►
Description
Recorded Feb. 15, 2022 during day one of DAODenver at Temple Denver.
Presented by DAOPlanet.org
A
Cool
well,
since
my
name
is
in
the
title,
I
guess
I
can
kick
things
off
and
lob
it
up
to
you
guys
actually
to
maybe
introduce
yourself
just
kind
of
give
it
a
little
brief
background
on
who
you
are
and
what
you're
doing
so
lauren.
Why
don't
you
start
with
us.
B
Hi,
I'm
lauren,
I
work
with
gibbeth
and
the
tec,
and
at
give
us
I
do
mostly
communications
and
the
tcm
steward
and
we're
really
actively
involved
in
governance
in
all
of
those
styles.
So
I'm
happy
to
be
here.
C
Hi
hi
everyone,
I'm
tyler,
I've
been
around
dow
master
since
it
started
we're
really
focused
on
kind
of
putting
together
the
organizational
best
practices
for
dalles
there
right
now.
I
kind
of
help
with
our
leadership
team
and
then
also
run
our
research
division.
So
do
you
have
issues
within
your
organization
and
the
dow
in
general,
we're
happy
to
chat
and
talk
about
that
and,
if
you
haven't
figured
out
come
tell
us
how
to
do
it
right.
A
Cool,
my
name
is
chris
powers.
I
work
on
governance
at
dxtau.
Dx
style
is
a
fully
on-chain
organization
that
is
approaching
its
third
year,
a
three-year
anniversary.
This
we
manage
a
couple
different
d5
products,
and
we
distinguish
ourselves
most
other
dows,
because
we
use
notable
reputation
based
governance,
token
base
governance.
So
I
think
the
the
title
of
this,
I
guess,
is
rock
the
vote
right,
which
I
think
was
like
a
cool
campaign
in
like
the
90s.
A
I
remember,
puff
daddy,
like
hosting
some
concerts
about
voting
and,
like
that's
important,
I
think
better
governance,
I
guess,
is
a
little
bit
more
appealing
to
me.
I
don't
know
if
we
can
really
define
what
better
governance
is,
but
it's
kind
of
like
a
way
that
we're
kind
of
like
moving
towards
there
so
maybe
like
if
we
just
kind
of
start
with,
maybe
from
like
a
systems
perspective
of
like
how
you
think
someone
that's
going
about
wanting
to
institute
quote
unquote.
A
B
Sure
yeah
well,
something
I
really
like
is
something
we've
been
doing
at
the
token
engineering
conference,
which
is
collaborative
collaborative
dow
design.
Basically,
we
did
something
called
collaborative
economics
where
I
really
think
it's
the
best
way
of
going
about
things.
Instead
of
just
having
like
a
one-size-fits-all
solution,
we
involved
the
community
and
educated
them
all
about
all
the
different
parameters.
B
The
way
that
they're
going
to
affect
the
community
and
we
ended
up
designing
our
governance
system
and
a
bonding
curve
with
community
input,
and
we
did
it
in
like
an
iterative
processing,
and
so
we
had
yeah.
We
had
these
parties
where
we
got
people
to
to
come
in
and
and
people
who
knew
who
knew
a
little
bit
more
about
the
the
systems
that
were
being
proposed.
B
The
different
parameters
being
proposed
could
explain
to
other
people
how
to
use
them,
and
we
had
this
whole
dashboard
and
then
basically,
anybody
who's
involved
in
the
community
could
start
putting
forward
proposals
for
the
dao
using
this
dashboard
and
coming
to
these
parties.
A
Like
we
can
like
almost
call
that
it's
like
the
life
stew
right,
it's
like
the
stew
that
creates
life
that
like
exists
before
you're,
not
really
sure
what
these
ingredients
are
or
what's
going
to
happen,
but
then,
like
a
bolt
of
lightning
happens
or
then,
like
kind
of
things,
form
and
kind
of
do
that
so
tyler.
I
guess
like
what
are
some
initial
design
structures
or
systems
for
like
maybe
that
and
like
what
would
be
that
goo?
