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From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 12
Description
In this Governance and Risk meeting with Steven Becker we discuss creating the correlation portfolio and facilitating growth in the blockchain economy.
Meeting Minutes: https://github.com/scottrepreneur/maker-minutes
Live Tweet: https://twitter.com/Shaughnessy119/status/1052951715220217857
Podcast version: https://soundcloud.com/makerdao/sets/governance-and-risk
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 1: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-governance-risk-framework-38625f514101
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 2: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-governance-risk-framework-fc8939f3d4e9
Foundation Proposal: https://medium.com/makerdao/foundatio...
Website: https://makerdao.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/makerdao
Reddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/
Chat: https://chat.makerdao.com/home
Email: info@makerdao.com
A
Hello,
everyone
welcome
to
the
October
18th
edition
of
the
scientific
governance
and
risk
meeting
with
Stephen
Becker,
our
president
and
CEO
I
think
this
is
our
both
episode.
I'm
not
entirely
sure
I'm
gonna
hand
it
over
to
Stephen
almost
immediately
to
give
us
recap
of
last
week
and
talk
about
what
we're
gonna
get
into
this
week.
A
It
was
a
great
idea
from
David,
so
I
tested
it
out
yesterday
and
it
was
a
great
opportunity
to
actually
get
a
refresher
a
lot
of
the
things
we've
talked
about
from
the
beginning
during
the
daily
walk,
so
I'll
post,
a
link
in
our
chat
here
and
I'll
make
sure
that's
reflected
in
our
subreddit
and
maybe
even
when
I
post,
the
YouTube
video
we'll
add
links
to
the
SoundCloud.
So
people
don't
need
to
be
stuck
to
their
computers,
whether
they're
watching
these
news,
all
right,
I,
think
that's
it
for
my
update
so
Stephen.
B
To
recap,
the
last
time
we
were
on
a
communicate,
the
community
call.
We
were
looking
at
various
risk
parameters,
but
we
focused
mostly
on
what
government's
is
what
governance
means,
because
I
think
the
one
thing
I'm
trying
to
drive
home
over
and
over
again
is
that
the
MKR
token
is
a
governance
token
and
the
way
we
can
wrap
my
head
around
what
that
means
is
obviously
the
the
first
part
being.
What
can
you
do
with
it?
B
So
we
all
know
that
there's
two
different
types
of
books:
there's
a
governance
vote
in
your
Executive
Board,
and
the
reason
that
you
have
a
governance
board
before
an
executive
oute
is
so
that
you
can
increase
the
confidence
in
the
executive
vote
actually
being
approved
and
the
underlying
states
being
deployed
to
the
blockchain.
But
what
we
didn't
highlight
is:
where
should
you
hold
your
mkr
tokens?
B
Theoretically,
you
should
put
them
in
one
of
two
places
in
Ko
token
should
always
be
either
in
the
voting
structure,
because
you
are
always
required
to
be
cognizant
of
what's
going
on
in
the
system
and
assessing
and
evaluating
the
proposals
that
are
in
the
system.
The
idea
is
that,
in
theory,
you
should
have
a
continuous
deluge
of
proposals,
and
each
of
these
proposals
should
have
an
inherent
value
to
the
system
that
everyone
needs
to
consider
and
will
be
considering
them
through
social
media
all
the
way
through
to
a
governance,
vote
and
notice.
B
Now
that
no,
this
is
the
continuous
work,
the
continuous
approval
voting
system
where
you,
as
I
said
you
have.
This
continues
the
illusion
of
proposals
with
which
you
need
to
assess
the
underlying
value,
and
then
you
obviously
need
to
select
which
ones
you
want
to
incorporate
in
the
system.
But
that's
for
the
executive
side.
The
continuous
approval
voting
is
for
the
executive
votes
is
basically
how
you
actually
want
to
about
changing
the
state
of
the
system.
B
Now,
that's
where
that's
one
place,
you
can
put
you're
in
character
things
if
you
have
found
that
the
proposals
that
are
coming
in
do
not
have
any
new
material
value
or
do
not
have
any
value
whatsoever,
then
one
would
basically
assume
that
the
value
of
NPR
would
be
staggering
for
that
time.
That
time
being
so,
the
next
place
you
want
to
keep
your
MKR
is
in
the
liquidity
pool.
In
my,
in
my
mind,
that
means
you
wanted
to
an
NPR
to
die.
B
B
You
don't
wish
to,
and
you
feel
that
the
additional
value
in
the
proposals
will
not
outstrip
the
endline
volatility
of
NPR,
so
the
best
idea
would
be
to
you
know,
go
into
dying
click,
your
store
value
there,
whatever,
whatever
other
sort
of
liquidity
in
trajectory
you
wish
to
take,
but
in
principle
those
are
the
two
places
you
should
be
keeping
your
mkr
token
or
at
least
the
value
of
NPR's.
Okay,
the
third
one-
and
this
is
pretty
much
what
everyone
is
pretty
much
doing
right
now-
is
you're
keeping
you
anything
else
opens
and
you
what?
B
Now?
Theoretically,
you
shouldn't
be
keeping
it
in
you,
one
that
you
should
either
be
in
died,
which
you
should
be
in
the
voting
structure.
