►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 101
Description
## Introduction
- Richard Brown: General Q&A
- Forum Recap
- LongForWisdom: Governance at a Glance
- PSM Discussion
## MIPs
- Charles St. Louis : Weekly MIPs Update
- @Gov-Facilitators: Inclusion Review
## Smart Contracts
- @Smart-Contracts: TUSD Update
- Derek: Governance Chief Contract Redesign
- Brian McMichael : MANA and LEND Evaluation (Smart Contracts)
## Risk
- Vishesh Choudry : State of the Peg
## General Q&A
We’ll open the floor for any questions about Scientific Governance and Risk.
Please join us and help shape the future of the MakerDAO.
## Links
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 1: https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-risk-framework/part-one
Website: https://makerdao.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/makerdao
Forum: https://forum.makerdao.com/
Chat: https://chat.makerdao.com/home
Email: info@makerdao.com
A
A
All
right,
I'm
twisting
one
of
the
government's
facilitators
for
make
it
down
I'm
joined
by
various
various
levels
of
affiliation.
All
right
so
and
go
through
the
agenda
again
quickly
always
starts
fairly
full
agenda
again
this
week,
so
we're
gonna
have
me
doing
government's
at-a-glance
as
usual.
We're
gonna
have
a
brief
segment
for
discussion
of
ii-if.
The
texture
with
stabilization
module
proposal
can
have
a
weekly
mips
update
from
charles
the
editor.
A
B
C
A
Okay
Lucas:
it's
us
the
updates.
We've
got
Derek,
doing
a
brief
presentation
on
the
upcoming
D
s
chief
contract
redesign,
and
then
we've
got
prime
at
Michael
filling
in
for
will
who's
doing
who's,
presenting
the
manner
and
lend
smart
contract,
evaluations
and
I'm.
If
finally,
we've
gots
vishesh
from
risk
doing
super
peg,
hopefully
we
might
skip
this
thing,
cool
all
right,
I
guess
we'll
get
started
all
right,
so
I'll
go
through
governance,
advanced
briefly
to
get
us
going
cool.
A
So
again,
it's
been
a
fairly
busy
week
for
discussions
and
signals,
but
a
few
signals
this
week.
Let's
start
discussions,
and
so
we
have
a
discussion
from
Oliver
in
chalk,
discussing
negative
negative
DSR.
They
say
RFM
and
negative
rates
generally,
quite
a
good
discussion
in
there
and
we
had
user
bits
suggests
disabling
ether
liquidations
as
a
radical
solution
to
fix
the
defect.
A
Some
interesting
discussion
there
I
think
most
people
would
prefer
not
to
do
that,
but
that
was
under
some
debate
around
lowering
the
liquidation
ratio
only
thing,
and
then
we
had
another
good.
We
had
a
couple
of
good
discussions
to
be
honest
around
the
around
the
PSM
pixelization
module
particular
I
want
to
highlight
one
from
a
fourth
street
which
had
quite
good
summary
and
analysis
of
the
pros
and
cons
which
I
think
I
read
cool,
so
sooner
request
wise.
We
had
again,
as
I
said.
A
Quite
a
few
Syrus
is
singling
to
ask
whether
we
should
raise
the
eath
ether
debt
ceiling
just
because
we're
nearing
the
during
the
current
ceiling
again
Luis
Manuel
as
a
commissioned,
is,
is
doing
a
foreign
poll
I.
Was
there
innocent
arrest
on
how
the
smart
contract
team
should
proceed
with
USD
and
which
I
guess
we'll
hear
more
from
this
intersection
later
money
supply
is
asking
whether
we
should
consider
decreasing
or
adjusting
the
risk.
Remiss
visitor
excellent
can
see
to
make
more
attractive
endless
quest,
emit
more
dye.
A
Let's
see
Joshua
Pritikin
asked
whether
we
should
consider
making
refinements
to
the
PSM
or
to
release
it's
sort
of
as
soon
as
possible
kind
of
thee,
without
any
of
the
more
radical
improvements
that
were
suggested.
I
think
in
general,
people
would
prefer
to
release
it
sooner
rather
than
try
and
build
in
something
complicated.
Initially.
A
See
we've
got
a
continuing
signed
request
from
Joshua
particular
again
asking
whether
we
should
increase
the
duration
of
the
codons
they're,
going
security,
module
delay
and
then,
finally,
with
sort
of
an
shinning.
The
signal
from
aqua,
fel
kwarrel
live
I'm,
asking
whether
Megiddo
should
signal
that
it
prefers
for
comprar
Ward's
to
die
suppliers
and
borrowers
to
be
disabled.
It's
failed,
and
so
we
went
rear
you're
recommending
that's
to
compound
I
think
that's
ends.
The
signal
rests
for
this
week,
such
that
quite
a
lot.
A
C
D
On
Monday
we
had
the
inclusion
polls
go
for
the
seven
myths
and
sub
proposals,
so
those
four
myths
and
three
sub
apostles
and
the
inclusion
polls
end
just
a
few
minutes
ago,
and
all
the
inclusion
polls
passed,
except
for
the
mid
12
amendments
and
nip
17
so
just
to
make
it
clear.
These
proposals
may
be
reintroduced
in
the
future
for
another
community
vote.
However,
the
issues
that
resulted
in
its
initial
rejection
I
will
need
to
be
addressed.
D
So
in
order
for
that
to
happen,
we'll
have
to
have
some
conversations
or
further
conversations,
rather
in
the
forum
threads
themselves,
to
figure
out
what
we
can
do
better
for
both
of
these.
It
makes
sense
that
the
mid
twelve
amendment
didn't
pass,
because
it
relates
closely
to
MEP
17
and
incorporates
some
of
the
logic
in
having
these
reoccurring
adjustments
in
place
for
tip
17
and
that
was
for
actual
debt
ceiling
and
actual
risk
premium
adjustments.
D
So
I'll
follow
up
in
my
EPS
update
later
in
the
week
that
we'll
start
to
have
more
open
conversations,
hopefully
in
the
in
the
MIPS
RC
channel
and
the
forum
threads
about
how
we
can
get
the
best
solution
for
both
of
these.
So
today,
long
and
possibly
rich
will
do
the
inclusion
PO
review,
basically
confirming
which
of
these
seven
proposals
and
sub
proposals
will
be
included
on
in
the
governance
poll
on
Monday,
and
it
will
likely
be
that
only
four
of
them
or
five
of
them,
sorry
we'll
be
moving
forward.
D
So
if
it
does
indeed
past
the
governance
pool
stage,
the
executive
vote
for
it
will
be
on
the
final
Monday
of
the
month
and
then
Len
will
be
using
the
weekly
cycle
either
next
week
or
the
following
week,
to
hopefully
on
board
the
lend
collateral
type
and
and
will
and/or
sorry
Brian
will
be
covering
the
smart
contracts
assessment
of
both
of
these
collateral
types
later
in
the
call
the
Clara
onboarding
community
green
light.
Poles
will
go,
live
on
next
Monday.
D
D
In
terms
of
MIPS
recent
activity,
we
saw
they've
12
get
proposed
by
Levin
rain,
and
it
is
currently
in
requests
for
comments.
Phase,
there's
been
quite
a
good
amount
of
discussion
going
on,
but
I
do
encourage
anyone
who
has
instructed
I've
yet
to
go
ahead
and
provide
feedback
and
input
because
they
are
working
on
potentially
taking
input
from
the
community.
D
The
second
one
that
was
most
recently
proposed
was
a
declarations
of
intent
for
forward
guidance.
