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Description
00:38 Lisa’s new book How Emotions are Made
14:11 Can we truly feel an emotion before we can name it?
31:06 Is it true that the !Kung people feel no fear?’
41:42 Fear in the body, the brain, and in concept
49:46 Do animals have emotions as we know them?
59:09 Lisa’s advice for young scientists: Keep it empirical
Robert Wright (Bloggingheads.tv, The Evolution of God, Nonzero, Why Buddhism Is True) and Lisa Feldman Barrett (How Emotions are Made, lisafeldmanbarrett.com)
Recorded on August 22, 2017
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B
Are
you
I'm
great?
How
are
you
doing
I'm
pretty
good?
Let
me
introduce
this
I'm
Robert
right.
This
is
the
right
show
and
meaning
of
like
TV.
You
are
Lisa
Feldman
Barrett
you're,
a
professor
at
Northeastern
University.
Not
just
any
professor.
You
are
the
university
distinguished
professor,
in
contrast
to
all
your
undistinguished
college,
they're.
B
But
it's
up
it's
your
call.
It's
up
to
you,
whatever
you
think
is
gonna
work
best
for
your
career
wines,
certain
North,
Northeastern
University,
professor
psychology,
and
you
are
the
director
of
the
interdisciplinary,
affective,
Science
Laboratory,
and
the
founding
editor
in
chief
of
the
journal,
emotion
review,
and
what
we're
going
to
talk
about
is
your
new
book
how
emotions
are
made,
which
has
gotten
a
fair
amount
of
attention?
B
A
Yeah
I
suppose
the
elevator
pitch
description
would
be
it
feels
to
us,
as
if
emotions
are
triggered
somewhere
deep
inside
our
brains
and
that
we
emotions
are
our
reactions
to
things
that
happen
to
us
in
the
world.
But
in
fact
our
brains
aren't
structured
to
react
to
anything.
The
anatomy
of
the
brain
and
also
it's
the
way
that
it
functions,
physiologically
and
metabolically
indicate
that
actually,
our
brains
are
predictive,
that
is,
our
brains,
are
making
guesses
all
the
time
about.
B
And
yeah
I
I,
don't
I
I,
certainly
I've
noticed
that
the
predictive
nature
of
my
interaction
with
the
world
now,
but
but
at
some
implications
of
this
way,
so
I
gather
your
worldview.
Your
view
of
emotions
kind
of
begins
with
thinking
about
what
how
the
brain
actually
would
produce
what
we
call
emotions,
but
some
of
the
implications
that
are
I
think
counterintuitive.
B
Some
people
are
first
of
all,
you're
saying
that
emotions
are
not
universal,
that
it
isn't
the
case
that
I
would
find
the
emotion
of
fear
as
I,
think
of
it
in
every
culture
right
for
starters,
that's
right
and
and
I
think
you're,
saying
as
well
that
emotions
aren't
evolved
through
natural
selection,
at
least
in
the
kind
of
finely
tailored
way.
We
might
think
of
them
as
being
evolved
right,
like,
like
fear,
being
a
specific
adaptive,
emotion,
right,
you're
or
you're.
B
A
Think
you
have
to
be
really
careful
how
you
phrase
this.
So
let
me
just
say
a
couple
of
things.
The
first
thing
that
I
would
say
is
that
these
aren't
the
book
you
know
doesn't
contain
near
musings
of
things
that
I
happen
to
think
are
interesting
or
even
beliefs.
That
I
personally
have
the
book
lays
out
a
theory
in
sigh.
So
theory
is
not
a
set
of
ideas.
A
It's
a
set
of
ideas
that
are
backed
up
by
experimental
evidence
and
in
this
book,
I
cover
experimental
evidence
from,
as
I
said,
from
not
just
from
brain
imaging
and
studies
of
of
individual
neurons.
But
you
know,
studies
of
anatomy,
studies
and
physiology
studies
of
metabolism,
as
well
as
studies
that
cross
cultures,
and
you
know,
examine
infants
and
animals
that
are
not
human
and
so
on
and
so
forth.
So
I
think
that's
the
first
point
to
make.
A
The
second
point
to
make
is
that
this
is
a
theory
that
is
very
grounded
in
natural
selection
and
evolution.
It's
just
not
the
essentialist
view
to
use
a
specific
philosophical
word,
the
it's
not
a!
It's
not
an
evolutionary
view
which
states
that
fear
evolved
for
the
purposes
of
detecting
threat
and
keeping
you
safe.
So
in
the
book,
I
definitely
discuss
what
I
think
of,
as
probably
the
strongest
evidence
for
what
is
evolved
and
what
is
adaptation
'el
in
a
human
brain,
but
I.
A
A
My
view
is
a
bit
of
a
different
view:
I
sort
of
start
with
the
brain
I
start
with
the
anatomy
and
the
functioning
of
the
brain
and
I.
Ask
the
question:
well,
what
kind
of
brain
do
we
have
as
humans
and
given
that
we
have
this
kind
of
brain?
What
kind
of
emotions
can
it
make
and
how
does
it
make
them
mm-hmm.
B
Okay,
so
now
used
one
kind
of
technical
term
there
adaptation
and
by
that
I
guess
we
mean
you
know
something
like
a
little
a
piece
of
organic
machinery
that
exists,
because
in
the
past
it
contributed
to
the
proliferation
of
genes.
You
might
say
it's
designed
in
quotes
by
natural
selection,
to
do
something
and
and
and
you're
saying
that
the
emotions
per
se
I
mean.
Obviously
they
are
a
product.
