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From YouTube: DXgov Weekly Meeting [2021-02-03]
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A
Welcome
to
dxdot
governance,
discussion
for
wednesday
february
3rd
2021,
starting
first
with
the
proposal
roundup,
the
proposals
on
mainnet,
which
cost
a
lot
of
money
to
get
there,
there's
lots
of
different
worker
proposals
in
there
as
we
move
to
the
top
of
the
month
here.
So
as
we
were
just
discussing
before
the
recording
went
on,
these
were
very
expensive
proposals
to
get
on
into
the
queue
and
will
be
expensive
ones
to
vote
on.
A
So
of
course,
the
gas
is
reimbursed
up
to
90
by
dx
dow,
but
this
is
a
huge
cost
to
dx
style.
So
we're
talking
about
exploring
those.
A
There
are
just
a
couple
of
the
proposals
to
highlight,
there's,
as
I
said,
some
worker
proposals
and
then
there's
the
two
different
member
balancer
proposals,
so
each
for
50
eth,
so
one
had
sent
63
000
die
and
attach
the
transaction
etherscan
transaction
in
there,
and
then
it
was
requesting
a
50
and
the
other
one
sent
it
in
usdc
and
attached
the
transaction
and
that
one's
requesting
54,
50.5,
eth
and
yeah,
and
so
actually
a
couple
of
the
worker
proposals
are
actually
requesting
in
die
there.
A
So
we're
already
seeing
some
usage
in
there
and
then
there
is
the
dxdow
discord
launch
initiative
that
keenan
has
been
working
on.
So
this
is
just
a
dxd
will
be
a
deep
reward
to
reward
community
members
for
contributing
and
building
the
discord
there,
and
I
think
and
yeah
there's
a
couple
pending
booster
boosting
proposals.
A
couple
that
are
interesting
is
there
is
the
the
fun
the
swapper
relay
with
dye.
A
So
this
is
a
testing
out
the
swapper
relay,
and
so
you
actually
first
have
to
fund
the
relayer
from
the
voting
and
from
the
funding
and
voting
power
scheme,
and
then
the
multicall
scheme
actually
can
use
that.
So
this
is
the
the
first.
I
believe
funding
of
the
swapper
relay
with
5000
die,
and
then
there
is
another
diversified
treasury
authorization,
diversification
proposal
that
will
exchange
a
hundred
years
for
die
till
the
multi-sig.
A
This
one
is
also
interesting
and
great
because
it
has
the
first
verification
for
the
multi-sig
addresses
in
the
proposal
there.
So
a
lot
of
proposals,
I
don't
think
anything
too
contentious.
Oh
and
there's
also
a
join
the
radical.xyz
cedar
program
signal
proposal,
which
will
be
a
very
expensive
signal
proposal
for
that,
but
any
thoughts
or
comments
on
the
proposals
there
just
to
be
clear.
B
That
these
the
proposals
are
expensive,
not
because
of
anything
to
do
with
the
proposals
themselves,
but
just
because
of
the
gas
costs
and
the
general
costs
of
using
california.
B
A
B
Cool
yeah,
sorry,
one
more
point
on
the
swapper
liquidity
proposal
that
is,
funding
5000
die
and
then
the
multi-call
proposal
to
actually
kick
off
the
deposit
he's
also
sending
five.
So
the
way
that
works
is
you
know
the
relayer
will
check
the
price
of
the
ethic
on
uniswap.
B
You
know
through
public
functions
that
will
that
are
incentivized
that
gets
called,
and
then
it
will
make
a
deposit
into
swapper
using
the
five
thousand
die
and
it's
to
do
it
at
the
current
prices.
So
there's
going
to
be
some
leftover
of
one
of
those
tokens
depending
on
the
price.
It's
looking
like
there'll,
be
some
leftover
e
and
then
that
stays
in
the
relay
and
can
get
pulled
back
into
the
treasury
again
by
like
the
public
function.
B
A
B
Yeah
there
was
a
little
bit.
There
was
a
right
now
you
have
to
send
the
e
through
the
multi-class
scheme,
but
the
goal
is
actually
to
make
it
so
that
only
funding
comes
from
the
funding
and
voting
power.
So
there
will
probably
be
a
newer
version
of
the
plugin
which
will
change
that
so
that
it's
not
eve
from
the
multicultural
scheme.
B
But
for
now
it's
it's
ether
from
the
multi-vote
scheme
and
tokens
from
the
funding
and
running
in
the
future.
It'll
be
completely
separate
once
there's
a
replacement
for
that
scheme,
but.
A
Cool
and
as
I
said,
we
were
talking
before
the
call
about
ways
to
move
these
a
lot
of
these
proposals
to
ex
die.
I
just
think
that'll
be
a
process
we'll
have
to
outline
and
yeah.
I
think
we
can
work
on
that
asap
to
figure
out
how
we
can.
We
can
do
this
and
push
as
many
proposals
there
for
worker
payments
as
possible.
Obviously,
a
lot
of
things
will
have
to
remain
on
mainnet,
the
things
that
control
swapper
and
omen
and
ens
so
yeah.
A
Cool
next
up
the
contributor
guidelines,
as
we've
been
iterating
on
in
the
last
couple
weeks.
I
actually
think
this
is
a
great
opportunity
for
to
use
xdi
for
signal
proposal,
so
there
were
a
couple
things
added.
A
I
think
this
week
on
on
the
clarifications
on
like
rep
awards
happening
after
the
complete
of
the
first
proposal,
and
so
pope
I
don't
know
if
there's
anything
else,
you're
looking
for
for
signal
or
what
do
we
need
to
do
to
maybe
push
these
through
to
another
through
an
ex
die
vote
to
ratify
them?.
D
Yeah,
that
was,
I
think
that
was
just
the
main
hold
up.
Is
we
had
some
other
additions
chris
that
you
pointed
out
to
me
via
key
base
regarding
when
to
claim
your
rep,
which
is
in
the
second
payment
for
your
worker
period,
so
that
would
be
for
most
of
us
two
months
of
rep
requested
in
the
second
worker
payment,
and
then
I
can
clarify
one
other
thing,
and
I
think
this
is
what
we
said
is
that
for
your
trial
period,
you're
not
gaining
any
rep
right
that
that's
what
we're!