It
is
also
in
the
request
for
comments,
phase
and
I
believe
it
was
proposed
by
Akiva.
He
is
also
working
with
community
improve
it.
In
short,
it
aims
to
help
volt
user
users,
hedge,
their
exposure
to
the
base
rate,
the
via
various
derivative
contract,
and
lastly,
there
was
a
TUSD
update.
So
there
is
that
forum
pool
or
signal
request.
However,
you
want
to
call
it
for
the
next
steps.
D
For
the
toc
token,
as
collateral
type
Lucas
will
be
speaking
about
that.
As
well
and
I
mean
in
shortages,
highlights
the
concerns
surrounding
the
overall
concerns
of
TUSD
as
a
Clairol
type
and
the
maker
protocol,
so
that
sums
up
the
MIPS
update
for
this
week.
I
will
post
it
on
the
forums
as
well
and
now
I
think
we
can
move
on
to
long
for
wisdom,
providing
that
inclusion
pool
review.
A
The
MEP
18
see
force
a
proposal
for
removed
for
modifying
meta
parameter
distance,
which
is
also
going
in
the
cycle,
also
continued,
and
so
this
will
have
the
effects.
If
this
process
does
have
the
effect
of
removing
the
DSR
spread
polls
from
the
weekly
cycle,
then
we
have
the
MIT
42
as
a
proposal
to
amendment
12
also
failed.
As
just
said,
you
know
that
the
S
is,
did
it
make
see
the
no
votes
but
due
to
the
default
inclusion
thresholds?
A
A
So
as
part
of
the
the
governance
timeline
and
plan
for
the
PSM
I
mentioned,
there
would
be
two
chances
to
discuss
this
in
the
next
few
meetings.
I,
don't
think
we
can
really
fall
to
spend
the
entire
meeting
discussing
it
like
we
did
last
week
that
we
can
probably
give
it
like
10-15
minutes
so
I
kind
of
start
that
off
to
sort
of
say
and
the
Pearson
timeline
which
I
showed
in
the
forum.
I'll.
C
A
A
So
there's
a
deceiving
there's
the
fear
in
the
Fiats
and
then
then,
when
you
decide
like
which
ERC
20
token
M
is
traded
for
die
and
then
we
have
the
option
of
implementing
multiple
copies
of
that
with
various
parameters
right.
So
so
for
each
thing,
it's
like
those
four
parameters,
debt-ceiling
en
fait
out
and
the
token,
and
then
we
can
have
a
number
of
those
which
should
probably
not
exceed
like
five
or
something
because.
A
C
A
Cool
one
point
is
that,
because
this,
because
there's
like
four
parameters
for
each
thing
and
as
potentially
there's
a
decision
to
be
made
about
how
many
of
these
things
we
have,
it
would
probably
be
best
to
vote
on
the
parameters
in
the
form
of
sets.
So
we
have
someone
proposed
a
set
of
parameters
or
a
set
of
vsms,
and
then
we
pick
from
one
of
probably
maximum
five
sets,
rather
than
voting
on
each
parameter
individually,
because
that'll
get
confusing
with
the
fact
that
we
can
have
like
1
to
N.
Here,
sums.
A
A
E
A
F
I
can
start
so
hi
everybody,
I'm
Lucas
I'm,
one
smart
contracts
team
over
the
last
week,
I
was
tasked
with
looking
at
the
new
TUSD
implementation
and
white
listing
it.
So
when
I
was
reviewing
the
code,
I
found
kind
of
four
main
concerns
about
it.
If
we,
if
we
choose
to
whitelist
this
new
implementation,
so
I'll
just
go
through
at
a
high
level
through
the
four
points.
So
the
first
is
that
TUSD
has
functionality
that
enables
them
to
declare
deposit
addresses.
F
So
if
you
declare
one
address
as
a
deposit
address
for
another,
if
you
transfer
to
USD
tokens
to
that
first
address,
it
automatically
gets
routed
to
the
second
address.
So
the
issue
with
that
is,
if
our
joint
adapter
40
USD
is
declared
as
a
deposit
address,
someone
would
be
able
to
call
join
and
the
transfer
from
in
that
joint
would
forward
the
funds
out
of
the
join
adapter.
But
our
internal
accounting
system
in
the
VAT
would
be
convinced
that
there
were
TUSD
tokens
into
that.
F
F
In
addition,
every
time
that
the
TUSD
team
upgrades
their
smart
contracts,
we
as
the
smart
contracts
team,
have
to
review
the
new
code
and
then
whitelist
that
implementation
before
anyone
is
able
to
actually
exit
their
vault
positions.
So,
in
between
the
time
that
a
smart
contract
is
upgraded
and
we
have
reviewed
it,
everyone
who
has
TUSD
funds
in
the
maker
protocol
is
effectively
their
funds
are
like
frozen
and
due
to
the
fact
that
this
TUSD
token
is
roughly
ten
times
the
size
of
an
average
ERC
20
token
implementation.
F
It
takes
a
very
long
time
to
review.
So
if
there
were
multiple
upgrades
per
year,
it
could
be
good
lead
to
a
really
big
time
suck
on
the
smart
contracts
team,
because
TUSD
currently
is
the
only
collateral
type
in
the
maker
protocol
that
we
would
have
to
continuously
review
in
order
to
keep
it
as
an
existing
collateral
type.
None
of
the
other
collateral
types
require
this
because
they're
not
like
upgradeable.
F
So
what
we're
concerned
about
is
that
this
token
could
lead
to
diminishing
returns,
because
time
would
be
taken
away
from
the
smart
contracts
team
to
review
and
onboard
new
collateral
types,
adding
to
the
collateral
portfolio
to
maintain
this
existing
collateral
type
and
what
we
said
in
the
forum
post
is
that
you
know
this
would
definitely
be
worth
it
if
it
were
a
more
valuable
collateral
type
such
as
WB
TC,
something
that
provides
revenue
for
the
protocol
and
has
a
high
amount
of
utilization.
But
TUSD
has
a
low
stability
fee
and
a
low
debt
ceiling.
F
So
the
you
know
the
amount
of
benefit
for
the
amount
of
work
that
we're
doing
just
seems
to
be
leading
to
diminishing
returns.
So
yeah
with
that
I
encourage
everyone
to
vote
on
the
forum
poll.
I
posted
it
yesterday.
It's
gonna
be
up
for
seven
days.
So
next,
next
Wednesday
we'll
finish
up
the
forum
poll
and
then
we'll
move
we'll
move
forward
from
there
to
an
on
chain
now
rank
force,
rank
choice.
E
Yeah
I
I'll
add
that
their
team
was
super
cooperative
and
very
helpful
with
us
as
well,
so
their
engineering
team
seems
to
be
great
I
had
a
question
about
the
upgradability
implementation
upgradability
point:
if
I
understand
correctly
for
a
u.s.
DC
right
now,
we
are
using
the
gem
join
5
adapter,
which
doesn't
doesn't
have
this
implementation
pinning
feature
the
gem
join
6
does
even
though
US
DC,
just
like
true
USDA,
uses
the
same
implementation
proxy
pattern,
so
I
assume
that
this
is
because
USD
CU
is
simply
added
on
an
accelerated
timeline.
E
B
Yes,
it
was
had
it
quickly.
So
that's
why
we
didn't
have
the
joint
adapter
with
the
implementation
there
and
we
are
looking
at
it
for
the
PSM.
But
even
then,
for
example,
USD
see
the
implementation.
It
is
a
small
self-contained.
