►
From YouTube: Ostrom’s Governing the Commons - Book Club Chapter 2
Description
Timecodes:
00:00 - Topics
12:50 - Reputation system
24:45 - Separate the resource system for the flow of the units
35:20 - Two problems of the commons
41:37 - Topic about firm and the state and how to deal with oportunists
47:38 - Evolution of DAOS for governing the commons
53:25 - Raffle time! And closing.
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B
A
How
come
so
we
can
start
to
to
pass
around
and
see
if
anyone
brought
up
the
topic
to.
C
A
Cool,
we
were
talking
a
little
bit
about
this
and
the
and
the
call
where
we're
having
just
now
do
you
want
to
pass
it
to
someone.
A
D
Thanks
so
I
have
to
confess
that
I
haven't
read
the
chapter
and
I'll
be
doing
mostly
a
lot
of
listening
in,
but
I
hope
to
keep
coming
to
this
book
club
and
read
the
chapter
before
the
next
one
and
I
will
pass
it
to
tonga.
B
D
Thanks
griff
yep
same
boat
as
well,
so
this
is
my
first
time
joining
the
book
club
and
do
you
guys
have
a
resource
like?
Is
this
book
available
online
somewhere
easily.
D
F
F
Oh
no
well,
I
said
hi,
but
okay
as
far
as
topics
of
the
day
go.
One
thing
that
seemed
really
interesting
to
me
is
the
the
way
the
game
changes
in
an
iterated
game
versus
a
single
shot.
So
in
chapter
one
they
talked
a
lot
about
how
the
prisoner's
dilemma
only
holds
under
a
few
constraints.
Right
players
can't
communicate.
F
You
know
et
cetera
in
this
game
in
chapter
two,
they
talked
kind
of
about
how
over
time
players
preferences
for
cooperation
versus
defection
would
also
be
modified,
based
on
like
their
time
horizon.
F
So
if
they
expect
that
you
know
how
far
along
they
are
in
the
game,
what
they
expect
the
other
agents
to
do
and
if
they
expect
the
future
rollout
of
rewards
to
be
in
some
greater
than
the
immediate
payoff
of
defection
and
kind
of
that
that
balance,
because
that
greatly
expands
how
we
think
about
the
game
which
is
kind
of
in
chapter
one.
F
What
ostrom
said
was
a
really
important
thing
is
to
not
get
locked
into
this
very
narrow
view
of
things,
but
understand
the
variables
that
affect
the
game
itself
and
the
players
in
the
game
and
how
to
expand
that
to
achieve
optimal
outcomes.
A
F
Yeah,
so
I
think
it's
like
it's
an
iterated
game,
plus
players,
preferences
for
time
horizons
right,
because
humans,
value,
immediate
things
generally
a
whole
lot
more
and
so
how,
in
an
iterated
game,
the
time
horizon
of
players
affects
their
choice,
to
cooperate
or.
A
Is
anybody
atta?
Do
you
have
something.
G
Yes,
I
I
was
quite
fascinated
by
this
two
mentions
of
one:
how
changing
technology
affects
the
viability
of
governing
a
commons
and
two
that
one
of
the
biggest
problems
that
needs
to
be
solved
for
a
full
without
performing
commons
is
mutual
monitoring
mutual
accounting,
and
I
think
this
is
something
that
relates
quite
substantially
to
crypto,
and
it
also
got
me
excited
to
think
about.
G
You
know
like
how
crypto
could
be
applied
and
how,
like
mutual
monitoring
with
this
new
emergent
technology,
can
reach
new
levels
with
like,
like
very
increased
scale,
forecasts
yeah.
So
I
would
like
to
also
discuss
about
this.
B
I
also
find
interesting
like
it
when
it
says
like
there
is
some
people
who
is
at
least
in
spanish,
and
it
says
opportunists,
but
it's
the
like.
The
people
is
just
there
and
draining
the
the
things
of
the
commons,
and
I
think
she
talks
about
good
stuff
like
how
to
deal
with
that
like
and
not
how
to
deal
but
like
like.
It's
were
two
things
like
governance,
and
I
I
read
in
spanish.
B
I
never
know
the
words
are
good,
but
like
government,
and
I
think,
company
and
whole
like
different
systems
to
to
deal
with
that
and
yeah.
That's
what
I
found
from
more
interesting
like
to
bring
it
up.
A
Maybe
we
can
start
talking
about
this
three
puzzles
of
supply,
commitment
and
monitoring
that
she
was
talking
about
how
that's
the
most
difficult
challenges
we
have
in
a
commons,
one
to
ensure
that
we
can
bring
supply
and
supply
in
the
sense
of
rules
like
how
can
we
bring
a
set
of
rules
in
a
in
a
collaborative
way,
because
there's
also
the
independent,
interconnected
and
collaborative
points
that
she
brings
so
bringing
bringing
rules
in
a
collaborative
way
that
players
understand
that
they
are
interconnected
and
that
they
want
to
collaborate.
