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From YouTube: Risk, Vulnerability and the Precarity of Identity Gregory Vigneaux Adapt Institute OpenShift Commons
Description
Risk, Vulnerability, and the Precarity of Identity
Dec 18 2020
OpenShift Commons Briefing #TransformationFriday
Guest Speaker: Gregory Vigneaux (Adapt Institute)
Host(s): Diane Mueller and Jabe Bloom (Red Hat)
Link to slides: https://bit.ly/3r9We95
Gregory Vigneaux (Adapt Institute) discusses organizational identity and the processes that continually reproduce it as two key frames for understanding and evaluating risk. The vulnerability of identity and its reproduction are then explored while offering insights into resilience and adaptive capacity. After the talk, we’ll have a conversation led by Jabe Bloom and Diane Mueller (Red Hat) and take questions from the audience.
Our Guest, Gregory Vigneaux (Adapt Institute) is a consultant focused on incidents, turbulence, and risk. His work is founded on practical experience fighting forest fires around the country with U.S. Forest Service and National Park Service Hotshot Crews, a master’s degree in emergency management, and a continued fascination with how we operate in dynamic environments. He has worked for FEMA, consulted for Save the Children, developed a systems course for the Naval Post Graduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security, and co-founded the Adapt Institute (https://bit.ly/34yzZjE) .
Website: www.gregoryvig.com
A
B
Thank
you
so
much
diane,
my
name
is
gregory
vigneo,
it's
a
really
hard.
Last
name
I
am
coming
to
you
live
today
from
boulder
colorado.
I
thought
it'd
be
good
to
give
a
little
bit
of
background
here
to
maybe
show
you
a
little
bit
of
where
I'm
coming
from
some
of
my
practical
background,
the
most
formative
parts
of
it
are
in
wildland
firefighting.
B
I
worked
for
the
united
states,
forest
service
and
national
park
service,
primarily
on
what
are
known
as
hotshot
crews,
which
are
highly
trained,
highly
cohesive,
highly
self-sufficient
units
of
about
20
to
22
people
that
respond
to
high
priority
fires
all
over
the
country
and
they
hike
into
traditionally
remote
parts
of
fires
and
spend
anywhere
from
just
a
couple
to
14
days,
working
on
the
perimeter
of
the
fire
with
chainsaws
and
hand
tools
to
prevent
the
fire
from
spreading
any
further.
It
was
probably
the
best
job
I've
had.
B
It
was
a
very
formative
experience
being
able
to
work
every
day
to
eat
sleep
with
the
same
bunch
of
men
and
women
and
work
for
about
six
to
seven
months
together,
doing
the
same
thing
day
in
and
day
out.
So
got
a
lot
of
experience
working
in
units,
it's
a
hot
shot,
crew
or
a
wildfire
crew.
I
think
you
could
also
call
it
a
team
and
we
go
all
over
the
all
over
the
country,
so
a
lot
of
diverse
experience
there.
B
B
So
I
did
a
bachelor's
degree
in
wildfire
management
and
master's
degree
in
emergency
management,
and
I've
been
fortunate
to
work
on
a
few
different
emergency
management
disaster
management
research
projects
here
and
in
new
zealand,
including
co-founding.
The
adapt
institute
with
two
great
colleagues
the
adapt
institute
is.
Its
purpose
is
to
help
progress,
emergency
management
practice
and
education
through
a
core
competency
approach.
B
So
my
background
is
in
natural
hazards
and
emergency
management,
and
I
think
that
when
I
see
this
community
and
interact
with
you
online,
I
think
we
have
a
lot
of
things
in
common.
I
think
we're
just
coming
to
sort
of
the
same
things
from
different
angles,
and
I'm
really
excited
about
that.
I'm
particularly
excited
about
things
like
the
incident
command
system,
making
its
way
over
to
your
neck
of
the
woods,
which
is
an
artifact
of
the
wildfire
management
system.
B
So
I
think
that
there
is
a
lot
of
similarities,
a
lot
of
things
we
share
and
we
can
have
a
lot
of
really
interesting
discussions
around
incident
management
and
hazards,
risk
and
vulnerability
just
coming
at
it
from
two.
You
know
very
different
angles,
so
I'm
hoping
to
be
able
to
continue
this
discussion
with
you
after
the
talk
and
hopefully
online
through
twitter
and
email
and
whatever
else.
B
So
what
I'm
hoping
to
do
today
in
this
talk
is
really
elevate:
the
organizational
identity
and
the
work
so
framing
the
work
as
the
processes
that
reproduce
this
identity
as
two
elements
that
we
can
use
to
evaluate
and
analyze
hazards
and
risk.
So
I
want
to
put
those
central
to
discussion
about
vulnerability,
so
in
doing
so,
I
want
to
first
start
out
with
a
bit
of
a
metaphor
and
then
dive
into
some
of
the
theory
where
we
get
identity
from
this
theory
of
self-individuation.
B
B
So
right
off
the
bat
you
have
something
that
has
an
identity.
The
giraffe's
giraffeness
is
its
identity,
and
it
needs
to
continuously
reproduce
this
identity
to
continue
being
a
giraffe.
So
right
off
the
bat
identity
is
precarious
to
the
degree
that
you
always
need
to
reproduce
it.
So
the
metaphor
here
is
to
organizations
and
organizational
identity,
and
I
think
it
is
generally
easiest
to
think
about
organizational
identity
in
terms
of
what
the
function
of
the
organization
is,
but
there's
obviously
more
to
it
to
that.
B
What
tristan
others
call
the
goodness
of
fit
between
these
two
systems
and
there's
ideas
about
how
tasks
should
be
designed
and
how
works
should
be
managed
and
how
teams
should
act.
So
all
of
this,
I
think
kind
of
maybe
coalesces-
is
the
word
into
an
identity,
so
being
an
organization
is
already
doing
something
and
that
an
organization
has
to
continuously
make
itself
into
the
kind
of
organization
that
it
is,
and
that
is
a
very
precarious
thing
for
reasons
that
spend
quite
a
few
slides
getting
into.
B
Is
you
have
to
keep
the
ball
rolling
to
continue
having
that
identity,
and
this
becomes
particularly
difficult
when
we
talk
about
you
know
what
is
in
the
environment
the
what
is
in
alterity,
so
that
becomes
increasingly
difficult.