You
know
standard
year,
C,
20
and
through
you
see,
on
the
other
hand,
every
time
that
it's
been
upgraded
and
it's
been
upgraded
at
least
I
think
three
or
four
times
this
year
alone.
B
G
Just
like
which
hey
yeah
I
can
jump
in
so
we
did.
We
did
look
over
the
contract.
Currently,
it's
got
the
ER
cm
from
20
implementation
in
there
and
then
they've
also
got
some
things
like
there's
all
these
black
lists.
There's
some
reward
programs
they've
implemented
their
own
gas
refund
component
to
the
token
and
then
there's
the
the
forwarding
that
was
mentioned
as
well,
and
those
are
just
ones
that
come
to
mind.
A
E
Just
wanted
to
ask
like
not
that
this
matters
so
much
for
us,
but
if
someone
given
them
the
feedback
that,
because
of
this
horribly
over-engineered
upgradable
implementation,
potentially
we're
gonna
end
up
having
to
drop
this
thing,
because
it's
not
worth
you
after
reviewing
it
all
the
time,
because
I
just
seemed
it
just
seems
like
this.
Isn't
this
wasn't
really
the
greatest
decision
on
their
part?
E
You
know
I
raised
some
of
these
concerns
in
the
forum
thread,
so
I'm
hoping
they
get
a
chance
to
kind
of
read
that
I
mean
the
nice
thing
is
they're
they're
tokens
upgradeable,
so
they
could
upgrade
and
fork
all
that
stuff
out,
maybe
make
the
design
more
modular
and
we
could
reconsider.
I
mean
really
it's
up
to
governance
at
this
point
yeah,
but
you
know
whatever
you
guys
want
to
do
that.
C
A
F
Yeah
we
chose
to
propose
the
idea
of
setting
the
debt
ceiling
to
zero
because,
like
Chris
was
saying,
if
they
do
upgrade
their
smart
contract
in
the
future
to
be
more
simplified
and
easier
to
review,
then
we
would
be
happy
to
onboard
them
back
in
the
future.
But
what
this
would
be
allowing
us
to
do
is
allow
the
people
that
have
their
funds
in
the
vault
right
now
to
be
able
to
exit
while
not
allowing
any
new
vaults
to
be
open,
but
to
USD
for
the
time
being.
E
Yeah,
that's
that's.
One
thing
that
we
didn't
bring
up
is
that
we
got
really
lucky
this
time
that
users
didn't
have
a
bunch
of
stuff
locked
in
the
protocol.
I
think
one
of
our
engineers
had
stuff
locked
in
the
protocol
and
there
would
have
been
a
lot
of
complaining
and
user
pressure
to
quickly
approve
the
new
implementation,
otherwise,
which
would
have
added
a
whole
social
component
to
this.
So.
B
And
also
this
is
a
this
is
a
collateral
that
doesn't
have
liquidations
activated
right,
so
you
can
imagine
the
kind
of
worms
if
this
would
be
another
collateral
that
did
have
liquidations
and
then
for
some
reason
they
upgrade
the
token
and
nobody
can
join
in
anymore.
And
you
know
the
price
is
dropping
things
like
that,
so
these
kind
of
things
they
I
think
they
helped
for
for
future
collateral,
but
may
end
up
in
this
situation
as
well.
A
H
So
anyone
everyone
feel
free
to
ping
myself
all
along
for
wisdom
and
we'd
love
to
have
more
people
participate
in
the
discussion
around
some
of
these
features,
so
yeah
I
welcome
you
all
to
come
and
join
in
that
space.
So
all
right
now,
if
I
can
go
to
the
next
slide
there
we
go
all
right.
Seeing
this
is
a
one
hundred
and
first
government
school
I
thought
it
would
be
a
fitting
title
to
call
this.
The
101
refresher
so
just
to
set
the
scene
and
set
the
scope.
H
What
is
D
is
chief,
what's
at
scope,
so
two
mechanism
to
authorize
governance
changes
to
the
maker
protocol
by
electing
a
chief
contract
when
we
talk
about
governance
changes.
Of
course,
talking
about
DSR
stability,
fee,
Oracle,
changes,
collateral
changes,
process
and
protocol
changes
overall,
and
these
governance
changes
occur
when
users
vote
by
locking
their
in
care
in
Unchained
proposals
and
increasing
its
weight.
So
I
think
we're
all
fairly
familiar
with
this
at
the
structure
but
walking
through
this.
So
voting
for
proposals
is
conducted
by
a
continuous
approval.
H
Voting
we're
a
proposal
only
becomes
elected
when
it
surpasses
voting
fate
of
the
last
successful
proposal.
So
this
comes
up
a
lot
when
we
talk
through
the
redesign
and
the
nature
of
the
hat
and
how
we
have
to
surpass
the
previous
spell
and
the
amount
of
the
weight
of
empire
on
it.
So
the
state
of
the
system
is
continuously
active,
has
continuous
approval
voting
and
such
requires
continuous
governance,
because
at
any
time
a
competing
proposal
could
be
introduced.
So
again,
there's
a
continuous
burden
and
yeah
unawareness
to
make
sure
that
the
MPR
distribution
is.
H
You
know
that
the
governance
is
aware
of
the
NPR
distribution
and
there's
also
a
bunch
of
technical
scope
that
the
s
chief
includes
with
regards
to
its
interaction
with
the
chief
approvals,
so
the
public
functions
such
as
lock-free
etch,
both
slate
enlist
functions,
which
I
won't
go
into
detail,
but
I'm
happy
to
sort
of
break
this
out
into
a
more
formal
structure
in
the
in
the
post.
I,
with
the
help
this
my
contract,
guys
if
we'd
like
to
get
into
that
detail
as
well.
H
So
with
that
I
sort
of
stood
there,
we
go
okay,
so
I
just
wanted
to
talk
a
little
bit
about
the
problem
space.
So
what
what
are
the
challenges
that
we
experienced
with
governance
today,
just
to
sort
of
give
us
some
direction
with
what
a
redesign
should
be
so,
of
course,
transition
risk
when
moving
between
boats?
H
Sorry,
when
moving
between
proposals,
there's
a
we
presented
with
a
period
of
time
when
a
smaller
amount
of
empire
may
be
needed
to
elect
a
random
proposal,
so
another
proposal
could
sneak
in
and
I
have
some
examples
in
the
appendix
which
I
will
attach
to
the
forum
post.
So
if
any
of
this
is
not
clear
or
the
way
slates
play
into
this,
we
can
also
dive
deeper
into
that
now,
also
yeah,
when
a
new
proposal
gains
a
majority
of
MKR.
H
If
the
action
of
lifting
a
new
hat
is
not
an
automatic
or
an
instant
action,
that's
managed
by
a
keeper,
and
that
means
that
again,
an
alternative
proposal
could
sneak
in
and
introduce
unexpected
changes
again.
Spray
spells
can
exist
and
they
do
exist.
You
can
see
that
on
mkr
Gulf
that
there
are
a
few
out
there
and
they
potentially
pose
an
ongoing
threat
to
the
system
if
they
were
to
gain
enough
MPR
to
be
a
threat.
H
Luckily,
at
the
moment,
they
have
very
minimal
MKR
on
them,
but
there
is
again
that
distribution
that
poses
a
threat,
there's
no
pause,
duration
between
user,
lock
and
free
actions
leading
to
a
potential
flash
loan
risk.