A
So
I
thought
it
was
really
interesting
how
one
of
the
solutions
she
proposed
for
that
was
trust
and
community
building
and
angela
asked
me
a
question
the
other
day
saying
like
why.
Why
are
we
not
like
git
coin
grants?
What
makes
a
commons
different
from
a
git
coin
grants,
for
example-
and
I
think
this
hits
that
in
a
sense
of
we
need
to
build
trust
to
to
ensure
that
we
are
agreeing
to
act
in
an
interoperable
way.
A
So
I
thought
I
think,
that
deals
with
opportunistic
behavior
as
well
and
and
how.
A
And
and
it
starts
to
tap
a
bit
into
mutual
accounting,
but
that's
that
goes
into
the
monitoring
that
it's
another
subject
so
yeah
does
anybody
has
anything
to
connect
with
the
topics
that
you
brought
based
on
this.
C
So
I
think
that
one
of
the
things
that
the
hard
the
hard
part
about
analyzing
that
type
of
framework
and
understanding
the
problems,
especially
when
it
comes
to
the
commitment
problem,
is
understanding
what
oshram
called
a
a
credible
commitment
and
understanding.
What
identifying
a
credible
commitment
is
in
real
life,
because
you
have
so
many
different
players
and
actors
that
come
in
and
out
of
a
system
who
may
act
like
they're
committed
or
think
that
they're
committed.
F
System
yeah-
and
I
guess
one
thing
to
maybe
build
on
that-
is
you
know
in
the
in
the
context
of
iterated
games
right
if
agents
interact
with
each
other
they'll
start
to
to
remember
like
who
acts
in
what
way
right,
so
agents
can
build
reputation,
and
so,
in
the
context
of
the
you
know,
social
capital
saying
like
you
know.
F
Well,
if
people,
if
there's
like
a
cultural
norm
of
how
people
behave,
people
can
build
that
into
their
assumption
of
how
things
will
roll
out,
which
is
awesome,
but
then
also
there's
the
the
dichotomy
there
where
that
works
at
a
smaller
scale,
where
the
agents
can
they
interact
with
each
other,
frequently
enough
to
build
a
reputation
model
of
each
other
and
also
that
there
are
enough
people
that
they
remember
all
the
people
that
interact
with,
but
then
achieving
that
at
scale
becomes
quite
a
different
thing.
F
So
I
thought
that's
kind
of
interesting,
because
you
can
kind
of
weigh
the
kind
of
axelrod
tit
for
tat
games.
Where
you
have,
you
know,
different
agents
interact
and
they
just
kind
of
learn
from
each
other,
and
then
you
can
also
weigh
the
kind
of
like
cpr
policy
thing
where,
like
everyone
gets
together
and
interacts
to
over
the
shared
resource,
to
build
the
social
capital
and
the
two
are
very
similar.
But
then
they
also
branch
out.
If
you
like,
you
know,
try
to
scale
them.
C
A
I
think
measuring
reputation
brings
like
a
gamifiable.
F
Yeah,
like,
if
you
know
about
the
chinese
social
credit
score
experiment
they're
rolling
out,
which
is
now
being
rolled
out
pretty
widely.
I
think,
essentially,
you
get
a
score.
It's
like
credit
score,
but
it's
a
social
credit
score
based
on
all
the
things
and
that
affects
the
lending
rates
you
get
where
you
can
travel
what
jobs
you
get,
how
much
your
posts
get
shown
on
various
social
networks
like
all
the
things,
so
it's
pretty
much
that.
G
Actually,
connecting
that
to
comments
and
in
a
hypothetical
situation,
you
could
imagine
those
like
chinese
citizen
scores
with
really
high
impact
on
someone's
social
life
being
put
as
like
collateral
to
establish
like
this
kind
of
commitment
or
this
kind
of
skin,
to
avoid
the
fear
of
you
know
like
free
rider
or
like
increasing
the
cost
of
being
caught
while
being
monitored.
G
Reputation
doesn't
seem
to
be
hindering
the
development
of
commons
for
china.
F
Yeah
and
I
think
they
actually
do
do
that
where,
like
you
know,
if,
if
you
do
something
like
commit
a
crime
or
whatever,
it
does
ding
your
credit
score
right,
which
affects
other
areas
of
your
life,
so,
like
yeah,
I
think
that's
kind
of
one
of
the
things
they're
trying
to
achieve,
but
in
the
context
of
like
a
cpr
or
something
it'd,
be
really
interesting.
F
So
you
have
like
the
fishermen
who
are
rolling
out
there
right
and
then
they
all
agree
like
we're
gonna
fish,
you
know
x
per
day
or
something
and
then
one
doesn't
if
that
affects
their.
You
know
their
social
score
that
might
influence
their
behavior
more
than
just
saying,
oh
well,
you
get
a
fine,
because
you
fish
too
many
fish
this
day
or
something
right
so
that
that
might
change
the
game.
There
too,.
