►
From YouTube: Futureproof Governance Frameworks Andrew Thurman mod; Sky Minnert DXdao; Dennison Bertran Tally; Jul
Description
No description was provided for this meeting.
If this is YOUR meeting, an easy way to fix this is to add a description to your video, wherever mtngs.io found it (probably YouTube).
A
B
Hi
everyone
thanks
for
coming
through
yeah,
as
the
announcer
said,
we're
gonna
be
talking
about
future
proofing.
Dows
today
have
an
excellent
panel
for
this
particular
topic:
representatives
from
maker
down,
tally,
dx
and
the
current
chief
decentralized
growth
officer.
Perhaps
the
first
time
that
title
has
ever
been
deployed
over
at
live
pier,
so
welcome
everyone.
Let's
get
right
into
it.
I
think
we're
gonna
just
start
off
by
talking
about
some
of
the
problems
facing
current
dows
and
then
we'll
get
into
talking
about
our
panelists
respective
projects.
B
So
starting
off,
I
think
a
big
problem
we're
beginning
to
face
is
that
the
current
state
of
dao,
tooling
and
sophistication
has
been
wildly
outstripped
by
the
amount
of
power
these
organizations
have
and
the
amount
of
money
they
control
back
envelope,
math
between
d5
tvl
treasuries
and
market
caps
of
governance.
Tokens
gets
you
within
striking
distance
of
a
half
a
trillion
dollars.
B
Nonetheless,
governance
systems
are
relatively
rudimentary
extremely
simple,
ostensibly
this
adds
to
their
security,
but
we're
beginning
to
see
some
cracks
in
as
bad
actors
realize
that
dows
can
in
fact
be
targets
for
attacks.
What
is
the
current
state
of
dow
tooling?
In
your
guys's
mind,
and
is
it
sufficient
for
where
the
ecosystem
currently
is
skye?
Let's
start
with
you.
C
Thanks,
hello,
oh
hi,
so
daos
are
all
about
decentralization
and
basically
the
that's.
What
gives
them
their
strength
and,
I
would
say
the
most
the
most
vulnerable
pieces
in
the
system
for
a
dao
are
the
centralized
points
of
of
failure
and
in
our
current
system
we
try.
We
can.
You
can
try
very
very
hard
to
maintain
like
decentralization
throughout
your
entire
flow.
C
But
often
you
know
you
have
to
rely
in
this
current
world
on
centralized
systems,
maybe
for
your
social
media,
like
twitter
forums,
even
discords
chat,
communication
channels
and
so
at
dxi.
We
spent
a
lot
of
time
trying
to
push
and
think
about
the
tools
that
dao's
actually
need
and
we
invest
in
projects
that
are
building
those,
and
I
I'm
calling
them
ddaps,
which
is
dowdapps
and
basically,
if
we
have
a
a
tool
that
can
be
a
dap
or
a
decentralized
product,
and
you
can
log
in
with
your
wallet.
C
What
dows
really
need
is
the
ability
for
the
dow
to
own
that
account
and
if
the
dao
can
own
that
account
and
control
the
actual
permissions
of
the
accounts
that
they've
delegated
to
their
contributors
and
members
that
solves
the
problem.
But
most
of
these
dapps
that
we're
using
in
this
space,
if
they're,
either
web
2
or
they're,
they
can't
be
actually
owned
by
the
dow.
And
so
we
want
teams
and
people
that
are
building
those
to
come
reach
out.
C
C
E
Hey
yeah,
I
mean,
I
think,
to
step
back
like
what
what
did
dao's
do:
dows
govern
decisions
over
shared
resources,
so
I
think
there's
both
on
and
off
chain
governance.
That
happens,
so
I
kind
of
think
of
tooling
around
those
two
separate
things
I
think
we're
in
very
early
days
of
both
on
and
off
chain
tooling
for
dows
on
the
off
chain
side.
E
You
know,
there's
everything
from
the
communication
layer,
how
we
use
discord,
how
we
use
any
kind
of
communication
platform
to
share
knowledge,
develop
ideas
and
then,
of
course,
on
the
on
chain
side,
there's
actual
like
token
governance
standards,
and
I
think
the
tools
around
just
the
actual
token
execution
of
how
decisions
are
made
we're
still
in
fairly
primitive
days.