That
was
something
that
kind
of
came
up
end
of
last
year,
beginning
of
this
year,
which
is
something
we'd
like
to
introduce
to
the
new
contracts,
also
migration
risk
when
migrating
to
a
new
chief
contract.
So
this
is
very
much
place
to
the
transition
risk,
but
it's
it's
the
same
concept
where
Authority
must
be
transferred
which
introduces
there.
H
This
coordination
problem
between
the
existing
hat
and
the
new
proposal,
and
you
have
to
ensure
that
there's
enough
M
care
in
the
old
Chiefs
to
actually
pass
the
proposal
and
so
again,
some
complexity
with
this
process
of
moving
from
one
proposal
to
another
and,
of
course,
from
a
usability
perspective.
The
inability
to
vote
on
multiple
concurrent
proposals
again
because
of
the
structure
of
of
how
we
do
governance
today
and
yet
something
I've
alluded
to
before
the
distribution
across
proposals
potentially
weakens
the
current
hat.
H
So
you
know
in
I,
took
this
snapshot
I
think
a
week
or
two
ago,
and
you
can
see
there's
quite
a
strong
distribution.
This
is
from
chief,
make
it
calm
and
you
can
see
how
that
distribution
is
across
the
the
proposals
that
big
dispels
so
again
with
that
framework
or
with
that
that
sort
of
whole
domain
in
mind
and
the
goal
of
this
initiative
is
to
redesign
the
governor's
chief
to
make
it
more
secure
and
user-friendly.
So
really,
the
two
key
drivers
are
security
and
usability.
H
Summing
up
what
we've
already
said,
the
security
so
there's
a
transition,
migration
risk,
flash
phone
risk
distribution
expire,
your
risk,
formal
verification.
So
we
have
an
opportunity
now
to
really
dive
into
formal
verification
and
see
see
what
groups
we
can
optimize
and
then
usability
so
concurrent
proposals,
delegation,
incentivization
we
haven't
spoken
about,
but
those
will
be
coming
up
next
and
there's
an
opportunity
for
us
to
use
the
wrapper
to
make
this
a
lot
more
efficient
and
work
with
the
token
and
then,
as
part
of
that,
also
explore
reducing
gas
costs.
H
So
when
I
think
of
these
groups,
I'm
kind
of
grouping
them
into
a
central
feature
functionality
and
then
desirable
considerations,
things
that
we
have
to
take
into
account.
There
may
be
trade-offs
depending
on
how
the
system
is
designed,
and
so
these
all
sort
of
work
into
the
design
of
the
new
contract
and
anyone
I
apologize,
I,
didn't
say
it
at
the
beginning,
but
feel
free
to
jump
in.
If
you
do
have
questions,
I,
don't
have
the
chat
open.
H
H
So
the
initial
exploration,
let's
just
throw
out
a
number-
let's
say
50%
of
MP-
are
locked
in
chief
needs
to
be
exceeded
as
the
threshold
and
then
we
also
have
a
minimum
quorum,
which
is
a
governance
defined
defensive,
lower
boundary
that
would
that
has
the
function
of
preventing
spells
from
passing
with
a
smaller
amount
of
mpr.
So
if
we
take
that
and
say,
okay,
the
three
components
here
are
the
threshold,
the
upper
and
lower
boundary
of
that
threshold,
and
these
are
still
being
worked
through
and
considered.
H
Do
we
actually
even
need
the
upper
or
lower
boundary?
It's
there
as
a
mechanism
to
prevent
governance
from
saying
but
set
the
threshold
at
90%,
in
which
case?
Oh,
that's
bad,
because
you
know
we're
just
not
going
to
get
that
participation.
So
we
have
to
be
careful
between
the
security
of
the
system,
but
also
making
sure
the
spells
can
pass
and
then
the
quorum.
So
looking
at
what
that
would
look
like
you've
got
the
threshold.
H
You've
got
the
upper
and
lower
bounds
and
then
you've
got
the
quorum
and
taking
this
from
a
theoretical
perspective,
you've
got
to
look
at
okay.
What's
the
amount
of
MK
are
voting
for
proposals
over
time?
Look
like,
and
in
this
case,
if
we
throw
some
numbers
at
it,
and
you
see
we're
on
that
threshold
of
50%,
140
K
would
be
the
threshold.
H
That's
actually
kind
of
high
we're
not
going
to
fit
that,
because
if
we
take
this
model
and
put
it
on
the
threshold
on
on
the
actual
executive
proposals
this
year,
we
see
that
we're
actually
split
between
about
50,000
and
100,000.
Mkr
I
think
looks
like
beginning
of
June
was
our
highest,
yet
just
over
a
hundred
thousand
MK
are
participating.
H
That's
the
key
sort
of
concept
that
I've
pulled
out,
and
then
we
do
have
other
ones.
So
the
multiple
concurrent
proposals
that
was
the
biggest
one
I
think
from
a
usability
perspective
that
came
up
on
the
forums
so
has
a
name
says
participation
in
multiple
proposals
at
any
point
in
time
eliminates
the
need
for
batching
proposals,
something
we
struggled
with
and
also
removes
the
need
shift
MKR
waste
from
one
proposal
to
another,
because
you
do
have
the
ability
to
vote
on
multiple
proposals
within
an
interface
at
any
point
in
time,
the
chief
rapper.
H
So
this
kind
well,
this
allows
us
to
simplify
air
lock
and
free
actions
and
interacting
with
multiple
proposals
and
is
really
important,
because
by
a
virtue
of
having
multiple
spells
that
you
can
be
voting
on
at
any
point
in
time,
you
may
be
adding
MKR
to
your
to
your
weight.
You
may
be
removing
it
and
to
do
so,
having
a
miss
chief
chief
rapper
will
let
you
do
so
in
one
action.
H
Simplifying
the
interaction
with
the
contracts.
I
think
I
have
one
of
the
later
points.
This
is
where
we
really
need
to
focus
on
around
gas,
optimization,
making
sure
that
these
actions
are
efficient,
and
it
also
allows
us
to
prevent
flash
loan
risk,
like
I
said,
with
a
delay
and
lock
like
with
the
delay
between
lock
and
free
actions,
and
this
is
the
area
where
we'll
also
look
to
fold
in
vote
delegation
in
incentivization.
I
H
We
have
completed
this
piece
of
work,
m'kay
and
chief
expiry,
so
yeah
have
either
a
timeout
or
a
decay
to
remove
stale
MKR,
that's
locked
in
chief,
so
that
those
threshold
values
remain
functional
because
the
thresholds
really
reacting
to
the
amount
of
impaler
in
chief.
So
we
have
to
make
sure
that
that
is
up-to-date,
not
fail
and
accurately
refer
reflects
participation
and
the
amount
lost
in
chief.
H
Spell
creation
button,
so
this
is
one
that
may
may
be
very
useful
in
from
a
future-proof
point
of
view,
because,
as
we
seek
to
decentralized
governance
and
get
more
participation,
more
engagement
from
third
parties
creating
spells
there's
an
opportunity
to
enforce
a
small
bond
just
to
make
sure
that
there's
a
sort
of
skin
in
the
game.
If
people
are
to
create
bills
and
prevent
spamming
of
the
system
and
these
values
would
be
up
to
governance
to
decide
on.
H
So
my
plan
will
be
for
the
for
the
formal
nip
to
have
a
list
of
all
the
values
that
we
need
to
decide
on,
probably
in
a
tabular
format,
and
then
we
can
just
work
through
them
and
make
sure
that
it
aligns,
with
everyone's
view,
poor
support.
