call
have
been
in
the
past
that
their
strong
opinions
here
so
I
really
encourage
people
to
get.
This
conversation
kicked
off,
we
as
an
ecosystem
and
are
going
to
need
to
address
this
type
of
stuff,
and
the
sooner
we
can
start
tossing
ideas
around
the
faster.
We
can
come
to
some
consensus
in
the
forums.
E
Well,
I
think
a
pretty
pretty
obvious
main
thing
is
more
clearly
communicating
how
uncertain
the
system
is,
or
just
like
that,
there's
uncertainty
about
how
much
collateral
vault
holders
will
get
back
if
they're
liquidated.
So
that's
a
pretty
straightforward
change,
but
then
we
still
do
is
we
haven't
like
we
don't
have
any
algorithm
or
formula
to
like
figure
out
exactly
how
much
we
would
compensate
compensate
vault
holders.
So
that's
well.
A
F
Can
do
just
waitin,
so
you
know
you
can
look
at
the
were
these
people
liquidate
and
somebody
else
actually
posted
a
mask.
It's
literally
like
sixty
six
percent
plus
thirteen
percent
is
going
to
get
child.
You
get
no
more
than
twenty
one
percent
that
and
that's
what's
a
13
percent
liquidations.
We
know
I'm
a
business
guy
I
tend
to
split
the
difference,
so
you
know
be
going.
F
F
I,
think
those
are
a
real
problem
and,
as
long
for
wisdom
pointed
out,
I
want
to
classify
those
because
there
was
somebody
and
I
can't
remember
right
now
that
posted
another
scenario
that
I
really
had
to
look
at
and
I
have
to
go
back
to
do
it
so
I'm
not
going
to
talk
about
it
now
and
I'm
going
to
leave.
It
is
the
zero
bid
class
and
whatever
other
class,
and
so
when
I
kind
of
just
brushed
the
numbers
out,
I
don't
see
they.
F
You
know
if
you
did
it,
even
as
a
totals
like
69
thousand
two
hundred
s
was
lost
in
the
whole
debacle.
The
zero
bid
debacle
and
10%
of
that
is
sixty
nine
hundred
I
mean
then
that's
split
by
whomever.
However,
you
know,
and
so
that's
the
maximum
exposure
I
would
be
willing
to
go
for
on
that,
and
then
there's
a
real
issue
that
you
know.
I
looked
at
ball.
F
Two
two
eight
eight
was
kind
of
an
interesting
case
because
that
guy
manually
liquidated
him,
so
he
kind
of
manually
sold
his
stuff
and
he
was
getting.
He
was
basically
flipping.
He
flipped
half
as
at
twenty
to
twenty
five
hundred
at
basically
seventy
five
and
if
I
think
that
that
was
where
auctions
might
come
in
at
because
this
guy
was
going
through
unis
whop,
you
know,
debate
lalala,
you
know
anything
that
you
know
if
I
said
and
kind
of
plotted
a
curve.
F
This
is
the
best
you're
gonna
get
in
an
auction
somewhere
in
there
when
we're
hitting
90.
Seventy-Five
is
a
real
number.
You
know
that
these
auctions,
even
if
they
were
working,
you
probably
wouldn't-
have
got
much
more
than
that,
because
dye
was
hard
to
find
auction
bidders
had
to
pay
a
hellacious
amount
of
money
just
to
get
bids
in,
and
so
you
know
when
I
look
at
this
whole
mess.
That's
like
the
real
deal
is:
is
that
the
people,
the
way
the
system
is
structured?
F
Currently
that
you
know
the
idea
that
you're
only
going
to
lose
thirteen
percent
and
you're
going
to
get
your
your
collateral
auctioned
off
at
your
liquidation
price,
completely
unreasonable,
not
you!
Nobody,
not
even
in
the
financial
world,
would
expect
that.
It's
not
going
to
happen.
It's
only
if
you're
doing
you
know
tit-for-tat
liquidations
like
oh,
we
went
down
eight
percent.
We
need
to
liquidate
a
couple
things.
You
probably
get
a
good
price
or
somebody
makes
a
mistake
which
just
happened
recently.
F
So
there's
two
reasons:
why
long
for
wisdom
kind
of
induced
me
to
do
it,
but
I
sit
I,
try
to
look
at
the
entire
community.
So
if
there
was
anybody
that
was
going
to
advocate
for
dye
holders
and
vault
holders,
it's
gonna
be
me
because
I
don't
see
anybody
else
really
doing
that,
and
so
I
sit
there
and
I
look
at
this
from
their
perspective
and
I'm.
Just
like
well
wow
really
happening
here
and
what's
really
happened
here.
F
You
know
the
compensating
people
that
was
really
for
the
maker
community,
but
since
anybody
can
come
into
the
forum's
we're
just
getting
every
piece
of
everybody
in
that
thread,
I
intended
it
for
maker
holders
and
governance
to
discuss
what
do
we
want
to
do
and
then
the
other
thread
was
like
make
your
claim.
I
want
to
hear
it,
because
I
really
wanted
to
see
what
people
thought
they
were.
Thinking
and
the
Hat
go
at
this,
you
know
it's
a
stress,
reliever
right,
if
you
don't
say
anything
about
it.