D
E
The
way
I
did
it
was
if
that
trial
person
succeeds
the
first
month
he
gets
rep
but
slashed
to
that
percentage.
But
there
might
be
like
me
and
john
talked
a
little
bit
about
about
this
like
we.
We
might.
We
want
to
give
out
rep
to
to
contributors,
but
if
someone
fails
trial
period,
maybe
that's
not
the
right
person
to
get
rep.
D
Yeah
definitely
I
haven't
have.
I
think
I
can
clarify
that
a
little
bit
but
like
I
even
have
in
there
like,
if
we
have
issues
with
people
not
acting
in
good
faith
like
they
say,
they've
completed
work,
but
they
really
haven't
or
they
completed
it
so
poorly
as
to
just
say.
Oh,
I
completed
work
in
order
to
gain
gain.
You
know
financial
gain
or
rep,
or
something
like
that.
Obviously
the
squad
guide
or
any
other
person
that's
had
contact
with
that
contributor.
Can
then
say
you
know
this.
D
Isn't
this
isn't
quality
work,
we're
not
going
to
pay
you
for
this.
You
know
sorry,
so
I
guess
the
question
is
then
for
successful
child
period
workers
who
then
move
on
to
their
two-month
full
two-month
stints
they're
doing
that
first
proposal
on
x-dire
alchemy,
where
it's
two
and
a
half
months
we
want
to
give
them.
Maybe
what
would
be
like
a
pro
rata
of
we're
doing
50
pay
for
those
first
two
weeks,
so
we
could
do
the
exact
same
thing
with
the
rep,
which
would
be
I'm
not
gonna.
D
Do
the
math
that
quickly
in
my
head,
but
I
would
assume
it's
something
like
point:
oh,
what
what
two
for
well
like
yeah,
so
something
thank
you,
john,
so
yeah,
something
like
that
for
the
two-week
period.
We
can
do
that
and
I
can
just
put
it
in
there.
I
doubt
I'll
get
or
we
will
get
any
pushback
about
that.
D
I
think
it's
just
a
matter
of
clarification,
but
if
it
seems
everyone
else
was
pretty
fine
with
the
80
percent
prorated
pay
for
the
trial
period,
so
we
could
probably
just
go
ahead
and
do
a
proposal
on
xdi
chris,
and
I
were
kind
of
saying,
though
there
is
that
the
factor
of
like
this
being
kind
of
an
ongoing
improvement
thing,
but
at
least
if
we
do
have
the
community
finalize
it
it'll
be
just
good
for
the
document
book
and
the
website
and
stuff
like
that
is
something
to
like,
say
hey.
A
And
I
think
we
should
get
in
the
habit
of
like
updating
it
every
quarter
or
something
and
like
that
goes,
and
if
it's
on
x
die
like
I'm
not
as
worried
about
passing
a
signal
proposal.
So
I
feel
like
this
isn't
on.
We
won't
have
this
ongoing
living
document,
but
just
periodically
getting
some
signal.
D
Yeah
and
like
luckily,
I've
had
quite
a
few
people,
just
kind
of
hop
on
and
like
look
at
it
and
you
know,
make
a
suggestion.
I
don't
even
know
who
sometimes,
which
is
perfectly
great,
and
if
something
like
really
obvious
that
we
should
need
to
address
sooner
rather
than
later
comes
up.
We
talk
about
it,
and
just
do
it
like
that,
so
people
can
always
just
add
notes
to
skye
mentioned
this,
though
I
think
we
will
want
to
do
like
an
ipfs
doc.
D
Not
just
have
google
docs
once
it's
ratified
and
then
we'll
also
have
it
on
the
dock
book
and
stuff
like
that
as
well.
B
And
I
think
it's
important
not
to
give
people
rep
up
front
in
their
very
first
proposal,
just
to
make
sure
that
they
are
proving
themselves
as
like
a
legitimate
actor,
not
a
scammer,
not
an
attacker,
and
that's
because,
like
rap
gives
you
quite
a
bit
of
privileges
in
the
system,
especially
with
holographic
consensus.
Right
like
it
basically
only
takes
one
rep
holder
to
pass
a
proposal
in
theory.
So
we
you
know,
I
think,
from
a
securities
perspective,
it's
important
to
be
vetting
new
rep
holders
to
at
least
you
know
some
yeah.
So.
F
John,
like
that's
a
good
point
and
I
understand
the
security
issue
there,
it's
it's
a
little
bit
against
like
the
like
anyone
anonymously
come
to
a
bounty
and
like
you
can
earn
like
point
one
percent
rep,
which
well
I
mean
that.
Maybe
they
don't
want
that
right
now,
but
like
we,
we
do
have
like
a
general
goal
to
like
get
small
amounts
of
rep
out
to
like
lots
of
more
people
and
they're,
not
always
vetted.
That's
the
thing.
So
that's
like
already
a
risk.
We
have.
You
know.
B
Right,
I
guess
what
I'm
suggesting
isn't
so
much
that
we
don't
have
like
rep
for
smaller
things,
but
that
they
do
the
small
thing
before
they
get
the
wrap.
That's
like,
I
think,
the
minimum
bar
and
like
we
can,
I
mean
we
could
maybe
even
think
about
making
it
a
little
harder
for
some
things,
but
yeah.
All
I'm
saying
is
like
people
shouldn't
be
able
to
come,
pretend
to
be
a
worker
and
get
rep
while
actually
doing
nothing.
You.
A
Know
that
would
be
bad
yeah.
I
think
it's
like
a
standard
that
we
kind
of
want
to
have,
and
that
makes
yeah
that
makes
sense.
I
do
it
also.
That
just
of
course
brings
up
like
the
security
that
we
want
to
make
sure
that
we're
monitoring
and
checking
proposals
as
much
as
possible,
because
that
is
a
possibility.
B
D
D
If
you
want
to
get
your
first
payment,
you
put
your
your
two
and
a
half
month
request
and
you
can
do
50
of
your
first
payment.
I
don't
know
it
does
seem
a
little
like.
Don't
we
want
more,
you
know
everyone
to
vote
and
they
at
least
you
make
it
past
that
trial
period
and
you're
now
going
to
get
paid.