For
that,
I
think,
that's,
probably
something
we'll
get
in
to
discussing
on
this
panel,
but
how
we,
how
we
evolve
towards
new
token
governance
standards
beyond
just
liquid
token
governance.
D
Hi,
so
we
think
about
this
question
a
lot
at
tally,
and
one
of
the
things
we
found
is
that
the
fomo
always
outstrips
the
tooling,
and
I
think
that
we've
entered
this
kind
of
interesting
phase
where,
when
we
build
better
tooling,
the
fomo
gets
bigger
and
outstrips
the
tooling
even
more.
D
So
something
that
we
started
to
realize
and
think
about
is
how
education
is
a
really
important
component
here,
we're
primarily
a
company
based
of
engineers.
So
we
have
a
habit
of
thinking.
The
answer
to
most
things
are
engineering
solutions.
We
try
to
engineer
our
way
out
of
everything,
but
we
found
is:
is
that
really
people
need
to
be
educated,
a
bit
more
on
what
dows
are
what
they
do,
what
the
norms
are
before
we
even
sort
of
experiment
with
other
kind
of
things.
D
Although
I'm
happy
more,
the
first
person
who
loves
to
experiment
people
need
to
sort
of
like
understand
what
dolls
really
mean.
If
you
look
at
the
sort
of
wonderline
finance
thing,
where
danielle
put
this
tweet
out-
and
he
said
enough,
the
dow
is
going
to
be
managed
by
me
now
and
and
people
started
saying
calling
it
like
a
danielle
autocratic
organization.
D
You
know
that's
a
real
thing
right.
People
have
to
understand
what
is
a
dao
right
like
it's,
not
just
the
fomo
of
like
I
threw
my
money
in
number:
go
up
we're
all
in
this
together
awesome!
It's
it's
about
the
responsibilities
of
participating
right,
the
responsibilities
of
the
success
falling
on
your
shoulders
as
well.
So
we
really
think
there's
a
big
educational
component
here.
D
That
needs
to
be
done
to
sort
of
manage
folks
expectations,
but
also
address
their
responsibilities
in
daos
as
well,
because
some
of
the
latest
things
that
you've
seen
happen
really
aren't
engineering
things
that
you
can
engineer
your
way
out
of.
But
you
need
to
sort
of
like
educate
your
way
out
of.
F
Yeah
very
thoughtful,
thank
you,
hi
peyton
from
maker
dow
here,
so
I
think
the
tooling
actually
is
coming
along
really
fast
and
that's
one
of
the
neat
thing
about
open
source
structure
right
is
that
new
ideas
tend
to
birth
very
quickly
once
they
come
to
market.
F
However,
the
problem
I
see
with
it
is
that
we're
kind
of
in
this
situation,
where
we're
laying
down
the
train
tracks,
while
the
train
is
chugging
along
and
anytime,
you
implement
a
new
tool,
a
new
system,
a
new
voting
mechanism.
You
have
to
really
understand
the
benefits
and
and
drawbacks
before
you
implement
it,
or
you
can
run
into
a
serious
danger
situation.
F
So
when
we
look
at
like
nation
states
as
like
a
great
example
of
people
have
been
doing
governance
for
a
really
long
time.
We
see
that
their
bureaucracy,
the
people
that
actually
maintain
their
tools
and
their
systems
is
several-
are
several
times
larger
than
the
people
actually
making
the
governor's
decisions-
we're
not
quite
there
in
d5.
So
I
think
it's
actually
more
of
a
problem
of
getting
people
are
more
interested
in
governance
and
can
experiment
with
these
tools,
analyze
them.
Research
them
and
really
present
plainly
to
communities
like
hey
all
right.
B
Why
why
dows
are
bad
for
a
little
bit
more
just
in
the
past
two
months,
we've
seen
what
I
think
some
people
would
characterize
as
successful
governance
attacks
on
some
of
the
most
high
profile,
dows
justin
sun,
successfully
took
out
a
flash
loan
and
passed
a
ave
governance
proposal
to
have
a
deployment
of
ave
onto
tron
and
attempted
to
do
similar
shenanigans
on
compound
and
makerdao
having
a
stablecoin
he's
associated
with
added
as
collateral.