F
This
and
I
knew
would
take
time
and
I've
refrained
from
posting
in
the
thread,
because
I
have
a
tendency
to
just
nail
and
summarize,
and
then
everybody's
like
done
with
it
and
I,
don't
want
to
do
that
and
anything
that
I
thought
I
really
wanted
it
to
be
more
private
and
run
it
by
a
few
people.
First,
before
I
even
thought
about
airing
it
publicly
and
I'm
literally
still
digesting
it,
because
I'm
still
digesting
what
people
are
throwing
at
us
and
so
I
yeah.
That's
my
doing.
A
About
on
that,
thank
you
for
taking
the
initiative
in
the
forums.
Is
there
two
groups
two
camps
forming
then
like
that
campus
says
that?
Because
if
there's
like
the
number
thirteen
is
on
the
site,
we
all
expected,
the
only
thirteen
would
be
seized
versus
we
didn't
get
what
we
think
we
should
have
gotten
from
the
collateral
or
from
the
option
mechanism.
Is
there
a
big
dichotomy
between
those
two
groups,
or
is
it
primarily
people?
You
know
agitating
for
what
should
have
happened
in
those
zero
bid,
auctions.
B
I'm
not
sure,
there's
a
there's,
a
strict
dichotomy
like
that,
which
is
which
is
actually
one
of
the
points
Oakland
automakers
well
like
kind
of
separately
today,
is
that
considering
the
zero
bids
auctions
like
as
a
separate
class
from
the
other
options,
it's
maybe
not
the
perhaps
not
the
best
idea,
because
there
are
options
that
were
liquidated
like
prices
in
between
like
reasonable
and
zero
right.
There
were
ones
that
win
it
like
twenty
percent
and
like
my
fifty
percent
of
the
value,
yes.
A
F
I
mean
cyrus
wrote,
it
is
if
these
auctions
going
off
even
at
sixty
seventy
percent,
these
people
get
wiped
out.
It's
just
a
protocol
that
gets
saved
I
mean
literally
the
maker
protocol
866
percent
of
these
losses.
You
know
when
we're
talking
about
ten
percent
max
giving
them
back,
and
it's
only
on
the
zero
bids
or
anything
else
that
I
can
see
so
the
deal
here
is
that
you
know
all
those
auctions
that
went.
You
know
below
that,
sixty
to
seventy
percent,
they
have
to
figure
out
the
exact
numbers,
they're
all
they're
all
wiped
out.
F
You
know
and
and
then
make
her
eat
the
rest.
So
I
have
a
heart.
That's
why
in
some
ways,
I
don't
think
people
are
going
to
understand
this
or
they're
gonna
have
a
real
hard
time
digesting
it,
and
so
the
zero
bid
auctions.
That's
something
else,
but
but
this
in
terms
of
the
way
the
system
works.
If
those
bids
are
like
80
to
70
percent
of
your
liquidation
value
somewhere
in
there,
you
are
gonna,
get
nothing
back
and
the
protocol
gets
something
back
to
cover
the
die
that
we
already
paid
them.
F
This
is
my
point:
we
already
paid
them,
two-thirds,
their
liquidation
value
for
their
app
sure,
not
a
great
price,
but
we
paid
them
out
and
now
we're
having
to
dilute
maker
to
make
up
those
losses.
So
that's
the
real
effect
here
and
that's
that's
the
real
result
of
what
happens
in
the
situation.
So
the.
B
Question
I
think
is
trying
to
figure
out
whether
we
maybe
I
guess
whether
we're
compensating
based
on
the
fact
that
we
weren't
or
like
that
that
it
wasn't
clearly
communicated
to
what
the
penalties
would
be
right
like.
Is
that
something
that
it's
our
responsibility
or?
Is
that
something
they're
like
well,
you
know
they
should
have
researched
and
figured
out
what
liquidations
were
and
how
they
worked
before
signing
up
right
like
do
we
accept
that
or
like
does
anybody
think
that
did
do?
F
Think
from
the
protocol
perspective,
it's
their
responsibility,
I
mean
I,
looked
pretty
carefully
into
the
system,
but
I'm,
not
a
guy.
That
tries
to
really
understand
in
detail
before
I,
throw
any
significant
amount
of
money
behind
some
of
us
and-
and
you
know,
once
you
realize
that
your
stuff
was
gonna,
get
liquidated
at
auction.
There's
no
way
that
you
can
expect
any
value
at
auction.
I've
seen
auctions
go
all
the
time.
You
know
I've
seen
stuff
go
like
between
one
and
three
percent
of
actual
resale
value
in
an
auction.
F
It's
the
real
deal
and
when
you're
talking
about
its
trust
of
that
forget
it
man,
the
idea,
you'd
even
have
liquidity
in
there,
which
we
didn't
is,
is
the
real
truth
there
and
so
I
think
in
some
ways
the
community
failed
to
communicate
to
the
people.
This
we
do
need
some
liquidity
mechanisms
for
auctions
which
I've
been
working
on,
but
even
so
you
know
70
some
percent,
someone
wrote
in
the
chat
like
73
5.3
percent,
anything
below
that
you
know
based
on
the
liquidation
fee.
F
You
know
it's,
they
don't
get
anything
back
because
we're
we
already
gave
them
something.
We
gave
them
alone,
and
so
they
took
that
money
and
they
have
it.
They
had
it
in
hand
when
they
use
it
for
I,
don't
know,
didn't
you
know
they
lose
their
F
and
don't
get
a
chance
to
pay
back
on
it.
Well
shoot.