I
think
you
say,
they're
a
product
in
some
sense
of
our
evolved
nature
and
of
at
a
patient
you're,
just
saying
the
emotions
per
se.
A
What
I'm
saying
the
human
brain
I
don't
know
that
I
would
say
that
natural
selection
designs,
anything
that
makes
natural
selection
slightly
more
intentional
than
it
actually
is,
but
but
we
can
use
that
language
you
know
air
quotes,
writes
designed
it.
What
I'd
say
is
that
the
human
brain
evolved
to
do
what
what
all
brains
do,
which
is
to
anticipate
sensory
inputs
and
make
sense
of
them
in
order
to
act
in
a
way
to
keep
you
alive
and
well
and
ultimately
to
let
you
you
know,
let
your
genes
make
it
into
the
next
generation.
A
A
You
know
have
additional
mechanisms
that
allow
us
to
do
it
in
ways
that
other
animals
can't
and
in
the
book
I
talk
about
what
these
are
and
some
of
the
ways
that
we
make
sense
of
sensations.
We
would
colloquially
refer
to
as
emotions
right
so
and
the
sensations
that
we
are
anticipating
are
not
just
the
sights
and
sounds
and
smells
of
the
external
world.
We
also
have
to
anticipate
the
sensations
that
come
from
the
internal
milieu
of
our
own
bodies
and
in
fact
this
is.
B
One
thing
you're
saying
I
guess
is
that
our
experience
of
our
emotions
is
an
interpretive
act.
It
depends
on
the
concepts
we
have
kind
of
about
emotions
in
a
certain
sense
and
a
version
of
this
I
think
kind
of
goes
way
back.
I
mean
there's
a
standard
experiment
that
you
see
in
that
you
mentioned
in
the
book,
and
you
see
in
Psych
textbooks
where
I
think
they
injected
people
with
I.
Guess
it
was
adrenaline
and
they
found
that
how
the
adrenaline
made
them
feel
or
made
them
feel
that
they
felt
hell.
B
You
know
how
they
interpreted,
the
adrenaline
depended
on
the
situation.
They
were
in
I
forget
what
the
possible
outcomes
were.
I
guess
it
could
either
make
them
feel
exhilarated
or
make
them
feel.
Maybe
nervous
I
forget.
But
but
the
point
is
that
the
physical
sensation
itself
was
not
determinative
and
what
was
it
they?
What?
What
are
the
do?
You
remember
like
what
kinds
of
sewers.
A
Yes,
I
do,
but
let
me
just
say
this
that
I'm
not
just
saying
that
emotions
are
an
interpretive
act.
There's
evidence
that
everything
that
you
see
and
hear
and
taste
and
feel
it
and
do
is
an
emotion-
is
an
interpretive
act.
So
emotions
are
not
special
in
this
way.
They
just
work
the
way
that
the
wait.
You
know
how
does
light
become
visual
visual
sight?
How
does
air
pressure
changes
become
sound?
How
do
the
internal
workings
of
your
own
body
become
feelings
of
elation
or
feelings
of
anger?
The
mechanisms
are
the
same.
A
Basically,
there's
nothing
special
about
emotions
in
that
regard.
They
you,
your
brain,
makes
emotions
the
way
that
it
makes
every
perception
and
thought
and
memory
and
feeling
that
you
have
the
the
experiment
that
you're
talking
about
is
slightly
fraught
experiment.
Actually
it
was
done.
It
was
published
in
the
1960s
by
Schachter,
Stanley,
Schachter
and
Jerome
singer,
and
it
was
a
standard
kind
of
an
experimental
paradigm
that
was
used
during
that
time
where
test
subjects
without
their
knowledge
would
be
injected
with
adrenaline.
We're
not
allowed
to
do
that
to
people
anymore.
A
Not
just
in
psychology
but
in
by
you
know,
biology
and
and
in
chemistry
and
physics,
too,
but
yeah
sure,
but
I.
But
what
I'll
also
tell
you
is
that
there's
a
I
mean
there's
just
a
tremendous
amount
of
evidence
from
other
other
experiments
in
social
psychology,
which
is
what
we're
talking
about
here,
but
also
in
vision
and
in
on
you
know,
hearing
and
in
a
range
of
different
I'm
scientific
domains.
A
That
supports
the
idea
that
your
brain
basically
is
making
sense
of
sensory
inputs
in
order
to
know
what
they
are
and
what
to
do
about
them,
and
sometimes
your
brain
make
sense
of
sensations
as
a
thought
and
sometimes
as
an
emotion
and
sometimes
as
a
memory
and
sometimes
as
a
belief
and
so
on
and
so
forth.
Okay,.
B
Well,
let's
take
some
I
want
to
get
back
to
the
various
the
kinds
of
evidence
that
led
you
toward
this
world
for
you,
but
let's
to
try
to
put
some
flesh
on
this
talk
about
some
examples.
You
give
in
the
book
emphasized
that
emphasize
the
extent
to
what
you
think
emotions
are
kind
of
concept
dependent.
So,
let's
see
there's
the
the
time
your
your
okay,
there's
a
word
I
think
is
it.
Is
it
Dutch
the
idea
that
that's
the
comfort
and
coziness
it?
B
The
the
word
refers
to
the
comfort
and
coziness
and
togetherness
of
being
at
home
with
friends
and
loved
ones,
and
you
say
you
were
with
a
I
guess,
a
Dutch
friend.
If
I've
got
this
right,
she
explained
the
word
to
you
and
you
say
once
she
you
say
quote
once
she
explained
it
to
me:
I
immediately
experienced
it
now
so
you're
saying
I
mean
well
you're
saying
you
were
not
feeling
the
the
feeling
of
the
coziness
of
being
with
a
friend
until
she
spelled
out
the
concept.