But
the
only
reason
you
want
to
keep
your
anything
out.
Soaking
in
in
the
wallet
is
when
you
do
not
have
liquidity
in
fluidity
of
the
the
secondary
market
working
for
you
nicely
when
you
don't
believe
that
you
can
actually
transfer
all
your
value
of
NPR
in
to
die
appropriately
or
on
the
other
side,
you
decide
that
the
voting
construct
you
still
need
to
get
used
to.
B
It
doesn't
really
appeal
to
your
high
standards
of
security,
or
maybe
you
still
need
to
try
and
figure
out
what
that
security
is
and
really
get
used
to
it.
The
point
being
is
there
are
these
natural
frictions
in
both
the
voting
structure
and
in
the
liquidity
pool,
and
those
frictions
will
then
induce
some
folks
to
maybe
keep
the
end
player
in
their
own
wallets,
but
ultimately,
without
those
frictions,
there's
only
really
two
places
you
need
to
to
be
in
MPI,
either
in
the
voting
construct
or
in
Die,
where
you
have
a
store
value.
Why?
B
Why
am
I?
You
know
talking
about
this?
The
reason
I
am
mentioning.
This
is
because,
if
you
ultimately
want
to
find
out
what
the
true
value
of
NPR
token
is,
which
represents
governance,
which
represents
your
ability
to
vote,
those
two
mechanisms
will
always
be
head
butting
against
each
other
and,
as
a
consequence,
creating
Christ's
discovery
on
what
it
means
to
vote.
B
I
mean
that
is
ultimately
what
I
was
trying
to
get
at
and
it
behooves
NPR
token
holders
to
be
constantly
cognizant
of
this
process,
because
the
continuous
approval
voting
system
does
not
have
a
quorum
and
the
reason
it
does
not
have
a
quorum
to
pass
a
proposal
is
that
it
is
an
incentive
for
everyone
to
participate,
because
if
you
do
not
participate,
there
is
a
chance
that
a
proposal
could
pass
that
does
not
have
a
proper
representation
or
what
you'd
consider
a
proper
representation
of
the
entire
system.
Well,.
A
That's
interesting,
I'm
trying
to
wrap
my
head
around
this,
so
you're
saying
that
it
should
be
either
sing
and
die,
or
should
be
in
the
voting
system
or
potentially
in
your
wallet
if
you
want
to
maintain
some
flexibility.
But
ultimately,
the
price
discovery
in
this
in
this
model
is
the
price
of
maker
is
at
that
point
where
people
don't
find
it
worthwhile
to
actually
lock
it
up
into
the
voting
system
and
they're,
leaving
it
on
the
exchange,
so
that
that's
the
balance
that
it
needs
to
reach.
B
Folks
might
be
in
the
votes
in
constructively
looking
at
all
these
proposals
coming
in
and
they're
thinking.
No,
these
proposals
are
not
going
to
create
value.
That's
going
to
surpass
the
underlying
volatility
of
nkr
price
discovery,
so
they
think
I
don't
want
to
sit
here
and
actually
be
exposed
to
this
volatility.
While
I
wait
for
better
proposals
to
come
along,
so
you're
going
to
die
and
you
keep
your
store
value
and
die.
You
obviously
be
cognizant
of
what's
going
on
in
the
system.
B
B
In
terms
of
your
words
and
power
and
how
you
can
unlock
further
value
in
proposals,
that
literally,
is
the
unlined
dynamic
for
for
being
a
part
of
NPR
governance,
but
the
most
important
part
about
this
is
that
it
is
governance.
You
have
to
continuously
be
involved
with
us
and
that's
a
lack
of
quorum
is
the
incentive
to
make
sure
that
you
do
stay
engaged
a
lot
of
people
might
think.
Oh
that's!
Quite
a
bit
of
you
know,
time
of
my
of
my
life.
Why
must
I
constantly
be
looking
at
something
in
constantly
worried?
B
Well,
unfortunately,
that's
where
that's
where
the
process
is
and
that's
where
the
process
works,
and
your
level
of
engagement
is
very
similar
to
how
you
see
different
folks
out
there
with
their
different
incentives
as
to
why
they
want
to
get
into
a
capital
asset
of
sort.
You
know
everyone
has
their
own
profiles
to
which
they
have
to
bring
to
bear
on
their
choices.
This
is
no
different.
Do.
A
You
think
that
we're
gonna
see
sort
of
an
emergence
of
a
demographic
like
clearly
defined
demographics
and
maker
holders,
where
perhaps
the
retail
CTP
users
retail
ecosystem
participants,
are
less
interested
in
walking
up
their
maker
long
term,
whereas
large
investors
like
the
16
Z's
or
the
people
that
are
representing
payroll
funds,
might
choose
instead
to
keep
their
maker
locked
up.
Always.
B
The
one
aspect
there
is
really
having
a
rather
an
opinion
on
where
dye
is
going
to
asymptote
off
in
terms
of
its
supply.
That's
really
done
line
factor
if
you
do
not
see
that
a
proposal
can
give
you
the
opportunity
to
generate
more,
then
you
sitting
back
and
saying:
okay.
Well,
all
we
add
in
asymptotes,
or
are
we
just
at
a
low?