D
It
is
kind
of
like
why
not
get
your
first
month's
rep
you're,
not
about
you
know,
we've
we
think
you're,
not
a
bad
actor.
Maybe
it
turns
out
you
are
and
we
are
monitoring
proposals
and
we
are
going
to
vote
against
you
if
you
are
a
bad
actor.
It
turns
out,
like
you
have
this
big
I
don't
know,
show
you're
putting
on
or
something.
But
I
know
that's
a
long
time
right,
especially
like
in
the
d5
world.
B
Well,
the
other
thing
too,
which
I
like
just
kind
of
neglected
to
mention,
is
that
you
do
get
rep
for
passing
a
proposal
just
itself
right.
So
if
you're
doing
a
proposal
anyways,
I
guess
there's
no
harm.
B
D
Definitely
I
yeah,
but
I'm
just
thinking
about
the
logistics
now
it
just
dawned
on
me
that
you
know
that
is
what
the
two-week
trial
period
is.
Basically
is
we're,
saying:
hey,
you
know
we're
keeping
a
close,
we're
hand-holding,
you
we're
making
sure
you're
not
a
liar
or
cheat
and
then
we're
like
okay.
You
know
we're
going
to
pay
you
now
so
can.
B
A
Okay,
cool
yeah!
That's
great!
I
think
that's
good.
I
think
the
way
we
have
just
there's
a
doubt.
You
basically
have
the
two
week
trials
like
almost
like
a
doll,
talk
post,
there's
nothing
on
chain
about
it
and
then
at
the
conclusion
of
the
two
week.
When
we're
like
good
to
go,
then
there
would
be
the
first
month
proposal
when
you
get
paid
you
get
paid
right
and
that
would.
E
D
Yeah
and
that's
only
50
like
how
most
people
do
it,
I
I
know
others
who've
been
around
longer,
do
it
differently,
but
at
least
for
most
new
people.
That's
how
we're
doing
it.
Okay,
so
cool
yeah,
so
x,
die
proposal
will
happen.
Does
everyone
is
everyone?
Okay,
then,
with
you
know
letting
people
get
their.
You
know
first
month
rep
during
their
first,
you
know
worker
request
and
then
the
second
month
rep
during
their
you
know,
work
or
payout
request
that
no
one
has
a
huge
problem
with
that.
E
I
mean
as
long
as
people
can
still
get
rep
from
doing
a
proposal
and
getting
it
through.
I
think
that's
no
problem,
but
if
we
had
yeah,
if,
if
you
didn't
get
rep
from
from
doing
proposals,
maybe
yeah,
maybe
we
should
have
done
it
differently
but
like
if
we're
gonna
protect
us
us
from
from
that,
we
might
well
as
well
protected
from
the
creation
proposal
reward.
A
D
Okay,
sorry,
I
just
want
to
make
sure
so
that
means
that
we're
okay
with
requesting
one
month
of
worker
rep
the
first
pay
request,
because
they've
done
the
trial
period.
Because,
again,
like
you
have
debt,
we
have
you
know
even
just
logistically,
if
you
know
someone's
doing
like
omen
or
whatever
we
want
someone
to
do
to
vote
on
a
market,
a
market
validation
issue
or
something
like
that.
We
probably
want
that
person
to
participate
right
and
like
not
be
barred
from
participating
for
a
whole
month.
A
D
B
A
A
Cool
and
then
next
just
wanted
to
give
or
get
a
little
bit
of
update
on
the
multi-call
scheme
as
it
relates
to
the
bonding
curve.
So
we
had
the
signal
proposal
passed
about
a
month
ago,
a
little
over
a
month
ago
on
halting
the
bonding
curve
and
then
the
multi
call
scheme
had
just
been
installed.
I
think
it
just
last
week
and
so
john.
I
think
there
was
a
little
hiccup
in
the
ability
to
control
those.
B
But
the
bonding
curve
contract
is
actually.
It
follows
a
proxy
proxy
pattern
where
the
bonding
curve
contract
itself
is
actually
the
proxy
and
there's
a
separate
implementation
contract
for
the
logic
and
so
right
now,
alchemy
in
the
ui
is
actually
not
pulling
in
the
api
like
the
the
functions
that
are
on
the
implementation
contract,
so
you
actually
can't
call
the
right
function
to
make
the
bonds
we
could
do.
B
The
proposal
outside
of
alchemy,
like
using
you
know
doing
it
directly
to
the
blockchain,
but
the
we
discussed
this
in
the
dev
call
yesterday
and
decided
it
would
be
better
to
just
like
get
the
ui
fixed
first
and
make
sure
it
displays
finding
the
ui
and
like
proceed
through
the
ui.
So
hopefully
I
think
orrin
is
working
on
this
already.
So
hopefully
we
will
have
that
up
and
running
soon
and
then
be
able
to
propose
without.
C
A
Awesome
and
then
wanted
to
devote
maybe
the
rest
of
the
meeting,
we'll
see
how
long
to
the
gov
governance
2.0
signal
proposal.
So
this
is
the
governance.
2.0
working
group
has
been
working
the
last
couple
months
on
trying
to
come
up
with
a
long-term
solution
on
how
to
develop
a
new
governance
system
that
sustainably
intertwines,
rep
and
dxd.
A
So
I
think
we've
hopefully
landed
on
the
structure
of
the
solution
and
we
just
a
couple
more
things.
I
think
we
need
to
discuss
in
terms
of
how
to
tweak
it
to
make
sure
that
this
is
this
works
for
everybody.
So
I
just
wanted
to
share
my
screen
for
a
little
bit
to
go
over
quickly
the
actual
proposal
and
then
a
couple
things.
I
think
we
need
to
discuss
before
moving
forward
so
or.
A
No
awesome,
so
this
is
what
I
presented
last
week
at
the
governance
2.0
meeting,
and
this
is
a
version
of
this.
That's
in
the
proposal
that
I'm
sorry
the
thread
on
dow
talk,
so
there's
three
items
that
are
in
the
gov
2.0
solution.
A
One
is
a
new
voting
power
equation
that
includes
both
rep
and
dxd.