No.
A
The
example
was
meant
to
illustrate
that
your
brain
has
this
capacity
to
when
it's
making
concepts
for
the
purposes.
Concepts
are
like
the
guesses
that
your
brain
is
making
about
upcoming,
sensations
that
you're
trying
to
predict
your
brain
is
trying
to
predict
and
and
therefore
deal
deal
with,
and
your
brain
has
this
capacity,
which
is
called
generativity,
and
this
word
means
that
your
brain
can
mix
and
match
past
experiences
to
come
up
with
new
combinations.
New
conceptual
combinations
that
you
have
never
experienced
before.
A
Features
to
that
experience
which,
without
the
single
word
takes
me
15
minutes
to
describe
to
you
I'm
exaggerating,
but
maybe
takes
me
a
few
minutes
to
describe
to
you
because
I
want
you
to
be
able
to
understand
all
the
things
I'm
feeling
and
I.
Don't
have
a
single
word
to
communicate
it
with
to
you.
I
have
to
try
to
get
your
brain
to
do
the
same
kind
of
conceptual
combination
that
my
brain
was
doing,
but
in
Dutch
there
is
a
single
word
that
captures
many
of
those
elements.
A
B
B
Okay,
let
me,
let's
take
an
example,
that
you
also
mentioned
it's
more
familiar
to
people,
the
German
word,
shading
Freud,
which
means
taking
you
know
finding
happiness
or
delight
or
something
taking
joy
in
the
misfortune
or
suffering
of
your
enemies.
Now
I
would
have
thought
I
mean,
first
of
all,
that's
the
kind
of
thing
that
it's
certainly
not
implausible.
To
think
that
that
would
be
part
of
a
kind
of
an
adaptation.
B
Even
if
this
toddler
has
never
had
any
kind
of
conversation
with
her
parents
about
enemies
or
how
we
should
feel
or
any
any
of
this
I
I
would
think,
I
mean
I
think
this
would
be
a
common
view
that
you're,
maybe
arguing
against
I,
would
think
that
that
toddler
would
feel
good
about
the
the
misfortune
of
the
enemy.
Now
you're
saying
that
that
toddler
will
not
because
it
hasn't
been
kind
of
socialized
into
it
or
what
well.
A
I
think
you're
confusing
words
and
concepts.
First
of
all
and
second
of
all,
you're,
you-
and
you
know
probably
many
of
us
before
we
know
the
science
are
assuming
that
toddlers
have
mental
states
that
are
like
adults,
I,
don't
know
any
three
year-old
who
conceives
of
an
enemy
in
the
way
that
an
adult
does.
That's
something.
That's
learned
all
right,
but
they
let
me
let
me
just.
Let
me
just
sort
of
explain.
A
Let
me
respond
to
your
question
so
so
three-year-olds,
assuming
that
a
three-year-old
has
a
concept
and
can
make
an
instance
of
anger
and
assuming
that
they
also
feel
pleasure,
which
they
do
from
birth.
That
part
is
baked
in.
You
know
that
not
happiness
but
pleasure.
Then
it's
possible
for
a
three-year-old
sprain
to
do
conceptual
combination
and
make
an
instance
of
pleasure
at
somebody
else's
misfortune,
which
is
what
shutting
through
it
is,
doesn't
require
that
the
person
is
your
enemy.
A
It
just
requires
that
that
person
may
be
harm
view
in
some
way,
or
maybe
you
don't
like
them
very
much,
but
maybe
you've
been
angry
at
them
in
the
past,
but
feeling
pleasure
at
somebody
else's
misfortune.
Only
the
only
thing,
the
only
conceptual
apparatus
you
need
to
be
able
to
make
is
pleasure
and
and
an
experience
of
misfortune.
A
If
you
can
combine
those,
then
you
can
feel
schadenfreude
even
without
the
word,
but
what
you
can't
do
is
you
can't
communicate
it
very
easily
and
you
can't
it's
very
effortful
and
therefore
metabolically
inefficient
to
make
it,
whereas
if
you
know
the
kant's,
if
you
have,
if
you
know
the
word,
then
your
brain
is
very
efficient
at
making
the
instances
of
the
concept,
but
I
also
need
to
point
out
to.
You,
though,
is
that
this
that
your
your
use
of
the
word
concept
or
your
understanding,
your
concept
of
a
concept,
is
a
it's.
A
A
kind
of
a
common
sense
view
that
that
many
people
have,
but
in
science
you
know
scientists
have
been
studying
what
concepts
and
categories
are
for
decades
now,
and
one
thing
we
know
for
sure
is
that
concepts
aren't
abstract
in
the
sense
that
I
think
that
you're
that
you're,
meaning
them
to
be
so
if
you
can
hear
the
sound,
be
as
be',
you
have
a
concept
for
that
sound.
If
you
didn't
have
a
concept,
you
wouldn't
hear
that
those
acoustics
as
the
as
the
letter,
B
I,
mean
so
concepts
so.
A
What
is
yeah
I
mean,
let
me
just
say
it
this
way.
A
category
traditionally
is
a
group
of
events
or
objects
or
items
or
people,
but
a
group
of
things
that
are
all
similar
in
some
way
and
a
conceptual
category
category
most
of
the
categories
that
we
deal
with
in
everyday
life
are
categories
where
the
similarity
is
based
on
function
not
based
on
perceptual
similarity.
That
is,
you
know
if
you
think
about,
for
example,
if
I
say
the
words,
bat
and
ball
and
Bob
the
acoustics
of
the
B.
