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A
Into
the
house
standing
committee
on
small
business
information
technology
meeting
a
special
welcome
to
any
guest.
We
have
anybody
like
to
recognize
some
guests
in
the
audience
before
we
like
get
before
you
get
started
like
you
have
a
few
reminders.
Please
silent
all
cell
phones
at
this
point
time,
which
includes
myself.
If
you
would
like
to
speak
on
a
bill,
please
use
the
sign
in
sheet
at
the
entrance
of
the
room.
A
The
request
to
speak
is
within
the
chair
of
discretion
based
upon
the
time
restraints
for
its
meeting
and
information
already
presented,
just
reminded
that
no
signs
are
permitted
in
the
rooms
members
attended
remotely.
Please
indicate
your
location
when
clerk
calls
rome.
If
any
member
has
a
question
or
comment,
please
signal
aubry
or
jennifer
members
attending
remotely
have
that
remotely
have
a
question
or
comment.
Please
send
a
question
and
zoom
using
the
chat
function
clerk.
Would
you
please
call
roll.
F
A
President
room
before
you
begin,
please
turn
on
your
at
this
point
time.
You
all
please
approach.
We
have
representatives
from
the
auditor
auditor
of
public
accounts
to
discuss
the
most
recent
audit
of
our
unemployment
insurance
system.
Before
you
again,
please
turn
on
your
mics.
Introduce
yourselves
for
the
record.
G
G
All
right,
thank
you
very
much,
mr
chairman
and
members
for
the
opportunity.
We
always
appreciate
the
invitation
and
the
chance
to
share
with
the
legislature
about
the
work
of
our
office.
As
you
all
know,
we
were
asked
to
come
today
to
speak
about
our
recent
audit
findings
related
to
the
unemployment
insurance
office,
and
we
wanted
to
start
out
with
explaining
why
we
do
the
audit
that
we
do
of
that
office,
and
it
is
part
of
our
annual
audit
work
that
is
mandated
by
statute.
G
Okay.
There
we
go.
We
get
our
slides
to
work.
I
think
you
all
have
copies
as
well,
but
it
is
part
of
our
annual
audit
work
under
krs
43.060.
Our
office
is
required
to
annually
audit
the
commonwealth's
financial
statement.
The
fancier
name,
for
that
is
the
annual
comprehensive
financial
report,
or
you
may
hear
us
call
it
the
acfer.
G
We
use
a
lot
of
acronyms
at
the
auditor's
office,
so
apologize
in
advance
for
that,
but
that
is
an
audit
that
we
do
annually
again
per
statute
and
the
objective
of
an
audit
when
we
do
that
is
to
form
an
opinion
on
the
financial
statements
of
the
commonwealth
and
whether
those
financial
statements
are
materially
accurate
and
accurately
represent
the
financial
position
of
the
commonwealth.
So
when
we
set
out
to
do
an
audit,
that's
that's
the
objective
of
the
financial
statement.
Audit
work
as
we
talk
about
that
audit
opinion.
G
One
area
that
we
didn't
want
to
note
as
an
improvement
from
fiscal
year
2020
compared
to
2021,
was
that
in
fiscal
year
20
there
was
actually
a
qualified
audit
opinion
related
to
the
unemployment
insurance
fund
related
to
the
internal
control
issues
that
happened
in
fiscal
year
2020
and
the
unknown
amount
of
benefits
that
were
owed
to
claimants.
At
the
end
of
that
year,
due
to
the
backlog,
we
did
see
some
improvement
in
those
areas
that
led
to
an
unmodified
opinion
as
to
the
commonwealth's
act
for
for
fiscal
year
2021.
G
So
we
did
want
to
mention
that
and
when
we
look
at
the
report,
the
reason
that
you've
invited
us
here,
the
report
that
we
issued
on
february
9th
is
called
the
statewide
single
audit
of
kentucky,
our
our
acronym
for
that
is
swac,
and
that's
that's
how
we
pronounce
that
one
swac
volume.
One
is
the
report
that
provides
those
financial
statement,
internal
control,
audit
findings
from
the
audit
of
the
ag
first.
G
We
did
see
19
findings
and
those
don't
all
relate
to
the
office
of
unemployment
insurance,
but
a
little
over
half
of
them
did
involve
or
relate
to
the
office
of
unemployment,
insurance
or
the
unemployment
fund,
and
similarly
in
2020
about
half
the
findings
out
of
25
that
year
also
related.