Two
is
good
governance,
incentives
to
encourage
governance
activity
in
terms
of
voting,
and
then
three
is
a
migration
process
to
a
new
system.
The
voting
power
equation
is
by
far
the
most
important
part
of
this,
because
that
is
really
what
adjusts
the
the
power
structure
of
dxtail.
So,
of
course,
right
now,
voting
power
in
geek
style
is
determined
completely
by
how
much
reputation
an
ethereum
address
holds.
A
So
when
we
submit
proposals
they
pass
or
fail
based
purely
upon
how
much
rep
is
on
is
on
the
for
and
how
much
rep
is
on
the
against,
and
so
what
we're
proposing
here
is
to
create
a
new
equation
that
determines
the
voting
power
that
combines
rep
and
dxd.
A
So
to
do
this,
we
have
we
don't.
Just
we
want
to
com,
have
some
some
stipulations
for
the
dxd
and
rep
in
order
to
to
to
determine
those.
So
these
are
the
inputs
we
have
in
this
dxd
state,
and
this
would
be
up
to
dx
style
governance
to
define
exactly
what
state
dxd
is
at
the
minimum.
A
It
would
be
a
governance
staking
contract
similar
what
you
see
in
wi-fi,
but
this
also
could
include
being
lps
and
dx
dow
products,
and
then
we
introduced
this
idea
of
future
months
committed,
which
is
a
forward-looking
commitment
to
dx
dow,
so
those
that
are
not
just
dx
style
dxd
holders,
but
also
willing
to
commit
their
gxd
in
the
future
that
we
want
to
reward
that
and
and
then
reputation
held
and
then
also
we
are
introducing
a
reputation
decay
function
so
that
we
don't
have
reputation
that
is
just
maintains
influence
over
the
long
term.
A
So
the
way
that
we
do
this
quickly
is
we
come
up
with
this
idea
of
dxd
influence,
which
takes
into
account
those
factors
and
then
rep
influence
which
takes
in
account
rep
deflate.
We
normalize
them
both
and
then
we
determine
weights
and
combine
them.
A
So
calculating
dxt
influence,
so
here
have
this
equation
here,
which
is
basically
the
amount
of
dhd
stake
times
future
months
divided
by
six
raised
to
0.75,
and
so
that's
an
equation
where
the
0.75
I'm
calling
b
in
this
scenario,
that
would
be
adjustable
by
governance
and
that's
just
a
way
of
either
increasing
the
effect
of
long-term
infectors
or
decreasing
those,
and
the
six
here
is
basically
like
a
shelling
point
for
what
we
would
say
is
like
the
average,
the
average
future
commitment
to
to
staking.
A
So
in
this
case,
if
you,
if
you
stay
for
six
months,
your
dxd
influence
it
would
your
multiplier
would
be
a
one.
But
if
you
staked
at
four
months
I
mean
it
started
for
four
years,
so
it'd
be
much
much
longer
than
that.
You
would
get
a
higher
multiplier,
so
your
dxd
influence
would
grow
the
longer
you
are
willing
to
commit
your
dxd.
A
A
If
it's
greater
than
one,
then
that
gives
us
slower
decay
in
the
first
year
of
inactivity
and
faster
in
the
second
year
and
then
24
months
again,
is
I
guess,
kind
of
like
a
shelling
point
for,
for
if
someone
has
been
inactive
for
24
months,
then
their
rep
influence
should
decline,
because
we
don't
want
people
just
maintaining
influence
and
power
over
this
system
because
they
had
a
large
amount
of
rep.
At
some
point
we
only
want
to
be
giving
rep
influence
to
those
that
are
actively
contributing
to
dx
dao.
A
C
A
Yeah
and
then
step
two:
we
just
have
to
normalize
the
rep
influence
and
dxd
scores
and
then
step
three.
A
We
combine
these
rep
influence
and
dxd
influence,
so
this
would
be
you
have
rep
influence
and
dxd
influence
and
how
we
combine
them
into
a
single
number
for
voting
power,
and
I
want
to
talk
about
these
specific
numbers
in
a
second,
but
just
the
idea
is
having
some
way
of
combining
them
into
a
single
number
by
weighting
them
appropriately,
and
so
that's
the
voting
power
equation
and
then
there's
good
governance,
incentives
and
then
for
good
governance.
Incentives.
A
There's
actually
kind
of
three
different
things
we
agreed
on
to
promote
one
is
the
idea
of
distributing
some
either
dxd
or
revenue
to
dxd,
that's
staked
in
the
governance
staking
contract
or
in
lping
in
lping,
in
geek
style
products.
So
this
would
be
similar
to
what
yfi
does
and
having
rewarding
those
that
are
participating
in
governance.
Two
is
what
a
retroactive
governance
bonus,
so
the
governance
bonus
would
be
a
backwards-looking
way
of
rewarding
positive
proposals
and
people
that
are
voting
for
those
proposals.
So
that's
something
we
would.
A
We
would
want
to
introduce
and
then
the
third
is
selected
incentivized
representatives,
so
this
would
be
finding
dxdow
governors
or
voters
outside
of
full-time
workers
that
are
basically
it's
their
job,
to
monitor
and
vote
on
proposals
and
at
the
end
their
record
would
then
be
would
be
viewed
later
and
they
would
be
able
to
either
be
voted
in
for
more
time
or
voted
out
by
dh
style
governance
and
the
idea
being
here
that
we
need
someone
especially
the
way
that
holographic
consensus
works,
that
we
need
someone
to
be
able
to
monitor
the
system
almost
at
all
times
and
not
just
have
the
existing
system,
which
is
you
know,
people
are
doing
it
basically
for
altruistic
reasons
and
then
the
migration
process
to
a
new
system,
and
so
here
this
is
another
thing
I
want
to
talk
about
today,
but
in
the
current
system
we
can
see
that
rep
holders
right
now,
of
course,
have
all
the
power.
A
A
So
we
want
to
figure
out
a
way
to
get
to
the
new
system,
and
so
here
we
have
two
components:
basically
allocating
a
portion
of
the
premium
dxd
to
rep
holders
under
certain
under
a
three
or
four
year,
vesting
component
and
then
second
is
inflating
rep
and
distributing
it
to
certain
dxd
holders,
and
this
would
be
we
have
identified
here-
addresses
that
bought
dxd
from
the
curve
and
also
current
dxd
holders.