If
we
need
a
little
bit
more
discussion
on
this
one,
but
I
wanted
to
interpret
it
just
in
terms
of
us
supporting
different
cell
types
and
potentially
different
pauses
that
will
be
relevant
to
them.
H
Spell
expiry
so
again,
a
security
measure
against
all
spells
from
passing
and
presenting
them
from
passing
multiple
times
and
finally,
gas
cost
reduction.
So
definitely
with
a
new
contract.
We
have
an
opportunity
to
explore
ways
of
reducing
gas
costs,
so
I
think
this
is
my
final
slide
talking
about
the
indicative
q3
next
steps,
so
I've
broken
it
down,
broken
it
down
to
a
quarter.
July
August
September,
1st
phase
sort
of
where
we
are
now
in
terms
of
analysis
and
feedback.
H
Going
back
to
the
beginning
of
the
presentation,
we've
really
got
to
handle
eyes
those
mkr
that
MK
our
participation
as
it
exists
today
to
define
what
the
threshold
and,
if
we
need
the
boundaries
and
what
they
should
be.
Then
I'll
work
with
Charles
and
my
contracts
team
to
roll
that
into
a
formal
myth.
It'll
go
to
a
governance
vote
will
begin
both
smart
contracts,
work
and
front-end
development,
I
work
which
I'd
like
to
have
tested
quite
a
bit
with
the
governance
community.
H
H
However,
it's
that's
quite
a
quite
an
important
piece,
because
if
you
remember
the
migration
risk
that
we
mentioned
at
the
beginning
is
exactly
at
this
point
in
time
where
we
have
to
make
sure
that
our
migration
from
one
chief
to
the
other
is
coordinated
understood
by
the
community
and
that
everyone's
on
board
with
it
so
and
then
yeah
launch
and
migrate.
So
that
is
it
from
me.
H
A
Mean
I
would
say
thanks
that
was
very
interesting,
looking
forward
to
being
able
to
get
rid
of
a
bundling
unrelated
changes
together,
they're
waiting
cycle,
one
thing
I'll
also
mention-
is
with
this
new
chief.
This
would
give
us
a
chance
to
modify
how
the
monthly
governor's
cycle
works,
to
make
it
hopefully
more
efficient.
H
Yeah
and
so
one
of
these
one
of
the
coordination
pieces-
I
didn't
include
it
yet,
but
Charles
I
guess
we'll
need
to
make
sure
that
I
did
the
MIT
documented
and
shared
with
you
at
the
right
point
of
time.
So
it
goes
into
the
cycle
at
the
optimum
time.
So
I
guess
we'll
come
to
that
when
we
have
the
formal
MIT
but
yeah,
something
for
us
to
think
about
in
terms
of
planning
at
this
against
all
the
other
work
we
have.
H
A
delegation
yeah,
that's
a
good
question-
make
a
man
so
any
concept
of
delegation
in
this
meaning
to
have
one
wallet
pass
and
care
deposited
to
another.
We're
no
I'm
yeah
we're.
So
the
background
to
delegation
is
we
yeah.
A
lot
of
people
are
interested
in
delegation
is
something
where
we're
really
focusing
on
as
well,
and
when
we
started
looking
into
that,
we
found
that
the
chief
contract
we
have
today
wasn't
optimal,
and
if
we
were
to
do
delegation
with
what
we
had,
we
would
have
to
redo
it
once
we
did
the
new
chief.
H
So
how
much
a
delegation
will
be
able
to
roll
into
this
I'm,
not
sure
but
I'm
thinking
our
approach
and
will
be
to
optimize
the
chief
rapper
to
enable
us
to
do
delegation,
but
that
will
be
a
separate,
not
core
set
of
contracts.
I'll
leave
it
at
that,
because
at
this
point
in
time
I
don't
know,
but
but
that's
something
I'm
I
will
work
to
do.
The
delegation
document
and
I
think
that'll
be
the
next
one
we
put
out
there
for
the
community
to
take
a
look
at,
and
there
is
also
there's
an
internal
review.
G
G
G
Conformance
ERC's,
there
is
a
mint
function
which
is
mint
able
by
a
crowd,
sale
contract.
However,
the
card
sell
contract
has
been
self
destructed,
so
the
the
total
supply
for
mana
is
currently
at
the
max
supply.
There
was
an
audit
done
by
open
Zeppelin,
and
the
team
has
given
this
one,
basically
a
low
risk
assessment.
For
addition,
the
other
token
that
we
looked
over
is
lend
good
news.
This
is
also
a
very
low
risk
basic
year,
C
20
token
non
upgradeable,
and
this
also
can
use
the
gem
join
adapter.
G
The
only
non
standard
feature
we
found
in
this
one
is
that
the
decimals
returns
are
you
in
256,
instead
of
you
into
8,
which
doesn't
really
affect
our
adapters,
and
then
this
does
have
mint
functions
as
well.
However,
there's
a
state
machine
built
into
the
contracts
such
that
the
coin
is
only
miscible
in
the
presale
or
IC
o----
state,
and
we
can't
go
back
from
there,
so
there
was
also
an
audit
done
by
this
by
Victor
measurin
and
that
was
approved
for
from
a
net.
G
A
I
Alright,
so
just
to
kind
of
recap:
around
died
from
eath
we've,
you
know
grown
to
154
million
died
issued
from
youth
out
of
160
million
debt
ceiling
wrong,
so
I'll
just
touch
on
these
collateral
types
first,
so
this
is
the
Heath
I
supply
and
basically,
what
we've
seen
is
in
the
last
two
weeks,
this
balloon
from
114
million
died
issued
to
154
million.
So
that's
a
pretty
significant
jump
and
we
should
probably
unpack
that
in
a
minute,
but
just
to
touch
on
some
of
the
other
collateral
types.
I
Briefly
so
USD
see
a
what
we
saw
essentially
was
since
July
1st,
roughly
a
19
million
die
jump
in
the
amount
that
was
issued.
That
was,
you
know
primarily
one
to
two
large
users,
and
then
we
saw
this
grow
a
bit
from
then
that's
that's
something
to
to
touch
on
as
well.
We
WBT
see
dye
supply
so
after
the
initial
sort
of
steady
state
utilization,
around
10
million
that
had
increased
pretty
quickly
20
million
after
you
know
that
that
was
the
cap
was
increased
and
then
for
dat.
I
What
we
essentially
saw
was
a
pretty
significant
dip
in
the
amount
of
dye.
That
was
issued
from
from
BT
after
March
twelfth
events
and
then
that
basically
stayed
pretty
low,
took
a
bit
of
a
dip
as
well
right
around
that
time
line.
So,
as
we
all
know,
what
happened
basically
a
few
weeks
ago,
was
the
kickoff
of
so
this
compound
farming
activity
and
so
that's
definitely
impacted
the
dye
ecosystem
in
a
pretty
significant
way.
I
So
let
me
just
circle
back
to
eath
here.
So
what
we
essentially
seen
basically
is
a
significant
amount
of
dye
being
supplied
in
compounds.
Obviously,
there's
a
significant
borrow,
but
given
the
nature
of
the
rewrapping,
the
the
biggest
net
impact
here
is
the
additional
sort
of
ninety
eighty
five
to
twenty
million
dye.
I
That's
sitting
this
supply
in
there
and
we
also
see,
for
you
know,
other
assets
like
US,
DC
and
eath,
there's
a
little
even
larger
buffer
in
the
amount
that
supplied
versus
the
amount
borrowed,
because
you
know,
given
the
the
nature
of
the
profitability
of
the
different
types
of
farming
behavior
and
given
the
you
know,
sort
of
various
projected
stabilities
and
yields
on
these
different
assets.