That
makes
up
that.
Like
you
know,
initial
creation
of
life.
C
Yeah
for
for
us,
it's
been
interesting
at
dow
masters,
we're
relatively
small
team,
probably
about
30,
to
40
core
contributors
and
what's
been
interesting,
you
know
for
anyone
who's
starting
a
dow
or
new.
In
the
dow
there,
our
governance
has
been
pretty
laissez
faire,
I'd
almost
say
where
it's
more
about
almost
coalition
building
and
going
out
and
those
those
real
core
contributors
spending
time
in
the
community
and
just
getting
a
sense
of
where
people
are
at
in
one-on-one
conversations
in
spending
time.
C
Just
in
the
discord
and
whenever
we've
put
things
up
to
a
vote,
I
think
in
the
early
stages
we've
almost
always
known
that
you
know
the
community
is
behind
this,
and
so
it's
been
interesting
to
look
at
the
governance
at
the
early
stage
and
see
it
almost
as
this
coalition
building
process.
You
know
how
can
we
go
out
and
get
everyone
jazzed
about?
C
You
know
this
general
direction
that
we
might
be
going
and
then
you
know,
as
we've
been
growing
and
we've
been
thinking
more
and
more
hersh
in
the
audience
is
redoing
our
tokenomics
right
now
and
we're
starting
to
to
think
about
these
things
like
the
reputation
and
decoupling
that
from
the
financial
token,
because
I
think
ultimately,
we
have
relatively
strong
opinions
that
those
things
should
be
decoupled
and
then
it
comes
back
to
a
question
of
I
think,
employing
a
process
similar
to
what
you
all
said.
Lauren
of
this
almost
emergent
governance
process.
C
You
know
where,
where
do
people
want
to
be,
you
know
spending
time
putting
their
vote?
How
are
we
going
to
think
about
doing
that,
so
we're
in
the
very
earliest
stages
of
that
and
I'll
stop
there.
I've
stronger
opinions
about
it.
No.
A
I
think
I
think
we've
got
like
some
room
to
run
here
with
this
yeah,
because
it's
like
ethereum
dows,
like
we
did
not
invent
public
goods
or
like
governance
of
them
on
chain
management
of
them.
Is
it
like
new
evolution,
but
there
were
ways
of
managing
public
goods.
A
I
think
a
lot
about
like
managing
open
source
and
like
the
governance
around
open
source
right,
open
source
has
been
open
source
software
has
been
around
for
a
long
time
and
the
way
that
that
is
iterated
on
and
governed
like
has
been
predates,
like
you
know,
the
blockchain
land
and
really
what's
happening.
A
I
guess
with
this
on-chain
governance
is
we're
actually
formalizing
some
of
that
governance
around
those
communities,
and
so
I
guess
it
kind
of
creates
this
tension,
though,
between,
like
creating
formal
structures
for
governance
that,
like
create
accountability,
transparency
and
like
all
of
these
things
that
are
good,
that
we
want
to
have
for
these
public
goods
that
can
grow
and
we
want
to
see
foster.
But
at
the
same
time
like
does
that
like
stymy
growth,
innovation
or
kind
of
like
you
know,
whatever
we
were
actually
talking
backstage
before
this.
A
You
know,
like
you
know
we
think,
of
open
source
management
and
governance.
You
know
you
think
a
lot
about
like
the
benevolent
dictator,
right
and
so
like.
Is
there
a
room
for
the
benevolent
dictator
in
dow
governance
and
so
tyler,
since
we
we're
chatting
about
this,
like?
What
do
you
think
about?
You
know
benevolent
dictators
in
in
endow
governance.
C
Yeah
yeah,
it's
interesting
trying
to
look
at
some
of
the
case
studies
as
to
what's
out
there.
I
was
telling
chris,
you
know.
If
you
look
at
ethereum,
you
know,
vitalik
had
is
his
initial
vision
for
it
and
then
you
know
recently
comes
out
with
ethereum
in-game
and
that's
that's
quite
different
than
what
that
you
know.