B
B
F
Sure
absolutely
security
is
always
going
to
be.
Your
number
one
concern
right.
F
A
really
big
problem
is
the
ability
to
borrow
these
governance
tokens
at
such
a
large
rate,
because
basically,
a
core
tenant
of
a
lot
of
governance
systems
is
that
people
who
hold
the
token
are
incentivized
right
by
the
performance
of
the
protocol.
Well,
if
you're
short
a
token
you're
inverse
incentivized.
So
you
see
these
governance
attacks
potentially
being
quite
profitable,
so
I
think
really
what
it
kind
of
comes
down
to
is
designing
systems
and
understanding
when
you
might
be
at
risk
in
those
systems.
F
For
instance,
if
you
look
at
our
maker
voting
portal,
our
dashboard,
where
we
handle
our
votes,
we
like
to
have
a
little
box
that
says
like
all
right:
here's
how
much
available
maker
there
is
at
other
lending
platforms,
here's
how
much
maker
is
staked
in
the
governance
contract.
Just
so
it's
very
clear
to
people
that,
like
hey,
if
these
numbers
start
switching
one
way
or
the
other,
we
might
be
in
danger,
and
we
kind
of
need
to
mobilize
and
take
action.
F
D
To
sort
of
like
follow
on
that,
we
can't
expect
the
technology
itself
to
save
us
right
like
again,
I'm
thinking
about
like
an
educational
component.
People
also
have
to
be
paying
attention
right.
D
Dows
cannot
simply
exist
as
smart
contracts
and
expect
that
you
know
just
because
it's
christmas
eve,
you
don't
have
to
be
like
watching
the
shop
right
like
it's
not
enough
to
think
that
the
systems
alone
are
going
to
be
enough,
because
the
systems,
the
way
they
work
are
pretty
clearly
spelled
out,
and
people
have
a
lot
of
time
to
sort
of
think
about
the
organization
of
these
systems
and
kind
of
find
a
way
around
it.
I
think
we
also
have
to
be
very
careful
in
what
we
characterize
as
governance
attacks
right
there.
D
There
is
a
fine
line
between
people,
we
don't
like
getting
ideas
through,
and
people
actually
attacking
right
and-
and
that
is
something
we
have
to
keep
in
mind
like
justin
sun,
of
course,
is
like
the
boogeyman,
and
we
don't
like
him
is
the
sort
of
idea
that
the
ethereum
community
pushes,
but
I
think
that's
a
dangerous
idea
to
push
right.
He
is
another
contributor
in
the
ecosystem
of
web
3,
whether
or
not
we
like
it
and
the
systems
that
he
were
interacting
with
were
permissible
for
him
to
do
what
he
tried
to
do
right.
E
Yeah
I'd
agree
with
that.
I
think
yeah,
it's
important
to
just
be
clear
on
what
we
mean
by
the
risk-
and
I
think
you
know,
civil
attacks
are
kind
of
like
the
number
one
problem
that
gets
identified
when
we
think
about
liquid
toca
governance
and
that's
when
you
have
anonymity,
one
anonymous
actor,
creating
multiple
accounts
that
effectively
makes
them
the
whale.
I
think
in
the
case
of
ave,
we
actually
knew
who
the
attacker
was.
So
you
know
there's
even
some
transparency
around
that.
E
So
I
think
you
know
there
are
different
kinds
of
problems
we're
talking
about.
I
do
also
want
to
just
call
out
that
the
dell
I
think,
you've
set
up
the
question
around
the
d
phi
dao
landscape
and
I
represent
live
pier,
which
is
actually
not
a
d5
project.
We
are
a
proof-of-stake
protocol,
that's
using
blockchain
technology
to
actually
build
core
internet
infrastructure,
we're
doing
decentralized,
video
transcoding,
so
people
show
up
for
a
different
reason
fundamentally
when
they
run
a
node
with
live
pier.
E
C
I
think
you
can
actually
design
a
system
that
is
not
susceptible
to
those
things.