A
Yeah,
I
think
that
ties
both
with
the
point
you
brought
beretta
of
like
how
behaviors
change
the
players
change
with
time
constraints,
because
one
of
the
examples
she
gave
was
that
the
fisherman
that
has
a
little
boat
he's
not
going
to
fish
way
more
than
he
needs
in
a
way
that
would
harm
that
ecosystem
because
he
wants
their
future
generations
to
have
access
to
that
resource.
A
A
So
that's
kind
of
a
case
of
of
reputation
or
at
least
awareness
of
the
ecosystem
that
you're
that
you're
inserted
in
and
that
also
ties
with
the
state
and
firm
type
of
enforcement
that
both
this
mainly
the
state
not
as
much
the
firm,
but
mainly
the
state,
uses
fear
to
control
the
outcomes
that
are
gonna
come
from
the
collective
and
then
that's
kind
of
what?
A
What
she's
proposing
like
an
exit
for
for
not
having
one
person
putting
putting
down
what
is
going
to
be
the
behavior
that
it's
kind
of
what's
happening
in
china
with
the
collateral
that
that
you're.
A
D
So
I
don't!
Oh
sorry,
so
I
don't
yet
have
a
like
a
pointer
to
what
I'm
thinking
now.
So
I'm
just
gonna
riff
on
the
idea
of
reputation
and
thinking
about
you
know
reputation
as
extremely
valuable
to
a
community,
because
it
allows
you
to
predict
behavior
of
certain
individuals
and
in
small
communities.
It's
it
allowed
you
to
know
who
and
who
not
to
trust
in
your
local
community,
which
used
to
be
really
geographically
based.
D
So
it
was
valuable
to
survival
to
have
an
idea
of
the
reputation
of
the
people
with
whom
you
cohabitated
and
or
co-villaged.
D
They
were
the
right
word
for
this,
for
that
and
our
our
sense
of
reputation
now
far
exceeds
the
scope
of
our
local
communities,
specifically
the
people
that
we
maybe
depend
on
on
our
day-to-day.
And
now
our
reputation
has
sort
of
gone
out
into
I
don't
know
into
into
different
areas
and
is
used
for
different.
D
You
know
different
measures
and
a
more
you
know,
I
don't
know.
What's
what
I'm
looking
for
like
anonymous,
not
not
anonymous
but
like
unknown
stranger.
You
know
that
that
word
is
the
word
I'm
looking
for,
like
somebody
who
doesn't
know,
but
I've
seen
I've
seen.
You
know
I
might
buy
a
product
that
they
recommend,
because
I
know
that
this
person
has
recommended
other
good
products
or
other
good
books
or
other
good
movies,
or
so
it's
sort
of
you
know.
D
Reputation
now
is
more
interest
driven,
I
think,
and
can
be
used
for
many
different
things
than
it
used
to
be,
and
I
think
that's
producing
some
interesting
results
in
terms
of
you
know
trusting
people
by
their
reputation
without
actually
knowing
who
they
are,
but
just
on
their
past
actions
that
and
they
can
still
be
anonymous
to
us.
D
F
I
think
a
really
interesting
thing
with
that
right
is,
if
you
have
this
reputation
system,
and
then
you
can
use
it
to
interact
with
people
where
you
might
not
have
had
the
personal
opportunity
to
build
up
a
you
know,
relationship
or
view
of
them.
F
But
you
know
that
there's
a
system
that
does
that
kind
of
scales,
the
the
social
capital
from
the
you
know
the
villagers,
with
their
cultural
norms
to
a
larger
thing
kind
of
like
what
china
is
doing,
although
there's
a
key
difference
because
for
it
to
work
in
the
common
pool
resource
system
right,
at
least
as
far
as
in
chapter
one,
what
they
described
as
the
things
the
people
participating
in
the
system
need
to
be
helping
to
design
and
build
the
system
and
participate
in
it
right,
because
if
you
have
a
system
that
measures
reputation,
that
reputation
score
is
only
as
valuable
as
your
trust
in
the
system
itself.
F
Because
if
you
don't
trust
the
system,
it
doesn't
matter
what
reputation
scores
it
spits
out.
So
for
a
large
group
of
people
to
then
use
a
reputation
system,
they
have
to
collectively
agree
to
it
to
then
for
it
to
have
value.
So
it's
kind
of
interesting
how
the
same
principles
of
the
the
smaller
common
pool,
resources
then
kind
of
scale
out
as
well,
because
you
know
you
have
to
have
a
system
that
people
agree
on
and
want
to
use
and
that
they
value
the
system.
G
G
Yeah,
this
is
quite
an
interesting
topic
and
especially
because
it
also
writes
questions
as
questions
about
how
the
collected
kind
of
data
points
on
people
can
be
utilized,
or
can
they
be
for
these
kind
of
monitoring
or
commitment
issues
right
now
you
know.
Insurance
companies
are
using
credit
scores
for
their
own
decision,
which
is,
of
course
like
problematic,
in
structure,
etc.