So
coarse
guard
goes
on
to
say
that
a
giraffe
is
trying
to
keep
a
particular
instance
of
giraffeness
going
and
one
of
the
ways
that
the
giraffe
does.
This
is
through
nutrition,
so
giraffes
to
keep
going
have
to
consume
plant
life.
B
B
So
one
of
the
things
that
I
think
she's
bringing
up
here
that
we
should
pay
attention
to
is
this
emergence
of
identity
and
environment
that
are
alongside
one
another.
So
to
part
of
the
giraffe's
identity
is
that
it
is
a
vegetarian
so
to
that
giraffe.
What
appears
as
food
depends
on
that
identity
of
being
a
vegetarian,
so
I
do
identity.
Plant
life
equals
food
and
for
identity
can
to
continue,
is
contingent
upon
the
inflow
of
food.
So
there's
this
sort
of
always
co-emergence.
B
What
we
need
to
reproduce
our
identity
depends
on
what
our
identity
is
and
that
identity
is
contingent
upon
receiving
some
sort
of
flows
from
the
environment.
So
there
is
this
coupling
that
is
taking
place.
That
is
also
very
precarious.
So
not
only
do
you
have
to
continue
reproducing
this
identity,
which
is
hard
enough
in
a
vacuum,
but
you
also
have
to
do
this
now
with
being
dependent
on
something
from
the
environment
entering
into
the
system.
And
lastly,
coarse
guard
says
that
to
regenerate
which
I
think
she's
talking
about
the
lineage
of
the
giraffe.
B
She
needs
to
reproduce,
and
I
think
we
can
connect
this
to
sort
of
an
organizational
in
an
organizational
way
by
saying
that
to
continue
being
the
kind
of
organization
we
are,
we
need
to
produce
technologies
in
the
form
of
products
and
services
that
will
reproduce
our
identity.
I
definitely
want
to
get
into
that
further
because
it's,
I
think,
it's
a
very
core
piece
of
being
a
socio-technical
system.
B
So
I
want
to
dive
down
a
little
bit
here
and
talk
about
where
some
of
this
idea
of
having
an
identity
is
from
and
being
a
entity
comes
from.
There
are
a
number
of
places
that
I
think
you
can
get
this
from.
I
like
to
use
the
organismic
metaphors
that
come
from
an
act
of
cognition
in
the
work
of
evan
thompson,
francisco
varela
and
now
ezekiel
de
paulo,
which
is
where
I
think
the
work
of
alberto
matrana
and
francisco
varela
kind
of
exists
in
its
final
form
for
the
time
being.
B
So
the
first
thing
they
address
is
this
idea
of
stealth
production.
The
giraffe
is
a
self-producing
unit,
but
of
course
they
provide
in
the
second
half
of
this
quote
the
very
important
condition
that
yes
self-producing,
but
also
dependent
on
environment,
to
perpetuate
these
self-producing
processes.
B
So
another
way
of
saying
this
is
that
all
possible
states
of
activity
must
always
lead
to
or
generate
further
activity.
So
there's
this
kind
of
self-perpetuating
self-referential
cycle,
and
this
is
where
you
get
identity
from
a
few
different
few
different
people
to
include
evan
thompson
or
an
agreement
that
operational
closure
is
where
identity
first
emerges
from.
B
So
then,
you
get
the
condition
of
self-distinction,
which
is
where
there
is
something
that
differentiates
inside
from
outside
of
these
this
operationally
closed
network.
They
say
that
it
provides.
This
provides
the
possibility
of
a
boundary,
but
it
doesn't
necessarily
need
to
be
a
boundary
some
kind
of
processes.
Some
kind
of
something
is
taking
place.
That
is
saying
this
is
the
inside.
This
is
the
outside.
B
So
I
think
that
this
is
the
minimum
sort
of
graphical
representation
that
you
can
have
of
what
it
is
they're
talking
about
right.
So
I've
drawn
this
with
a
boundary,
because
I
think
that
it
is
the
easiest
way
to
imagine
it,
and
then
you
have
on
the
inside.
Here
you
have
the
top
of
the
feedback
loop,
which
is
can
consist
of
processes
which
I'm
calling
here
work
cycles,
and
I'm
you
get
that
from
some
of
the
earliest
work
on
socio-technical
systems
from
tris
and
tristan
bamforth.
B
So
maybe
one
of
the
ways
to
think
about
this
is
work
begets
more
work,
I
think,
is
probably
the
simplest
way
to
put
it,
but
this
work
that
begets
more
work
is
always
producing
the
identity
of
this
of
this
organization
as
a
coal
mining
organization.
As
long
as
these
things
keep
happening
as
long
as
this
cycle
keeps
moving
around,
you
are
reproducing
the
identity
of
the
coal
mine
as
the
coal
mine.
Now
there's
a
couple
interesting
things
to
maybe
draw
attention
to
here
that
are
interesting
for
discussions
of
risk
and
vulnerability.
B
A
lot
of
I
think
what
I
tend
to
be
focused
on
is
are
external
threats
and
things
that
are
outside
of
us,
even
the
things
that
are
somehow
tied
to
us
because
of
our
dependency
I'll.
Think
about
things
being
very
external
and
from
my
natural
hazards
background,
I
think
that's
definitely
part
of
it,
but
trist
in
a
few
different
papers
with
a
couple
of
different
co-authors
brings
up
some
interesting,
interesting
points
about
work
cycles
and
how
they
can
or
cannot,
produce
vulnerabilities
and
again.
B
They
had
boundary
tasks,
meaning
they
could
work
across
across
functions
and
the
sort
of
the
complete
work
cycle
was
their
responsibility
and
they
were
in.
The
entire
team
was
responsible
for
that
work
cycle
through
what
is
what
they
call
responsible
autonomy
now,
after
the
age
of
mechanization.
What
happened
was?
Is
you
had
what's
called
long
wall
teams
and
they
were
working
instead
of
small
groups?
They
were
working
to
like
40
50
group,
40,
40
to
50
person
groups,
and
these
groups
were
highly
fragmented.