The
two
examples
that
you
gave
the
first
is:
it
can
be
attacked
with
a
lot
of
money.
So
if
you
have
a
lot
of
money,
you
can
attack
it.
So
you
can,
you
can
solve
that
problem
and
then
second,
is
it's
not
decentralized?
So
if
something's
not
decentralized,
and
someone
has
like
a
key
to
access
something
and
they
can
take
over
and
then
mind
everything,
that's
also
a
problem.
C
B
Yeah,
that's.
These
are
great
points
dennis,
and
I
want
to
start
with
you
on
this
one,
because
you
touched
on
this
a
little
bit
one
of
the
ways
you
can
defend
against
these
types
of
attacks
that
we've
seen
or
not
attacks
you've
made
a
good
point.
There
is
through
greater
participation.
B
Some
of
the
most
important
votes
in
these
protocols
get
two
dozen
addresses
involved
at
most
and
only
a
fraction
of
a
governance
token
circulating
supply.
You
know
we
were
just
dragging
danielle,
but
the
vote
not
to
unwind
wonderland's
treasury
is
by
far
the
most
popular
dow
vote
ever
it
had
over
20
000
participants
and
it's
kind
of
wild
that
the
most
popular
ever
is
only
20
000
participants.
B
So
what
can
we
do
to
galvanize
more
participation?
What
kinds
of
crypto
economic
networks
could
we
create
around
incentivizing
participation?
Or
is
it
really
you
know
a
public
good
people
just
need
to
get
off
their
ass?
They
shouldn't
be
paid.
D
Yeah,
so
those
are
some
great
questions,
something
I
like
to
think
about.
Is
you
know
when
we
talk
about
20
000
people
showed
up
right.
A
lot
of
people
recently
showed
up
in
the
ens
sort
of
brouhaha
that
was
happening
in
their
community.
D
People
show
up
when
they
care
right
when
it
affects
them
when
they
have
an
opinion
they
show
up
when
they
care
a
lot
of
votes
that
happen
in
d5
protocols
are
extremely
abstract,
technical
things,
so
people
say,
oh
only
20
people
showed
up,
but
I
would
be
really
impressed
if
20
000
people
showed
up
to
like
readjust
the
multi-collateralization
ratio
across,
like
you
know,
defy
lending
pools
at
like
you
know,
some
sort
of
inverse
ratio
to
something
or
other
right.
That
would
be
a
different
world
that
we
would
be
living
in.
D
So
I
think
it
depends
on
what
people
are
voting
on
and
certainly
I
think
you
probably
can
design
systems
that
are
more
responsible
of
saying
hey.
You
know,
if
only
three
people
show
up
to
this,
maybe
the
vote
should
be
going
longer
or
maybe
like
more
people
should
have
to
like
go
through
this
process.
Maybe
maybe
you
can
design
systems
to
give
the
community
the
ability
to
to
look
over
these
decisions
a
little
bit
better.
But
again,
if
you
don't
understand
how
it
works,
you
don't
understand
how
it
works
like
with
wonderland.
D
I
think
a
lot
of
people
were
just
promised,
number
go
up
and
they
weren't
sure
if
number
would
go
down,
and
so
they
got
in
there
and
it's
just
like.
Oh
no
save
us,
let's
vote,
but
do
they
did
they
participate
before
then
right
like
when
number
went
up,
did
they
check
in
or
care
did
they
just
say
number
goes
up,
everything's
fine!
I
don't
know
right.
D
Additionally,
we
need
better
tools
right.
We
need
better
tools
to
understand.
What's
happening,
we
probably
need
more
primitives
that
become
universal,
that
they
can
understand
right.
So
I
think
it's
a
combination
of
things,
but
one
thing
that
I
do
want
to
point
out
is
a
lot
of
these
systems
are
very
new
right.
So
when
we
talk
about
decentralization,
it's
there's
a
little
bit
of
a
mismatch
of
thinking.
Okay,
you
know
three
women
get
together
and
they
decide
that
they're
going
to
build
some
sort
of
new
lending
protocol,
it's
very
complicated
and
they
launch
it.