If
we
are
an
asymptote
I
mean
a
question
I
had
the
other
day
is.
B
Are
we
like
the
central
bank?
Do
we
have
a
multiplier
effect
and
the
answer
is
not
if
you
really
once
you
get
this
in
your
head
very
clearly,
it's
pretty
simple!
You
just
think
about
this
thought
experiment!
Imagine
there
is
no
other
collateral
out
there
except
eath
right
and
imagine
all
Heath
is
put
into
a
CVP
at
most
all
your
going
to
be
able
to
take
out
the
sixty-six
percent
of
value
of
that
eve,
but
you
can't
go
and
take
out
that
value
and
by
moniece
there
isn't
anymore
e.
You
used
it
all.
B
So
the
natural
function
of
the
system
is
actions
is
actually
to
remain
complete
and
consistent.
So
if
you
had
to
use
that
thought
experiment,
you
would
actually
reduce
the
value
that
is
in
the
system,
but
because
we're
looking
at
growing
an
economy,
that's
sixty
sixty
six
percent
extraction
of
value.
You
could
quite
easily
use
to
go
and
fly.
Will
a
new
organization
finance
a
new
operation
get
assets
going
and
by
definition,
grow
the
economy?
B
A
C
Sure
so
one
question
I
had
I'm
just
wondering
how
to
increase
voting
participation
from
smaller
holders.
You
know:
is
there
any
way
that
you
could
envision,
maybe
maker,
rewarding
those
holding
less
maker
to
vote
and
maybe
not
rewarding
the
larger
holders
just
to
give
an
incentive
for
people
to
vote
on
uncertain
topics,
or
is
that
a
dumb
idea?
No.
B
It's
a
great
idea,
but
the
underlying
assumption
of
that
idea
is
that
any
proposal
can
pass,
which
fundamentally
is
the
problem,
and
if
someone
brings
in
a
proposal
that
says
mega
dog
should
be
an
ice
cream
factory.
Well,
what
will
happen
is
if
it
does
pass.
Makeda
will
not
become
an
ice
cream
factory.
The
governance
security
module
will
take
over
identify
that
the
proposal
that
is
attempting
to
pass
is
detrimental
to
the
system
and
the
system
will
shut
down.
B
So,
therefore,
the
proposals-
and
this
is
the
most
important
part-
is
that
the
proposals
need
to
be
vetted
appropriately,
either
from
a
rigorous
point
of
view
or
from
a
care
alignment
of
incentives.
So
if
you
want
to
introduce
a
new
article,
then
you
say:
okay
well,
let's
vote
on
this
new
article.
But
what
does
this
mean?
Where
did
it
come
from?
How
do
they
get
their
pricing?
How
are
they
gonna
stick
around?
Are
we
sure
they're
gonna
stick
around
you're
gonna
start
weighing
these
guys
up.
So
by
the
time
you
get
to
actually
votes.
B
You're
gonna
have
a
clear
idea
about
what
you're
voting
about.
So
if
you
do
have
a
proposal
that
somebody
wants
to
sell
motorbikes
of
them,
make
it
out
again,
it'll
be
something
that's
against
the
system
and
what
you're
hopeful
is
that
the
government
security
module
will
catch
that
again,
I
think
what
I'm
trying
to
get
at
is
the
basis
of
this
is
everything
needs
to
be
vented
from
a
rigorous
point
of
view
before
it
can
actually
be
considered.
B
A
You
I
think
the
the
tongue
raised
another
interesting
point
that
I
think
that
people
have
been
talking
about,
and
this
comes
within
waves.
I.
Thank
this
people
get
interested
in
governance
in
maker.
Doubt
apathy
becomes
one
of
the
major
concerns
and
then
that
inevitably
leads
to
in
incentivization
mechanism.
Is
there
a
magic
plan
or
game
theoretical
construct
that
we
can
use
to
force
or
encourage
people
to
vote
and
usually,
as
soon
as
I,
see
those
I
jump
in
almost
immediately
and
say,
like
that's
doomed
to
fail?
A
Never
do
that
in
the
nicest
possible
way,
but
every
time
that
you
incentivize
a
voting
mechanism
in
my
experience
or
from
the
things
that
I've
seen
in
our
space
you've
created
a
profit
motive
for
people
to
manipulate
that
system,
and
so
you
no
longer
need
to
be
interested
in
maker
doubt
or
die
or
stability.
You
just
need
to
be
interested
in
showing
a
return
off
of
manipulating
a
voting
structure
and.
B
B
Way,
the
one
thing
that
is
really
I
find
always
interesting
and
actually
took
me
a
while
to
get
my
header
on
it
when
you
think
about
voting
when
you
think
about
participating
in
an
entity,
there's
always
this
counterparty
construct
in
your
head,
it's
me
doing
something
in
order
to
get
someone
else
to
do
it,
but
you
always
have
that
construct
in
your
head.
So
therefore,
you
think
how
best
to
get
someone
else
to
do
something
where
in
this
system,
this
is
one
of
the
first
iteration
is
where
you
are
completely
responsible
for
absolutely
everything.