B
B
These,
like
multi-skilled
teams,
was
that
they
had
created
very
interdependent
tasks,
and
that
was
where
that
work
cycle
was
becoming
vulnerable,
because
if
everyone
needed
to
be
at
100
performance
all
the
time
and
because
people
were
dissatisfied
with
the
way
of
the
conditions
in
the
mind
rightly
so,
there
was
high
absenteeism
and
people
weren't
getting
along.
So
you
had
this
situation
where
people
who
shouldn't
have
been
in
the
mind
were
having
to
come
down
and
provide
reinforcements.
B
B
Yes,
but
it
also
scales
to
a
vulnerability
in
the
ability
of
the
organization
to
reproduce
its
identity,
so
it
scales
in
that
way,
so
keeping
in
mind
self-distinction
and
self-production
de
paulo
wants
to
talk
about
flows,
and
he
first
says
that
autopilesis,
which
is
closely
related
to
operational
closure,
doesn't
adequately
account
for
exchanges
of
matter
sort
of
across
the
boundary
of
the
cell
or
whatever.
The
autophagic
unit
has
to
be
it's
generally
a
cell,
so
they
think
that
they
haven't
appropriately
accounted
for.
B
This
primordial
tension
that
is
involved
in
self-individuation,
and
they
provide
two
sort
of
extremes
and
the
first
one
is
total
openness
and
they
say
that
a
state
of
total
openness
there
is
no
self-distinction,
so
there
is
no
delimited
unity.
Every
environmental
flow.
Everything
in
the
environment
contributes
to
your
identity.
They
say
it
continues
to
contributes
to
self-production.
B
I
have
a
bit
of
an
issue
with
that.
I
think
that
if
you
are
accepting
every
environmental
flow
into
your
system,
you
are
sustaining
the
system
in
some
way,
but
you're
not
producing
an
identity,
because
you
haven't
really
selected
every
anything
you're
not
holding
on
to
anything
falsely,
as
in
in
an
emphasis
on
a
paper
on
a
certain
slowness
right,
would
write
that
you
are
being
as
there's
no
difference
between
you
and
your
environment
because
you're
moving
too
fast.
B
So
in
this
extreme,
I
you
don't
really
get
into
an
identity
and
the
bottom
one
where
you're
totally
delimited.
You
have
a
very
strong
sense
of
identity,
you're,
protecting
that
there
is
a
impenetrable
boundary
around
your
organism
and
around
the
organization
totally
robust.
Nothing
can
come
in
no
environmental
flows,
but
at
the
same
time
you
can't
reproduce
your
identity,
because
you're
not
letting
letting
anything
in.
B
So
these
are
the
two
extremes
he
says
we
need
to
overcome
and
the
way
that
he
does,
that
is
through
talking
about
agency,
which
is
a
a
really
interesting
way
to
go
with
this.
He's
saying
that
as
agents
through
regulating
our
agency
and
it's
the
collective
agency
of
the
organization,
or
maybe
some
people
in
the
organization,
you
are
accepting
flows
that
contribute
to
self-production
and
you
are
rejecting
flows
that
would
harm
your
ability
to
be
self-distinct
to
be
delimited
from
your
boundary.
B
B
But
once
that
decision
has
been
made,
there
is
a
further
degree
of
precarity
that
is
sort
of
instituted
there,
because
you
at
some
point
might
need
to
change
these
flows.
You
might
need
to
switch
to
another
flow,
I'm
going
to
get
into
that
a
little
bit
later,
with
the
hazard
analysis
section,
I
think
it's
just
that's
where
your
adaptive
capacity
sort
of
comes
from.
I
think
one
of
the
areas
is
your
ability
to
select
different
flows
and
still
produce
the
same
identity.
B
So
it's
this
idea
of
moving
around
in
a
basin
of
attraction
and
being
multi-stable
in
the
earlier
example,
the
giraffe
is
multi-stable
in
the
sense
that
it
can
eat
anything
essentially
any
plant
matter,
and
it
does
pretty
well.
It
has
specific
routines
in
flood
and
drought,
it's
multi-stable,
but
it's
not
multi-identity,
and
that
you
can't
make
a
giraffe
a
carnivore.
B
B
B
So
if,
in
cases
where
we
are
completely
incoherent,
I
would
say
that
we
are
not
producing
any
kind
of
identity
whatsoever,
whereas
we
can
maybe
picture
it
as
some
kind
of
graded
boundary
where
we're
somewhere
along
this
gradient
and
when
we're
completely
coherent.
We
are
driving
towards
that
identity
and
somewhere
in
the
middle,
we
stop
being
able
to
reproduce
that
identity
coherence
is
at
risk
much
in
the
same
way,
identity
is
and
that
it
is
something
that
can
be
lost.
B
We
have
an
identity
we
have
established
and
we
want
to
hang
on
to
that
identity,
and
it
is
precisely
for
that
reason
that
identity
as
first
at
risk
and
everything
else,
every
other
degree
of
precarity
is
fundamentally
second
to
that.
It
is
this
thing
that
we
don't
want
to
lose
and
that
places
it
at
risk
just
by
itself
and
coherence
is
all
at
risk
because
we're
trying
to
manage
and
lead
organizations
and
maybe
transform
them
in
a
in
a
coherent
way.
B
We
don't
want
to
lose
coherence,
and
if
we
do,
we
sort
of
lose
that
capacity
to
reproduce
that
identity.
I
was
there's
a
story
that
comes
to
mind
I'll,
just
briefly
share
with
you.
I
was
hiking
into
a
fire
in
california
some
years
ago
and
when
you
do
this
and
you're
always
in
a
highly
structured
line,
every
wildfire
is
a
highly
ordered
system
and
we
were
hiking
in
along
this
road
and
we
were
hiking
along
some
power.
B
Poles
and
they'd
already
fired
already
come
through
there
and
I
was
walking
along
and
every
all
of
a
sudden.
Everyone
realized
that
the
utility
lines
were
coming
down
on
top
of
us,
which
is
never
a
good
thing,
and
everybody
from
we
went
from
this
moment
of
total
coherence,
totally
driving
the
identity
to
completely
incoherent,
not
producing
any
identity,
and
that's
what
I
think
about
when
I
think
about
coherence
and
the
production
of
identity.
B
So
I
want
to
start
here
by
putting
some
of
these
concepts
together.