D
You
know,
four
weeks
later,
it's
a
little
unreasonable
to
expect
that
everyone
around
the
world
is
going
to
participate
in
how
it
runs
right
when
most
the
knowledge
of
the
the
project
exists.
Within
these
you
know
three
or
four
women's
heads
right.
So
when
we
talk
about
decentralization,
we
should
add
a
time
scale
to
it.
Right
if
compound
is
not
decentralized
by
the
year,
2340
right
like
yeah,
it's
a
failure
right,
that's
not
decentralized,
but
is
it
if
it's
not
decentralized
a
couple
years
later
right,
like
you
know,
I
have
a
small
child.
D
You
know
five
years
into
having
a
small
child.
You
still
have
a
small
child
right
like
it's
not
done
yet.
So
sometimes
we
have
to
like
take
a
step
back
and
think
where,
at
what
point
are
we
judging
the
decentralization
of
these
organizations,
because
if
they're
complicated
they're
going
to
be
hard
to
build.
E
Yeah,
I
also
think
that
there's
a
misconception
that,
unless
everyone
votes
on
everything,
it's
not
a
dow
and
d
fight
doesn't
have
delegated
governance.
We
actually
have
as
again
as
a
proof
of
stake
protocol,
a
delegated
proof
of
stake
where
token
holders
delegate
their
tokens
to
node
operators
who
have
you
know
those
governance
rights
in
our
case,
delegators
can,
if
they
wish
choose
to
vote
against
their
node
operators,
but
again
the
types
of
decisions
we're
making
based
on
the
protocol
and
infrastructure
network
that
we
are.
E
They
are
highly
technical,
but
as
a
node
operator,
you're
highly
incentivized,
to
want
to
pay
attention
to
the
changes
that
are
being
proposed
to
make
changes
and
to
vote
on
those
and-
and
again
I
think
it's
like
not
everything
has
to
proceed
to
an
unchained
vote
as
well.
I
mentioned
the
difference
between
on
and
off
chain
governance
like
surely
there
are
things
that
we
should
just
be
able
to.
E
You
know
collectively,
decide
on
and
those
who
want
to
engage
in
that
decision,
making
to
deliberate
openly
and
be
really
transparent,
so
that
people
can
see
ultimately
what
decisions
were
made.
I
think
that
you
know,
as
a
member
of
a
community
what
you
care
about
most
is
being
informed
about
the
decisions
that
are
happening.
C
For
me
getting
so
whether
you're,
a
dow
that
already
exists
or
a
project
that
wants
to
decentralize
and
become
a
dao
or
a
small
dow,
that's
just
starting,
I
think
the
most
important
part
is
getting
governance
of
your
ecosystem
in
the
hands
of
people.
That
will
be
good
governors
and
that's
not
an
easy
thing
to
do.
But
one
way
to
do
it
well,
one
way
not
to
do
it
is
just
let
people
who
have
a
lot
of
money
buy
governance
power
in
your
system.
C
One
way
to
do
it,
which
is
not
perfect,
is
to
give
governance
power
only
to
people
that
contribute
value
to
your
ecosystem,
so
starting
that
from
scratch
is
very
hard.
There
is.
There
are
people
walking
around
eat
denver
this
week
that
are
actually
handing
out
nft
governance
power
to
a
dow,
that's
about
to
start
and
that
that
is
a
very
unique
way
to
distribute
and
launch
a
dao?
But
it's
coming
from
a
couple:
people's
minds
right.
C
There
was
an
initial
distribution
and
we've
had
about
60
inflation,
and
it's
worked
rather
well.
Now,
it's
not
as
distributed
as
some
big
projects.
There
are
not
20
000
people
that
have
governance
power
in
dxdow.
There
are
about
550
wallets
that
hold
governance,
power
and
only
100
of
those
maybe
have
voted
in
the
last
two
months.
But
you
know
that
those
100
people
that
are
voting
earn
that
government
governance
power
by
actually
contributing
value,
and
so
we
believe
that
that
is
a
good,
a
step
in
the
right
direction.
C
There
are,
you
know,
molecules
also
do
share
based
governance,
where
you
have
to
actually
contribute
value
or
and
sometimes
contribute
capital
to
get
that
governance
power,
but
these
dows
are
pretty
open,
even
if
you
can't
buy
a
liquid
token
to
get
governance
power.