A
So
that's
brief
overview
of
the
system
and
then
just
a
couple
things.
I
want
to
mention
to
kind
of
kick
off
the
discussion
here
so
one
this
is
a
signal
proposal.
A
So
this
signal
proposal
is,
you
know
it's
not
executable
code,
but
this
would
be
something
that
we
would
take
as
a
bill
take
and
then
build
a
new
governance
system
off
off
of
this.
So
there
may
be
some
flexibility
in
terms
of
what
the
the
terminology
is
or
the
the
text
is,
but
we
want
to
have
this
text
be
as
tight
as
possible
so
that
there's
not
open
for
interpretation
for
other
things,
some
potential
items
to
discuss.
A
I
think
the
the
first
one
is
the
voting
power
breakdown.
So
for
the
voting
power
breakdown,
this
is
once
we've
calculated
dxd
influence
and
rep
influence.
What
weight
should
they
have
on
on
proposals
or
what
voting
power
should
they
have?
After
discussing
with
people?
I
think
we
probably
should
just
land
on
50
50
right,
so
that
would
be
dxd
influence.
A
Second
thing:
I'd
like
to
discuss
is
the
rep
inflation
to
dxd
holders,
so
this
in
the
in
the
proposal
that
and
the
text
in
the
thread
there
is
now-
is
five
percent
to
split
between
those
that
bought
from
the
curve
and
current
dxd
holders.
I
think
we
could
also
play
with
this
a
little
bit
because
we
may
want
to
introduce
some
of
the
the
idea
of
the
the
dxd
guild
to
this.
A
So,
if
we're
going
to
be
giving
some
rep
to
a
dxd
guild
in
the
in
the
next
couple
months,
maybe
that's
a
way
of
also
inflating
rep
there
and
then
lastly,
is
the
10k
to
the
10k
of
the
dxd
pre-mint
to
current
rep
holders
and
how
that
fits
into
this
equation
there.
So
I
know
I
talked
a
lot.
Hopefully,
people
have
read
through
before,
but
just
wanted
to
kind
of
give
a
quick
overview.
Everything
there
yeah
and
just
open
to
comments,
questions
concerns.
G
Yeah
it
looks
like
txt
holders,
or
at
least
I
think
it
was
cobello
who
mentioned
that
10k
dxd
to
wrap
holders
is
probably
too.
G
A
D
Right,
I
thought
we
had
a.
We
actually
had
a
very
quick.
It
was
just
a
lot
of
information.
I
think
during
the
gov
2.0
presentation,
like
a
lot
of
very
good
information,
and
so
when
you
even
like
gave
some
time
chris
to
say
hey,
maybe
people
want
to
talk
about
this
more,
but
everyone's
like
no.
No,
we
need
to
reward
rep
holders,
you
know
they're,
you
know
it's
part
of
the
you
know
part
of
it
is
to
incentivize.
D
You
know
maybe
rep
holders
that
have
not
been
active
anymore
by
having
to
claim
the
dxd,
but
also
this
is
kind
of
like
a
compromise
and
getting
dxd
and
rep
on
the
same
page.
So
there's
definitely
like
a,
I
think,
a
justification
for
some
sort
of
dxd
allocation.
D
The
one
critique
I
saw
that
may
have
some
weight
that
I
don't
know
how
we
play
out.
Is
it
how
that
liq,
the
liquidation
in
lowering
the
price
of
dxd
by
doing
the
air
drop,
would
affect
affect
our
current
price
of
dxd?
D
I
know
other
things
are:
maybe
you
know
things
change
the
price
all
the
time,
so
how
much
we
want
to
take
that
into
consideration
of
10
000
dxd
versus
a
smaller
amount,
good
point,
yeah
air
drop,
lock
dxd.
We
could
do
that.
The
other
thing
is
what
about
just
how
how
it's
distributed
right.
So
I
like
I,
actually
quickly,
just
wanted
to
look
at
the
what
how
many
addresses
have
how
much
rep
and
like
just
like?
D
What's
our
goal
here,
so
I
saw
that
we
had
of
about
246
rep
holders
who
have
somewhere
between
point
zero,
zero
one
percent,
rep
and
point
zero,
zero,
nine,
so
less
than
point
zero,
one
percent,
so
those
are
like
completely
inactive
accounts
like
what's
a
reasonable
amount
to
give
those
accounts.
If
we
want
to
like
incentivize
them
to
you
know,
take
the
time
to
actually
get
the
dxd
like.
D
D
D
B
Yeah,
I
feel
like
there's
a
couple
very
different
ways
to
look
at
what
you'd
want
to
do
with
like
the
inactive
or
lower
end,
like
one
thought
would
be
to
say:
hey,
they're,
inactive
they're,
not
participating
cut
them
out
of
the
distribution
because
they
haven't
done
anything
to
deserve
it,
they're,
not
an
active
part.
So
why,
like
inflate
dxd
for
the
inactive
voters,
the
other
way
to
look
at
it
would
be.
F
So
I
guess,
but
like
does
any
like
to
pope's
point,
if
someone
had
a
some
rep
from
like
the
initial
distribution
and
they've,
never
done
anything
with
dx
dao
and
all
of
a
sudden
they
find
out,
they
could
go.
Get
some
dxd
like
what
amount
of
dollars
worth
of
dxd
like
one
dxd.
Would
they
like?
Would
they
go,
find
their
old
rep
and
like
go
claim
and
pay
gas
to
get
one
dxd
if
one
dxd
is
worth
ten
thousand
dollars
so
like
how
much
dollars
worth
of
dxd
would
like
someone
get
out
of
bed
for.
D
Yeah
and
then
we
just
I
mean
that's
part
of
it,
and
then
you
consider
you
know
if
that's
worth
it,
if
we
even
consider
that
worth
it,
we
multiply
that
by
about
you,
know
240
250
or
something
right
and
that's
we're
starting
to
get
to
the
range
of
amount,
the
amounts
of
dxd
we
need
to.
You
know
incentivize,
that
group
and
then
it's
the
other
groups
as
far
as
more
of
a
reward.