I
think
we've
got
an
understanding
of
identity
as
this
ongoing
kind
of
this
process
of
self-individuation,
where
it
is
delimited
and
there's
operational
closure.
There
is
a
network
that
is
continuing
to
reproduce
that
identity
and
then,
underneath
that
we
have
identity
reproduction.
B
B
I
think
the
the
larger
these
get,
the
more
they
sort
of
preclude
change
to
a
certain
degree
or
the
harder
they
are
to
change
to
a
certain
degree
there.
So
if
it
gets
really
big-
and
I
think
part
of
that
bigness
is-
there
are
specific
versions
of
the
past
and
detailed
stories
about
the
future,
they
all
sort
of
make
it
kind
of
hard
to
move
in
any
direction.
I
think
you
become
very
focused
on
robustness
and
not
focused
on
multi-stability
and
certainly
not
focused
on
transformation.
B
B
I,
like
cilia's
paper,
is
really
is
really
great
here,
he's
saying
that
you
have
to
invest
some
sort
of
resources
in
the
reproduction
of
this
identity.
You
are
hanging
on
to
something
that
makes
you
the
kind
of
organization
that
you
are,
and
I
think
that
that's
exactly
right,
the
larger
your
identity
is,
I
tend
to
think
or
more
have
the
thicker
that
it
is.
B
I
think
you're
going
to
tend
to
invest
more
resources
and
reproducing
that
than
you
would
if
it
was
let's
say
smaller
to
some
degree,
and
you
were
maybe
a
little
bit
more
sort
of
ready
for
or
open
to
change
within
this
idea,
this
understanding
of
who
you
are
so
there
at
the
bottom.
There
is
this
inflow
that
is
coming
into
the
operationally
closed
network.
B
There
is
also
an
outflow
now
in
depaulo's
work.
He
refers
to
the
inflow
as
an
enabling
condition,
so
something
is
entering
into
these
reproducing
processes
that
perpetuates
them.
But
in
our
case,
when
we're
talking
about
a
socio-technical
system,
there's
also
something
that's
coming
out.
That
is
part
of
that
identity.
Reproduction,
and
I
want
to
draw
attention
to
that
now.
B
This
is
a
bit
of
an
expansion
on
de
paulo's
work
in
the
sense
that
we're
looking
at
that
output
in
a
in
a
very
material
way,
but
I
think
it
I
think
it
applies.
So
if
you
are,
let's
say
a
bridge
company,
you
need
an
input
of
materials
to
make
that
bridge.
So
that's
the
inflow.
Of
course
you
need
other
things,
but
at
the
bare
minimum
you
need
something
to
make
a
bridge.
B
B
I
like
the
concept
of
the
bridge
because
it
connects
to
ann
marie
willis's
paper
on
ontological
design,
but
the
bridge,
let's
say,
connects
to
socio-technical
communities,
so
two
social
technical
systems
that
are
communities
and
makes
possible
commerce
that
wasn't
possible
before
let's
say
so.
That
also
needs
to
be
sustained.
That
is
part
of
what
you
are
sustaining
through
maintaining
the
bridge.
B
I
think
there
is
also
a
certain
amount
of
risk
that
is
generated
that
needs
to
be
faced
by
the
bridge
company
by
putting
up
a
bridge
a
a
certain
amount
has
been
introduced.
I
think
folk
in
a
paper
called
resilience.
Thinking
does
the
best
version
of
this.
Where
he
comments
on
how
resilient
international
european
travel
had
become,
and
then
goes
on
to
say
that
yes
super
resilient,
but
when
the
icelandic
volcano
sort
of
took
place
in,
I
think
2008
and
made
air
travel
impossible.
B
B
I
think
that
we
also
from
a
natural
hazard
standard
that
bridge
becomes
vulnerable
to
a
lot
of
different
malice
and
floods
and
mass
land
movements.
It's
all
tied
up
in
this,
but
it's
this
output
that
we
need
to
continue
not
only
being
used
but
maintain.
I
know
bridge
companies,
don't
generally
maintain
bridges,
but
for
the
sake
of
the
metaphor,
we
need
to
keep
this
technology
in
use
to
continue
reproducing
our
identity.
B
So
I
want
to
come
back
up
now.
I
think,
after
being
in
a
little
bit
of
a
in
being
in
an
abstract
space
and
simplify
this
a
little
bit
more
using
the
work
of
maturana,
so
maturana
talks
about
systems
as
having
structure
and
organization,
and
I
think
the
easiest
way
to
talk
about
this
is
through
his
example
of
using
a
table.
So
a
table
can
be
made
of
plastic
or
steel
or
wood.
It
can
have
a
glass
table
that
can
be
a
top
that
can
be
glass.
It
can
be
oval.
B
It
can
be
really
any
any
number
of
configurations,
but
that
is
its
structure,
its
organization.
What
it
also
also
refers
to
as
its
class
identity
is
its
tableness,
so
its
organization
is
its
identity.
It's
how
you
know
it's
a
table
so
for
us
for
our
purposes
here.
The
structure
of
the
system
is
what
reproduces
the
system
as
the
kind
of
system
that
it
is
and
its
organization
is
that
system's
identity.
B
B
So
all
you
can
do
is
is
provide
a
perturbation
that
can
trigger
a
change,
but
you
don't
actually
cause
that
change
by
what
you
did
to
the
system
for
job
capra
gives
an
example.
He's
like
you,
could
you
you
can
kick
a
dog,
but
whatever
that
dog
is
gonna.
Do
is
based
upon
its
structure,
its
history
and
how
it
exists
at
that
moment,
so
we
get
systems
that
are
acting
based
on
their
own
internal
dynamics.
B
So
this
is
fundamental
to
the
next
slide,
which
is
my
own
version
of
this.
I
think
maturana
matarana
writes
that
you
can
classify
any
system
by
using
these
four
domains
of
structural
determinism
and
in
the
first
one
you
write,
so
you
have
interactions
that
can
trigger
changes
of
state,
which
is
just
a
mildly,
changing
the
system.
Whereas
then,
you
can
have
a
domain
of
changes
of
state
where
you
have
changes
in
structure
without
loss
of
class
identity.