A
Sound
are
actually
different
in
all
three
cases,
but
you
hear
it
as
the
same
sound.
Your
brain
is
it's
paying
attention
to
certain
sensory
information
and
it's
ignoring
others
to
create
that
similarity.
If
I
say
to
you
what
what
about
the
category
of
like
all
the
things
that
you
can
use
to
protect
yourself
from
the
rain?
Well,
you
can
use
a
rain
coat.
You
can
use
an
umbrella,
but
you
could
also
use
a
newspaper.
You
could
use
a
car
either.
A
You
could
use
a
lot.
There
are
a
lot
of
different
things
you
could
use.
Those
things
are
not
similar
in
terms
of
their
perceptual
features,
they're
similar
in
terms
of
their
function,
the
function
that
you're
using
them
for
from
little
babies
three
month
old
babies
can
make
conceptual
categories
like
that
with
words.
So
if
you
take
an
object
like
this
to
a
three
month
old
and
you
say,
look
sweetie,
this
is
a
one
and
you
put
the
web
down,
and
maybe
it
makes
a
squeaking
sound
and.
A
To
the
baby
look
sweetie,
this
is
a
and
you
put
the
down
and
it
makes
a
squeaking
sound.
And
now
you
pick
up
a
third
thing
like
this
and
you
say,
look
sweetie!
This
is
a
well
these
things.
Don't
look
the
same.
If
I
dropped
them,
they
wouldn't
sound
the
same
mm-hmm.
They
don't
feel
the
same.
But
if
I
call
this
a
lug,
the
baby's
going
to
expect
it
to
have
the
same
function,
the
squeak
as
these
objects
did.
Okay,
yeah.
B
No
I
get
that
and
and
and
I
understand,
that
we
categorize
things
and
and
and
and
so
on,
but
but
just
to
make
sure
I
understand
to
get
back
to
my
toddler,
I
mean
you
said
that
toddler,
you
emphasize
things
that
a
toddler
actually
probably
wouldn't
have
a
concept
of
I,
think
I
mean
and
I'm
not
saying
it's
all.
There
is
a
concept
of
an
enemy
I,
don't
know,
I
mean
look
toddlers
act
as
if
they
identify
friends
and
enemies.
They
act
that
way.
Okay
behaviorally,
they
do
so
and
any
of
it.
B
A
A
B
Its
views
since
the
day
they're
born
fine,
but
how
has
the
consensus
you
shaped
this
shade
employed
in
the
industry
because,
in
the
thought
experiment
there
have
there
hasn't
been
any
explicit
discussion
of
it.
The
toddler
doesn't
know
how
other
toddlers
feel
in
circumstance.
So
how?
How
has
this
particular
thing?
The
shade
employed
been
socially
constructed
because.
A
The
toddler
understands
that
you
know
from
the
moment
that
babies
are
born.
We
are
not
only
explicitly
labeling
things
for
them,
but
we're
also
using
words
in
their
presence
and
they're
capturing
all
of
the
statistical
regularities
that
go
with
those
words.
So,
for
example,
let
me
just
you
know,
play
out
this
example
and
then
we'll
get
back
to
your
toddler
example.
When
my
daughter
was
seven
months
old,
so
this
is
way
before
she
you
know.
Would
conventionally
have
language.
A
My
husband
and
I
were
sitting
at
dinner
with
her
at
the
table.
One
night-
and
you
know
my
husband
and
I,
were
looking
at
one
another.
She
was
sitting
over
to
the
side
and
our
oven
was
over
kind
of
over
on
this
side
and
I
made
a
point.
I
made
a
comment
about
how
loud
the
oven
was
while
I'm
looking
at
my
husband
and
my
daughter
turned
and
looked
at
the
oven,
and
my
husband
and
I
were
like
wow.
A
That's,
let's
just
see
what
she
let's
just
see
what
she
knows
so
with
looking
at
each
other.
We
would
lame
things
in
the
room
and
never
move
our
eyes
away
from
each
other
and
she
would
turn
her
head
and
look
at
these
things.
She'd
look
opposites,
okay
or
just
like
this
example,
with
the
three
month
olds
that
I
mentioned.
You
know
those
kids
don't
have
conventionally,
they
don't
have
what
we
would
condense
language,
but
governments
are
being
used
as
cues
right.
B
B
A
Think
well,
I'm,
not
we
were
talking
about
it
yeah,
but
my
point
to
you
is
that
if
it's,
if,
if
a
child's
brain
can
make
concept
a
and
concept
B
mm-hmm,
however
those
concepts
got
there,
then
the
brain-
that's
child's
brain-
can
combine
those
to
make
a
new
concept.
That's
a
combination
of
a
and
B.
That
is
what
conceptual
combination
is
and
now
you
know
you're
saying
to
me.
A
A
B
A
That's
something
that
I
discuss
in
the
book
where
words
become
important
is
that
they
make
it
very
efficient
to
be
able
to
make
that
instance
again
without
having
to
expend
the
same
amount
of
metabolic
energy
to
do
so,
and
you
can
talk
to
other
people
about
them
very
efficiently
and
also
you
you
don't
have
to
talk
about
all
of
the
rules
about
when
to
feel
it
and
when
not
to
feel
it.
So
let
me
give
you
an
example
of
this.
There
is
a
from
the
illunga
tribe,
which
is
in
the
South
Seas.
A
A
B
A
Something
that
people
feel
right
on
a
fairly
regular
basis
and
I'm
gonna
give
you
an
example
of
we're
having
a
ready-made
concept,
not
one
where
you
bet
your
brain
house
to
labor
over
combining,
but
actually
a
ready-made
concept
is
really
helpful,
and
that
is
it's
an
example
that
I
use
in
the
book,
which
is
in
the
military.