That's
the
way
the
system
works,
I,
don't
I,
don't
know
how
else
to
explain
it
to
people
was
pretty
obvious
to
me
from
reading
I
I,
don't
know
how
to.
E
But
but
the
issue,
the
issue
is
there
wasn't
in
the
like
the
interfaces
that
people
use
like
you
can
go
like
all
this
informations
out
there.
You
can
figure
it
out
and
you
did
but
like
unless
we
make
it
explicit
in
the
interface
it's
like.
Oh,
you
have
to
go
to
these
places
and
learn
about
it,
and
these
are
all
the
risks
like.
We
just
didn't.
F
Know
how
you
don't
even
know
how
you
do
that
in
the
interfaces
there's
so
many
interfaces
like
defy
savor
and
all
this
other
stuff?
How
do
you?
How
do
you
put
like
you
know?
Please
read
you,
know
this
and
then
tell
everybody
to
include
that
and
interface.
It's
a
nice
concept,
but
in
a
decentralized
system,
you're
gonna
have
outliers
and
hangers,
and
so
it's
like
you
know,
I
always
heard
in
crypto.
It's
like
don't
put
in
more
money
than
you
can
afford
to
lose.
F
It's
the
same
kind
of
with
every
investment
that
you
can
make
in
the
most
real
senses.
You
better
know
what
you're
doing
when
you're
sticking
money
in
there,
because
you
can
lose
it
nothing's
guaranteed,
particularly
in
the
last
market
drop
I
mean
people
have
been
pretty
smoked,
and
so
it's
not
not.
You
know,
people
got
hurt.
F
It's
just
I
was
I,
wanted
people
to
be
able
to
blow
off
steam
on
the
zero
bid
auctions
and
those
are
the
type
OTT
were
really
I
was
looking
I
mean
I
want
to
have
a
proposal,
it
says,
look,
you
know
if
things
drop,
you
know
if
the
OSM
price
and
the
live
price
or
the
auction
price
is
like
20
percent
I.
Think
maker
should
just
ride
the
collateral
through
screw
the
auction
haunt
them,
because
if
you
have
an
80%
market
dislocation,
there's
nothing
left,
you
try
and
you
try
an
auction
into
that.
F
B
G
B
Yes,
this
remember
the
point.
The
other
way
we're
saying
like
like
yes,
like
the
high
point,
is
a
very
good
one
like
in
like
many
people
compared
with
you
eyes
the
into
it
like
the
interface
with
the
protocol,
like
we
can't
be
responsible
for
UI,
is
in
that
way
right,
like
the
protocol,
can't
be
responsible
for
you
guys
anyone
can
make
you
I
am
right.
E
B
E
G
E
B
Think
it's
impossible.
We
work
with
them
like
it's
impossible
to
take
responsibility
for
like
half
of
them
right
like
either
we're
responsible
feels
like
the
UI's
injector
of
the
system,
or
we're
not
responsible
for
them.
Like
the
protocol,
yeah
I
can't
say,
like
some
of
yours
are
responsible
for
somewhere
on,
so
it
needs
to
be
like
any
speed
like
a
consistency
that
right
look.
F
At
the
normal
system
right,
the
normal
system,
there's
a
banking
system
that
has
rules
and
regulations
and
laws
about
what
kind
of
loans
can
be
made
by
by
certain
people
and
and
what
the
rules
and
regulations
are
for
how
to
deal
with.
You
know
the
liquidations
on
those
or
foreclosing
on
those.
Well,
we
don't
really
have
as
any
of
that,
and
so
it
really
throws
the
onus
on
governance.
You
know,
and
the
system
to
be
very
clear
about
what.
F
If
the
system
is
that
they're,
presenting
and
and
I've
been
thinking
about
a
document
that
I
haven't
written
anything
and
then
basically
for
the
people
within
it
to
understand
they
are
the
N
I.
Don't
I,
don't
know
how
you
communicate
this
to
people,
because
it's
straight
up
across
the
board.
You
are
responsible
for
your
own
money,
the
systems
and
laws
and
can
be
in
place
to
help
us,
and
you
do
that,
because
there
are
times
that
things
just
get
so
messed
up,
we're
like
well,
we
actually
need
a
law
and
a
rule
here.
F
Somebody
else
needs
to
step
in
and
say
you
just
can't
do
this
anymore,
and
do
we
really
want
to
get
to
the
point
where
regulators
are
going
to
come
after
the
system,
because
we
didn't
do
the
things
that
if
I
was
a
regulator
I'd
be
like
they
should
have
done.
They
should
be
doing
these
things,
which
is
informing
the
people
of
what
the
real
risks
and
hazards
are,
and
this
event
was
a
perfect
event
to
illustrate
what
are
the
real
risks
and
hazards
to
people.
I
mean
it's.
F
B
B
I
mean
this
is
this
is
kind
of
where
my
problem
comes
with
the
whole.
If
we
compensate
now,
then
we're
setting
up
expectations
for
the
future,
because
it
if
people
are
confident
in
the
system,
because
we
compensate
all
holders,
then
that's
not
sustainable,
because
next
time
something
it's
gonna
be
like
where's.
The
well.
E
I
think
my
point
would
be
that
like
for
right
now,
since
we
communicated
in
a
way
that
was
like
showing
that
we
were
confident
when
maybe
we
shouldn't
have
been,
we
compensate
this
time,
but
in
the
future,
we'll
like
actually
communicate
like
more
accurately
the
system
and
the
uncertainties.