Initial
plan
was
five
years
ago,
and
yet
you
see
the
community
totally,
you
know
galvanized
behind
it
and
say
this
is
absolutely
where
we
want
to
be
going.
C
You
know
if
we
try
and
think
of
a
counterfactual
or
an
alternative,
it
would
be
like
the
most
opposite
thing.
We
could
do
would
say:
hey
community,
everyone
submit
their
proposal
for
where
we
think
ethereum
should
go
and
then
somehow
we're
going
to
have
a
sense-making
process
as
to
how
to
get
there.
C
Both
are
valid
ways
to
do
things
but
as
like,
when
vitalik
comes
out
and
says:
hey
like
we're
going
here,
the
benefit
of
that
is,
you
can
move
faster
and
it
kind
of
puts
in
those
guide,
rails
and
and
to
me,
that's
something
that
you
know
is
very
beneficial
for
dalles,
because
it
lets
them
move
faster
right
when
you
know
where
you're
going,
then,
all
of
a
sudden
it's
easier
to
design
some
of
those
governance
mechanisms
to
say
we
now
have
these
core
objectives,
and
so
what
do
we
need
like?
C
What
governance
now
makes
sense
to
put
in
place
to
make
sure
we
hit
those
core
objectives?
And
I
think
that's
something
that's
you
know
been
interesting
to
watch
and
see,
and
even
at
down
masters
we
struggle
with
this.
You
know
how
much
should
the
the
sort
of
core
leaders
be
setting
the
vision
and
and
stuff
first,
how
much
do
we
need
to?
You
know
rely
on
the
community
to
pull
that
up
and
I
think
it's
an
open
question
and
I
don't
think
there's
one
right
answer,
but
I
do
think
there
is.
B
Yeah
I'd
love.
To
add
to
that.
I
think
I
mean
for
me
when
I
think
of
the
benevolent
benevolent
dictator.
It's
often
the
the
benevolent
belevolent
role.
So
it's
somebody
who
maybe
has
expertise
in
the
field,
and
I
don't
think
that
it's
it's
best
to
have
people
with
expertise
in
the
field
to
make
the
decisions.
Ultimately.
But
I
really
really
like
the
advice
process.
B
So
it's
like,
including
the
opinions
of
experts
in
the
field
and
people
who
are
affected
by
the
decisions
and
then
like
bringing
those
things
together
and
then
informing
the
community
and
it's
like
and
and
having
all
of
this
transparent
as
well.
So
like
the
people
in
the
benevolent
dictator,
roles
can
also
have
opinions
and
then
their
influence
might
sway
people
one
way
or
another,
and
maybe
because
they
actually
have
expertise
in
the
field
and
maybe
because
they
actually
have
a
good
idea
of
how
things
should
go.
B
But
then
people
actually
are
able
to
make
up
their
own
minds.
And
then
I
think
that
this
comes
down
to
like
then
how
we
capture
the
voting
process.
So
it's
like
we
could
have.
B
I
mean
something
that
like
like
something
that
I
get
frustrated
with
in
voting
is
when,
like
it's
not
really
anonymous,
you
know
it's
like
it's
like
you're
voting
with
your
e
address
and
it
shows
like
people
know
it's
me,
you
know
you
can
just
find
out
it's
me
so
then
that
actually
prohibits
me
from
voting
in
the
way
that
I
want
to
so
I
think,
like
having
anonymous
voting
and
then
also
having
it
so
that
you
don't
see
like
real-time
results,
so
you
don't
know
how
the
benevolent
dictator
voted.
A
And
I
think
kind
of
what
I'm
hearing
is
like
it's
almost
like
decoupling,
all
of
the
different
functions
that
maybe
like
the
benevolent
dictator
did
but
like
okay,
you
can
still
like
provide
the
vision,
but
in
terms
of
like
the
decision,
implementation
like
that
can
actually
go
through
like
a
different
system,
and
I
think
that's
what
like
having
these
on
chain
structures.