So
we
did
see
an
overall
decrease
in
the
number
of
findings.
G
These
are
reports
that
come
out
every
year.
We
did
want
to
mention
some
things
from
fiscal
year,
2020
that
you
may
recall
that
were
a
bit
the
headline
grabbers
from
the
2020
audit
work.
G
That
was
a
big
issue
in
fiscal
year
2020..
Unfortunately,
we
did
not
see
anything
of
that
magnitude
replicated
in
fiscal
year
2021.
So
that
was
a
positive
and
another
thing
that
we
wanted
to
note.
In
2020
fiscal
year
audit
we
found
that
there
were
10
employees
at
the
office
of
unemployment
insurance
who
had
access
and
actually
did
access
their
own
claims
in
the
system,
and
that
was
not
an
issue
that
we
saw
repeated
either
in
fiscal
year
2021..
G
The
finding
that,
at
least
to
my
eye
raises
the
most
concern
is
finding
number
five
in
our
report
and
that
related
to
fraudulent
activity
within
the
oui
system
or
the
qs
system.
You
all
I'm
sure,
if
you're
familiar
with
oui
you're
familiar
with
that
acronym
of
queues
is
the
system
that
processes
the
claims
for
the
system,
no
surprise
that
that
there
was
an
increase
in
fraud,
claims
that
that
happened
significantly
across
the
nation.
G
After
the
passage
of
the
cares
act
which
created
those
new
temporary
unemployment
programs
and
kentucky
was
not
an
exception
to
that
issue.
Nor
was
kentucky
immune
from
the
effects
of
that
issue.
Our
next
slide-
and
I
won't
read
this
slide
to
you,
but
it
does
create.
It
just
provides
some
background
information
about
the
details
of
those
three
big
temporary
federal
unemployment
programs-
and
you
all
have
heard
that
before.
So
I
won't
won't
go
into
detail
on
that,
but
that
is
part
of
what
led
to
an
increase.
G
I
think
in
the
fraudulent
activity
that
we
saw
with
unemployment
claims
jumping
into
some
of
the
specifics
of
finding
five.
In
our
report,
I
will
note,
despite
our
best
efforts,
we
have
a
typo
on
this
slide
and
it's
a
math
typo
that
that
number
at
the
bottom
should
say
a
hundred
and
eighteen
thousand
nine
hundred,
so
that
that
extra
zero
is
inadvertent.
But
what
auditors
did
in
part
of
the
work
on
unemployment
of
the
unemployment
insurance
system?
G
We
identified
some
high-risk
categories,
and
these
are
three
of
the
high-risk
categories
that
we
devoted
specific
focus
to
claims
that
listed
the
labor
cabinet
or
the
commonwealth
as
the
employer,
out-of-state
claimants.
And
then
we
also
look
particularly
at
claims
from
the
third
quarter
of
fiscal
year,
2021,
due
to
a
large
number
of
claims
that
were
processed
in
that
quarter
and
and
we
will
follow
up
with
another
slide
in
a
minute.
But
we
focused
in
on
claims
that
only
received
two
weeks
worth
of
payment
during
that
quarter.
G
G
Among
the
categories
there
were
54
total
claimants
in
the
fiscal
year
that
had
reported
the
labor
cabinet
or
commonwealth
of
kentucky,
as
their
employer
and
our
auditors
looked
in
detail
at
a
sample
of
13
of
those
claims
in
the
category
all
13
of
the
claims
in
the
sample
were
identified
as
fraudulent,
because
the
claims
were
not
filed
by
employees
of
the
commonwealth
and
the
total
in
the
sample
was
a
little
over
20
000..
The
total
that
was
paid
out
to
those
54
claimants
was
over
333
000.
G
The
next
higher
risk
category
that
we
looked
at
is
a
much
larger
category.
A
total
of
28
377
out-of-state
claimants
made
claims
and
received
payments
of
over
195
million
during
the
fiscal
year.
Obviously,
as
part
of
the
audit
process,
we
weren't
going
to
look
at
all
28
000
individual
claims,
but
auditors
looked
at
a
sample
and
looked
at
34
claims
and
of
the
34
claims
that
were
randomly
selected
and
looked
at
15
of
those
were
fraudulent
and
had
received
payments
totaling
more
than
69
000.
G
Those
totaled
2.9
million
a
little
over
that
auditors
pulled
26
of
those
claims
for
further
review
and
their
sample
size
and
25
out
of
the
26
within
this
category
were
actually
identified
as
fraudulent
and
the
payments
there
that
were
looked
at
and
identified
as
fraudulent
were
a
little
over
29
thousand
dollars.