So,
but
we
can
like
point
to
that
communication.
We
won't
have
to
compensate
next
time.
Well,.
F
You
know
begs
a
question:
we
can
always
provide
our
own
insurance
tent
people
pay
for
it
and
use
that
as
a
fun
for
such
things
in
the
future
that
such
things
do
exist
and
then
deal
with
the
you
know:
liquidity
and
the
auctions.
You
know
I
mean
we
can
address
the
system
from
a
system
point
in
a
lot
of
different
ways,
make
sure
the
surplus
goes
up
a
little
bit.
F
You
know
the
buffer
against
these
things
and
have
cash
to
pay
for
whatever
kind
of
a
lot
of
different
approaches
to
adjusting
the
system
so
that
it
is
more
robust.
The
P
R
on
the
zero
option
did
honestly
I.
Think
you
know
it's
a
tough
call,
because
even
if
these
people
that
you
know,
if
all
that
60
is
that
F
had
all
actually
liquidated
at
a
price
I,
don't
think
there
would
have
been
die
to
soak
it
up.
I,
don't
think
they
would
don't
think
that
75
an
ass
photo
flown
just
because
of
the
liquidity.
F
Wasn't
there
no
provided
there
was
liquidity
and
bitters
with
liquidity
to
actually
make
bids,
maybe,
but
we
would
think
it
would
have
still
been
bet
been
below
the
75%
threshold
just
the
way
the
market
moved,
and
so,
while
I
have
from
TR
sympathy
like
if
I'm
a
business
owner,
I
own
maker
I
go
god
I
gotta
make
I
got
to
do
something.
To
appease
these
people
and
at
least
make
it
look
like
we
did
something,
and
what
is
the
number?
It's
a
million
dollars
just
kind
of
depends
on
what
that
price
is.
F
But
it's
like
you
know,
six
thousand
Misha
max
I.
Think
you
split
you
split
whatever
you
think
the
difference
is
and
divided
up
between
the
vault
owners
just
be
done
with
it.
Don't
eat,
don't
even
hang
it
out.
Just
pick
a
number
ten
percent
be
done.
This
is
what
we're
gonna
do
to
fix
us
and
then
we're
actually
going
to
correct
the
system,
but
no
right
now
it
is
these
holes
still
exist
and
we're
not
well
we're
going
to
make
an
insurance
fund
for
other
events.
We're
not
doing
this
one
again.
B
But
I
kind
of
one
comments
what
you
said
again,
which
is
that,
like
you
know,
we're
saying
we're
saying
like
we
didn't
effectively
communicate
well
like
we
need
to
be
really
clear
about
like
what
is
we
in
this
case
right
like?
Are
we
saying
that,
because
the
UA,
the
Oasis
you
I,
was
not
clear,
there's
like
that?
That's
why
we're
we're
like
we're
like
compensating,
because,
like
some
subset
of
users,
didn't
use
the
Oasis
UI
they
use
defense
over
like
do
it.
We
comment
saying
them
as
well
like
I.
F
B
F
Other
ones
I,
don't
know
what
we
can
do.
I
honestly,
don't
know
what
we
can
do.
I
read,
reddit
I,
looked
at
Oasis
I
read,
make
your
documentation
certainly
enough
to
go
in
and
spare
it
out
the
risks
I
honestly
it
I'd
have
to
go,
look
and
see
whether
we
really
have
a
blatantly
laid
out.
You
know
in
your
face.
This
is
a
hazards
of
using
die
owning
maker.
D
This
is
Charlie
I've
been
asking
a
couple:
questions
on
the
sidebar
I'm
just
curious
to
surface.
In
case
people
haven't
had
a
chance
to
read
that
have
we
actually
calculated
like
in
the
rosiest
possible
case,
meaning
like
benefit
of
the
doubt
assumptions
on
the
part
of
CP
holders
like
what
the
actual
liabilities
cumulative
liability
would
be
or.
E
D
D
Do
at
least
have
a
number
on
the
table
to
discuss
in
like
beyond,
philosophically
how
people
want
to
approach
the
problem
like
there's.
A
really
big
difference
between
a
I
mean,
there's
big
difference
between
having
the
discussion
in
the
abstract
and
saying,
like
there's,
fourteen
thousand
eighth
on
the
table.
B
B
Need
like
all
of
those
numbers,
like
some
figure
out
like
you
know
what
is
the
worst
case
of
what
they
would
have
got
back
like
had
everything
functioned?
What's
like
the
best
case?
What's
like
you
know
what
like
the
in
between
cases
like
given,
given
what
the
Oracles
was
doing
at
the
time,
given
what
the
keepers
are
doing
at
the
time.
B
We
need
all
these
right.
You
know
the
best
case,
the
worst
case
and
like
based
on
the
market
conditions
right,
so
we
can
figure
out
like
because
so
we
can
come
at
this
with
numbers
and
say
like
right
in
the
best
case,
you
would
about
this
in
the
worst
case.
You
would've
got
this
the
market
case.
You
probably
would
have
got
this,
and
then
we
can
sort
of
say
we've,
given
what
everything
that
happened.
We
think
it's
fair
that
you
get
this
one
or
between
these
two
or
whatever,
like
I
kinda,
feel
like.