So
when
you
talk
to
military
personnel,
particularly
men
who
have
been
deployed
into
a
situation
of
war
where
they
are
protecting
their
their
unit,
mates
from
an
enemy,
they
experience
sometimes
pleasure
in
killing
the
enemy
and
I'm.
A
Not
you
know
normally,
when
we
think
about
humans
who
experience
pleasure
at
killing
other
humans,
we
don't
think
of
that
as
a
particularly
desirable
characteristic.
Some
of
these
guys,
you
know,
come
back
from
deployment
and
they
feel
they
experience
a
lot
of
distress
over
the
fact
that
they
actually
enjoyed
killing
someone.
But
the
fact
is
that
if
they
had
the
concept
of
leggett,
they
would
that
there
was
ready-made
for
them.
They
would
just
like
with
schadenfreude.
A
B
B
I
would
have
thought
that
in
any
culture
that
the
vast
majority
people
in
any
culture,
if
they're
walking
along
at
night
and
they've,
been
told
that
there's
some
lethal
beast
in
the
woods
or
something
and
they're
alone
or
some
you
know
some
some
threat
and
they
hear
this
rustling
right
next
to
them
all
of
a
sudden.
That's
that
sounds
like
it
could
be.
The
thing
I
would
think
that
a
lot
of
people
in
every
culture
have
the
feeling
I
identify
as
fear
which,
of
course,
is
correlated
with
certain
physiological
responses.
A
I'm
saying
is
that
the
first
of
all
that
fear
as
a
category
is
associated
with
a
lot
of
different
physiological
patterns,
not
just
the
stereotype
which
you
are
identifying
and
similarly
the
physical,
the
physical
pattern
of
the
stereotype
can
be
associated
with
other
mental
states.
So
what
I'm
not
saying
that
that
people
don't
have
those?
A
But
people
in
that
culture,
don't
have
that
physiological
pattern,
I
just
don't
think
they
would
make
sense
of
it
as
fear,
in
the
same
way
that
you
know
Tahitians,
don't
experience
loss
as
sadness,
they
experience
loss
as
a
completely
different
experience
right,
so
the
physical
sensations
associated
with
losing
a
child
aren't
sadness
for
them.
The
experience
is
more
like
a
sickness
like
an
illness,
that's
what
they
feel
it
as.
B
B
B
A
B
A
The
same
way
that
you
can
feel
a
tug
in
your
stomach
and
that
tug
that
exact
tug
you
can
your
brain
can
make
that
into
a
feeling
of
disgust
or
a
feeling
of
hunger
or
a
feeling
of
longing
or
a
feeling
of
anxiety.
Or
you
know
it's
it's
not
that
the
physical
sensations
are
similar.
It's
that
exactly
the
same
physical
sensation
can
be
made
sense
of
as
many
different
emotions,
depending
on
the
context
and
the
concepts
that
you
have
available
to
you
sure.
B
But
to
get
back
to
fear
if
the
context
is
as
I
said,
you're
walking,
you
know,
there's
a
threat
somewhere
in
the
bushes.
You
hear
the
rustling.
That's
that
context
is
going
to
steer
you
in
an
interpretive
direction.
I
just
want
to
be
clear.
You
said
that
the
come
do
I
think
you
said,
have
the
physiological
much
the
physiological
reaction
I
have
but
you're
saying
they
don't
feel
fear
the
way
I
feel
it
I'm.
A
Not
saying
that
they
have
the
exact
physiological
sensations
that
you
have
in
that
instance,
because,
frankly,
you
and
I,
when
we
were,
if
we
were
walking
down
a
dark
street,
would
not
necessarily
have
the
same
physiological
sensations,
and
you
yourself,
if
you
were
walking
down
a
dark
street
on
two
different
nights
with
in
two
different
on
two
different
days.
May
not
exactly
have
this.
What
I'm
saying
is
the
human
body
has
the
capacity
to
have
a
certain
vocabulary,
chol
patterns,
that
all
human
bodies
have
this
capacity?
B
A
Anthropological
evidence
usually
consists
of
scientists
who
would
go
and
embed
themselves
in
a
culture
and
then
observe
and
talk
to
members
of
that
culture.
For
example,
we've
done
research
on
the
Himba
of
rural
namibia
in
northwestern
namibia,
so
we
I
had
a
graduate
student
who's.
Now,
a
postdoctoral
fellow
in
my
lab
and
another
scientist
who
went
on
my
behalf
to
Namibia,
because
I
couldn't
myself
go
and
who
tested
subjects,
we've
studied
the
Tanzanian
hunter-gatherers,
the
hodza
groups,
who
have
been
hunting
and
gathering.
A
You
know
on
the
African
savannas
continuously
this
these
groups,
since
the
Pleistocene
and
I,
can
tell
you
that
they
don't
experience,
emotion
or
perceive
emotion
in
a
way
that
is
similar
to
an
Americans.
It's
not
that
they
don't
have
the
same
physiological
sensations.
They
do.
They
just
make
sense
of
them
in
different
ways
and
they
act
on
them
in
different
ways.
So
you
know
even
a
rat,
even
a
rat
in
a
cage
mm-hmm
makes
different
varieties.
A
You
know,
for
example,
you
know
we
would
conventionally
call
fear
right
in
a
threat
situation.
A
rat
will
do
many
things
and
the
sensations
are
very
different.