B
So
if
you
want
to
get
something
done,
you
actually
convincing
yourself,
first
and
foremost,
you're,
not
convincing
the
board
of
directors,
you're,
not
convincing,
you
know
you're,
not
convincing
an
organization
to
to
change
its
point
of
view.
You
are
quite
literally
convincing
yourself
so
that
fiduciary
responsibility
actually
sits
with
you
and
the
kind
of
confusing
part
about
it
is
that
it's
got
so
many
points
where
things
can
go
wrong.
If
you
let
it
and
if
you
let
it
it's
your
fault,
it's
not
anyone
else's
fault.
So
it's
a
case
of
saying.
B
Well,
you
know
we
all
grown
up,
we're
all
adults,
we
all
know
where
the
system
works
and
where
it
doesn't.
So.
Therefore,
the
responsibility
is
with
us
the
same
token
holders.
It's
not
we
don't
we're
not
going
to
go
blame
the
the
board
of
directors.
If
something
goes
wrong,
you
know
we're
not
going
to
go
blame
management
if
something
goes
wrong
because
there
isn't.
C
A
You,
you
might
have
a
limited
expectation
that
that's
going
to
have
any
positive
impact
on
your
life
at
any
point
in
a
regional
election,
but
with
the
maker,
Dow
ecosystem.
I.
Think
that
we're
going
to
see
a
huge
cohort
of
people
that
are
enormous
ly
interested
in
ensuring
that
their
time
and
their
investments
and
their
their
stability
is
well
maintained
and
they're
going
to
make
sure
that
they
have
their
eyes
and
their
maker
tokens
locked
up.
So
they
can
emission
stop
foolishness
from
happening
before
it's
too
late.
B
One
thing
everyone
knows
is
that
you
know
when
you,
when
you
go
to
vote
in
your
local
or
general
election.
The
one
thing
you
always
bearing
in
the
back
of
your
mind
is
really
at
the
end
of
the
day.
How
does
my
vote
count
and
you
constantly
trying
to
get
a
sense
of
what
value
it
actually
brings?
What's
value
in
bears,
and
will
it
really
make
any
difference
whatsoever?
Because
you
know
it's
very
clear:
that's
you
know
a
basic
premise
off
of
how
people
see
voting
in
maked
owl.
B
It
basically
is
the
same
thing,
but
on
steroids
you
really
got
to
sit
there
and
ask
that
question
not
just
to
the
point
where
you
dismiss
it
and
go
either.
Oh
I'm
not
worth
anything
or
actually
I'm
worth
a
lot.
You
need
to
have
a
look
at
it
all
the
way
down
to
the
point
where
you
saying
your
point,
one
MKR
or
your
1nk
are
effectively
is
going
to
unlock
real
value
in
a
proposal.
B
That's
basically
the
mapping
that
you
have,
and
you
know
that,
because
the
proposal
is
in
effect
created
to
make
the
best
amount
of
sense
for
the
system.
Your
contribution
is
a
step
along
with
the
mass
of
people
looking
for
the
same
value
in
unleashing
the
Asura.
Looking
for
the
same
value
in
the
proposal
where,
if
you,
if
you
think
about
a
normal
general
election,
you
don't
get
that
sense,
because
you
do
not
know
that
the
proposal
or
that's
candidates
or
whatever
you're
voting
on
for
that
actually
has
that
rigorously
vetted
points
of
view.
B
That
concludes
with
the
fact
that
this
is
a
very
writing
for
the
system.
You
look
at
a
candidate
and
you've
got
to
basically
be
subjective
himself
and
say
well.
He
may
bring
or
she
may
bring
new
ideas.
That's
all
cool
I,
don't
know
effectively
going
with
a
gut
feel
in
this
space.
Everything
boils
down
to
a
specific
rigor
and
that
rigor
should
part-and-parcel
convince
a
lot
of
people
and
all
you're
doing
is
contributing
to
what
is
effectively
a
consensus.
B
A
I
think
it
makes
sense
for
me,
at
least
if
anybody
else
is
confused.
Please
ask
questions
in
the
chat,
but
so
I
think
that
that's
an
interesting
point
that
we're,
assuming
that
there's
sort
of
a
direct
fiduciary
responsibility,
at
least
a
self-interested
one,
which
will
cause
people
to
be
remain
engaged
especially
large
holders.
But
we
also
talked
about
I,
don't
know
if
this
is
official
or
like
whether
it's
a
plan,
but
we
talked
about
delegated
voting
a
lot
as
well.
A
When
we're
sort
of
conceiving
about
the
future
or
the
maker
down
governance
system,
it
would
have
delegated
or
delegating
votes.
Would
that
be
sort
of
how
smaller
holders
would
say,
get
representation
in
this
system?
Or
is
this
to
avoid?
If
somebody
knows
that
they're
engaged
in
the
system,
they
know
that
they
want
to
be
or
they're
engaged
enough
to
want
the
system
to
succeed,
but
they
can't
necessarily
or
might
not
believe
they
have
the
capacity
to
make
intelligent,
risk-based
decisions
and
they
decide
to
delegate
their
token.
B
It's
possible
to
put
in
the
roadmap
to
to
do
that,
but
in
essence,
what
we're
doing
with
each
proposal
is
that
if
it
is,
if
it
is
a
proposal,
that's
gone
through
a
governance
want,
for
instance,
because
pretty
much
every
should
go
through
a
governance
vote.