B
A
B
A
B
B
F
So
I
just
took
this
from
the
medium
article,
which
these
a
number
seen
that
medium
article
seemed
pretty
thorough,
but
it
has
now
been
checked
and
if
you
just
do
21
percent
of
their
total
number,
its
thirteen
thousand
two
hundred
seven
out
now
what
people
get
out
of
that.
But
that's
the
absolute
top
number
that
anybody
could
expect
to
get
back
and
that's
absolutely
with
them
liquidating
at
their
liquidation
price.
And
so
the
numbers
only
go
down
from
there.
C
F
Most
anybody
could
expect
in
a
lawsuit
case
if
I
was
gonna
sue,
that
is,
the
most
I
could
ever
expect
to
get
back
and
I
know,
I
wouldn't
get
it.
Cuz
I'm
have
to
pay
lawyers
fees
and
then
there's
gonna
be
some
haggling
about
that
they
wouldn't
auction
at
liquidation,
price
plain
and
simple.
So
I'm
not
gonna,
get
that
if
I
was
de
litigate
against
someone
for
this
number,
I
wouldn't
get
it.
F
B
Is
the
keepers
are
never
gonna
pay
like
it
so
assume
the
liquidator
prices,
the
market
price
right?
The
keepers
are
never
gonna
pay
that
there
was
gonna
pay
bit
less
because
they
need
to
make
their
own
profit.
So,
like
potentially,
that's
not
the
best
case,
because
that's
assuming,
like
altruistic
I,.
C
Think
I
can
jump
in
here
and
provide
a
little
bit
of
color
on
exactly
how
you
you'd
calculate
that
number
right.
So
at
liquidation,
the
value
of
your
ether
is
a
hundred
and
fifty
percent
of
the
value
of
your
debt.
Then
there's
a
13
percent
liquidation
penalty,
so
that
basically
means
the
debt
gets
bumped
up,
see
if,
let's
just
take
round
numbers,
you
start
with
a
hundred
debt.
C
You
know
where
you
expect
bidding
to
stop,
assuming
that
all
keepers
are
trying
to
earn
a
profit,
and
so
then
you'd
add
that
other
you
know
three
percent
go
into
the
hundred
and
thirteen
and
then
you'd
take
you
know:
150
116,
that
number
divided
by
a
hundred
fifty
should
work
out
to
about
twenty
one
percent.
I.
Think
that's
where
this
number
is
coming
from.
B
And
say:
yeah
I
mean
this
is
all
good
to
give
us
like
a
general
idea
of
what
we're
working
with,
but
we
really
need
just
like
a
list
of
all
the
like.
Although
I
could
adults,
we
need
to
know
all
the
liquidation
prices
for
them
like
what
price
they
actually
got
at
auction
and
all
this
stuff
like
we
just
need
like
a
giant
spreadsheet.
That's
an
a
scripture
that
generates
it
from
from
the
chain
between
like
two
date,
ranges
right.
So
we
can.
B
F
Don't
know
that
we
wanted
I,
mean
I
posted
a
threat
for
people
to
make
cases,
but
I
honestly
I,
don't
know
that
we
need
to
go
through
that
case.
We
know
the
total
ass
liquidated
in
the
zero
bid
auction.
So
to
talk
about
the
zero
bet
auctions
to
stick
there.
You
know,
we
know
the
total
bit
the
that
went
there,
and
so
you
know
this
was
the
absolute
best
case.
F
F
A
matte
medium
or
later
yeah,
they
have
a
whole
list
of
like
all
the
vault,
IDs
and
and
yeah
they're.
All
it's
all
there.
It's
in
that
medium
article
on
the
spreadsheet.
It's
right
there,
yeah
I,
downloaded.
It
was
looking
at
it
like
pretty
impressive
work.
I,
don't
I
haven't
confirmed
it
I
think
someone
should
confirm
that,
but
it
looks
good.
It
looked
right.
You
know
so
I'm,
just
saying
like
yeah
we
can
go
through
and
man
spend
a
lot
of
man
years
or
I.
F
B
D
I
I'm
gonna
make
a
couple
concrete
suggestions
of
you
in
mind,
and
this
will
and
these
will
require
work
from
others.
So
I'm
sorry
for
volunteering,
other
people
number
one.
We
should
get
that
data
first
party
on
the
zero
liquidated
vaults
and
a
range
of
scenarios
of
what
the
holders
could
have
anticipated
receiving
were
they
not
to
have
been
liquidated
at
zero
and
I.
Think
that
the
chat
has
surfaced
a
couple
of
the
different
factors
involved
in
this
I.
Don't
imagine
that'll
be
too
hard.
D
B
Yeah,
like
mice
like
maybe
this
is
less
important.
Other
people
vote
my
kind
of
the
point
coming
coming
from
with
like
the
kind
of
philosophical,
as
you
sort
of
put
them
reasons
for
why
we're
doing
this
is
that
the
Dow
should
have
consistent
decision
making
like
around
this
and
other
things
right
like
we
need
to
go
to
us
like
anytime.
We
make
a
decision
for
a
reason
like
that.
B
That's
gonna,
just
like
exist
forever
right,
so
if
we
then
want
to
make
a
decision
with
for
a
different
reason
in
the
future,
then
we
need
to
answer.
The
question
was
like:
why
are
we
doing
it
differently
from
how
we
did
before
so
again?
While
they
may
be
seem
less
important
than
like
the
optical,
and
like
other
reasons,
it
is
important.
We
consider
the
reasons
for
why
we're
doing
what
we're
doing
to.