B
The
example
that
maturana
gives
is,
he
gave
his
son
a
saw
and
a
little
toolkit
and
his
son
cut
off
the
end
of
his
table
and
that
table
was
still
recognizable
as
a
table,
even
though
it
had
lost
some
of
his
structure.
He
goes
on
to
say
that
in
the
domain
of
possible
disintegrations,
you
can
have
structural
changes
with
loss
of
class
identity.
B
He
then
gives
the
example
that
his
son
went
on
to
actually
cut
the
table
in
half
and
it
lost
its
tableness,
so
it
was
no
longer
identifiable
as
a
table,
but
it
was
identifiable
as
something
else.
Then
you
have
the
domain
of
possible
destructive
interactions,
so
interactions
that
can
disintegrate
the
system.
B
B
So
I
think
that
the
first
thing
you
get
that
was
maturana's
domain
of
perturbations
are
possible
interactions
that
trigger
no
changes
or
changes
in
daily
in
operations.
So
I
think,
there's
subtle
changes.
They
don't
really
require
too
much
it's
a
variation
in
input
that
doesn't
change
anything
in
output.
B
While
our
identity
maintains
not,
nothing
has
changed
in
our
identity,
and
I
think
you
get
kind
of
a
few
different
versions
of
this.
I
think
the
first
one
is
that
if
you
are
a
bridge
company-
and
that
is
your
identity
and
you
are
making
bridges
out
of
stone
and
that's
your
thing
and
stone
is
no
longer
in
vogue.
B
Let's
just
say
you
have
the
possibility
to
change
your
inflows
from
stone
to
iron.
Part
of
that
equation
is
is
that
you
need
to
also
change
how
you
transform
inflows
into
outflows
and
to
borrow
from
the
socio-technical
systems,
literature.
We
start
talking
about
multi-skilling
in
there
of
training
people
or
having
people
who
are
able
to
work
with
more
than
one
material
and
still
transfer
transform
that
into
an
output
that
sustains
your
identity
as
a
bridge
company.
So
flows
can
change
in
sort
of
any
number
of
degrees
and
still
produce
the
same
identity.
B
So
we
have
this
capacity
for
multi-skilling
multi-stability
in
the
domain
of
resilience,
where
we're
sort
of
moving
around
in
a
basin
of
attraction,
we're
changing
flows
but
we're
keeping
that
identity
constant.
I
think
that's
the
idea
of
resilience,
I
think,
in
the
earliest
paper,
from
that
I've
seen
from
hollings
in
73.
Is
you
get
this
idea
of
persistence?
B
So
identity
persists,
but
the
way
that
it
is
reproduced
change.
So
this
brings
us
down
to
transforming
giraffes
into
tigers.
You
have
all
possible
interactions
that
can
trigger
changes
in
our
identity,
as
well
as
how
we
produce
it.
So
we're
not
talking
about
really
basins
of
attraction
at
first
we're
talking
about
changing
what
they
are,
so
that
we
can
move
into
a
new
one
and
change
our
identity
and
its
reproduction
folk
writes
about
that.
This
can
be
deliberate.
We
can
change
from
a
being
a
bridge
company
to
possibly
being
an
airplane
company.
B
We
can
change
who
it
is
that
we
are.
I
think
the
forest
service
is
going
through
or
is
presented
with
a
domain
of
transformation
right
now
or
are
are
approaching
it
and
that
they
have
to
move
from
a
seasonal
workforce
to
a
full-time
workforce.
That
will
definitely
change
the
culture
of
that
organization
and
that
that
could
be
something
that
could
be
deliberate
on
their
part.
I
also
there
are
it
all.
Is
also
written
about
that
these
things
can
be
forced.
B
There
are
changes
in
what
gundersen
and
hauling
would
call
the
panarky
that
surrounds
you.
There
could
be
changes
in
in
that
in
any
number
of
those
layers
that
force
you
to
transform,
who
you
are
and
how
you
produce
that
identity,
and
I
think,
in
that
case
you
end
up
in
this
domain
of
dissolution
before
moving
back
into
the
domain
of
transformation.
B
There
is
something
that
is
that
you
go
through
and
then
move
back
into
that,
but
there's
this
period
where
you
maybe
don't
know
who
you
are
and
how
you're
producing
that.
One
of
the
examples
that
comes
to
mind
from
my
background
is
hurricane
katrina,
where
the
federal
policy
emergency
management
policy
landscape
had
just
changed
drastically,
and
I
don't
think
people
really
knew
how
things
were
supposed
to
go
and
identity
was
unclear.
B
So
matriarana
writes
that
if
you
go
fall
into
the
domain
of
dissolution,
a
new
system
of
a
new
class
appears.
So
you
don't
have
what
whatever
you
went
in
there
with
you're
not
going
to
have
after
you
leave.
So
I
think
this
is.
This
is
maybe
a
place
where,
if
you
fall
into
it
from
another
domain-
and
I
was
definitely
influenced
by
canada
when
thinking
about
this,
you
could
move
you,
you
enter
there
and
a
new
system
might
emerge
and
bring
you
back
into
one
of
the
other
domains.
B
So
when
putting
this
together,
my
goal
was
to
create
something
that
would
help
me
and
maybe
others
to
think
about
what
hazards
are
we
vulnerable
to,
as
it
relates
on
this
very,
I
would
say,
an
almost
coarse
scale
of
our
identity
and
who
we
are,
I
think,
that's
I
think,
that's
a
big
part
of
what
we're
looking
at
these
sort
of
brand
large-scale
questions.
What
is
out
there
that
could
stop
us
from
being
ourselves.
B
What
are
the
opportunities
to
change,
how
we
reproduce
ourselves?
How
can
we
change
from
the
kind
of
animal
that
we
are
and
what
lies
out
there?
That
could
cause
us
to
really
be
in
a
lot
of
trouble,
and
I
think
the
follow-up
question
to
that
is
what
is
beyond
our
transformative
and
adaptive
capacity.
B
So
although
the
concepts
are
different,
I
think
this
definitely
stays
consistent
with
maturana's
original
purpose
of
figuring
out
how
much
change
is
possible
before
we
no
longer
remain
the
same,
and
what
we're
looking
at,
I
think,
is
more
in
terms
of
hazards
than
maybe
in
terms
of
what
hubbard
was
writing
about
with
risk
management
some.