G
I
mean
another
way
we
could
do.
It
is
definitely
have
vested
dxd
for
three
years,
and
if
and
we
actually
include
like
a
condition
which
is
like
at
the
end
of
the
three
years,
you
need
at
least
some
some
amount
of
rep
to
actually
get
the
dxda
out.
So
it's
basically
like
a
signal,
for
there
is
money.
If
you
want
to
contribute
like.
Let's
imagine
we
are
actually
just
doing
the
best
thing.
We
actually
like,
there's
a
high
chance
that
we
just
throw
out.
G
A
Yeah,
I
mean,
I
think
we
should
definitely.
I
guess
my
question
is
like
how
many
years
should
we
invest,
but
like
it,
I
think
this
should
definitely
be
best.
I
guess
that
is
a
little
bit
harder
if
we
want
to
do
the
incentivized
dormant
rep
holders
that
they're
incentivized
by
like
a
vest
in
txd
in
the
future,
but
like
I'm
to
me,
I
think
this
is
this.
Should
this
should
all
be
vested.
E
H
C
It
it
can
be
on
swooper
and
judith
fees.
Why
not.
B
To
really
make
something
non-transferable,
you
have
to
be
willing
to
enforce
the
non-transferability
right
so
like
I
think.
What
actually
is
the
linchpin
in
rep
being
non-transferable
is
basically
social
consensus
that
if
a
transfer
were
noticed,
we
could
slash
that
the
rep
holders
could
slash
that
rep
to
zero.
So
if
there's
like
a
consensus
amongst
the
doubt
that
people
should
not
transfer
their
rep
because
technically
you
can't
even
transfer
ownership
of
rep
with
if
it's
owned
in
a
smart
contract
right,
you
could
do
it
trustlessly.
B
But
if,
if
the
dow
says
it's
non-transferable
and
then
somebody
were
to
do
that,
it's
like
the
dow
could
slash
that
rep
right.
So
you
have
to
be
willing
to
do
that.
I
think,
basically,
in
order
to
make
it
truly
untransferable.
C
B
A
Yes,
I
guess
martin
martin's
an
interesting
point
about
like
rep
decays,
but
like
dxd
influence
does
not-
and
I
guess
that's
true
and
so
deke
style
would
have
to
ensure
that
it's
continually
issuing
rep
in
that
case
because
like
if
it
some
reason
stopped
issuing
rep,
then
eventually
like
rep,
would
rep
influence
would
would
decline.
A
But
like
it
would
only
decline
if
it's
maintained
at
50
percent
right,
there
would
still
be
50
of
the
governance
capability
until
it
was.
It
actually
did
decayed
completely,
and
actually,
I
think
in
in
the
equation
I
was
suggesting.
I
think
it
was
like
you
have
a
minimum
decay
amount.
That's
like
.05
is
the
multiplier
so
that
it
would
you'd
still
maintain
some
influence.
G
B
D
Didn't
you
include
a
range
like
there's
a
there's,
a
potential.
You
know
if
we
find
you
know
some
trend
happening
with,
like
dxd
holders,
roguely
voting
down
proposals
and
basically
impinging
upon
the
dow
being
able
to
carry
out
its
its
day-to-day
function
as
a
you
know,
pro
as
the
products
that
we
we
govern
in
our
ecosystem,
we
could
then
redistribute
the
power
as
well
right
from
not
50
50.
If
we
feel
that
something's
going
on
that's
imbalanced.
A
Yeah-
and
that
was
so-
that
was
originally-
why
I
think
the
there
is
a
lot
of
the
breakdown
of
what
the
weight
is,
is
a
huge
like,
very
important,
and
so
originally,
I
had
like
leaned
more
towards
rep
only
because
dxd
holders
like
we
actually
don't
know
what
it's
like
kind
of
to
govern
and
if
there's
like
some
problems
with
that
like
how
would
those
be
addressed?
A
A
Alternatively,
I
think
if
the
10k
allocation
was
the
vested
dxd
was
used
for
governance,
then
you
can
imagine
in
that
scenario,
where,
like
the
current
rep
holders,
that,
like
we
assume
in
this
scenario,
that
they
have
like
long-term
interest
of
dx
dow
involved
and
they
have
experience
governing,
that
they
would
have
a
significant
portion
or
they
would
have
real
dxd
influence
from
their
vested
dxd.
A
So,
even
though
they
would
maintain
like
they
would
probably
get
most
of
their
influence
from
the
rep
influence
score
because
the
vested,
if
the
vested
dxd
was
included
in
the
voting
power
equation,
then
they
would
maintain
some
ability
to
influence
from
the
dxd
influence
side,
and
so
maybe
then
they
could
like
adjust
it
there.
But
that's
why
I
think
these
things
are
like
all
all
tied
together.
I.
B
Think
the
main
mechanism
protecting
against
some
kind
of
like
liquid
token
governance
attack,
whether
it's
you
know
a
straight
out
like
attack
or
something
more
akin
to
like
corporate
rating
or
whatever
it
is.
I
think
the
main
protection
against
that
is
having
the
requirement
for
both
rep
and
txt
right.
So
it's
going
to
be
harder
to
civil
attack.
You
have
to
do
something
to
kind
of
prove
yourself
just
to
get
some
kind
of
voting
power.
If
you.
E
A
And
you're,
locking
up
the
dxd,
so
you're,
not
just
holding
the
dxd
right,
you
would
have
to
commit
to
like
a
future.
Your
dxd
influence
would
be
based
upon
how
your
future
commitment,
yeah.
B
And
locking
it
up
protects
you
against
flash
loans,
but
I
mean
it's
also
probably
worth
noting
that
you
can
still
loan.
You
can
still
do
a
loan
over
a
certain
period
of
time.
Right
so
I
mean
you
can
still
just
straight
off
buying
something,
but.
A
Yeah
I
mean,
I
think
I
I
think
that
is
in
general,
like
an
underrated
component
of
this
whole
thing,
but
that
was
like
basically
the
same
thing.