D
D
There
was
certainly
an
attacker
right
that
caused
these
zero
liquidations.
Like
there,
the
mempool
dynamics
at
the
time
are
not
indicative
of
and
someone
who
wrote
better
keeper
software
than
everybody
else
and
accidentally
happened
to
you
know
in
effect
bid
0
when
everybody
else
has
went
down
for
totally
random
reasons.
D
The
this
was
a
coordinated
in
almost
incredibly
intelligent
attack,
and
I'm
not
sure
if
that
house
has
been
made
public,
but
part
of
the
input
to
my
thinking
here
is
that
it's
not
like
this
happened
to
us
by
chance
like
this
was
there
was
an
opportunity
created
both
by
the
maker
specific
software
in
infrastructure,
as
well
as
environmental
conditions,
but
that
was
specifically
exploited
by
an
intelligent
actor.
This
was
not
something
that
just
happened
to
happen
and
that's
part
of
my
thinking
on
it
because
I
think
it's
quite
different.
D
D
G
D
Are
some
men
pool
specialists
live,
live
now
and
a
bunch
of
other
folks,
so
I
think
there's
quite
a
bit
of
brainpower
focused
on
it
right
now,
but
not
taken
to
its
conclusion.
The
short
version
would
be-
and
this
was
a
novel
mempool
attack
that
targeted
a
number
of
different
layers
of
the
infrastructural
stack
in
a
way
that
we
haven't
seen
before
and
at
this
point,
although
it's
not
certain
seems
eminently
likely
that
it
was
premeditated
and
like
a
very,
very
highly
intelligent
attack.
F
A
F
I
heard
it,
this
is
just
but
I,
never
eivin's
I've
been
waiting
for
a
report
or
even
any
indication
that
no
other
than
just
people
chatting
about
it.
In
the
background,
I
wanted
to
see
anybody,
that's
like!
Oh,
we
have
real
data
on
this
and
we'll
present
it
in
a
week
or
whatever
I
had
nothing
on
that.
That's
a
whole
different
ballgame
that
doesn't
just
have
implications
for
a
maker,
but
literally
across
the
board,
and
nor
could
we
be
expected
to
be
on
a
hook
for
a
system
attack
yeah.
D
You
there's
currently
no
evidence
for
minor
collusion
whatsoever.
There
is
evidence
that
this
was
a
targeted,
intelligent
attack
that
exploited
basically
like
in
efficiencies
or
compounding
sort
of
like
is
basically
a
compounding
attack
across
multiple
layers
of
the
stack,
not
minor
collusion,
but
III
think
that
that
analysis
will
be
public
in
the
next
week.
Yeah
I
think
well.
G
F
G
A
Internal
analysis,
there's
thinking
and
all
the
rest
of
it
and
the
outcome
or
a
decision-making
process
for
the
community
can
be
affected
by
all
kinds
of
post-mortem
in
science
that
chain
analysis.
Analysts
will
be
dropping
in
the
coming
weeks,
but
I
think
that
there's
still
utility
and
figuring
out
what
models
are
available
to
us
and
what
best
and
worst
you
need
in
case
situations
with.
B
F
We
definitely
Kurt
suggested
a
second
second
group
doing
a
chain
on
chain
analysis
and
presenting
data,
so
we
can
compare
it.
The
medium
article,
that's
important,
and
then
we
can
proceed
on
things,
but
making
any
decisions
on
compensating
anybody,
I
need
all
information
before
I
can
do
that.
This
is
floating
out
there.
I
can't
make
a
decision.
B
B
D
A
I
think
that
this
ties
back
to
other
conversations
that
tried
to
initiate
in
the
past,
but
we
need
to
understand
whether
it
is
that
we
live
in
an
adversarial
ecosystem
of
disparate
protocols,
all
working
together
and
compensate
or
competing
for
you
know,
market
share,
chair
and
network
effects
and
the
strongest
survive,
but
there's
the
other
model.
It's
just
like
the
real
world
model,
where
there's
all
kinds
of
rules
and
regulations
and
people.
If
they
do
things
we're
not
supposed
to
they
get
in
trouble,
then
there's
in
our
world
we've
seen
things
like
open
and
nexus.
A
Mutual
and
a
bunch
of
other
organizations
spawned
themselves
up
in
order
to
be
able
to
hedge
against
time
foreseeing
circumstances
so
I
don't
have
that
even
look
I'd
love
to
be
in
the
conversation
or
the
government's
call
where
people
start
discussing
compensation
for
pegged.
Deviation,
then,
at
that
point,
I,
don't
know
what
the
protocol
would
look.
G
Like
a
one
for
reason
and
I
think
Matata
as
well
just
can
it
can
I
make
a
suggestion
eventually
here
on
the
communication
side
of
side
of
things,
I
already
think
it's
it's
impossible
for
maker
to
actually
to
control
every
single
or
even
like
taking
responsibility
for
every
single
you
why
that
is
actually
using
the
underlying
protocol.
But
there
is
a
point
to
be
made
that
a
lot
of
also
liquidations
were
based
on
risk
appetite
for
from
what
vault
owners
rights,
even
though
there
was
this
was
I.
G
Am
president
to
talk
event
in
single
day
that
happened
all
that
causal,
the
liquidations
there
is
do
some
probabilistic
maths
here
that
you
could
do
being
observing
actually
the
system
collateralization
for
a
long
time.