But
I
think
it's
definitely
a
a
hazard
analysis
that
it
is
asking
how
much
can
we
withstand
and
what
can
we
do
about
it
in
these
course
categories
of
what
is
our
identity
and
how
do
we
reproduce
it?
A
This
was
just
awesome
and
it
makes
you
think
about
organizations
on
on
so
many
so
many
so
many
levels,
and
I
I
can't
tell
you
how
much
thing
how
many
things
good
things
you've
triggered
in
my
head
and
there
are
a
lot
of
questions
and
comments
too.
So
if
folks
have
questions,
ask
them
the
chat.
If
you
want
to
turn
your
video
on
go
for
that
jay,
why
don't
you
take
it
away
to
start
with,
because
I
bet
you
can
lead
this
discussion
quite
nicely
sure.
D
Greg
thanks
so
much
I
I,
I
loved
the
presentation,
one
of
the
things
I
was
I
was
I
was
thinking
while
I
was
watching
it
like
you,
and
I
share
some
vocabulary
that
maybe
not
everybody
else
does
when
I
think
about
like
identity
and
the
reproduction
of
identity.
One
of
the
ways
I
might
map
it
into
the
community
that
we're
talking
to
right
now
is
kind
of
like
operations
like
literally
kind
of
the
reproduction
of
the
operating
conditions
of
a
company
or
of
a
system.
D
I
think
there's
some
interesting
things
when
you
look
at
your
last
slide
about
thinking
about
kind
of
the
way
in
which
a
system
coheres
both
kind
of
at
a
physical
mechanical
level,
but
also
the
way
in
which
that
cohe,
that
mechanical
coherence
is
kind
of
reproduced
by
social
coherences,
right,
like
by
multiple
mental
models
and
the
ability
to
kind
of
share,
just
enough
information
to
kind
of
keep
a
conversation
going.
Keep
the
social
network
together
and
stuff
like
that.
E
D
B
I
I
think
we
deal
with
a
lot
of
the
same
ideas,
a
lot
of
the
same
dynamic
aspects
of
our
work
environment.
I
think
sometimes
I'm
a
little
bit
not
having
the
software
experience,
I'm
a
little
bit
outside
of
that.
I
think
what
we
are
all
trying
to
do
is
create
and
manage
coherent
holes,
and
that
is
one
of
the
things
that
we
are
trying
to
reproduce.
B
I
think
that,
from
what
I
understand,
reading
reading
about
agile
and
different
sort
of
management
methodologies,
you're
trying
to
do
that
differently
than
we
are
we're
trying
to
do
that.
I
think
primarily
in
a
way
that
is
world
war.
One
centered
and
I
think
that
other
people
have
are
opposed
to
that
in
the
way
that
they
are
reproducing
coherence
within
their
organization
I
had
sort
of
on.
B
D
B
That
you
are
so
a
particular
a
a
typical
day
in
the
life
of
a
firefighter
is
you
know,
you're
on
a
16-hour
shift
and
you're
going
to
work
14
days
in
a
row
and
then
take
two
days
off
and
then
have
another
14
day
roll.
That's!
The
goal
is
to
is
to
stay
out
for
14
days,
because
that's
the
sweetest
deal
around.
B
So
I
think
that
drawing
the
distinction
of
not
being
on
an
incident
versus
being
on
an
incident
is
actually
pretty
hard.
So
what
we're
doing
is
there
is
a
running
narrative
lasting
the
entire
year,
the
entire
six
months,
seven
months
whatever
it
is
that
it
is
continuing
to
build
on
itself
and
we're
doing
a
lot
of
what
we
call
tailgate
sessions,
which
are
quick,
aars
sort
of
before
we
load
up
in
the
trucks
and
head
back
somewhere
else.
So
there
is
a
lot
of.
B
I
wouldn't
call
it
learning,
but
there
is
a
lot
of
constructing
this
running
narrative
of
what
we
did
and
how
it
what
went
well
and
what
didn't
and
there's
definitely
people
who
are
in
charge
of
that
narrative.
And
there
are
people
who
are
not
in
charge
of
that
narrative
just
because
there's
you
know
positions
and
varying
degrees
of
social
capital.
D
Yeah
interesting,
I
mean,
I
think,
like
you
know,
just
to
again
reflect
a
little
bit
on
on
what
you're
saying
and
try
to
like
your
tailgate
sessions,
remind
me
of
like
in
in
in
kind
of
agile
and
flow
thinking.
There's
these
two
different
ways
of
thinking
about
like
how
to
do
an
after
action
review
or
incident
review
or,
however,
you
want
to
describe
those
things,
and
one
of
them
is
that
you
set
up
time
boundaries
of
time
boxes.
D
So,
every
two
weeks
you
stop
the
development
of
software,
you
deploy
it
and
then
you
reflect
on
what
went
good
or
bad
right
and
that's
every
two
weeks
you
do
that
it's
called
the
retrospective,
but
in
flow
based
thinking.
One
of
the
things
that
we
differentiate
is
that
you
should
that
kind
of
information
rots.
D
So
if
there's
an
incident,
you
should
actually
do
the
do
the
reflection
as
close
to
the
incident
as
possible,
and
so
it's
not
a
time-bounded
thing.
It's
actually
an
event-based
thing
that
happens
and
that
that
feels
more
like
what's
happening
inside
of
like
the
resilience,
engineering,
community
and
stuff
like
that.
So
I
think
it's
something
interesting
there.
I'm
also.
D
So
much
of
like
klein's
early
work
is
so
you
know,
based
in
kind
of
analysis
of
firefighting,
so
I
think
it's
interesting
to
have
someone
who's
actually
done
the
firefighting
trying
to
think
through
some
of
this
stuff,
and
you
know
applying
it
to
actual
practice.
I
think
it's
kind
of
an
interesting
thing
when.
B
C
A
question
of
you:
real,
quick,
hey
jay.
I
I
wanted
to
know
how.
Perhaps
you
had
a
way
to
move
that
incident
management
into
like
a
life
cycle.
So
it's
more
part
of
the
the
cyber
and
I.t
risk
register
so
that
it
doesn't
become
a
one-off
thing,
you're
constantly
chasing
and
you're.
Going
after
oh
incident
incident,
I
mean
a
typical
banquet.