You
can
actually
like
yeah,
peel
back
those
different
functions
to
kind
of
switch,
a
a
little
bit
on
a
different
topic,
but
related.
A
A
Perhaps
it's
not
at
the
level
of
like
a
civil
attack,
but
you
very
quickly
do
realize
that
one
of
the
most
important
things
in
terms
of
a
governance
system
and
a
governance
culture
is
how
do
you
manage
the
attention
of
voters
or,
like
the
fatigue,
you
know
or
people
call
voter
fatigue
and
I
think
deciding
like
what
proposed
like
what
is
a
proposal
or
even
the
idea
that,
like
is
everything
that
is
voted
upon
like
created
equally
and
so,
maybe
like.
A
How
do
you
think
about
like
what
you
would
define
as
like
quote-unquote
governance
decisions
from
a
community
and
like
how
should
you
delineate
between
those
decisions
on
some
that
are
maybe
like
very
large
or
some
that
are
like
small
and
like?
Where
do
you
kind
of
like
how
do
you
direct
those
to
them
so
like
lauren?
You
want
to
start
us
off
with.
B
Yeah
I
mean,
I
think,
that
I
think
that
we
need
to
just
have
different
systems
for
different
types
of
votes.
Really
like
there's,
like
I
mean
I
was
reading
like
some
of
the
questions
that
were
proposed
by
people,
and
I
was
reading
the
panel
description
and
and
there
and
one
of
the
questions
was
like
which
vote
should
be
on
chain
and
which
vote
should
be
off-chain.
B
There
are
also
a
lot
of
questions
about
like
what's
the
ideal
quorum,
and
I
think
that,
like
all
of
these
things
like
you
need
to
consider
like
what
you're
actually
voting
on,
are
people
voting
on
controlling
the
treasury
or
are
they
voting
on
like
like
whether
or
not
we
should
change
what
we
call
ourselves
from
givethers
to
unicorns.
B
Important
and
critical
than
other
things,
and
so
I
think
that,
like
the
parameters
which
we
use
to
control,
those
votes
like
can
be
adjusted
based
on
the
votes
and
then
we
can
create
like
modular
systems,
at
an
on
an
as
needed
basis.
So
it's
like
you
start
out
with
like
this
kind
of
decision
making
process
and
then,
as
you're,
going
through
the
process
of
being
a
dow
and
making
decisions,
then
you
can
add,
like
layers
on
top
of
that,
like
new
voting
structures
as
new
problems
arise,
yeah.
C
Yeah,
I
guess
my
thoughts
on
this
are
a
lot
around.
Who
does
who
does
it
affect
you?
You
kind
of
ask
like
when,
when
do
we
vote
or
what
should
a
proposal
be,
and
if
I'm
thinking
about
like
what
needs
to
be
an
on-chain
proposal,
then
to
me
that
needs
to
have
an
impact
on
the
majority
of
the
dow
right.
C
I
I
don't
think
I
need
a
an
on-chain
vote,
necessarily
for
you
know
should,
should
we
have
a
research
meeting
at
eight
o'clock
or
nine
o'clock
right
like
that
very
simplistic
example
right,
but
then,
when
it
gets
down
to
you
know
we're
talking
about
you
know,
should
we
change
the
bonding
curve
on
you
swap
like
that
becomes
all
of
a
sudden.
This
is
very
important.
C
Everyone
should
know
and
then
yeah
my
other
opinion
there
is
that
there
should
be
pretty
it's
good
to
have
very
measurable
or
clear
outcomes
on
the
things
you're
voting
on
right.
I
think
I
think
it
needs
to
be
that
very
clear,
like
yes
or
no
or
a
b
and
c.
I
think
a
lot
of
dows
get
caught
up
and
you
know
we
need
to
be
decentralized,
and
so
we
need
to
have
these
votes
on
everything
and
and
at
a
certain
point
like
you
can't
set
a
strategy
with
a
vote
right.
C
We
can
put
up
three
different
strategies
and
then
say
which
one
do
you
all
think
we
should
execute
and
then
that,
like
that,
ultimately
can
be
a
vote.