How
the
rat
makes
sense
of
what
those
sensations
mean
in
terms
of
what
it
does
next,
what
it's
act
next
actions
are,
are
highly
variable
independent
on
the
context.
So
very
the
variability
is
the
point
right.
It's
fear
isn't
a
single
thing.
A
A
B
Both
depending
on
whether
we
think
the
threat
is
Vanquisher,
bull
but
I'd,
be
surprised.
If
there's
a
culture
that
faces
a
you
know
a
foe
of
over
well
anyway.
I
guess
one
thing
I'm
asking
is
I
had
taken
your
argument
to
be
that,
like
how
we
feel
depends
on
well
depends
on
the
concept,
and
you
know
by
the
way,
I'm
actually
very
sympathetic
to
the
idea
that
we
can.
We
we
can
change
our
experiences
by
reinterpreting.
B
B
A
Sure
so
here's
how
I
reach
the
conclusion
first
of
all,
I
would
say:
emotions
don't
make
you
feel
anything
they.
They
are
your
feeling
they
don't
make.
You
feel
anything
they're,
not
something
separate
from
feeling,
but
here
here's
you
know
here's
what
I
would
say
and
what
I
do
say
in
in
the
book.
One
thing
that
I
say
is
that
one
thing
that
I
show
is
that
all
experiences
concept
dependent
all
experiences
concept
dependent.
You
have
to
understand
what
a
scientific
notion
of
a
concept
is
for
that
statement
to
make
sense.
A
But
that's
what
I
explained
in
the
book
and
so
emotions
as
experiences
are
no
different
from
any
other
type
of
experience,
which
is
concept
dependent.
Now,
if
you
can
demonstrate
that
a
culture
doesn't
have
a
concept,
doesn't
have
a
concept,
then
you
can
infer
using
logic
that
they
wouldn't
eat.
They
wouldn't
normally
are
under
typical
experience.
Difficult
circumstances
be
able
to
experience
that
emotion
if
they
don't
have
the
concept
now.
A
Is
it
possible
because
they
don't
they
don't
have
a
word
for
it
and
they
don't
teach
it
to
their
children,
and
so
the
children's
brains
don't
become
that
those
concepts
aren't
bootstrapped
into
those
children's
brains
the
way
they
are
into
our
children's
friends
now?
Is
it
possible
that
occasionally
they
might
construct?
A
You
know
using
conceptual
combination,
an
instance
of
a
concept
that
would
be
structurally
similar
to
our
concept
of
some
concern
of
a
concept
of
fear.
Sure.
Absolutely.
If
you
have
the
ability
to
make
concepts,
then
you
also
have
the
ability
to
combine
those
concepts
in
novel
ways.
So
you
know
I
think
in
the
book
I
was
pretty
careful
at
out
saying
what
I
was
speculating
about
and
what
I
was
claiming
based
on
scientific
evidence
and
so
based
on
scientific
evidence.
We
know
that
the
the
Cong
don't
have
that
concept.
A
A
This
should
be
something
I
think
that's
familiar
to
you,
which
is
that
if
you
could
dissolve
the
concept,
if
you
could
deconstruct
the
concept
deconstruct
your
experience
and
remove
the
conceptual
elements
and
just
experience
them
sensations,
I,
would
say
then
you're
also
not
experiencing
fear
you
might
be
experiencing
a
race
part.
Amazing
part
in
and
of
itself
is
not
fear.
No.
B
It
is
possible,
through
meditation,
to
change
your
relationship
to
something
like
anxiety
such
that
it
doesn't
feel
like
it
did
before,
and
is
it
making
you
suffer
that's
possible.
My
own
feeling
is
that,
first
of
all,
it
takes
a
lot
of
work
to
get
to
that
point,
and
one
reason
it
does
is
because
these
things
are
so
deeply
embedded
in
us
and
I.
My
my
own
view
has
been
that
some
of
them
are
kind
of
adaptive
products
of
natural
selection
and
that's
not
your
view,
but
but
the,
but
on
the
theorem.
It's
not
my.
B
But
but
speaking
of
evidence
on
the
when
you
say
that
well,
if
they
don't
have
the
concept
of
fear,
they
can't
have
the
experience
of
fear.
I
mean
that
follows
logically.
If
we
accept
your
theoretical
framework
to
begin
with,
but
if
we
don't,
then
it
doesn't
follow
and
I
guess
I'm
asking.
Is
there
independent
evidence
there.
A
A
That
I
can
look
at
and
say
well
now,
I
know
for
sure
that
this
and
whether
or
not
they
report
being
afraid
whether
or
not
they
admit
being
afraid
whether
they
even
know
whether
they're
afraid
or
not,
that
I
somehow
have
some
objective
way
of
knowing
that
they're
afraid.
That's
just
doesn't
exist
in
science
anywhere
well,.
A
B
A
Here's
what
I
would
say
is
universal
what
what
is
universal.
This
is,
you
know,
based
on
evidence
from
so
many
domains
of
research.
It
would
be
hard
for
me
to
list
them
all
what's
what's
baked
into
your
body
and
brain
basically,
is
the
ability
to
experience,
pleasure
and
discomfort.
The
ability
to
experience
feeling
really
worked
up
and
really
calm
those
kinds
of
feelings
which
scientists
you
call
affect.
Affective
feelings
are
a
direct
result
of
your
brain's
regulation
of
your
the
internal
systems
of
your
body
and
everybody.
A
Barring
illness
has
the
capacity
to
have
those
feelings
and
they
are
not.
They
are
not
features
of
emotion
per
se.
They
are
features
of
consciousness,
their
properties
of
consciousness.