You
take
that
as
like
one
of
the
most
important
measures
of
risk
appetite
for
the
vault
illness,
right
and
I
think
maybe
a
piece
of
communication.
Whenever
vote
on
us
actually
creating
new
died
from
the
collateral.
G
There
is
potentially
have
a
little
message
around
probabilistically
how
much
they
could
lose
in
case
there
was
some
significant
event
and
that
would
already
kind
of
throw
back
and
their
themselves
the
responsibility
for
actually
for
Nate,
not
taking
too
much
risk
whenever
they
are
creating
that
in
the
system.
So
I
think
that
could
be
kind
of
like
it's
one
of
the
ways
of
communicating
it
indirectly,
maybe
under
yeah,
on
the
main
on
the
main
user
interface,
and
then
we
were
kind
of
like
throw
back
at
them.
G
Actually,
maybe
I
shouldn't
be
too
greedy
and
try
actually
to
just
leverage
too
much,
and
we
could
do
that
through
math
of
the
probability
so
I'm
taking
maybe
some
extreme
events
just
to
kind
of
throw
back
at
them,
because
this
is
being
a
lot
of
time.
Where
saw
like
all
the
like
system,
collateralization
below
300,
which
is
for
me,
seems
to
be
very
risky
and
that
actually
kind
of
reflects
the
risk
appetite
of
people
kind
of
leveraging.
So
so
yeah,
just
just
a
point
for
consideration.
B
Just
yeah
I
think
I
think
so
having
you're
right,
I
think
it's
gonna
kind
of
show.
People
like
I
guess
models
when
they
open
their
thing
of
like
how
long
how
liked
you
they
are,
how
it
likely
it
is
that
something's
gonna
go
wrong.
That
would
be
beneficial
but
but
I
kind
of
feel
like
it
comes
back
to
the
same.
The
same
thing
it's
like
you
shoulda
mentioned.
B
We
sort
of
show
it
to
those
people
before
they
use
the
system
right
well
like
we
can,
assuming
we
can
convince
the
Oasis
people
to
bet
on
the
Oasis
UI.
We
can't
necessarily
like
other
people
to
put
on
there
you
guys,
so
we
can't
ever
have
like
a
guarantee
that
someone
has
seen
that
before
using
the
system.
G
B
E
B
E
You
can't
guarantee
it,
but
you
could
there's
a
few
things
you
can
do.
You
can
work
with
those
like
the
bigger
UI,
so
there's
a
very,
very
high
percentage
that
more
people
have
seen
it
and
if
it's
like,
if
this
is
a
main
focus
of
the
DAO
like
people,
will
talk
about
that
and
it'll
be
more
of
an
understanding
like
I
do
agree
yeah.
We
can't
guarantee
that
everyone
sees
it,
but
we
can
make
that,
like
the
main,
like
a
main
understanding,
yeah.
F
Well,
here's
a
good
one,
somebody's
hosted
and
said
you
know
when
you're
gonna
borrowed
I
have
a
little
chart
pop
up
with
the
90
80
70
60,
all
the
way
down
to
10%.
You
know
if
your
collateral
price
drops
and
then
how
much
your
collateral
you
can
have
less
because
I'll
tell
you
something
somebody
that's
leveraging
up
if
they
see
that
75
percent
mark
in
the
zero
collateral
I,
don't
know
how
you
could
about
it.
F
If
the
you
know
and
that's
when
your
that's
the
liquidation
price,
you
know
I
mean
it
stares
you
right
in
the
face.
Oh
my
god.
If
the
prosumer
collateral
goes
down
to
70
percent-
oh
boy,
oh
you
know,
whereas
me
I
had
like
I
had
like
a
600
percent
collateralization.
You
know
you
have
the
liquidation
level
there
it's
kind
of
obvious,
but
you
know
it's
like
well
what
do
I
get
when
it
goes
to
20?
You
know
nothing,
probably,
but
the
idea
that
you
see
that
plain
and
clear
is
just
a
little
little.
F
B
G
Yeah
but
I
think
that,
like
the
way
that
it's
either,
she
provides
at
least
some
extra
information
to
be
partially
to
taken
the
risk
that
kind
of
like
michishige,
has
showed
quite
a
few
times
here.
Distribution
of
those
collateral
ratios
and
I've
liked
a
couple
times
when
he
was
talking
about
it
like
I,
kept,
insisting
on
that
because
for
me,
that's
kind
of
like
it's
really
about
the
risk
appetite
of
those
people,
and
there
is
a
lot
of
people
with
very
high
risk
appetites
playing
the
stakes
right,
but
high
risk
appetite.
G
G
F
As
I
say,
I
posited
to
the
sesh
that
you
know
now
that
we
have
this,
like.
You
know
that
wait
the
chart
that
you're
talking
about
I
want
those
90
80.
You
know
six,
fifty,
you
know
twenty
I
want
those
as
lines
on
a
running
chart
so
that
we
actually
have
a
chart
of
risk
appetite
versus
this
snapshot
that
he
gives
us
every
once
in
a
while,
or
you
know
that
we
can
look
at.
We
really
need
a
graph
of
this
risk
appetite,
because
what
I'm
seeing
is
when
the
markets
settle
down.
F
You
can
tell
me
what
you
see,
but
I've
been
seeing
that
the
system
goes
back
to
this.
You
know
10%
down
and
we
lose
10%
of
our
collateral
50%
down
and
it's
like
50%
of
our
collateral.