If
you
find
a
proposal
sitting
in
the
executive
vote
and
construct
and
it
hasn't
gone
through
a
governance
vote.
Well,
you
know.
That's,
that's
not
a
well
vetted,
it's
not
a
well-considered
proposal
so,
but
by
default
it
should
find
itself
falling
to
the
wayside.
B
To
your
points
of
delegating
your
vote
to
to
someone
else.
What
we're
trying
to
do
is
we're
trying
to
show
proposals
that
go
through
the
governance
vote
and
get
into
the
executive
vote
and
construct
that
has
clear
consensus.
So
when
you
hurt
even
on
it,
you
don't
you,
don't
necessarily
have
to
delegate
your
vote
to
someone
else,
because
by
default
of
it
being
in
the
executive,
Burton
construct,
you
can
assume
that
the
necessary
people
who
know
what's
going
on
wants
it
to
be
there.
That's
the
that's
the
point
I'm
trying
to
make.
B
So
essentially,
when
you
vote
on
an
executive
on
an
executive
vote,
you
should
be
a
part
of
the
considerable
mass.
You
should
be
way
past
the
critical
mass
new
way
past.
The
tipping
point.
It's
just
really
a
case
of
how
far
past
the
tipping
point
you
want
to
go
with
this
particular
for
this
particular
vote.
So
if
we
were
to,
for
instance,
we
want
to
include
token
ABC,
we
go
through
a
governance
vote
that
says:
yes,
we
want
to
include
it
because
it
all
makes
a
whole
lot
of
sense.
B
B
A
Well,
that's
that's
a
great
point.
I
think
that
it's
something
that
you
it's!
We
need
to
keep
in
the
back
of
our
minds
that
ultimately,
these
are.
These
puzzles
are
based
on
models
that
have
been
reproducible
with
open
datasets
created
by
experts
in
the
field,
so
to
question
them
or
for
them
to
be
for
there
to
be
any
sort
of
uncertainty
around.
A
That
is
probably
going
to
be
unlikely
and
so
I'm,
certainly
around
the
conclusions
of
the
proposal
is
probably
to
be
unlikely,
and
if
there
is,
then
that
means
that
there's
something
deeper
at
play
that
requires
ok,
yeah
I'm
caught
up
to
you
know,
that's
very
interesting,
but
there's
there's
this
unlikelihood
that
it's
going
to
come
down
to
a
50/50
split
on
any
one
proposal,
or
that
there
needs
to
be
campaigning
in
order
for
people
to
understand
what
the
facts
are.
Yeah.
B
I
mean
that's
the
that's
why
you
know
make
the
one
thing
I
always
find
when
I
go
to
governance
panels.
They
talk
about
everything
from
liquid
democracy.
To
delegate
to
you
know,
obviously
elegant
voting
to
all
these
constructs
that
you
you
need
to
consider,
but
the
underlying
constructs
assumes
that
the
outcome
is
up
in
air.
All
these
constructs
are
made
around
representations
so
that
whatever
the
outcome
is
his
failure
represents
it
where
we
doing
it
the
other
way
around.
B
Governance
book,
maybe
50/50
you
can
introduce
them.
You
can
tell
me
we
can
tell
the
whole
system
about
this
new
team
and
they
wonderful
and
everything's
fantastic
still.
There
might
be
a
case
that
they
will
not
be
voted
in,
but
in
terms
of
the
executive
vote.
That
is
where
we
basically
apply
everything
we
can
to
make
sure
that
there
is
a
highest
probability
of
that
proposal.
Moving
through.
A
A
C
Sure
it's
kind
of
like
a
weird
question,
but
you
know
if
if
a
collateral
type
gets
voted
in
like
a
cryptocurrency
or
a
coin
and
it's
ingrained
in
the
system
and
people
are
locking
it
up
and
you
know,
then
it
gets
systemic
works
and
you
use
cases.
You
know
in
the
event
that
that
coin
would
have
to
get
voted
out
for
whatever
reason.
What's
the
process
for
that
to
happen,
it's
like
that
could
be
a
big
vote.
B
What
do
you
would
probably
find
first,
that
happens
is
that
in
the
normal
course
of
events,
one
would
assume
that
this
would
happen
over
a
period
and
in
a
sort
of
transitional
map.
You
would
sort
of
find
a
gradation
down
to
zero
if
you
have
something
that
is
an
absolute
blacks.
One
out
of
the
blue.
Complete
mess
up.
It'll
just
immediately
put
the
debt
ceiling
down
to.
A
B
C
A
B
Then
the
are
there
any
other
questions
with
respect
to
two
previously
discussed
things
in
terms
of
risk
in
terms
of
including
kalanchoe
types,
you
know
how
we
consider
it
because
it
isn't
I
can
start
talking
more
about
how
to
construct
the
collateral
portfolio
I'm,
going
to
give
it
ten
seconds
to
see.
If
there's
any
any
questions,
if
not.