Those
are
in
large
part,
being
used
as
collateral
effectively
for
some
of
the
other
borrowing
behaviors
on
on
compounds.
I
So
before
we
sort
of
lose
that
thread
just
to
look
at
in
the
last
week
or
so
basically
about
300
million
in
nominal
borrow
of
dye
from
from
compound,
although
that
doesn't
necessarily
reflect
the
amount
of
net
borrow
increase
and
that's
a
distinction
that
we
can
touch
on,
but
basically
the
the
method
of
accounting
for
borrow
and
supply
and
compound
leads
to
kind
of
this.
You
know
somewhat
virtual
borrow
interest
that
is
effectively
like
just
achieving
a
more
aggressive
collateralization
ratio
and
for
the
amount
of
loans
outstanding.
I
Obviously
you
know
we
saw
that's
a
large
looking
number
at
around
800
million,
but
you
know,
given
the
the
fact
that
you've
got
154
million
die
from
eath
and
another,
you
know
40
or
so
million
from
a
couple
of
other
collateral
assets.
We're
looking
at
you
know
a
total
of
about
a
hundred
and
ninety
some
million
die
issued
there
and
about
88
million
of
that
died
in
the
DSR.
I
So
you
know:
net
you're,
looking
at
about
a
hundred
million
die
floating
out
there
and
you've
got
an
excess
supply
in
compound
of
93
million
dies,
so
that
is
where
sorry
85
million
die,
so
that
is
a
pretty
significant
chunk
of
the
die
supply
floating
out
there.
That
is
currently
sitting
on
on
compound
as
supplied
assets.
So
that's
that's
just
something
to
be
aware
of.
I
As
you
know,
movements
in
this
this
pool
of
die
could
have
significant
impacts
on
maker
and
risk
parameters
on
maker,
just
to
kind
of
look
at
under
the
hood,
some
of
those
lungs
so
for
maker.
What
we've
seen
basically
is
pretty
much
an
increase
in
the
amount
of
debt
that's
living
at
these
lower
collateralization
ratios
so
effectively.
The
risk
profile
of
at
least
the
demented
from
a
thon
maker
has
increased
and
that's
again
just
more
risks
to
be
aware
of
in
terms
of
how
you
want
to
go
about,
managing
and
handling
that
risk.
I
That's
you
know
a
complex
in-depth
conversation,
but
just
in
terms
of
the
numbers
you
can
see,
even
you
know,
at
a
neath
price
of
around
170
million
you'd
be
looking
at,
say,
30
million
die
liquidated
and
then
you
know
at
$150,
she'd
be
looking
at
a
total
projected
I
liquidated
or
about
70
million.
So
those
are,
those
are
pretty
significant
amounts
for
not
completely
unrealistic,
drops
in
each
price
just
to
kind
of
circle
this
back
to
what
it
means
for
the
peg.
I
This
had
come
down
a
little
bit,
just
in
the
last
I'd
say
a
couple
of
days,
24
to
48
hours.
So
you
know
it's
in
the
past
has
been
primarily
driven
by
eath
price
movements.
It's
not
a
hundred
percent
clear
that
at
this
point
in
time
that
it's
eath
Christ,
that's
driving,
what's
going
on
with
the
dye
peg.
So
if
we
were
to
zoom
back
in
on
the
last
week,
basically
some
of
the
the
fluctuations
in
eath
price
would
produce
historically
different
effects
in
what's
going
on
die.
I
A
I
The
dye
price
did
rise
a
little
bit
but
then
sort
of
as
the
e
thrice
was
coming
down
since
July
13th
or
so
last
three
days
you
didn't
see
sort
of
a
commensurate
rise
in
the
die.
Quite
so
they
actually
fell
a
little
bit.
So
that
was
something
a
bit
contrary
to
what
we
usually
see,
and
so
it's
important
to
kind
of
think
about
all
this
external
ecosystem
around
dyeing
how
it's
impacting
supply
and
demand
with
just
the
significant
amount
of
increase
in
supply,
particularly
from
eath,
died
in
the
last
two
weeks.
I
It
makes
sense
to
consider
that
you
know
there's
been
a
portion
of
that.
Yes,
that's
been
supplied
on
on
compound,
but
also
a
decent
amount
that
probably
made
its
way
just
onto
the
market
in
terms
of
selling
pressure,
just
as
a
function
of
the
mass
amount
of
minting
and
all
that
minting
is
currently
at
a
very
low
cost.
I
So
you
know,
there's
there's
very
few
barriers
at
the
moment
for
people
who
are
effectively
looking
to
libera
mint
dye,
sell
it
or
you
know,
even
use
the
US
DC
vaults,
though
that's
kind
of
capped
out
in
terms
of
debt
ceiling
for
getting
kind
of
free
hedge
positions.
So
that's
just
something
to
consider
where,
when
you
look
at
a
vault
like
us,
DC
where
liquidations
are
not
enabled
at
the
moment,
it's
it's
a
pretty
low
risk
option
for
fermenting
and
engaging
in
multiple
different
kinds
of
yield.
I
Seeking
behavior
the
cop
farming
stuff
is
one
example,
but
you
know
there
there
are
plenty
of
others
and
in
terms
of
just
straight-up
minting
guy
I
mean
the
that's
probably
the
best
yield
opportunity
at
the
moment,
and
so
it
sort
of
goes
without
saying
that
that's
a
significant
chunk
of
the
behavior
that
these
new
montañés
have
been
engaging
in
so
I'll
sort
of
pause
there.
Because
it's
a
lot
there's
a
lot
of
different
threads.
It
can
be
double
clicked
on
just
see.
You
know
if
there's
specific
questions.
I
Yeah,
so
this
is
just
something
to
to
circle
back,
so
the
US
DC,
a
debt
ceiling
was
raised.
So
there's
the
potential
for
more
that
that
minting
behavior.
So
when
we
were
looking
back
say,
you
know
July.
First,
there
was
sort
of
an
immediate
utilization
of
the
amount
of
of
debt
ceiling
that
was
available,
but
that
has
not
jumped
up
again
to
sort
of
cap
out
immediately
the
the
increased
leash.
I
I
There
are
a
few
large
users
that
sort
of
drove
a
huge
chunk
of
that
utilization,
and
so
you
know
whether
you
expect
to
see
you
know
if
another
large
user
comes
in
and
and
caps
out
that
that
debt
ceilings
well
like
how
you
want
to
to
handle
it
Sam's
sort
of
suggesting
lowering
the
base
rate.
So
yeah
there's
a
conversation
there
right.
So
if,
if
you're,
providing
very
low-cost
routes
for
fermenting
dye
and
basically
getting
access
to
a
lower
risk
capital,
and
if
it's
not
clear,
why
that's
lower
risk?
I
We
can
go
into
that,
but
for
getting
access
to
lawyers,
capital
position
and
using
it
for
sort
of
higher
risk
higher
yield
activities
like
comp
farming.
There's
a
question
of
how
low
you
want
to
make
the
rates
to
incentivize
that
versus
sort
of
accounting
for
the
the
risk
that
you're
inherently
underwriting
by
facilitating
this
behaviour.
I
So
you
know
we
looked
at
the
the
maker
eath
collateralization
ratios,
most
people
I
think
have
kind
of
nestled
on
at
least
most
of
the
conversations
that
I've
seen
I've
kind
of
nestled
on
the
USD
C
collateral
position
is
being
like
a
lower
risk
pool,
but
you
know
it's
it's
always
something
to
to
keep
aware
of
that.