If
you
contribute
value
to
a
community,
they
will
probably
award
you
governance
power,
no
matter
what
community.
C
B
Yeah
peyton,
I
want
to
hear
from
you
on
this
because
you're
our
resident
paid
protocol
politician
you're
a
professional
governance
participant
is
that
a
viable
model
is
that
going
to
be?
Do
we
just
pay
the
smartest
guys
to
to
run
governance
for
us.
F
Yeah,
that's
certainly
an
option
right,
there's
gonna,
be
benefits
and
trade-offs
to
everything.
We
talk
a
lot
about
cost
right
and
we
tend
to
go
directly
to
economic
costs
of
like
okay,
well,
layer,
one
is
expensive.
So
what?
If
we
move
things
to
layer?
Two
and
that's
a
good
thing
to
do-
that's
something
we're
working
on
at
maker
dow.
However,
a
much
harder
problem
to
address
is
how
do
we
address
the
opportunity
cost
of
actually
being
an
informed
voter
right?
F
If
you
have
10
proposals
going
up
this
week
and
it
takes
you
40
hours
to
actually
make
an
informed
decision
on
them.
You're
only
going
to
have
your
insiders
voting
on
it,
whether
you
like
it
or
not,
or
at
least
voting
as
a
fully
informed
like
a
voter
someone
who
who's
kind
of
taking
the
interest
of
the
dow
fully
fully
in
heart,
so
maker,
dow
one
one
thing
we've
kind
of
come
out
with
is:
is
delegation
we're
about
six
months
in
I
don't
know
time's
a
little
weird.
F
Someone
can
dunk
me
on
twitter
if
I'm
significantly
off
there,
but
we
basically
came
up
a
way
where
we
could,
as
promiscuously
as
possible.
Allow
delegate
delegation
to
take
place,
while
still
putting
on
some
kind
of
off
chain
restraints
that
make
the
larger
delegates
recognizable
have
them,
communicate
their
reasoning
to
the
community
that
way,
even
if
you're
not
able
to
take
part
in
a
vote
or
you're
not
able
to
pay
attention
to
what
your
delegate
did
last
week,
you
can
catch
it
up
really
quickly
in
a
post.
F
That
way,
you
can
at
least
evaluate
how
people
are
making
informed
decisions
and
kind
of
use
that
liquid
democracy
aspect
to
reallocate
your
token
weight.
If,
for
any
reason,
you
feel
that
someone
is
is
not
doing
their
job
of
of
actually
evaluating
these
things.
B
Got
it
yeah?
Well
we're
supposed
to
be
talking
about
future
proofing
dows,
so
I'd
like
to
get
into
architectural
trade-offs
that
you
guys
have
to
make.
I
think
you
know
everybody's
familiar
with
the
blockchain
trilemma.
You
have
choices
between
decentralization,
you
know
computational,
speed
and
security.
I
think
dows
face
similar
problems.
You
know
the
danielle
autocratic
organization
look
a
multi-sig
of
like
two
guys:
they
they
can
sling
some
funds
around
and
they
can
do
more
complex
things
with
their
treasury
because
of
the
centralization.
B
So
when
you're
thinking
about
potentially
creating
a
system
that
still
needs
to
exist,
hundreds
of
years
from
now
and
facilitate
you
know:
potential
entry
from
institutional
players
from
from
nation
states.
Perhaps
what
are
some
of
the
trade-offs
you
make
in
building
these
governance
systems
and
what
should
people
you
know
which
accesses
should
they
be
leaning
towards
when
they
have
to
make
those
decisions
in
order
to
make
sure
they
build
something
that
is
durable
and
can
last
skye?
Let's
start
with
you.
C
Yes,
from
my
perspective,
we
already
have
centralized
systems
whether
we're
talking
about
the
nft
space
or
web
2
or
finance.
We
already
have
centralized
systems,
so
we
can
already
use
those,
and
so,
if
you're,
making
it
down,
it's,
it's
leaning.
It's
sacrificing
decentralization
in
order
to
achieve
the
other
things.