A
Jump
in
really
quickly
sorry,
we
get
people
from
outside
the
organization,
but
we
always
have
people
from
inside
as
law
and
I
want
to
make
sure
that
the
people
that
work
at
make
your
daughter
aware
that
they
can
ask
questions
as
well
like
we'd
love
to
hear
from
come
on
inside
the
mode
as
well.
So
if
you
guys
have
anything,
feel
free
to
ask
okay,
that's
that's
my
speech.
B
B
So
the
next
thing
that
we
need
to
consider
is
actually
building
up
the
collateral
portfolio.
Now
the
way
that
I've
introduced
the
the
risk
mechanism
and
understanding
the
risks
have
always
been
from
a
per
collateral
type
point
of
view.
So
you
might
have
a
look
at
collateral
type
'abc.
You
do
an
assessment
on
it
and
you
tell
you
you
can
find
out.
The
liquidation
ratio
should
be
one
hundred
and
thirty
percent.
The
debt
ceiling
should
be
sixty
five
million
dollars
and
the
stability
theory
should
be
2.3
percent.
B
When
we
combine
that
into
the
portfolio,
are
we
actually
looking
at
apples
with
apples
when
we
compare
these
two
to
tokens,
I
mean?
Does
their
risk
profile
standardized
to
the
point
where
you
can
actually
measure
them
off
against
each
other
and
then
say
to
yourself
well,
given
their
risk
parameters
is
one
a
better
risk
than
the
other.
B
Now
the
the
short
answer
to
that
is
well.
No
because
you've
considered
them
independently
and
there
isn't
an
easy
way
to
standardize
the
comparison
between
the
two.
So
you
kind
of
need
to
reformulate
how
you
look
at
this,
because
you
need
to
create
a
collateral
portfolio
of
these
guys
and
not
look
at
things
just
independently.
So
what
you
need
to
do-
and
this
is
kind
of
like
the
economic
Triana
problem-
is
that
you
go
to
say
well,
if
I
want
to
have
the
similar
amount
of
risk
exposure
to
each
collateral
type.
B
How
do
I
go
about
doing
it?
Do
I
need
to
maybe
make
all
the
day
at
ceiling
the
same
and
then
have
the
liquidation
ratio
and
stability.
Key
change
or
do
I
need
to
have
all
the
liquidation
ratios
the
same
and
let
the
debt
ceilings
fluctuate
and
the
stability
thief
luxury.
The
reason
I
want
to
keep
something
the
same
one
of
the
parameters.
The
same
is
because
you
know
you're,
taking
on
more
or
less
the
same
kind
of
risk
to
each
collateral
time.
B
What
we
do
know
now
is
that,
even
though
we
got
slightly
more
potential
exposure
to
the
second
collateral
type,
we
actually
have
the
same
underlying
risk
to
both
collateral
types.
So
in
the
traditional
space
in
the
traditional
investment
space,
there
is
this
notion
that
when
you
build
your
new
investment
portfolio,
how
do
you.
B
B
So
if
you
say
you're
willing
to
lose
$10,000
in
risk-
and
you
wish
to
have
ten
assets
in
your
portfolio,
then
you
want
to
have
$1,000
of
risk
budgeted
to
each
asset
type
and
then
that
thousand
dollars
then
converts
into
different
exposures
that
you
have
to
each
of
these
asset
types,
and
you
have
varying
levels
of
exposures.
But
the
underlying
theory
is
that
each
one
of
the
answer
types
will
only
bear
$1,000
of
$1,000
at
risk
on
your
on
your
allocated
budget.
B
In
the
same
way,
this
is
how
we're
going
to
construct
the
commercial
portfolio
we're
going
to
have
a
look
at
something
called
even
on
the
capital.
If
you
remember
what
that
was,
the
basically
is
the
amount
of
the
amount
of
for
lack
of
a
better
word
amount
of
money.
That
NPR
token
holders
wish
to
lose
over
any
one
period
of
time.
All
can.
A
We
recommend
so
yes,
this
there's
a
lot
of
really
interesting
things
there
so
you're
talking
from
a
high
level.
We
have
these
three
different
levers,
basically
that
we
can
pull
in
order
to
adjust
our
exposure
of
any
one
particular
collateral
type,
but
you
also
said
that,
ultimately,
it's
up
to
CDP
users
to
determine
exactly
how
that
looks
by
the
their
usage
of
each
into
individual
asset
class
is.
B
A
B
This
comes
back
to
the
public.
The
policy
in
Tremont's
of
the
stability
fee
right,
there's
two
parts
to
it.
There
is
a
part
that
looks
after
the
system
that
tries
to,
if
necessary,
balance,
the
in
congruence
between
supply
and
demand
of
dye
as
a
whole,
and
then
there's
a
part
of
it.
That
looks
at
a
particular
collateral
type
and
says.
B
Well,
you
know,
in
order
to
induce
folks
to
use
this
collateral
type,
you
may
have
to
lower
the
stability
fee
for
that
particular
collateral
tag,
it's
preferable
to
have
that
be
a
price
discovery
or
a
market
or
insert
value.
But
for
the
time
being,
you
might
find
that
risk
teams
will
try
and
manipulate
that
policy
instruments.