So
again,
those
totaled
up
with
just
the
small
samples
that
the
auditors
looked
at
totaled
up
to
over
a
hundred
and
eighteen
thousand
in
payments
made
to
fraudulent
claims.
G
Those
cross-match
audits
had
been
suspended
for
a
four-month
period
during
covid
and
oui
had
fallen.
Quite
behind
on
completing
those,
so
what
we,
what
we
identified
during
the
audit
was
that
the
cross
match
for
the
third
quarter
of
fiscal
year
2020.
So
what
would
have
covered
january
to
march
of
2020
that
cross
match
process
actually
wasn't
even
started
until
august
of
2021,
so
they
were
working
to
catch
that
up,
but
that's
a
very
basic
fraud
detection
tool
that
had
fallen
quite
a
bit
behind.
G
Moving
on
to
some
of
the
other
findings
that
are
in
our
report,
there
were
a
number
of
I.t
security
and
data
processing
issues
that
auditors
identified
and
our
auditors
do
look
at
I.t
security
and
data
processing
as
part
of
their
financial
statement.
Audit
work,
in
addition
to
just
looking
at
the
the
numbers
on
the
balance
sheet,
so
to
speak
when
they
looked
at
the
queue
system.
G
Some
of
the
security
issues
that
were
identified
and
in
one
instance,
there
was
an
admin
account
that
had
high
level
privileges
within
queues
that
had
multiple
users
were
able
to
access
that
particular
admin
account.
So
there
was
no
way
for
anyone
to
be
able
to
track
who
actually
use
that
account
to
do
a
given
action.
At
a
given
time,
a
couple
of
just
basic
things
that
I
think
most
of
us
would
recognize
are
good
practices.
G
Cues
was
not
configured
during
fiscal
year,
2021
to
require
periodic
password
changes
and
similarly
the
the
mainframe
was
set
not
to
terminate
a
user
session
until
10
hours
and
they
were
working
with
cot
toward
the
end
of
2021,
the
commonwealth
office
of
technology,
I'm
catching
myself
using
acronyms
again,
you
all
probably
know
that
one,
but
they
were
working
to
change
that
to
30
minutes
so
again,
just
a
basic
change
that
could
be
made.
There
were
a
couple
of
other
it
findings
and
process
issues
that
were
repeats
from
2020
and
repeated
in
2021.
G
I
won't
go
into
a
ton
of
detail
on
those,
but
one
being
that
there
wasn't
adequate
technical
documentation
for
all
of
the
processes
that
the
queue
system
runs
and
another
being
that
oui
was
not
following
the
commonwealth
office
of
technology
enterprise
policies
requiring
system
security
plans.
So
those
were
things
that
were
identified
in
2020
recommendations
made
still
hadn't
been
addressed
in
2021,
so
you
know
we
follow
up
and
and
keep
those
on
the
radar.
G
G
So
they
they
failed
again
in
2021
to
actually
include
an
estimated
amount
for
accounts
payable
payable
in
the
initial
closing
package
that
they
provided
to
the
finance
cabinet.
They
did
work
with
finance
cabinet
to
come
up
with
an
estimate
and
and
provide
a
number
ultimately
that
you
that
you
would
see
in
the
aquifer
get
my
acronyms
right.
G
I
look
at
pharah
to
make
sure
I
don't
mess
up
my
audit
terminology,
but
there
were
over
120
000
claimants
that
were
still
part
of
a
backlog
at
the
end
of
the
the
june
30
2021
time
periods
at
the
end
of
the
fiscal
year.
So
obviously
the
unemployment
system
has
faced
a
lot
of
challenges.
G
G
We've
seen
findings
related
to
unemployment,
you
know
pre-pandemic,
but
the
level
of
findings
and
the
level
of
issues
with
the
influx
of
claims
due
to
the
pandemic
was
certainly
more
in
both
fiscal
year,
20
and
fiscal
year,
21
than
what
we
would
have
seen
in
a
typical
year-
and
you
know
our
role
as
auditors
is
to
come
in
and
report
the
data
as
we
find
it.
We
follow
the
data
and
we
report
it
and
we
make
recommendations
to
try
to
avoid
issues
recurring
in
the
future
to
try
to
ensure
a
federal
program.
G
Compliance
requirements
are
followed,
and
certainly
you
know
I
think
things
always.