22
000
employees
in
13
14
countries
will
have
what
a
thousand
incidences
a
day.
You
know,
how
do
you
move
that
into
a
regular
life
cycle,
a
risk
life
cycle.
C
B
B
Yeah,
so
the
incident
command
system
is
a
product
of
wildfire.
It
was
made
after
some
really
bad.
What
we
thought
at
the
time
were
bad
wildfires
in
the
1970s,
and
it
seems
every
time
we
think
a
fire
was
bad.
The
next
year
is
worse,
so
there
needed
to
be
a
way
to
organize
things
better.
There
was
lack
of
communication,
lack
of
coordination.
It
was
pretty
incoherent,
so
they
developed
over
the
course
of
a
few
years.
What's
called
the
incident
command
system,
which
is
effectively
a
command
and
control
system?
B
Where
you
have,
you
know,
essentially
one
person
in
charge
the
ic
and
you
have
people
who
are
you
know,
operations
section,
cheap
logistics,
finance,
it
would
have
to
be
a
it
has
to
be
adapted
right
and
it
is
practiced,
as
some
sort
of
you
know,
command
and
control
model.
Here's
fierce
hierarchy,
but
I
think
that
has
a
lot
of
potential
to
be
more
of
a
complex
adaptive
system,
just
because
it
scales
pretty
well.
B
So
when
I
think
about
what
what
you
said,
this
might
be
off
board.
What
we
have
are
people
in
called
incident
management
teams
who
will
staff
the
incident
command
structure,
so
you
have
instead
of
setting
it
up
like
an
ad
hoc
incident.
Every
time
you
have
people
whose
task
it
is
to
fill
out
and
manage
the
incident,
and
then,
on
top
of
that,
you
can
have
area
command,
which
is
running
multiple
instances
of
the
incident
command
system
at
what
are
called
incident
command
posts.
B
So
it
sounds
like
if
you
have
a
bunch
of
incidents
that
are
going
on
always
having
sort
of
the
same
people
who
are
managing.
Those
incidents
is
probably
the
quickest
way
to
learn
and
also
the
quickest
way
as
to
have
point
contacts,
and
you
can
aggregate
those
off
into
area
commands
and
that
sort
of
might
bring
some
degree
of
coherence
to
what's
happening.
B
C
D
D
A
The
the
the
communication
channel
and
having
that
repeatability
is
really
very
important
for
the
for
it
to
scale
to
something
like
what
james
is
talking
at
a
bank
is
like
everybody
knows
to
come
to
that,
and-
and
somebody
does
have
to
tag
amy
here,
because
amy
had
a
good
point.
She
was
chickened
to
talk
about
it,
so
amy
bring
it
up.
E
Well,
I
I
heard
two
things
there
right
like
it.
You
mentioned
like
a
deluge
of
incidents,
and
so,
as
was
suggested,
some
kind
of
coordination
in
the
incidents
will
help
you
deal
with
those
as
they
come
up,
but
the
other
thing
we
really
work
hard
on
in
sre-
and
I
talk
about
a
lot-
is
that's
that's
one
time,
skill
right.
You
can
handle
the
incidents
in
the
event
and
there's
it's
usually
like
in
security
and
sre,
it's
very,
very
fast
paced.
E
You
know
it's
it's
in
the
matter
of
hours
or
minutes,
usually,
and
so
that
coordination
is
super
key
to
the
like
bringing
order
of
those.
But
but
you
also
need
and
greg
talked
about
this
earlier
right.
Is
we
can't
just
have
the
incident
as
the
feedback
cycle.
There
are
bigger
longer
cycles
that
we
need
that
help
us
control
the
whole
socio-technical
system
or
regulate
it
or
govern
it
or
whatever
fancy
words
are
popular
right
now
you
know,
and
so
in
sre
we
talk
about
slos
right
in
security.
E
There
are
other
controls
that
people
tend
to
use,
but
ways
of
helping
teams
understand
their
out,
how
their
outputs
are
contributing
to
risks
into
incidents
before
that
stuff
hits
production,
and
then
you
have
both
of
these
cycles
right.
You
have
the
incident
review
cycle,
that's
feeding
back
into
your
engineering
and
product
organizations
and
security
needs
this
too,
and
then,
when
you
have
these
longer
cycles,
like
slos
and
security
reviews
and
things
like
that,
those
also
need
to
feed
back
into
your
product
and
engineering
organizations,
and
that's
kind
of
that.
E
D
D
If
you
over,
consume
all
of
the
you
know
acorns,
then
the
squirrels
will
will
die
down
the
way
to
implement
that
in
a
security
system
is
to
use
something
like
error
budgeting,
so
you
can
keep
on
putting
putting
out
more
and
more
features
until
you
hit
a
certain
amount
of
error
and
then
you
have
to
switch
from
feature
production
to
security
production
right
and
that's
the
back
pressure
of
a
feedback
loop,
as
opposed
to
just
saying.
Oh,
the
feedback
loop
is
closed
because
we
have
the
number
of
incidents.
F
Yeah,
no,
I
I
posted
a
couple
of
things
there
now
the
discussion,
a
couple
of
things,
there's
a
great
presentation
by
erica
morrison,
the
devil's
enterprise
summit,
where
they
talked
about
one
of
their
largest
industry
and
they
actually
used
the
incident
command
center
stuff
from
forestry.
So
it's
an
amazing
presentation
of
how
they
bought
a
consulting
company
and
particularly
it's
a
really
good
analysis.
It
was
like
the
worst
outage
they've
ever
had
also
on
the
dynamic
nature
of
some
of
the
things
we
do
in
ops.
F
Again,
I
think
if
you
look
at
dr
woods
konagle
and
that
stuff
they
talk
about
sort
of
this
sort
of
dynamic,
thrashing,
probably
an
easy
thing
to
pick
up.
A
beautiful
overlap
is
either
john
osbar's
master's
degree
or-
and
I
think
I
posted
that
and
then
jeff
sussner
has
written
a
really
good
book
about
design
delivery.
F
But
I
think
some
of
the
work
that
john
osborne
with
dr
woods
and
richard
cook
are
doing
are
more
about
the
sort
of
the
cognition
that
you
do
in
a
dynamic
scenario
where
things
are
thrown
at
you
change
the
dynamics,
and
I
just
want
to
say
I
was
I'm
gonna
have
to
watch
your
presentation
a
couple
of
times,
but
I
thought
it
was
fascinating.