C
To
me,
that's
not
that
interesting,
so
the
core
principles
which
a
lot
of
them
come
from
the
ethereum
space
like
maximum
decentralization
and
moving
that
direction
is
for
me
one
of
the
most
important
things,
because
that's
what
allows
censorship
resistance
if
we
have
a
d5
project
that
has
the
front
end
owned
by
the
actual
company
in
new
york
city,
it's
it
is
censored
and
it
can
be
shut
down
and
we
are
yeah.
That's
not
that
interesting.
C
If
you
have
a
d5
protocol
that,
where
the
front
end
is
actually
owned
by
a
dao
actually
owned
by
a
decentralized
entity,
and
even
if
they
could
come
after
a
couple
people
they,
the
no
government
in
the
world
can
actually
go
after
the
entire
dao
and
shut
down
this
front
end
and
so
things
that
that,
as
an
example,
is
something
that
dx
dow,
it
probably
leads
in
the
space
like
decentralization
first
and
then
we
move
a
little
slow.
C
Because
of
that,
so
we're
less
scalable
than
someone
who
is
a
smaller
team,
and
I
forget
what
the
third
part
is.
But
we
probably
the
decentralization,
is
the
most
important
but
other
dials.
Don't
have
to
do
that
and
and
we'll
see
it
only
matters
when
it
matters,
and
it
hasn't
mattered
right
so
far.
But
I
think
it
will
at
some
point.
E
Yeah
I'd
agree
with
that.
I
think
the
premise
that
decentralization
is
what's
needed
to
future
proof
governance
and
to
make
projects
sustainable
and
then
thinking
about
how
how
you
achieve
that
and
the
threats
to
it.
It
is
about
identification
and
and
having
as
much
confidence
that
you
do
have
a
large
number
of
truly
distinct
distinctly
identified.
E
You
know
nodes
or
participants
in
your
network,
and
I
mean
that's
what
we
talk
about
when
we
say
governance
risk
is
when
you
have
one
actor.
That
is
maliciously
pretending
to
be
a
bunch
of
decentralized
nodes
in
your
network.
So
I
think
the
question
of
identification
is
a
really
huge
one
and
we're
just
really
starting,
I
think,
as
a
space
to
to
tackle
identity
systems
in
governance.
D
I'm
a
pretty
proud
practical
person
and
I
think
we're
going
to
get
there.
Something
I
like
to
think
about
is
how
the
pyramids
were
built
to
last
for
all
time
and
they're
still
here,
but
the
people
who
built
them
are
not
and
again
you
know
my
experience
has
formed
a
little
bit
for
being
in
an
organization
that
is
very
engineering
heavy.
D
So
we
tend
to
think
that
engineering
is
the
solution
for
things
where
maybe
it's
it's
not
right
like
if
the
people
you
know
you
could
have
a
smart
contract
that
is
fundamentally
completely
decentralized
or
you
know
you
know
impervious
to
to
attack.
But
if
the
people
leave
it's
still
a
failure
right
and
I
think
it's
difficult
to
say
that
we
want
to
design
something
that
can
last
forever.
We
don't
know
what
forever
actually
looks
like
right.
Are
we
going
to
be
doing
d5?
D
D
Is
it
75
000
years,
or
you
know,
22,
000
years
or
three
years
right
like
what
is
the
amount
of
time
necessary
to
to
say
that
something
has
succeeded
and,
in
my
mind
currently
is
if
people
still
show
up,
if
people
still
care,
then
it's
still
succeeding
right
and
some
of
these
governance
attacks
are
fatal
for
for
the
organizations
that
have
been
building
them
and
that
that
is
a
shame,
but
the
people
are
not
gone
and
they
they
are
able
to
rebuild
it
and
rebuild
it
better.
D
So
I
think
there's
this
kind
of
idea
of,
like
you
know
when
you
break
bones
and
they
heal
back
they'll
yield
back
a
little
bit
stronger.
I
look
forward
to
the
next
couple
years
of
governance,
attacks
to
actually
teach
us
where
the
edges
are,
what
really
doesn't
work
and
I
think
from
that
learning
we'll
probably
be
able
to
build
much
better
systems.
F
Definitely
that's
very
inspiring.