But
I
think
thinking
about
you
know
what
needs
to
go
out
there
and
actually
be
like
discussed
in
advance
before
we
actually
put
it
on
chain
to
vote
on
is
actually
pretty
important.
When
you
think
about
that
whole
governance
process.
A
Yeah
and
just
to
give
some
dx
dial
perspective
here
so
we've,
I
think
if
you
add
up
mainnet
gnosis
chain
and
arbitram,
I
think
we've
passed
something
like
1300
proposals
since
inception,
so
we
actually
take
kind
of
almost
the
opposite
view
of
this,
which
is
more
of
like
lots
of
things
on
proposals.
So
like
every
worker
proposal
is
a
proposal
we
make
like
signal
proposals
on
these
things
and
one
of
the
things
like
there's
kind
of
two
reasons
that
we're
able
to
do
that.
A
One
is
our
consensus
mechanism
of
holographic
consensus
is
also
like
a
quorum
management
tool,
so
anyone
can
submit
a
proposal
but
to
get
a
proposal
into
the
boosted
phase
where
it
can,
it
doesn't
need
any
a
majority
to
pass.
There's
like
a
mini
prediction
market
or
a
staking
period
where
people
are
betting
on
whether
or
not
that
proposal
should
go
up
there.
So
that's
the
way
you
kind
of
manage
the
spam
element
to
that,
and
the
second
reason
is:
we
are
very
okay
with
like
what
people
might
like
call
low
voter
participation.
A
But,
like
I'm
glad
that
proposal
is
passing,
I
don't
need
to
vote
on
that,
but
it
like
kind
of
there's
a
certain
level
like
of
transparency
to
the
dow
and
to
the
community,
and
I
think
it
allows
like
kind
of
a
little
bit
of
a
contrast,
you're
talking
about
like
who,
like
people,
not
wanting
to
know
who
is
voting
where,
like
with
this
method,
it's
the
people
that
are
voting
for
this
proposal.
That
kind
of
give
it
its
legitimacy,
because
maybe
those
are
people
they're
like
well
known
in
the
community.
C
Or
something
yeah,
one
thing:
I'd
love
to
pose
to
you
too,
since
you're
a
part
of
these
much
larger
dowels.
I
think
at
the
early
stages
you
you
want
to
say
yes
to
everything
and
you
don't
want
to
discourage
people
by
voting
down
their
proposals,
and
so
I
think,
that's
probably
a
large
reason
why
we
don't
send
so
many
things
to
a
proposal
is
because
it's
our
contributors,
I
think,
as
everyone
knows,
are
the
most
important
part
of
your
tao,
and
so
you
want
to
create
a
culture
where
you
can
feel
like.
C
You
can
say
yes
or
no
so
to
your
anon
point,
but
I'd
be
curious
to
hear
from
your
all's
experience.
You
know:
how
have
you
created
that
culture,
where
you
can
you
know,
vote
yes
or
no,
and
and
people
are
okay
with
that
and
want
to
stick
around
or
or
is
it?
Is
it
a
feature
that
when
you
say
no,
they
want
to
leave
and
that's
that's
kind
of
what
you
want.
I.
A
I
just
say
it's
really
tough
and
I
would
say
the
first
proposal
from
most
geek
style.
Contributors
is
probably
like
the
most
anxious
moment
since,
like
middle
school,
like
just
like
the
like
I'm
putting
this
on
chain,
I'm
putting
myself
like
out
in
front
of
people.
This
is
what
I'm
gonna
work
on
and
then
people
are
gonna
vote
for
it
so
like
that
itself
is
kind
of
like
a
big
jump
that
people
like
want
to
make
sure
they
have
everything
set
up
before
they
like
go
to
that
level.
B
I
think
something
that
really
helps
for
me
personally
is
like
having
clear
criteria
of
like
so
it's
like.
We
have
our.