So
if
your
brain
is
always
controlling
your
body
and
the
sensations
from
your
body
are
always
being
experienced
as
affect
unless
you
there
are
some
things
that
you
can
do
to
try
to
make
that
not
happen,
but
I
don't
think
we're
gonna
have
time
to
discuss
what
kind.
B
A
B
I
mean
I'm
glad
you
mentioned
animals
because
I
was
gonna.
Ask
about
my
dog
now
I've
always
assumed
as
I
said,
I
have
a
one
of
my
two
dogs
is
kind
of
nervous
and
and-
and
you
know
like
at
night
will
be
walking,
you
know
like
you
know,
get
get
very
vigilant,
kind
of
and
and
and
and
and
if
there's
a
sound
he'll
kind
of
start.
You
know
and
I'm
always
assumed.
B
Maybe
I
thought
it's
plazo
he's
feeling
something
like
what
I
feel
I
think
you
would
say
he
isn't
and,
moreover,
I
guess
it
would
be
the
case
you
tell
me
I
think
my
dog
is
not,
you
would
say,
he's
not
capable
of
having
the
concepts
there
or
am
I
wrong
about
that.
That
that
would
that
would
that
would
kind
of
collectively
construct
fear
as
I
feel
it
well.
A
Here's
what
I
would
say
there
are
some
nervous
systems
that
are
very
responsive
to
little
sensory
changes
in
the
world
and
some
that
are
less
responsive,
and
maybe
you
have
one
dog,
who's,
less
responsive
and
one
dog
who's
more
responsive.
You
experience
that
him
as
being
afraid
or
nervous
I.
Don't
think
that
there's
any
evidence
that
dogs
have
so
that
dogs
can
make
sense
of
their
own
sensations
in
the
way
that
you
make
sense
of
their
actions.
Okay,
I
could
be
I,
I,
think
it'd
be
totally
fascinating
and
fantastic.
A
If
it
were
the
case
that
we
discovered
that
other
animals
could
make
sense
of
sensations
in
the
way
that
we
do
and
actually
one
of
the
things
that's
I,
think
really
surprising
in
the
book.
My
book
is
that
some
animals,
including
dogs,
can
do
conceptual,
can
do
conceptual
things
that
most
people
actually
were
unaware
of
in
part,
because
we're
always
comparing
them
to
ourselves.
We're
always
seeing
other
animals
through
our
own,
our
own
lenses
and
comparing
them
to
the
kinds
of
things
that
we
can
do.
A
But
in
fact,
you
know
it's
very
possible
that
other
animals
can
make
sense
of
their
sensations
in
ways
that
we
are
unfamiliar
with
that
we
are
unaware
of
so
I
guess
what
I
would
say
is
I'm
not
saying
that
other
animals
are
conceptually
unsophisticated,
I'm
saying
that
that
we
make
sense
of
our
sensations,
including
our
sensations,
of
what
the
sights
and
sounds
that
come
from
them.
We
make
sense
of
those
sensations
in
a
particular
way
that
it's
not
there's
no
evidence
right
now
that
there
are
any
other
animals
on
the
face
of
the
earth.
A
That
being
said,
there
are
some
animals
that
come
really
close
and
also
it's
possible,
as
I
say
in
the
book
that
if
we
stopped
looking
at
other
animals
through
you
know
human
lenses,
we
might
find
that
they
make
sense
of
their
their
sensations
in
ways
that
we
are
unfamiliar
with.
Now
you
can
ask
the
question:
well,
okay,
so,
but
do
they
feel
emotions?
Yes
or
no?
Well
it
then
that
becomes
like
a
philosophical
debate
which
is
interesting,
but
it
can't
be
resolved
by
science.
A
You
know
if
they
make
sense
of
their
sensations
in
a
particular
way.
Is
it
a
concept
or
I
mean?
Is
it
a?
Is
it
an
emotion
or
not?
Well
that
that
sort
of
begs
the
question
of
well.
What
is
an
emotion
and
nobody
agrees
on
the
definition
of
what
an
emotion
is.
No
scientist
agrees,
people
who
are
not
scientists,
debate
about
it,
I,
don't
think
it's
a
useful
I,
don't
think
it's
a
useful
question
I
I
think
what's
useful
is
to
ask:
how
are
various
animals
making
sense
of
sensation
so
to
predict
behavior
at
that?
A
B
The
whole
the
whole
field
is
riddled
with
this
problem.
We
can
never
look
inside
an
animal
other
than
ourselves
and
directly
experience
their
subjective
experience.
The
let
me
I
know
you've
got
a
go
soon.
Let
me
just
bring
up
one
other
subject,
because
there's
a
you
know,
there's
a
lot
of
dimensions
to
your
book
that
we
haven't
gotten
into,
including
what
you
see
is
the
social
implications.
You
know
for
law
and
so
on.
So
there's
a
lot
of
things
we
could
have
talked
about.
B
B
There
may
be
cultural
differences,
and,
for
that
matter,
a
given
facial
expression
is
especially
frozen
in
a
photograph
could
mean
a
lot
of
things
depending
on
context
and
what
the
person
is
gonna
do
next,
but
but
a
distinction
that
occurred
to
me
in
kind
of
evolutionary
terms,
is
between
what
you
might
call
the
say,
original
evolution
of
an
emotion.
Let's
take
something
like
anger
or
rage,
and
and
and
and
just
provisionally
accept
what
you
might
consider
the
naive
you
that
it
evolved
as
part
of
a
physiological
complex
that
motivates
an
animal
to
attack.
B
Somebody
who
has
attacked
it
or
whatever,
just
to
accept
accept
that.