As
that
pool
grows
and
grows
like
it
is
a
different
type
of
risk.
I
It's
not
necessarily
a
market
risk
that's
been
taking
on,
but
given
that
liquidations
are
not
currently
enabled,
it
doesn't
seem
that
too
many
people
are
too
concerned
at
the
moment.
With
that
TSTC
collateral
pool.
There's
a
lot
of
a
lot
of
questions
in
chat,
they're,
coordinating
yeah,
so
right
now
the
it
appears
so
maker
man's
point.
I
It's
it's
more
about
like
at
what
levels
you're
incentivizing,
what
kinds
of
behaviors
and
then
the
debt
ceilings
appear
to
primarily
get
moved
when
you
need
more
slack,
which
you
know
again,
it's
not
necessarily
the
wrong
way
to
manage
that.
It's
just
it's
stylistic
so
I
don't
know
if
you
would
necessarily
change
the
narrative
on
how
you're
choosing
to
set
those
those
debts
feelings,
but
right
now
it
primarily
just
seems
to
be.
I
You
know
when,
when
you
want
to
incentivize
more
utilization,
you
provide
more
slack
and
then,
if
that
slack
is
not
being
used,
you
lower
the
stability
fees
so
that
that
appears
to
be
the
the
suggestion.
Right
now.
That's
being
floated
in
the
chat
here
by
multiple
people
about
the
USD
C
disability.
So
maybe
that's
that's
a
conversation
to
be
had
for
the
community.
J
Yeah
I
found
a
spot
where
I
could
not
have
noise,
so
I
don't
know.
I
was
haven't
really
posted
a
big
one
on
this,
but
it
I
think
you
know.
Simoni
was
pointing
out
what
you
were
saying,
which
is
we
are
kind
of
taking
on
risk.
You
know
if
you
just
kind
of
look
at
and
I,
don't
have
a
good
vault
in
analysis
tool
to
look
at
why
we
have
these
big
numbers
of
liquidations
that
had
high.
You
know
pretty
much
at
higher
risk
points.
J
I
think
it's
bigger
players
that
are
just
taking
on
the
farming
risk
and
using
their
ass
to
do
it
basically,
and
so
you
know,
and
then
the
question
becomes
it's
a
double-edged
sword
right,
you'd
like
to
raise
fees
to
kind
of
capture,
part
of
this
farming
to
kind
of
mitigate
the
risk.
You
do
that
and
the
peg
goes
up
right
or
it
might
go
up,
but
it's
going
to
put
more
strain
on
it.
J
You
know
that
if
you
really
want
to
is,
if
peg
is
number
one
and
literally
I
said
and
Chad's
like
we
I'm
hearing
three
out
of
four
people,
saying
cleaning
room,
pay,
big
deal
and
and
everything
else
after
that
decentralization
risk
to
hell
with
it
like
we
got
to
get
the
peg
under
control
so
most
important
for
the
community.
I.
Don't
have
a
good
feeling
on
that,
but
it
has
implications
for
stretching
other
things
and
the
tools
to
manage
it.
J
J
I
talked
about
this
in
the
forums
like
we
could
it
maybe
even
range
the
rate
while
we
raise
the
DC
and
just
see
if
they
take
it
again
and
then
us
DC
a
if
you
want
to
help
that
you
got
to
come
down
and
rate,
but
again
I'm
just
back
to
like
do.
We
want
to
do
a
coordinated,
try
and
get
another
50
million,
just
like
25%
now
out
there
to
touch
this
and
then
just
have
in
the
back
of
your
head.
J
It's
going
to
elicit
risk
behavior
and
when
the
compound
thing
switches
it's
going
to
switch
hard
and
fast,
and
the
big
money's
going
to
move
out
of
this
and
we're
gonna
have
to
stop
it
up.
But
fortunately
we
think
we
have
a
lot
of
good
tools
to
do
that.
So
it's
kind
of
my
take
I
just
don't
know
how
we
do
the
coordinated
thing
and,
and
what
that
has
you
know,
want
to
hear
other
people.
J
I
Again,
I
try
to
keep
my
discussions
focused
on
the
the
the
sort
of
facts
and
numbers
of
what's
going
on,
and
one
thing
to
keep
in
mind
is
so
increasing.
Supply
of
dye
will
so
peg.
You
know
appears
to
be
consensus.
Primary
priority,
increasing
supply
only
impacts
the
peg
in
so
much
as
users
are
willing
to
mint
that
dye,
and
then
you
know,
sell
it
on
the
open
market,
and
so
that's
that's.
I
An
important
part
of
the
conversation
is
for
the
different
types
of
supply
that
are
created,
because
now
the
supply
is
kind
of
been
fragmented
into
multiple
different
use
cases.
You
have
to
consider
what
is
the
end
use
case
and
what
is
the
path
to
sort
of
removal
from
circulation?
For
every
you
know,
marginal
die,
that's
created,
is
it
being
created
just
to
then
be
locked
up
in
compound?
Is
it
being
created
to
then
be
sold
to
purchase?
Something
else
like
considering
the
the
life
cycle
of
that
die
is
a
really
important
part
of
the
conversation.
I
I
think
that
you
know
maybe
he's
a
little
bit
missing,
but
it's
it's
important
to
to
keep
in
mind
that
if
the
goal
is
to
say
bring
down
the
peg,
then
you
have
to
look
at
and
target
use
cases
of
diet
that
will
put
more
liquidity
on
the
open
market
and
help
to
drive
that
price
down.
You
also
have
to
ask
yourself
like
if
the
is
necessarily
something
that
is
going
to
happen.
I
You
know
at
the
current
point
in
time
or
if
there
are
other
you
know,
market
conditions,
other
smart
contract,
driven
fundamentals
that
are
putting
a
premium
on
dye.
You
know
so
that
it
is
worth
more
than
you
know:
1,
USD,
C
and,
and
that's
that's
again.
Another
important
part
of
the
conversation
that
I
think
is
maybe
a
little
bit
under
discussed.
But
you
know
just
in
terms
of
the
the
facts
and
the
math
like
for
peg
management.
Increasing
supply
is
not
necessarily
100%
equivalent
to
driving
down
the
peg.
E
If
you
guys
would
permit
me
just
to
sort
of
suggest
a
solution,
yeah
I
mean
the
the
peg
is,
let's
just
imagine
the
peg
was
on.
Actually,
let's
imagine
we
were
at
one
I
think
we
would
all
be
concerned
with
the
amount
of
risk
that's
building
up,
I
mean
you
know.
Just
a
few
months
ago
we
were
looking
at.
You
know
that
histogram
of
where
liquidation
ratios
were
was
in
the
500
600
percent
range.
E
We
had
a
lot
of
people
that
were
risk
off
because
of
Black
Thursday,
the
overall
macroeconomic
sentiment,
so
comp
has
incentivized
FA
collateral
holders
to
to
go
risk
on
and
they're
they're
pushing.
You
know
more
towards
that
lower
bound
of
where
liquidations
are
extremely
risky,
and
thank
you
for
calling
that
out
vishesh.
That
was
important.
So
if
we
were
at
peg
right
now,
I
I
think
we
would
probably
want
to
suggest
creating
multiple
as
collateral
types,
where,
let's
say
the
zero.
E
E
So
you
know.