A
I
was
talking
about
with
the
vested
dxt
if
that's
included
in
governance,
and
that
lowers
the
risk,
and-
and
so
I
mean
there's,
there's
think
about
this-
there's
like
what
is
the
situation
like
right
now
in
the
distribution
right
now
and
what
are
the
risk
of
that
and
then
there's
like
the
system
like
separate
from
this
and
like
long
term
and
like
independent
of
the
current
distribution
model
and
yeah.
I
think
that
we
want
to
be.
I
mean
we're
more
concerned
on
like
to
minimize
risk
by
through,
through
our
current.
D
Situation
right-
and
I
think
just
the
spirit
of
like
with
all
of
these
different
things
that
we
put
into
place
to
kind
of
balance
out
the
rep
dxd
stakeholder
interests.
We
are
doing
this
whole
process
to
give
dxd
holders
voting
rights
and
have
them
participate
in
governance,
and
you
know
engage
that
like
engage
them
with
their
dxd.
D
So
that's
like
the
main
intention
right
and
then
everything
else
is
kind
of
a
security
formation
structure
that
we're
just
you
know,
assuring
that
the
system
and
everything's
gonna
still
be
able
to
move
forward,
as
as
we
hope
it
will
so
yeah.
I
think
it's
a
good.
It's
just
a
good
good
statement
for
dx
dow
to
say:
hey,
it's
50
50.!
D
You
know
if
we
see
something
that
shows
that
it
shouldn't
be
50
50,
then
the
community
will
vote
to
change
that
hope
and
we
like
to
have
it's
not
too
late.
Oh
right,
that's
the
thing
is
right
now,
of
course,
like
that's
the
question
like
do,
we
have
we
have
enough
security
mechanisms
in
place
to
make
sure
that
it's
not
going
to
be
some
huge,
dramatic
issue.
A
Like
that
and
the
overlap
helps
because
we
don't
know
what
it'll
be
in
the
future,
but
we
know
for
now
like
there's,
probably
some
some
overlap,
yeah
and
I
think
the
5050
thing
it's.
I
think
it's
exciting
just
to
think
about
how
organizations
can
like
assemble
themselves
and
divide
power
right.
We
have
like
a
pretty
simple
way
of
doing
this.
Now
that
is
either
like
country,
nation
states,
one
one
person
one
vote
and
we
have
like
the
corporate
structure,
which
is
you
know
completely
capital
based.
A
D
Yeah,
I
I
sky
your
point
like
51.49.
I
was
thinking
that
would
make
a
lot
of
sense
if
we
had
like
aggregate
like
guilds
where
it
was
like
rep
holders,
and
then
we
had
the
dxd
holders.
I
think
it
would
make
complete
sense
to
do
a
5149,
but
since
it's
it's
an
individual
ethe
address
that
basically
has
to
hold
both.
B
It's
voting
power
is
a
melding
of
dxd
and
wrap
with
a
50
50
weight
given
to
like
each
side,
and
it's
normalized
I
mean-
maybe
even
that's
not
like
entirely
clear.
That's
exactly
50!
It
depends
how
you
look
at
it,
but
like
basically
the
voting
power
final
calculation
would
give
50
50
on
the
weights
and
but
yeah,
but
the
voters
are
actually
both
rep
holders
and
dxd
holders.
So
I
mean
my
hope
with
this.
Is
that
it
it
kind
of
dispels?
F
The
other
really
important
part
of
this,
given
that
like
dxd,
is
a
mainnet
token.
Rep
right
now
is
mainly
on
mainnet
and
we're
talking
about
maybe
using
other
chains
as
well
like
this
whole
system
is
awesome,
but
if
it's
all
on
mainnet
it
may
not
even
it
doesn't
like
in
the
current
state
of
things,
it
doesn't
work
so
so
like
like.
F
B
F
B
Yeah
I
mean,
I
think,
that's
a
really
important
point
too,
that
this
is
kind
of
like
broad
strokes
like
the
functional
requirements,
but
the
actual
implementation,
like
anything
right
like
you're,
going
to
have
to
you're,
going
to
come
up
with
questions
you're,
going
to
observe
things
so
like
at.
Like
the
more
nuanced
like
implementation
details
will
have
to
get
figured
out.
B
A
Take
the
the
country
analogy,
at
least
in
the
us
right,
so
you
have
a
legislative
branch
that
writes
the
laws
right
and
then
you
have
an
executive
branch
that
actually
needs
to
execute
the
laws,
but
of
course
they
have
to
execute
the
laws
like
they
have
some
freedom,
but
it
has
to
be
abide
by
what
the
actual
laws
are.
And
then
you
have
like
the
court
that
decides
whether
or
not
the
executive
branch
is
like
you
know
is,
is
is
falling
within
the
bounds
of
the
legislation
here.
A
So
I
think
here
like
this
is
like
the
initial
legislation
and
then
we
would
empower
people
to
to
execute
this,
but
then,
ultimately,
like
there's
still
is
going
to
be
need
to
be
like
a
migration
process.
That's
like
moving
funds
or
like
doing
you
know,
minting
dementing,
rep
or
all
of
these
things
that
are
ultimately
going
to
have
to
be
put
to
a
vote
eventually.
B
And
to
address
the
comment
from
cobello
and
slim
delgado
about
the
10
000
being
I
mean
they
both
kind
of
use,
some
hyperbolic
language
like
enormous,
and
what
did
he
say
outrageously?
Greedy
now
like?
I
would
push
back
on
that,
because
if
you
look
at
that
right,
so
ten
thousand
dxd
represents
about
one
fifteenth
of
total
supply.
10
of
the
pre-mint
or
you
know
at
the.
If
you
look
at
the
circulating
supply,
it's
20
of
the
circulating
supply
in
this
kind
of
outline
here
of
governance.
B
2.0
dxd
is
going
from
zero
percent
control
to
50
of
the
control
in
terms
of
the
factor,
and
so
it's
50
of
the
controllers
being
exchanged.
Essentially,
if
you
want
to
look
at
in
terms
of
like
economic
like
terms
here,
and
it's
like
50
of
control
is
being
exchanged
for
20
of
circulating
supply
right
which
to
me,
doesn't
if
anything,
that's
a
greedy
on
the
dxd
side
right,
because
they're
getting
way
more
control
than
then
the
inflation
is
is
being
given
up.