It's
only
when
the
markets
have
taken
a
hit.
Does
that
does
that
start
to
skew,
but
then,
over
time
it
starts
to
normalize.
It's
almost
like
a
risk
collateral,
optimization
game
that
our
people
are
playing
and
it
looks
like
we
kind
of
land
in
similar
areas
like
right.
Now
we
go
down
50%.
F
G
E
Cyrus
Cyrus
has
also
pointed
out
in
his
presentations
recently
that
the
qualitative
aspects
of
risk
analysis
are
going
to
be
important,
going
forward
for
making
models
and
like
really
understanding
the
risk
and
collateral.
So
it's
it's
a
bit
more.
It
seems
like
it'll,
be
a
bit
more
complicated
than
just
like
at
what
price
does,
how
much
collateral
get
liquidated
and
how
much
you'll
lose.
But
I
do
you
think
that's
a
good
place
to
start.
E
A
Thing
down,
so
it's
been
a
long
call,
and
this
is
not
the
last
discussion
we'll
be
having
on
this
topic,
and
so
I
think
that
we
have
some
takeaways
here.
We
have
some
models,
some
working
groups
to
get
together
to
generate
some
models.
We
have
some
obviously
there's
been
rumors
and
speculation
for
a
while
about
the
core
or
root
cause
of
some
of
the
issues
we've
seen
since
Thursday.
Hopefully,
some
additional
clarity
will
be
brought
to
our
attention
on
the
ecosystem
chain,
analysts
and
our
detectives.
A
There's
some
smart
people
in
this
ecosystem
can
provide
some
additional
clarity
about
what
happened
and
why
the
post-mortem
from
the
foundation
will
be
coming
out
seem
hesitant
to
put
a
date
on
it,
because
it's
fantastically
complicated
requires
a
great
deal
of
work,
but
I
look
forward
to
seeing
it
sometime
ideally
end
of
week.
I
might
be
optimistic
early
next
week.
Continue
the
discussion
in
the
forum,
so
please,
and
this
this
call
will
be
posted
online
zoom
has
upgraded
their
infrastructure,
so
it
doesn't
take
a
day
for
these
things
to
get
processed
anymore.
A
The
source
will
be
online
in
next
hour
too.
Let's
spread
the
link
to
the
call,
let's
get
the
conversation
spread
to
as
many
stakeholders
as
possible
and
continue.
I
will
probably
pick
it
up
again.
Next,
there's
for
this
Thursday.
If
there's
any
interesting
developments
and
we'll
see
what
the
Community
Alliance
on
these,
these
are
very
very
interesting
days.
We
live
in
all
right
thanks.
Everyone
thanks
for
people,
have
brought
the
discussion
thanks
Kurt
for
that
legendary
presentation.
A
Nice
make
remember
your
thoughts
and
long
for
raising
the
topic.
All
right,
I
see
everybody
in
a
couple
days
and
get
out
to
vote.
Oh
yeah,
sorry
I
forgot
almost
forgot
all
about
the
flop
option,
so
there's
a
discussion
that
needs
to
be
had
about
timing.
So
if
the
I
want
the
community
to
think
about
urgency,
does
this
require
an
executive
to
go
out
on
Thursday
I.
F
A
Executive
this
week
can
either
be
the
functions
and
the
stability
fees
for
side
I
on
us
DC,
or
it
can
be
only
the
flop
option.
If
the
community
decides
that
we
don't
want
to
mix
technical
and
monetary,
so
we
can
forego
monetary
policy
votes
on
Friday
or
we
can
have
a
flop
function
on
executive
on
Thursday
hope
that
it
passes
in
24
hours
and
then
have
a
normally
scheduled
monetary
policy
votes
on
Friday,
I.
F
F
Consider
that
one
highly
critical,
the
monetary
stuff-
maybe
it
can
wait
and
then
we're
already
at
zero
I,
keep
harping
on
the
SCD
lowering
the
sed
debt
limit,
but
I
haven't
heard
anything
from
Syrus
on
going
from
20
to
15,
so
I'm
leaving
that
alone,
but
yeah
I
think
that's
III
would
be
for
just
doing.
Let's
get
the
flop
and
the
thought
box
and
just
have
our
plate
and
revisit
all
the
other
stuff
and
another
executive
after
that.
One
well.
A
Yeah
there's
a
decision
to
be
made
here.
So
let's
do
this:
let's
get
a
forum
thread,
it's
a
great
to
say
that
it's
nice,
but
it's
it's
what
we
have
to
do.
So,
let's
get
a
forum
thread
that
has
a
poll
in
it
asking
the
community
how
they
want
to
handle
this
week's
executive
and
let's
have
those
three
options
in
there
and
just
see.
If
we
get
clarity
by
Thursday,
we.
D
C
That'd
be
useful
as
well.
I
I
can
say
just
briefly
from
a
technical
perspective.
One
thing
that
we've
discussed
since
you
can't
predict
when
an
executive,
though,
is
going
to
pass
anyway.
We
could
just
put
some
logic
in
the
spell
to
ensure
a
deterministic
time
for
when
the
flop
auctions
will
start
that's
easier
to
do.
If
the
spell
doesn't
have
say
monetary
policy
changes
as
well,
but
for
added
a
technical
level,
you
can
put
some
logic
in
there
like
these
are
only
gonna
start
at
9
a.m.