Honestly.
Thank.
B
B
The
seasonal
workforce,
the
the
people
who
are
driving
the
train,
all
all
live
together,
so
we're
never
not
processing
what
has
happened
and
not
learning.
Even
though,
even
though
the
fires
are
over,
it's
just
something.
That's
taking
place
all
the
time,
and
I
don't.
I
don't
think
you
can
discount
that
that's
one
of
the
ways
that
the
crossing
over
is
difficult,
we're
always
together,
really
and
even
like
I've
been
out
of
it
for
a
while
and
we're
still
processing
some
of
it.
B
So
it's
it's
an
ongoing
process,
and
I
think
that
is
an
advantage
in
our
favor.
There
is,
if
you're
interested-
and
this
is
a
maybe
more
of
a
stretch,
there's
also
the
cluster
approach
which
the
humanitarian
organizations
use,
which
is
much
more
of
an
innately,
complex
adaptive
systems,
way
of
managing
responses
and
one
of
the
it
it
goes
by
sections
food,
shelter,
agriculture.
B
A
There's
also
there's
another
application
of
this
we're
talking
about
risk
and
and
that,
but
also
when
we're
trying
to
create
a
corporate
identity
like
red,
hat's
culture
and
that
the
creating
cohesiveness
for
the
entire.
I
don't
know
how
many
16
000
people
there
are
too
a
lot
of
what
you're
talking
about
really
applies
to.
You
know
everything
from
corporate
culture
to
creating
a
brand
around
an
organization
to
you
know
how
we
as
organizations
are,
become
resilient
and
do
transformation,
but
you
know
how
do
we
change
too
and
create
something
that
all
of
us?
A
You
know
all
sixteen
thousand
people
who
are
being
subsumed
into
ibm
and
that's
another
360.,
I'm
sure
I
got
the
numbers
around
360
000
people.
So
how
do
we
sustain
that
identity
in
a
way?
That's
healthy
and
still
moves
the
organization
forward,
and
I
think
that's
something:
every
organization,
not
just
red
hat,
that
of
that
size
struggles
with.
So
you
know
my
my
brain
while
you're
doing
this
may
not
have
been
worried
so
much
about
linux
security
patches.
A
It
was
more
thinking
about
the
bigger
organizational
issues
that
we
have
to
create:
a
coherent
organization
that
lives
and
breathes
and
dynamically.
Does
it
in
a
healthy
inclusive
way,
and
that's
thought
you
gave
us
so
much
food
for
thought.
But
I
was
just
wondering
how
you
think
about
it
in
a
bigger
picture
way
like
large
organization
stuff,
rather
than
risk.
B
So
you're
we're
talking
about
reproducing
an
inclusive,
safe,
healthy
identity.
Is
that
sort
of
where
this
is
going?
So
I
think
gabe
has
two
terms
that
he
uses
that
I
seem
to
not
be
able
to
recall
here.
I
think
we
have
to
be
able
to
settle
first
on
what
makes
an
identity
and
decide
to
which
degree
can
we
allow
that
to
be
conflicting.
B
B
I
sort
of
think
about
that
as
like
the
central
pillar,
and
it's
the
easiest
thing
to
talk
about,
and
I
think
that's
where
I
focused
a
lot
of
my
time
today
and
I
did
acknowledge
but
didn't
really
get
into
all
the
stuff
that
sticks
to
that,
and
I
think
that's
where
the
of
where
you're
talking
about
is
where
the
trouble
lies
is
getting
like.
A
cohesive,
coherent,
positive
identity
because
you
get
and
gabe
is
the
term
fragmentation.
D
He
talks
more
about
transformation,
and
so
there's
actually
a
way
in
which
you
have
to
think
about.
There's
a
minimum
amount
of
resilience
required
to
go
through
transformation.
Otherwise
you
get
chaos.
You
get
these
delaminations,
this
disintegrations
right,
so
focusing
on
resilience
being
able
to
reproduce
stuff
and
then
going
into
a
transformation
where
your
identity
is
changing.
D
D
You
know
the
fourth
level
theory
of
environments,
which
are
complex
systems
theories
and
what
what
are
called
vertical
environments,
where
the
organization
tries
to
ingest
so
much
complexity
that
it
just
spins
apart
it
breaks
apart,
so
the
resilience
part
of
it
is
really
important
and
that
cilia's
paper,
where
he
talks
about
the
idea
you
know
like
in
software
engineering
in
particular,
we
have
a
habit
of
talking
about
options.
We
always
want
more
options,
make
more
options,
and
this
is
the
big
things
in
in
cybernetics
too
right.
D
A
All
right:
well,
we
are
sort
of
at
the
end
of
our
hour,
actually
we're
10
minutes
over
the
end
of
our
hour,
and
I
know
we
can
have
you
back
again
and
have
another
conversation
and
get
james
and
amy
and
ben
and
everybody
else.
Who's
been
chiming
in
and
barbara
on
the
side
here
in
the
in
the
chat
and
john
back
to
have
another
conversation
about
this.
A
I
think
this
is
one
one
of
the
most
thought
provoking
and
interesting
talks,
and
it
really
gave
me
a
a
lens
through
which
to
look
at
this
and
think
about
it,
much
more
deeply
for
tech
and
for
other
aspects
of
the
universe
that
we
all
live
in.
So
thank
you,
gregory
for
coming
today
and
yeah.
Barbara
is
asking
the
question
that
I
was
just
going
to
ask
you
quoted
so
many
things,
and
this
is
becoming
the
thing
on
fridays-
is:
how
do
we
get
a
bibliography
of
every
one
of
those
references?
A
A
A
Know
we're
going
through
the
giraffe
and
tiger
stuff
and
when
you
framed
it
in
resilience,
all
I
could
think
of
was
how
the
national
park
service
brought
up
their
twitter
handle
during
the
trump
era
so
that
they
could
get
out.
You
know
they
could
they
transform
themselves.
You
know
in
the
only
way
they
could
to
survive
the
four
years
of
of
trumpism
and
I'm
sorry
to
bring
up
politics
in
the
middle
of
this,
but
it
was
like
you
know.