B
You
obviously
induce,
but
at
the
same
time
you
can
only
induce
to
a
certain
extent
there
is
going
to
be
a
point
where
you
need
to
just
simply
accept
that
people
do
not
want
that:
a
collateral
type
netbook
their
portfolio,
no
matter
what
you
think
about
it
and
if
that's
the
case,
you
need
to
either
expand
your
portfolio
to
include
new
collateral
tags
or
do
an
adjustment.
The
appropriate
debt
ceiling
adjustment
for
each
of
those
unwanted
collateral
types,
as
I
said.
This
is
not
your
normal
risk
return
investment
aspect.
B
Were
you
trying
to
create
a
portfolio
for
yourself
by
allocating
funds?
This
is
purely
from
a
risk
point
of
view
purely
from
mitigating
risk
and
keeping
the
integrity
of
the
scope
of
the
system.
The
stability
of
the
coin,
but
also
importantly,
is
being
cognizant
of
the
business
dynamic
underlying
it
as
well.
It's
really
yes.
A
B
B
If
you
think
about
it
right
now,
ethers,
you
know,
has
a
hundred
million
deck
ceiling.
Let's
say
we
include
another
eight
and
each
of
them
get
ten
million.
Just
pretend
ten
million
dead,
seeing
each
who
knows
which
collateral
is
going
to
hit
there
dancing.
First,
you
don't
know
you
might
not,
but
that
all
of
them
will-
or
some
of
them
will
or
maybe
just
one
will,
the
point
being
is
when
you
hit
the
Dead
Sea
in
on
that
particular
collateral
time.
Do
you
then
increase
the
debt
ceiling
on
just
that
collateral
type?
B
A
Is
there
a
magical
formula
that
the
risk
teams
are
going
to
come
up
with
saying
that
we
have
like
X
number
of
collateral
types
and
the
years
are
three
levers
or
ten
libras
are
and
based
on
how
close
something
is
to
the
debt
ceiling?
This
means
we
need
to
do
something
over
in
this
area,
or
it
doesn't
involve
this
sort
of
constant
reevaluation
of
the
portfolio
on
a
daily
or
weekly
basis,
constant.
B
Re-Evaluation,
because
this
is
not
just
a
risk
team
reevaluation,
this
is
also
a
business
team
revaluation.
You
have
to
look
at
what
collection
types
want
to
be
used
as
collateral
versus
the
collateral
types
you
wish
to
be
used
as
collateral,
so
you
have
to
evaluate
it
from
both
points
of
view
to
be
completely
formulaic
is
to
miss
the
point
that
you're
actually
growing
in
an
economic
system.
B
Not
only
do
you
have
the
ability
to
have
collateral
types
that
be
included
that
are
in
demand,
but
make
Dow,
as
we
all
know,
is
also
a
flywheel
in
terms
of
generating
growth
for
those
particular
organizations
that
wish
to
interact
with
our
system
on
the
blockchain
economy.
So
we
have
this
twofold
function.
One
is
to
ensure
that
the
collateral
types
that
we
want
are
no.
A
B
So
if
you
find
that
a
certain
collateral
type
starts
pushing
up
the
debt
ceiling,
we
have
to
be
cognizant
of
the
fact
that
is
this
going
to
take
us
to
close
to
that
cap.
Because
not
only
do
you
have
a
high
concentration
in
terms
of
your
your
collateral
portfolio,
but
you
actually
have
an
increased,
an
exponential
increase
in
risk,
as
you
get
closer
to
that
cat,
because
you're
creating
more
of
a
liquidity
risk
for
yourself,
the
greater
the
exposure
you
allow
in
collateral
portfolio.
B
If
the
the
price
discovery
mechanism
in
the
secondary
market
becomes
a
lot
clearer
with
a
lot
more
depth
and
liquidity,
then
the
debt
ceiling
is,
you
know,
obviously
justified,
but
until
then
you
got
to
make
sure
that
you
lockstep
this
approach
appropriately
and
you
may
have
to
keep
a
debt
ceiling
in
place
for
a
particular
collateral
type.
If
it
has
reached
it
and
allow
time
for
all
the
other
collateral
types
to
catch
up,
you
may
not
even
need
to
adjust
the
stability.
B
You
may
find
that
you
are,
to
a
certain
extent,
coercing
folks
to
say
what
you
want
to
participate
in
this.
These
are
the
remaining
collateral
types
you
need
to
consider
so
we're
steering
the
system
towards
what
we
considered
to
have
been
better
stability
as
opposed
to
what
people
just
want
to
use
which
may
actually
deter
or
or
be
a
detriment
from
the
underlying
stability.
Okay,.
A
I
get
it
so
so
the
the
risk
hands
are
stewards
of
the
system,
but
they
also
need
to
remain
responsive
to
the
system
and
they
also
need
to
remain
cognizant
of
what
the
greater
crypto
world
is
up
to
and
anticipate
things
they
might
be
coming
down
the
pike.
It's
really
wow,
that's
great!
All!
Right!
Tom!
You
had
a
question.
We've
we've
talked
about
this
question.
You
have
a
couple
times,
but
it's
a
good
one.
So
if
you
want
to
go
ahead
and
ask
it
again
appreciate
yeah.