I
guess
the
three
things
I
think
about
most
are
security,
incentivization
and
transparency,
because
I
think
if
you
can
kind
of
work
along
those
axes,
you
can
really
build
towards
towards
the
resilient
system.
F
The
issue
is
like
oftentimes.
You
can
have
a
really
secure
system
without
an
incentive
structure,
but
then
you
introduce
an
incentive
structure
and
suddenly
you
go
from
a
situation
where
you
have
a
few
malicious
actors
right
that
might
be
motivated
to
take
you
down
to
an
army
of
rational
actors
that
can
profit
by
taking
you
down
and
that's
a
much
harder.
That's
a
much
higher
security
barrier,
but
the
nice
kind
of
bit
of
transparency
that
adds
in
there
is
like
it's
actually
okay
to
fail.
Like
it's,
obviously,
there's
a
lot
of
money
at
stake.
F
You
need
to
protect
people
and
you
should
fail
softly,
but
the
nice
thing
about
open
source
about
being
completely
transparent
with
your
systems
is
if
something
breaks
you
can
always
start
again.
You
can
always
go
back
and
refork
and
and
take
your
lessons
learned
and
and
apply
them
in
a
better
manner.
So
I
think,
as
long
as
you're
thinking
along
those
three
axis
like
you,
can
really
build
something.
That'll
stand
the
test
of
time.
F
B
I
think
we
have
about
two
minutes
left.
So
very
briefly,
can
you
guys
talk
about
what
you
know?
New
things
are
happening
with
dows
at
your
respective
organizations,
and
you
know
what
are
the
new
progress
that
your
organizations
are
making
on
this
front.
E
Oh,
hey
yeah
life
here
just
migrated
to
arbitrary
layer.
Two.
We
went
through
our
governance
process
for
that
we
do
have
liquid
token
governance,
but
we
are
going
to
be
exploring
identity
systems
in
our
protocol
as
well.
So
just
one
emphasize,
we
are
not
a
d5
project,
we
are
building
core
internet
infrastructure
and
that's
why
we
govern.
C
Yeah,
so
we
we're
we
build
dow
products
for
ourselves
in
this
weird
little
niche
space,
but
what
we
at
dick
style
realize
is
it'll,
be
awesome
to
bring
this
to
the
real
world,
and
so
one
thing
we
recently
did
this
jersey
is
copenhagen
flames,
which
is
an
esports
team
in
copenhagen
and
dick
yeah
dicks.
That
was
the
shoulder
sponsor,
and
you
know
this.
C
The
reason
we
did
this
is
because
the
founders
of
this
team
love
crypto
are
you
know
all
about,
will
want
to
learn
about
dao's
and
they
actually
want
to
dalify
their
community,
and
so
we
have
a
goal
in
2020
to
to
help
their
community
become
a
dao
to
help
them
make
decisions.
Obviously
it's
not
going
to
own
the
financial
like
wins
of
the
team
and
stuff,
but
if
they
can
downify
their
community
and
that
works,
we
can
do
that.
D
At
tally,
we're
building
tools
for
making
proposals
easier,
but
one
thing
that
we
found
that
it's
a
blocker
to
decentralization
is
the
knowledge
of
making
change,
resides
in
too
few
people,
and
you
have
a
situation
where
someone
wants
to
do
something,
but
the
person
who's,
technically
capable
of
doing
that
disagrees
and
just
says
sort
of
like
yeah
sure
go.
Do
it
and
then
people
who
want
to
do
it
are
like?
Oh,
we
don't
know
how
and
they're
like
sucks
to
be
you
so
we're
trying
to
make
tools
that
make
parts
participating
easier.
F
We're
iterating
on
delegation
that
I
mentioned
before
one
thing:
I'm
really
excited
about
that.
It's
not
me
some
of
our
awesome
guys
from
the
ducks
team,
our
development
and
user
experience
they're
working
on
getting
us
l2
voting
this
coming
up
in
the
next
few
months,
just
continuing
to
chip
away
at
the
the
cost
of
governance.
Yeah.
That's
awesome!
Well,.
B
Thanks
guys,
for
your
time,
wonderful
hearing
from
you
all.