G
For
example,
if
I
were
to
live
in
a
village
in
china,
and
we
were
to
have
a
technology
that
allowed
us
to
collateralize
our
reputation
scores
to
engage
in
a
project
and
basically
we
govern
the
commons,
but
the
the
source
we
use
do
not
come
directly
from
us,
but
from
the
government,
and
there
are
direct
consequences
for
the
impact
of
these
scores
on
someone's
life,
which
means
we
don't
need
to
start
from
scratch
in
designing
reputation
score,
and
I
think
then
it
means
these
kind
of
reputation.
G
Scores
with
real
impacts
can
also
be
used,
as
you
know,
the
primary
building
tools
for
the
comments
like
again
like
imagining
some
willing
to
create
the
commons
in
their
community
and
what?
What
is
the
source
that
they
can
use
to
monitor
each
other
available
in
terms
of
reputation
score?
I
don't
think
they
need
to
design
it
from
the
ground
up.
Yeah.
F
Yeah
like
if
they're
using
it
as
a
collateral
source,
then
no
any
any
collateral
would
do
right.
But
I'm
saying
if
the
reputation
itself
is
like
a
commons
right,
it's
like
you,
know
our
our
collective
view
of
reputation.
F
Then
it
people
would
have
to
opt
into
it,
because
otherwise,
you
kind
of
have
this
like
dystopia
versus
utopia
like
drift,
where
one
is
like
the
state
where,
like
like
she's
talking
about
the
firm
in
the
state,
there's
a
single
entity
that
determines
the
rules
and
they
enforce
the
things
etc,
and
what
they
determine
is
reputations
is
the
thing
you
can
use.
So
if
you
agree
with
them
as
to
what
reputation
is
then,
yes,
you
can
use
it,
but
if
you
disagree
with
them,
then
you're
kind
of
like
yeah.
F
A
Nate,
do
you
want
to
talk
a
little
bit
more
about
separating
the
resource
system
from
the
flow
of
the
units.
C
Yeah,
I
think
it's
just
it's
it's
very
difficult
to
when
we
put
it
in
a
framework
to
analyze
what
those
units
are.
So
if
we
were
to
take
this,
you
know
keep
going
with
this
reputation
system
what
that
reputation
is
and
the
flow
of
those
units
and
how
we
treat
the
flow
of
those
units
is
different
different
than
how
we
treat
the
entire
system
as
a
whole.
So
if
we
look
at
the
entire
system,
rod
is
right.
We
have
to.
C
We
have
to
have
a
collective
trust
in
that
system,
for
it
to
have
any
useful
utility
for
us.
However,
the
flow
of
those
units
is
just
as
important
in
analyzing
how
that
reputation
is,
is
divvied
out
to
people
and
when
it
is
divvied
out
to
people-
and
why
is
is
another
frame
of
analysis
that
needs
to
be
separated
from
the
the
system
itself
and
the
the
two
are
dependent
upon
each
other.
C
So
that
collective
trust
in
that
that
reputation
system
is
only
as
good
as
the
processes
that
we
create
for
it,
and
I,
I
just
think
that's
it's
kind
of
a
cut
and
dry
situation
when
it
comes
to
to
reputation
in
this
sense,
but
when
it
comes
to
other
cprs
and
like
the
general,
you
know,
environment
and
things
of
that
nature.
It's
a
lot
more
difficult
to
to
distinguish
the.
A
C
F
Well,
not
sure
I
mean
griff
can
practically
probably
speak
to
this
a
bit
more,
but
I
think
from
reading
through
the
common
stack
stuff.
I
think
this
is
one
of
the
things
common
stack
aims
to
to
to
help
with
right
is
to
like
say:
okay.
Well,
the
you
know,
the
management
of
this
commons
is
really
important
and
you're
gonna
need
to
have,
like
you
know,
some
general
tools,
some
like
analysis,
a
process
to
engage
in
governance
etc,
and
I
I
think,
like
with
that,
you
know,
there's
the
ideas
like
okay.
F
Well,
let's
design
some
templates
for
the
system,
but
let's
also
give
you
a
process
to
engage
with
that
system.
Manage
that
system
understand
it,
you
know
and
have
it
you
know
continue
on
so
yeah.
E
A
I
think
it's
similar
to
what
we
were
talking
about
before
of
having
the
the
stock
like
she
calls
the
system,
the
stock
right,
like
everything
that
everything
that
is
inherent
to
that
system
to
produce
the
the
unit,
the
units
of
flow,
so
everything
that
affects
on
the
resource
itself
that
people
can
take
it
in
and
out
of
that
of
that
system
is
this
stock
and-
and
I
think
you
were-
I
think
you
hit
on
the
point
beretta-
to
build
the
structure.
A
So
the
flow
starts
to
be
self-generated
from
that
structure
and
then
the
appropriators
can
come
and
make
use
of
the
values
that
are
being
produced
by
this
tools
and
the
system
and
this
processes.
But
I
think
yeah.
Maybe
you
don't
need
to
have
read
the
book
to
talk
about
this
point
griff.
If
you
want
to
compliment.