C
B
Okay,
who
do
we
want
to
pick
to
provide
services
for
us
as
make
it
out
and
the
folks
that
we
pick
well
they're,
either
going
to
come
with
a
bill
of
their
own
or
we
gonna
have
a
suggestion
way
that
we
should
pay
them
now.
You
know
consider
that
make
it
Dow
may
require
people
to
program,
front
ends
or
increase
the
transparency
or
better
the
governance,
or
do
specific
accounting
or
look
after
risk
all
become
a
better
article.
B
All
these
things
are
an
inherent
cost
that
folks
need
to
consider
all
the
system,
because
that
cost
is
inherently
the
function
that
makes
the
system
work
and
you
can't
you
can't
steer
away
from
that
cost.
You
will
always
need
that
sort
of
cost
to
a
certain
extent,
and
when
we
have
new
risk
teams
votes
it
in
those
risk
teams
are
not
going
to
come
just
because
gee
whiz.
This
is
a
fun
thing
to
do.
They're
gonna
come
with
very
specific
incentives.
B
A
B
Mixes
that
mix
is
really
dependent
on
what
here's
the
thing
that
it
that
it
was
very
hard
for
me
to
get
my
head
around.
But
as
soon
as
you
start
asking
these
questions
about
service
provision
to
make
it
down,
you
got
to
consider
this
from
the
point
of
view
of
MPI
token
holders
it's
what
they
want.
So
the
best
thing
we
can
do
right
now
is
educate
everyone
as
much
as
possible
and
make
no
YouTube
and
podcast
programs
like
this
for
people
to
reference
to
in
the
future.
B
So
they
understand
what
their
responsibilities
and
their
responsibility
is,
including
new
risk
teams,
because
that's
the
way
it's
going
to
make
the
system
better,
but
there's
also
their
responsibility
to
decide
when
a
risk
team
actually
is
a
regime
that
you
want
to
hire
or
if
a
risky
is
just
merely
a
representation
of
a
large
holding
or
a
strategic
interest
in
the
system.
You
can't,
you
know,
get
rid
of
them
because
they
might
have
the
specific
bias
you've
got
to
include
them,
because
you
need
a
spectrum
of
biases.
B
You
need
a
spectrum,
the
points
of
view
because
they
were
ultimately
coming
to
an
aggregate
form
that
should,
through
you
know
the
so
called
who
wisdom
of
the
crowd
benefit
the
system
as
a
whole.
That's,
ultimately
what
you
want
to
do
so,
do
you
pay
for
risk
teams
once
again,
it's
an
idea
in
your
mind
that
you
need
to
ask
another
person
if,
if
they're,
considering
painful
risk
teams,
this
is
not
another
person.
He's
gonna
ask
yourself,
as
named
Kato
can
hold
it.
Do
you
want
to
pay
our
esteem.
A
Okay,
sorry,
that's
a
great
discussion.
I
think
that
we're
gonna
have
it
again
in
the
future,
because
I'm
still
trying
to
wrap
my
head
around
incentivizing
third
party
groups
of
maker,
doubt
actors
and
the
risk
teams
was
one
of
the
most
interesting
ones
to
me.
So,
hopefully
we'll
revisit
that
again,
we.
B
A
B
From
the
massive
amount
of
literature
out
there,
you've
got
things
called
in
a
marginal
valued
risk
conditional,
very
divided
risk,
and
these
things
really
start
helping
you
to
find
what
collateral
types
you
should
include
in
your
portfolio,
given
the
current
state
of
your
portfolio
so
I
give
an
example:
there's
a
big
difference.
If
you
include
eat
into
your
portfolio,
which
we
have.
Does
that
mean
that's?
If
we
could?
Does
that
mean
that
the
next
item
you
should
use
is
Bitcoin
if
you're
looking
for
diversification?
B
B
This
idea
either
waiting
for
tokens
to
develop
that
are
clearly
orthogonal
and
clearly
not
correlated,
and
what
you
want
to
include
in
your
portfolio
or
what
you
need
to
do
is
go
take
a
lot
of
these
tokens
that
may
have
high
correlation
but
give
them
low
debt
ceilings,
because
your
diversification
benefit
is
always
there
and
you
can
it's
not
fantastic.
It's
not
the
hugest
diversification
benefit
in
the
world,
but
it
is
always
there
and
the
more
collateral
types
you
can
add
on
the
more
diversification
benefit
you
can,
you
can
create
again.
B
The
the
marginal
increase
may
not
be
huge,
but
the
point
being
is
we
don't
really
have
a
plethora
of
options
right
now.
We
are
kind
of
constrained
so
to
deal
with
that
constraint
is
to
broaden
the
number
that
we
use
and
decrease
the
debt
ceiling,
so
we're
not
over
exposed
to
what
is
clearly
from
a
portfolio
point
of
view,
something
that
is
now
particularly
correlated.
A
Okay,
that's
three
minutes
left,
so
maybe
we
can
put
an
end
to
the
proceedings
here.
I
think
that
today's
meeting
was
amazing
and
also
a
special
thank
you
to
Tom
I
just
noticed
that
you've
been
live
tweeting
the
meeting
as
we've
gone
along
and
that's
enormous
ly
valuable.
So
I
I
appreciate
that.
Thank
you.
Yeah
turn
to
your
retweet
for
sure.