Let's
stipulate
that
there
still
is
the
secondary
signaling
function
so
that
once
it
becomes
known
that
people
in
your
species
who
are
enraged
may
attack,
you,
then
exaggerating.
Your
rage
could,
in
theory,
make
adaptive
sense,
there's
a
way
to
intimidate
people
or
way
to
send
a
signal
as
to
just
exactly
how
angry
you
are
and
so
on.
So
you've
got
in
principle.
These
two
separate
functions,
one
of
which
is
signaling
and
I,
would
expect
the
signaling
function.
B
Even
if
the
emotions
themselves
were
universal,
I
would
expect
the
signaling
function
to
in
principle
come
to
differ
significantly
say
along
cultural
lines.
There
could
be
different.
You
know
kind
of
cultural
evolution
in
different
cultures
that
led
to
differences
in
the
in
the
expression,
the
convention,
expression
of
emotions.
Does
that
make
any
sense
to
you?
Well.
A
It's
a
nice
story
and
sure
it
makes
it's
a
story
that
makes
sense
and
but,
as
a
scientist
I
would
have
to
ask
the
question
you
know
is
it?
Does
the
evidence,
support
it
and
I
think
that
the
the
some
of
your
stipulated
assumptions
are
flawed?
If
you
haven't,
if
you
have
a
wrath
who
engages
in
defensive
aggression,
which
you
know
basically
means
it's
like
it,
it
does
like
you
know
it
kicks
up
its
bedding
and
tries
to
attack.
You
know
another
animal.
Is
that
fear,
or
is
that
anger,
I.
B
A
But
I
might
point
is
that
aggression,
aggression,
you
know
in
some
the
exact
same
behavior
is,
in
some
cases
seen
as
an
indicator
of
anger
and
in
other
cases
it's
seen
as
an
indicator
of
fear
and
when
it's
exactly
the
same
behavior
and
exactly
the
same
physiological
pattern
in
the
rat.
So
my
point
is
that
your
stipulation,
like
the
whole
story
that
you
just
gave
is
very,
very
clausa
Balazs,
a
hypothesis.
Absolutely
it's
just
that.
Some
of
the
stipulations
that
you
made
at
the
outset
actually
aren't
scientifically
supported,
I
think
so
they.
B
A
Well,
it's
not
my
conclusion.
It
isn't
based
on
the
fact
that
I,
don't
because
my
groceries
are
variable
expressions
are
variable
I.
Don't
therefore
assume
that
what
you
would
say
the
emotion
themselves
as
if
the
emotion
is
somehow
separate
from
the
expression,
that's
a
very
conventional
way
to
understand
what
an
emotion
is
and
but
that's
not
the
logic
that
I'm
using
at
all
I
know.
B
Besides,
for
example,
that
it's
not
so
clear
as
people
once
thought,
it
was
that
there
are
really
highly
consistent
biological
fingerprints
for
given
emotions
like
if
you
look
at
what's
going
on
in
the
brain
or
in
the
body
there
isn't
that
kind
of
uniform
I
know,
there's
a
lot
of
different
things.
You're
I
don't
want
to
trivialize
your
argument,
you're
bringing
a
lot
of
different
things
to
bear.
A
Somebody
who
was
interested
in
emotion,
I,
didn't
think
my
whole
career
would
be
about
the
nature
of
emotion,
I
guess
what
I
would
say
is
that
what
I,
what
I
tell
my
graduate
students
actually,
which
is
when
you
read
something
in
the
paper
or
in
a
book
or
in
a
scientific
journal
article
when
you
read
something
and
you
think
to
yourself.
This
is
just
right.
A
Similarly,
if
you
read
something-
and
you
think
absolutely,
this
is
like
obviously
true-
you
should
stop
and
think
for
a
minute,
because
what
it
means
is
that
you've
just
read
something
which
confirms
a
deeply
held
belief
that
you
have
and
both
of
those
things
or
both
of
those
you
know
are
traps
for
a
scientist
you.
What
you
want
to
do
is
you
want
to
take
your
deeply
held
beliefs
and
you
want
to
hold
them
out
as
hypotheses
which
are
testable
by
data
and
I.
So
I
think
that
you
know
when
it
comes
to
emotion.
A
Emotions
are
part
of
the
narrative
of
who
we
are
as
people
as
a
species
in
a
part
of
our
theory,
of
who
we
are
what
it,
what
it
means
to
have
be
a
human
and
what
human
nature
is
like.
So
it's
very
fraught
it's
fraught
from
right
from
the
beginning,
because
we
have
a
lot
that's
invested
in
in
any
particular
theoretical
view,
and
so
what
I
try
to
do
is
just
you
know,
try
to
catch
myself
in
those
moments
and
try
to
maintain
what
I
would
think
of.
You
are
familiar
with
the
concept
of
equanimity.
A
I
I
would
try
to
maintain
some
equanimity
in
the
sense
that
you
want
to
be
persuadable
by
evidence,
and
you
want
to
be
curious
about
what
the
answer
is.
Instead
of
foreclosing,
you
know
because
it
feels
good
or
because
you're
you're
trying
to
avoid
pissing
yourself
off
I,
guess
that's
my
that
for
me,
that's
the
bottom
line
in
all
of
this
I.
B
Agree,
it
is
very
hard
and
one
reason
it's
hard
is
because
people
don't
naturally
perceive
that
these
reactions
are
actually
effectively
driven
the
the
the
either
attraction
to
an
idea
or
rejection
of
idea
and
and
and
I
actually
I.
Think
meditation
can
make
you
a
little
better,
perceiving
that
yeah,
but
anyway,.