E
Well,
definitely,
the
making
sure
that
the
appropriators
are
placed
appropriately
in
the
system
and
that
there's
their
plan
for
is
definitely
part
of
the
common
stock
design.
Just
making
sure
that
you
know
in
the
initialization,
where
the
the
hatchers,
the
the
people
who
really
know
about
how
to
provide
best
for
the
cpr
they
are
allowed
to
enter
like
people
with
small
boats,
as
is
mentioned,
can
initialize
the
system
and
then
people
with
large
boats
that
maybe
they
don't
care
about
the
system
as
much,
but
they
still
want
to
extract
value
from
it.
E
They
can
come
in
later
and
and
still
participate
if
they
want
in
the
governance
of
this
system.
But
then,
at
the
same
time
you
know
we
know
that
the
the
bulk
of
the
governance
is
still
held
by
people
with
small
boats
that
really
care
about
the
future
of
the
commons.
At
least.
That's
that's
what
I
can
say
off
of
this
comment.
F
Yeah
and
I
think
that
ties
back
to
what
was
kind
of
talked
about
in
chapter
one,
which
is
that
for
the
system
itself
to
work
as
intended,
the
people
who
use
it
and
are
engaged
with
it
and
deeply
understand
it
need
to
be
the
ones
who
help
design
and
steer
the
the
system
and
the
process
right.
They
can't
have
just
an
outside.
You
know
organization
come
in
and
say:
okay
now,
you're
gonna.
Do
this
like
they're
generally,
like
the
map's,
not
gonna,
match
the
territory
right,
they're
gonna
miss.
F
So
you
need
the
people
who
are
actively
engaged
in
the
system
with
skin
in
the
game
who
understand
it,
who
have
deep
expertise
to
actually
help
design
it
and
help
manage
and
steer
it
and
then
chapter
two
there's
actually
also
a
part
where
she
says
a
major
source
of
uncertainty
is
a
lack
of
knowledge
and
she
talks
about
how
the
resource
system
itself
and
its
characteristics
have
to
be
established,
and
that
requires
a
blending
of
scientific
knowledge
and
local
time
and
place
knowledge.
So
you
need
both.
F
A
Okay,
now
I'm
just
going
to
say
that
a
great
advantage
we
have
in
that
point,
I
think,
is
she
says
a
major
problem
for
acquiring
information
is
how
expensive
information
is.
So
I
think
we
are
very
privileged
in
this
sense
here
of
how
there
are
so
many
people
like
actually
engaged
with
education
and
wanting
to
educate.
C
Others
yeah,
so
I
I
just
had
a
question
in
terms
of
that,
because
I
I
have
a
hard
time
understanding
how
how
we
educate
people,
especially
like
in
in
case
of
the
cpr
appropriators
on
long-term
risks,
because
you
know,
like
bretta,
said
before
that
you
know
there's
a
time
variable
where
we
want
the
immediate
results
now
and
like,
even
even
if,
like
you,
take
a
long-term
risk
like
an
earthquake
like
people
here
in
the
bay
area,
they
know
the
risk
of
an
earthquake
happening.
C
Yet
somehow
they
believe
it's
not
going
to
happen
to
them
on
the
day
that
it
occurs,
and
so
they
sit
there
and
they
you
know
they
ignore.
The
problem.
Ignore
the
problem
ignore
the
problem
until
the
day
it
does
happen.
They
say:
oh
man,
I
had
you
know
how
did
we
not
see
this
coming?
And
I
just
you
know.
I
see
that
issue
within
a
lot
of
cpr
situations
where
you
have
these
resource
systems
that
are
threatened
by
long-term
risks,
but
we
we
can't
educate
on
those
long-term
risks
very
well.
A
It's
probably
because
we
don't
know
about
them
yet,
and
and
that's
something
that
she
was
also
talking
about,
how
it's
so
difficult
to
create
one
type
of
model
that
fits
everything,
because
each
each
model
is
so
different
and
the
fact
that
they're
different
with
different
types
of
behaviors
with
different
rules
is
going
to
change
the
consequences
that
that
system
is
going
to
have
in
the
future.
A
F
Yeah,
it's
actually
kind
of
interesting,
because
I
remember
in
chapter
two
at
one
point:
she
talked
about
trial
and
error
and
she's
like
yeah.
You
know
if,
if
there
is
like
an
unbounded
scope
or
you,
you
don't
know
the
limits
of
your
system,
you
are
learning
by
trial
and
error.
Right
like
it
doesn't
matter
how
many
models
you
have,
if
you
don't
actually
know
the
entirety
of
your
system
like
it's
trial
and
error,
and
that
means
error
error
is
inevitable
if
you're
learning
by
trial
and
error.
F
So
that
was
an
interesting
thing
and
then
I
think
a
a
little
farther
down
she
mentioned
like
yeah.
We
don't
really
have
a
complete
view
of
how
to
get
around
this
like
this.