So
I
would
push
back
to
that.
B
I
think
another
way
to
look
at.
It
is,
if
you
think
about
startups
right.
So,
typically,
there's
seed
round
a
round.
Typically,
in
an
around
the
investors,
the
venture
funds
are
getting
20
30
of
of
the
stock
right,
so
that
deep
style
is
different.
This
is
we
have
this
unique
and
again
it's
kind
of
hard
to
understand
what
is
it
really
anyways
with
rep
and
dxd?
But
if
you
were
to
take
an
extreme
example
and
say
just
ignore,
like
rap
and
just
say,
dxd
is
simply
shares
which
it's
not
but
like.
B
A
hundred
thousand
from
the
pre-med
is
actually
in
the
hands
of
the
rep
holders
right
and
the
investors,
the
dhd
buyers
and
the
bonding
curve
hold
a
third
of
it
right
and
if
you
look
at
it
that
way
again,
this
is
a
great
deal
for
dxd,
because
now
they're
going
from
one
third
to
fifty
percent,
with
only
like
a
twenty
percent
increase
in
the
circulating
supply,
I
mean,
in
other
words
like
rep
holders,
going
from
controlling
a
hundred
thousand
vxd
to
ten
thousand
phd.
So
again,.
E
B
Not
greedy,
I
would
push
back
that
on
that
strongly,
so
I
don't
care
what
people.
B
A
H
The
thing
is,
you
know
this
is
this
is
quite
a
bit
of
the
future
like.
This
is
obviously
like
we're
signaling
to
to
this
right
now,
but
I
mean
things
could
change
and
this
will
be
sort
of
altered
like
we
are
signaling
for
this
right
now,
but
until
we
can
implement
this,
this
will
probably
take
a
bit
and
then
yeah
this
whole
layer,
one
layer,
two.
Where
is
this
going
to
happen?
H
D
Yeah,
I
think
maybe
we
can
just
you
know
it
would
be
good
to
like
add
the
comments
just
to
hear
what
dxd
holders
have
to
say
in
in
that.
In
that
discussion
that's
going
on.
I
do
think
that
we,
instead
of
looking
about
liquidity
like
how
it's
going
to
affect
lowering
the
price
of
dxd
like
ellen,
was
just
saying,
may
change
in
the
future.
We
have
no
idea
like
what
this
is
going
to
be
a
while
out,
but-
and
we
could
kind
of
say
that
you
know
that
was
a
ballpark
number.
D
You
know
to
be
determined
what
the
exact
amount
is
going
to
be,
and
then
I
I
don't
know
how
people
felt
about
the
suggestion
of
doing
some
sort
of
bracketing
like
we.
Maybe
that's
just
up
for
further
discussion,
but
like
are
we
really
trying
to
incentivize
debt
accounts?
Are
we
you
know
not
trying
to
incentivize
those
accounts?
Are
we
more
so
just
saying,
hey,
you're,
giving
up
your
voting
power
rep
holders
of
controlling
dxd?
D
So
we
want
to
reward
you
for
for
doing
that,
like
what's
our
our
incentives
here
for
doing
the
the
air
drop
and
kind
of
figure
out.
If
we
want
to
do
maybe,
like
a
tiered
dxd
drop
based
off
of
like
how
much
rep
you
have.
A
Well,
I
think
there
are.
There
are
two
different
types
that
you've
identified.
A
I
think
they're
pulp,
because
one
is
incentivize
dormant
rep
holders,
smaller
rep
holders
do
like
participate,
participate
again
and
then
separate
from
that
is
basically
rep
holders
that
control
the
treasury
now
convince
them
to
give
up
control
and
those
are
like
completely
different
motivations
right,
because
these
are
people
that
are
like
are
actually
like,
very
active
in
governance
and
have
like
been
there
been
around
since
before
dxd,
the
the
the
bonding
curve
versus
the
ones
that
are
that
are
like
we're
trying
to
get
out
of
dormant.
A
So
I
think
it
could
be
interesting
to
take
different
approaches
to
them.
I
guess
to
to
to
frame
john's
point
a
little
bit
more
right,
so
there
was
like
a
organization
that
was
like
controlled
by
rep
holders,
and
then
there
was
like
a
fundraising
aspect
right
and
that
fundraising
aspect
took
eth
in
and
then
like
in
return,
those
investors
got
dxd
and
then
they're
also
getting
some
like
governance
capabilities,
and
we
have
not
introduced
those
governance
capabilities,
and
that
was
not
in
the
initial
investment
part,
but
maybe
this
like
whole.
A
Maybe
this
like
gov
2.0
component
of
giving
dxd
so
governance
rights
is
like
tied
to
the
initial
investment
phase
if
you're
using
like
the
the
series
a
round
or
or
something
there.
So
I
just
think
there's
a
lot
of
things
tied
up
in
this
and
I
do
think
we
need
to
like
have
address
these
concerns
in
the
in
the
forum,
just
as
they
as
they
come
up,
because
it
is
there's
just
different
ways
of
looking
at
it.
D
Yeah,
I
agree,
I
think
the
one
thing,
though,
is
people
will
have
issues
with
if
some
accounts
get
like
a
crazy
distribution
from
this,
just
because
we
only
we
do
have.
Let's
see
I
mean
I
mentioned
it
a
little
bit
like
we
have
12
addresses
that
have
between
two
to
eight
point:
seven,
nine
percent
rep
and
the
way
that
distribution
looks
if
we're
just
basing
it
off
of
you
know
what,
how
you
know
percentage
of
rep
and
how
much
you're
going
to
get
of
that
of
the
of
the
pie.
D
That
might
be
a
kind
of
crazy
distribution
there,
and
we
might
want
to
look
at
in
those
cases
doing
some
sort
of
you
know
putting
those
that
group
and
having
that
group
break
down
a
certain
amount
of
dxd
and
have
another
group
break
down.
You
know
because
they're
these
are
you
know.
Essentially,
these
addresses
are
characterized
by,
like
you
said,
high
participation,
high
contribution
to
dx
dao.
You
know
a
lot
a
lot
of
positives
there,
but
maybe
the
way
that
that's
broken
down
amongst
those
addresses
is
not
like.