I
mean
I've
been
working
with
their
our
communications
team
on
creating
like
really
good
documentation,
so
it's
kind
of
like
we
have
our
covenant
and
we
have
like
our
code
of
conduct
and
like
the
things
like
the
proposals
that
are
being
put
forward,
need
to
first
agree
to
that.
So
then
it's
easy
to
vote
no
on
something.
B
That's
going
against
like
what
we
agreed
as
a
community
is
like
the
way
that
we
define
ourselves
and
then
and
then
I
think,
then
we
also
have
the
advice
process,
which
is
also
in
our
documentation,
and
it
explains
that
proposals
need
to
be
on
our
forum
and
need
to
like
generate
comments
for
a
period
of
at
least
five
days
before
they
can
even
go
towards
the
dow.
And
so
it's
like
there's
already
like
this
stringent
criteria.
It's
like
okay,
these
are
like
clear,
no
things
and
then
in
the
advice
process.
B
I
don't
want
to
be
like
the
naysayer,
but
then
and
then
I
think
it
really
just
takes
having
a
culture
where
it's
also
okay,
to
say
no
respectfully,
and
it's
also
okay,
to
disagree
with
something
and
then
communicate
about
it
and
then
like
work
together
and-
and
I
think
that,
like
that's
something
we're
really
focused
on
building.
So
I
think,
then,
like
having
the
cultural
care
is
like
another
element
of
ensuring
that,
like
good
proposals
go
through
and
then
proposals
that
aren't
good
for
the
dow
don't
go
through
and
yeah.
B
A
I
think,
like
forums
are
so
terribly
important
to
taos
and
like
kind
of
how
they
should
be
governed-
and
you
know
things
that
happened
before
the
proposal
process,
as
you
were
saying
so
just
because
we
only
have
a
couple
minutes
here
just
to
kind
of
close
out.
A
A
B
Well,
I
think
this
comes
into
the
the
conversation
about
quorum
and
it's
like
it
was
really
interesting
listening
to
eric
and
he
was
saying
they
set
their
minimum
quorum
too
high
and
they
could
never
reach
their
minimum
quorum
and
that
just
like
really
messed
things
up.
So
I
think
that
this
is
really
interesting
and
like
where
delegation
comes
into
play
is
like
then,
community
members
who
are
not
as
active,
but
then
they
have
trusted
other
community
members.
They
can
delegate
and
then
those
delegates
can
vote
for
them.
B
But
I
think,
like
another,
really
good
process
is
like
being
able
to
like
check
up
on
your
delegates,
and
we
have
this
like
one
voting
process
in
the
token
engineering
commons,
where
there's
like
a
delegate
voting
period
and
then
there's
a
period
after
where
the
vote
is
still
open.
That,
like
delegates
can't
vote
anymore,
but
then
people
can
check
on
their
delegates
votes
and
then,
if
they
don't
like
it,
they
can
say
no.
C
Yeah
not
too
many
strong
opinions
and
we
have
30
seconds
left
and
the
way
I
almost
think
about
delegation
is
from
an
organizational
structure
standpoint
unless
from
the
voting
standpoint
and
so
like.
If
you
look
at
kind
of
what
yearn
does
with
their
governance
model,
where
they
have.
You
know
these
individual
teams
that
are
each
in
charge.
I
feel
to
me
that's
almost
a
way
of
saying
look
like
you
know
as
a
part
of
yearn.
C
I
agree
that
this
team
is
best
suited
to
make
a
decision
here,
and
so
I'm
going
to
agree
with
whatever
outcome
that
they
choose,
and
so
that
to
me
is
just
another
way
to
think
about
delegation
rather
than
assigning
it
to
someone
is.
C
We
can
actually
do
it
at
the
organizational
structure
level
and
say
you
know
we're
gonna
almost
elect
or
come
up
with
these
teams
and
then
based
off
that
we're
gonna
agree
with
the
decisions
they
come
up
with
and
that's
more
of
a
softer
delegation
than
like
you
know:
here's
here's,
my
votes
as
you
do
with
you
know
an
ens
or
something
like
that.