This
is
a
really
hard
thing,
but
just
be
aware
that,
like
if
you're,
if
you
don't
understand
the
limits
of
your
system,
you
are
going
to
discover
them
via
trial
and
error.
So
yeah.
G
Yeah,
in
fact,
I
also
wanted
to
bring
this
because
the
two
problems
of
supply
that
she's
talking
about
is
I'm
not
sorry.
The
two
problems
of.
G
Consumption
yeah
consuming
the
commons
where
yeah
appropriation
problems
and
then
the
next
one
is
the
provision
problems.
So
the
supplying
of
the
commons
like
the
nourishing
of
the
commons-
and
I
think
that
also
relates
most
directly
to
the
digital
commons
because
they
need
like
sustaining
the
like
the
human
inputs.
Human
capital
is
the
one
that
makes
it
a
renewable
resource
that
contrasts
the
natural
resource
like
a
fishery,
and
I
wanted
to
bring
this
to.
G
Although
I
I
don't
know
much
yet,
and
I'm
looking
forward
to
take
the
education,
the
educational
course
to
cat
cat
and
how
it
stands
as
a
technology
to
address
this
kind
of
provision
problem
for
the
commons
and
maybe
like
solve
some
of
the
problems.
That
ostrom
is
mentioning
in
this
chapter,
and
I
wanted
to
ask
you
guys
or
those
evolved
with
cat
cat.
F
Well,
I
mean
there's
a
lot
of
things:
cad
cat
can
do,
but
one
thing
I
started
doing
today
is
actually
building
a
model
for
this
iterated
game
to
look
at
like
okay,
if
you
have
different
players
with
different
preferences,
how
might
their
preferences
change
based
on
you
know
the
amount
of
resources
they
have
and
then
how
might
that
affect
their
usage
of
this
commons
and
then
contrast
their
usage
to
the
renewal
rate
and
see
like
if
you
can
achieve
a
stable
equilibrium
or
what
not?
F
So
I
think,
like
cad
cad,
can
help
you
kind
of
test
out
a
lot
of
these
things.
Where,
like
you
know,
intuitively,
you
can
do
a
lot
of
like
back
of
the
napkin
like
you
know,
kind
of
rough
hand,
wavy
calculations,
but
like
this
can
help
you
cad
cad,
can
help
you
drill
down
into
a
little
more
depth
and
then,
as
far
as
circling
that
back
to
then
you
know
helping
educate
the
people
who
are
using
these
types
of
systems.
F
I
I
think
a
picture
says
a
thousand
words,
so
the
cool
thing
with
cad
cad
is,
you
can
write
out
the
code,
but
then
you
can
plot
it
and
you
can
make
a
picture
and
you
can
share
the
picture
with
people
and
see
like
look
see
it
changes
over
time.
This
is
the
good
part.
This
is
the
bad
part.
We
want
to
avoid
that.
So
we
want
to
do
this,
so
it
goes
up
in
this
direction
up
and
to
the
right
right.
So
so
yeah,
I
think
cad
guide
can
help.
F
You,
like
you,
know,
test
out
your
intuition
and
drill
down
into
more
more
detail
on
things
as
well
as
potentially
communicate
that
to
to
people
in
a
more
intuitive
way
via
pictures
and
plots
and
graphs
and
stuff
like.
E
E
Yeah,
I
I'm
a
big
fan
of
cad
cad.
I
I'm
also
a
little
skeptical
of
its
utilize
of
its
use.
Initially
for
designing
your
first
comments,
you
know,
but
ideally,
if
you
have
to
back
test
your
models,
I
mean
in
the
end
the
cool
thing
with
cad
cad
and
the
dream
of
cad
cat
is
that
you're
trying
to
take
you
can
learn
from
previous
mistakes.
You
can
take
data
from
other
models
that
already
exist
and
use
that
to
improve
a
model
that
you
already
have.
E
So
imagine
the
first
bridge
that
was
ever
built
if
someone
created-
maybe
not
the
first
one
but
the
first
model
for
a
bridge
that
was
built
that
model
probably
sucked
right
like
it
didn't
predict
a
whole
lot
of
great
things.
You
know
they
used
best
practices
to
make
a
model
for
that
bridge,
but
then,
when
they
use
the
model,
when
that
bridge
had
problems.
Oh,
why
is
there
a
crack
here?
You
know
they
can
they
can
improve
that
model
so
that
it?
E
Oh,
we
didn't
account
for
the
fact
that
the
temperature
gets
so
low
here
that
this
affects
the
integrity
of
the
steel
I'm
making
stuff
up,
but
whatever
right
or
you
know,
and
then
they
keep
building
and
improving
the
model
and
improving
the
bridges
and
improving
the
model
and
improving
the
bridges
and
then
tacoma
narrows
bridge
where
the
bridge
starts
going
waving
because
of
the
wind
blowing
and
in
the
wrong
at
the
wrong
speed
and
it
not
being
designed
to
manage
the
wind
properly.
E
Now
that
gets
added
to
every
model
from
there
on,
and
that
problem
doesn't
happen
to
anybody
using
these
models
to
build
bridges
and
so
for
cad
cat.