Maybe
we
need
multiple
tears
at
this
point
for
4f
and
then
naturally,
people
that
want
the
lower
rate
that
that
have
the
assertive
higher
liquidation
ratios
are
going
to
move
into
those
other
jeers,
and
we
start
to
get
a
real
good
idea
of
who's
super
risk
on
and
how
much
we
would
have
to
liquidate
for
those
people
that
sort
of
thing
so
yeah
I,
don't
know
it
may
not
be
ideal,
but.
J
You
know
I
honestly
agree
with
it
like
I
think
we're
all
kind
of
coming
to
more
tools
better.
You
know,
and
the
idea
of
having
multiple
tiers
are
the
same
thing.
I
think
originally
everyone
was
like
well.
Why
do
that?
And
it's
like
your
point,
it's
totally
because
to
manage
risk
in
terms
of
setting
the
liquidation
ratio,
even
a
Fiat.
You
can
change
the
fees
on
a
two
in
terms
of
liquidations,
but
we
don't
have
to
do
that.
You
know
and
then
the
DC's
to
manage
it.
J
Does
it
see
where
the
money
spreads
out
in
the
spectrum
I
mean
you're
always
going
to
have
your
best
one
at
the
bottom
taken
you
know
so
to
speak
for
the
longer
haul,
but
but
the
higher
risk
stuff
to
be
able
to
see
where
that's
kind
of
landing
collect
some
fees
deal
with
the
risk
by
having
liquidation,
ratios,
managed,
I.
Think
it's
all
plus.
J
C
I
wonder:
wait
make
one
one
quick
point
about
the
u.s.
DCA
and
the
base
rate,
so,
as
the
chef
sort
of
said
I'm
I'm
advocating
for
we
should
maybe
consider
lowering
the
base
rate
to
a
negative
value
to
encourage
more
supply
coming
from
us
DCA
it
shot
up
pretty
quick
when
it
was
at
0%
and
now
it's
sort
of
like
staying
flat.
This
is
more
dye
that
we
could
bring
to
fill
this
comp
driven
demand
and
I.
Think
we
need
to
fill
it
in
whatever
we
can.
J
One
thing
I
want
to
say
is
I
want
to
cycle
back
to
what
this
gesture
is
saying,
because
when
we
really
react,
go
with
us,
cuz
Simoni
wants
to.
You
know
that
we
are
taking
on
risk
here.
So
keep
it
in
mind
like
how
we're
managing
this
I,
like
the
idea
of
us
being
able
to
get
fees
out
of
different
tiers
to
deal
with
taking
on
this
risk,
pinion
that
these
markets
will
do
it
I
would
rather
do
it
in
that
way.
The
assay
as
it
sits
right
now.
J
Those
are
kind
of
a
lot
of
our
core
people,
and
we
could
let
that
facility
DC
up
and
then
basically
add
another
one
at
one
or
two
percent
for
all
the
new
people
that
want
to
take
the
rest
and
cycle
in
I
mean
we
probably
missed
out
on
50
million
worth
of
us
that
you
know
basically
would
have
paid
us
1
to
2
percent
to
have
access
to
a
facility
with
a
lower
lung
ratio.
I,
don't
like
that,
but
just
another
one,
because
we're
like
screw
it.
J
We're
gonna
keep
all
our
old
people
that
are
already
locked
down
in
the
good
facility
with
the
low
rate
and
then
basically
build
the
other
one,
but
anytime
anybody
leaves
that
facility.
The
money
is
going
to
jump
in
there.
So
there's
a
real
issue
of
how
do
you
manage
that?
But
it's
still
the
same
point
as
like.
You
would
like
to
get
some
fees
out
of
this,
but
then
you're
back
to
like
anything
you
try
to
collect.
J
J
It
may
be
a
changes.
I
honestly,
don't
know,
and
so
it's
a
real
quandary
I
think
the
compas.
You
is
really
a
blessing
in
disguise
because
it's
really
making
us
think
about
the
size
of
our
market,
which
is
why
everyone
wants
to
grow
and
we're
debating
how
to
do
it
and
then
using
our
growth
to
basically
lever
against
kind
of
what
I
want
to
call
from
confound.
You
know,
like
I,
want
150
million
to
be
something
that
the
dai
peg
can
just
swap
off,
because
it's
a
three
billion
dollar
affair.
You
know
I'm,
saying
I.
D
J
With
you
I
created
by
it,
is
a
but
it's
a
real
problem
and
it
could
come
from
anywhere
anytime
and
any
amount
that
we're
going
to
have
to
deal
with
this
not
just
from
down.
But
now
all
other
places
could
just
start
pulling
the
same
trick
and
make
dye
like
the
big
deal,
and
so
I
will
recant
the
I'm.
Sorry
compound
I,
like
you
guys,
a
lot
cuz
I
do
use
you
I
will
pull
back.
Thank
you
long
for.
I
I
Unless
you
have
users
that
are
there
willing
to
say,
okay
I'm
going
to
mint
this
asset
I'm
going
to
sell
it,
I'm
gonna,
relinquish
it
at
say
a
dollar
to
a
dollar
one
and
I'm,
okay,
with
taking
on
and
maintaining
the
risk
and
fees
associated
with
the
the
minting
of
the
asset
in
exchange
for
taking
that
that
short-term
profit,
and
so,
unless
you
have
those
that
market
making
behavior.
Unless
you
have
that
arbitrage,
behavior
you're
not
doing
anything
to
the
peg
by
necessarily
by
the
increasing
supply.
I
That
is
a
really
important
point
that
I
think
is
completely
overlooked,
because
people
in
their
minds
just
sort
of
think
quite
simply
more
supply
lower
price.
But
are
you
sure
I'm
missing
the
Rube
Goldberg
in-between
that
gets
you
there?
That's
that's
one
point.
The
other
point
that
is
I
think
not
to
throw
the
baby
out
with
the
bathwater,
but
everybody
is
very
much
so
focused
on
peg.
You
do
tend
to
overlook
system
level
risk
and
system
level
risk,
as
I
showed
earlier.
I
You
know
is
growing
not
just
in
percentage
terms,
but
also
in
total
dollar
terms,
and
you
have
to
keep
in
mind
how
much
of
that
nominal
risk
can
and
should
MKR
be
able
to
underwrite
and
that's
an
important
thread
to
sort
of
keep
underpinning
the
whole
conversation
and
again
so
lfw
said
last
point
so
I'm
leaving
it
at
that.
Okay,.
C
A
Okay,
cool
all
right,
so
I
think
the
last
points
Sam
it's
approaching,
half
costs
so
I
think
we
will
call
the
missing
here.
There's
been
lots
of
fantastic
discussion
around
the
peg
and
the
current
issues
facing
us
I
would
encourage
everyone
to
continue
that
discussion
on
the
forums.
I
know
it's
kind
of
cliche.
You
see
this
every
week
you
know
governance
happens
on
the
forums
and
all
that
sort
of
stuff.
So
I'd
love
to
see
it.
Sort
of
this
discussed
more
detail
and
specifically
like
more
concrete
I
guess
proposals.
J
Hey
can
I
have
one
minute
to
just
at
least
mention
on
the
compensation
pool,
so
yeah
I
think
I.
We
have
a
bit
of
a
quandary
and
the
quandary
is
we
had
95k
maker
voting
to
kind
of
do
something
about
it,
and
now
we
have
45
or
Kay
maker
kind
of
saying
no,
it's
unclear
to
me
what
to
do
about
it,
I'm
just
leaving
it
as
kind
of
a
laundry
for
the
community
what
they
think
the
next
step
is
and
help
us
out.
So
that's
it.
Yeah.