I
see
it
as
kind
of
a
similar
thing
where
for
the
first
models,
you
know
it's
kind
of
hit
or
miss
you
can
kind
of
just
justify
whatever
you
want
by
build
by
designing
a
model
that
fits
you.
What
you
want
to
say.
The
people
who
are
building
the
models
have
kind
of
an
undue
advantage.
E
I
would
say
to
push
for
their
own
agenda,
but
eventually,
when
these
models
get
a
lot
of
use
and
they
start
to
have
a
life
of
their
own
and
they
start
being
back
tested
by
data
from
hundreds
of
economies,
then
we
start
getting
something
really
useful
that
and
where
we
can
start
building
economies.
The
same
way.
E
We
build
bridges
with
certain
amounts
of
certainty,
and-
and
so
it's
a
long
term
play
for
for
me-
with
cad
cad
and
and
really
it's
a
public
good,
that
that
is
something
for
the
long-term
like
designers
of
economies.
But
maybe
the
people
who
are
using
it
now
are
really
just
you
know
it's
a
little
bit
of
they're
they're
doing
everyone
in
the
future
a
favor,
but
I
wouldn't
say
it
ends
up
helping
them
as
much
as
they
might.
A
D
B
Like,
for
example,
right
now
like,
I
feel
it's
a
lot
of
built
in
trust,
but,
like
I
was
thinking
like
we
could
implement
some
of
this,
like
what
do
you
think.
B
B
Like
have
natural
problems,
for
example
like
in
a
government,
you
can
have
like
the
problem,
like
the
the
one
who
is
burning,
like
it's
like
corrupted
or
stuff
like
like
something
in
between
like
like
who.
Could
we
implement
that?
What
the
book
is
saying
on
the
tech.
B
A
A
If
I
you
mean
from
my
from
my
understanding
the
she
brings,
the
the
state
and
the
firm
kind
of
in
a
parallel
of
something
she
talks
in
the
first
chapter,
that
is
the
only
the
only
way
out
which
it
talks
about
how
a
lot
of
the
centralized
capitalist
behavior
is
justified
by
corporations
or
by
the
state
saying
that
people
don't
have
the
ability
to
organize
themselves
and
that's
why
they
need
either
a
ruler
or
an
entrepreneur.
A
Why
why
it
makes
sense
for
both
the
rulers
and
the
people
to
be
in
this
system?
I
how
it's
it's
not
the
best
outcome
for
for
people
in
the
long
run.
A
I
think
that's
when
she
starts
to
bring
the
collective
action
and
all
of
this
suggestions
of
how
we
can
try
to
have
another
alternative,
that
it's
not
the
state
or
the
firm,
but
one
that
we
can
self-organize
collectively
and
that's
where
it
comes.
The
the
three
problems
that
are.
D
B
Yeah,
I
understand
now
yeah
I
was
like.
Maybe
me
I
I
misunderstood
like
I
was
thinking
like
yeah,
like,
for
example,
we
need
like,
like
you
say,
like
yeah,
it's
like
a
first
stage
like,
for
example,
someone
do
some
something
wrong
and
it
has
to
be
punished
somehow
the
but
yeah
what
you
just
say
now.
It
makes
a
lot
of
sense
like
it's.
B
F
I
think
one
thing
that's
important
to
to
specify
here
is
that
so
at
least
my
understanding
here
is,
in
the
context
of
you,
know,
exploring
the
different
options
available.
There's,
like
you
know,
there's
the
state,
there's
the
firm
and
then
there's
also
the
commons,
and
so
you
know
running
through
chapter
two.
Essentially,
they
said
like
look
if
you've
got
agents
who
are
independently
acting,
not
communicating,
they
are
generally
gonna,
take
sub-optimal
actions
that
will
likely
lead
to
ruin
of
the
common
poor
resource.
F
There
are
then
some
ways
that
people
organize
there
is
the
firm
which
generally
works
out.
If
you
know
you
have
like
a
capitalist
type
model
right,
okay,
great,
it's
generally
better
for
the
founder,
but
they
take
more
risk,
more
reward,
etcetera
cool.
F
Then
there's
the
state
and
she
explained
in
the
state
model
how
still
for
many
agents
it
actually
can
be
more
beneficial
for
them
to
be
part
of
a
state
that
achieves
some
level
of
organization
than
to
just
act
independently
right,
and
then
with
that,
though,
there
are
some
things
that
are
not
addressed
by
the
firm
or
the
state
in
which
place
a
common
pool
resource.
Could
very
much
be
beneficial
because
we
don't
have
something.
F
That's
that's
addressing
that
need,
and
so
I
think
it's
it's
important
to
understand
the
context
in
which
these
different
forms
of
organization
are
effective
or
needed,
and
not
just
to
think
one
is
better
than
the
other,
because
one
size
doesn't
fit
all
right
like
that
for
different
contexts.
F
Different
things
are
needed
and
so
yeah,
I
think
that's
important
to
emphasize,
because,
as
far
as
I
know,
you
know
when
austrian
described
them,
she
described
them
in
the
context
of
what
they
achieve
and
she
also
described
the
bounds
in
which
they
will
no
longer
work.
So
I
think
it's
important
to
specify.
F
Another
thing
too,
I
guess,
is
that
if
we're
talking
about
kind
of
like
the
evolution
of
these
things,
daos,
you
know
decentralized,
autonomous
organizations
where
you've
got
a
you
know,
decentralized
data
store.
That's
you
know
verified
by
cryptography
of
some
sort
and
rules
that
are
enforced
by
some
sort
of
you
know,
cryptographic
code
that's
executed,
deterministically
that
can
help
potentially
expand
the
scope
of
where
these
common
pool
resource
type
things
could
be.
F
Then
you
know
implemented
in
a
digital
way
and
or
at
scale
so
like
that
new
technology
kind
of
expands,
the
scope
of
what
before
was
addressable
by
these
common
pool
resource
type
of.
G
G
F
Well,
is
it
that
we're
saying
that,
in
a
situation
with
high
degrees
of
uncertainty,
establishing
reputation
allows
you
to,
then
you
know
have
like
use
leverage
social
capital
to
create
trust
to
lower
the
cost
of
doing
business?
So,
instead
of
having
to
spend
a
lot
on,
you
know
overhead
to
enforce
lots
of
things
and
design
really
complex
systems.
You
can
generally
say:
well,
I
trust
that
we're
going
to
be
okay,
so
it
lowers
the
you
know,
essentially
the
cost
of
doing
business,
and
is
that
kind
of
what
we're
pointing.
A
To
it
sounds,
it
sounds
to
me
more
like
a
trial
and
error
kind
of
thing,
like
uncertainty
and
repetition
like
despite
our
uncertainty,
we
continue
to
try
and
because
we
all
don't
know
because
we
we
have
this
common
base
of
uncertainty.
B
Yeah
I
just
found
the
best
way
where
she
talks
about
that,
but
yeah
it's
in
spanish.
I
think
I
should
next
time
read
in
english,
but
like
it's
almost
in
the
end
of
the
chapter
like
she's
talking
like
somewhat
demonstrates
that
there
is
a
play
of
dp
of
repetition
and
somehow
uncertainty.
B
D
E
G
A
Meanwhile,
you
guys
are
looking
for
it.
We
have
five
minutes
left
and
it's
time
to
raffle
the
pen.
So
let's
see
who's
gonna
be
the
the
big
winner
and
we
can
yeah.
We
can
close
this
session
just
so.
We
finish
on
time,
because
last
time
we
passed
a
little
bit
of
the
hour
and
thank
you
so
much
for
everyone
joining
so
two
things
that
I
wanted
to
do
before
we
go.
One
is
raffle
the
pen
and
then
second
is
decide
who
is
gonna?
A
A
Let
me
know
so:
okay
is
number
one.
Nate
is
number
two
tam
number
three
griff
four
manga
five
zap
six
burrata,
seven
number
three
sam
you!
You
won.
D
Can
I
can
I
say
one
thing,
I'm
looking
at
chapter
three,
it's
really
quite
long.
Do
you
think
maybe
it
would
be
worth
breaking
it
into
two
sections
or
just
no.
B
B
A
B
G
Same
and
in
fact
right
in
the
middle,
there
is
a
separation
between
the
first
analyzed
case
studies
and
then
the
theories.
So
it
would
in
fact
be
quite
interesting
to
see
how
it
theorized
about
these
cases
first
and
then
look
at
ostrom's
take
the
next
week.
D
Where
is
that
demarcation
actually
is
it?
Is
there
a
title.
G
88
after
88,
I
think
it's
theory
before
88
between
58
and
88.
It's
basically
analyzing
cases
across
the
world.
A
A
C
I
agree
with
the
the
separation
of
the
the
chapter.
I
think
it'd
be
easier
to
do
that
way.
Yeah.
Thank
you
for
everybody
participating.
D
F
Oh
I'll
pass
zip,
zip,
zip
timus.
Have
you
found
that.
B
Yeah
yeah
you've
pronounced
the
word
yeah.
I
I
think
that's
very
interesting,
but
because
I
was
reading
the
first
chapter
in
english
and
I
was
like
wow,
it's
super
hard
to
read,
and
then
I
swap
to
spanish
and
still
hard
to
read
so
so
I
think
like.
B
If
we
separate
and
yeah,
we
can
focus
more
and
it
will
be
better,
and
I
also
think
that
would
be
super
interesting
like
I
don't
know,
if
that's
possible
but
like
if
we're
reading
during
the
week,
and
maybe
through
the
chat
of
the
of
this
discord,
we
we
can
also
like
change
like
the
things
we
are
interested
in,
and
so
we
are
more
prepared
when
we're
talking
here
and-
and
that
would
be
awesome.
I'm
going
to
I'm
going
to
do
that
for
sure.