We
would
all
agree
things
work
best
when
we
all
work
together
to
try
to
do
our
role
to
ensure
that
that
those
requirements
are
followed
and
that
the
law
is
followed.
It
was
good
to
see
that
there
was
some
progress
from
fiscal
year
20
to
21,
but
certainly
when
you
see
the
fact
that
a
number
of
payments
were
made
on
claims
that
were
fraudulent,
there's
still
room
for
improvement,
and
so
I
think
that's
the
biggest
takeaway
from
from
the
audit.
G
A
Thank
you
guys.
I
appreciate
your
testimony.
We
do
have
some
questions,
I'm
reminding
the
people
they
came
as
my
request,
these
are
our
guests
they're
here,
because
they
had
to
do
the
constitutional
duty.
So
if
you
ask
questions
be
respectful
first
is
representative
beaujonowski.
F
Thank
you
very
much,
so
you
know
we
all
followed
the
issues
with
the
unemployment
office
very
closely,
and
my
understanding
is
that
a
major
reason
for
the
backlog
was
because
we
didn't
have
enough
trained
staff
members
who
could
do
the
higher
tier
research
and
and
figuring
out
the
answers
to
some
of
these
claims.
But
then,
if
those
staff
people
were
pulled
off
to
train
other
staff
people,
you
know
that
slowed
down
the
whole
process
altogether
and
then
combine
all
of
that
with.
F
If
there
was
sufficient
money
to
pay
for
that
whole
process,
can
you
speak
on
specifically,
I
mean
the
issue
of
backlogs
as
relative
to
the
you
know,
number
of
staff
who
were
in
I
know
we
let
go
a
lot
of
the
staff
people
in
the
unemployment
department
a
few
years
ago.
The
number
of
staff
who
could
handle
the
higher
tier
needs
and
then
how
much
it
would
have
cost
in
order
to
really
mitigate
those
backlogs.
G
Well,
I
think,
representative,
those
are
fair
questions.
Those
are
really
questions
that
are
outside
the
scope
of
what
a
financial
statement
audit
looks
at.
We
don't
really
do
a
staffing
analysis
as
part
of
the
financial
statement.
Audit
work,
what
our
focus
has
been
on
is
the
numbers
and
the
accounting
and
the
impacts
on
internal
controls
from
decisions
that
were
made
at
the
cabinet
or
the
office
or
program
level.
G
H
D
A
G
We
do
not
have
totals
the
claims
that
we
identified
here
as
fraudulent
were
caught
and
stopped
by
by
the
department,
but
unfortunately
again,
as
I
mentioned,
not
until
after
at
least
two
weeks
of
payment
had
already
been
paid
out
on
each
of
those
claims
that
were
part
of
our
samples.
So
again
as
part
of
the
audit
process,
we
look
at
samples.
G
C
What
are
the
ramifications
of
those
who
are
in
the
office
that
maybe
had
done
things
fraudulently?
Is
there
sanctions
that
you
guys
impart
or
what
kind
of
correctional
action
is
taken.
G
Absolutely
represented
that's
another
great
question,
and
it's
one
that
we
we
answer.
Often
at
the
auditor's
office
we
don't
have
any
enforcement
authority.
Our
authority
is
is
to
be
a
reporting
agency
so
as
it
relates
to
the
issues
identified
in
fiscal
year,
20,
for
example,
with
employees
who
would
access
their
own
claims.
G
Those
were
referred
to
enforcement
agencies
such
as
the
executive
branch
ethics
commission,
as
well
as
to,
I
believe,
the
attorney
general's
office
and
I'm
not
certain
of
the
status
of
those.
You
know
those
potential
investigations
or
potential
follow-up
on
that,
but
when
we
see
something
that
we
think
rises
to
the
level
of
potential
criminal
conduct
or
unethical
conduct
that
would
violate
executive
branch
ethics,
we
we
make
a
referral
of
that
information
and
share
that
with
the
appropriate
agencies
or
authorities
so
that
there
can
be
appropriate
follow-up.
Absolutely.
E
Hi,
how
are
you
appreciate
the
presentation
and
yeah?
I
realize
that
you
guys
follow
the
numbers
and-
and
I
want
to
try
to
keep
my
questions
that
way,
but
when
you
get
done
with
an
audit,
I
know
I've
been
part
of
a
lot
of
different
types
of
audits
and
that
usually
I'll
get
some
kind
of
recommendation
or
opinion
not
necessarily
opinion,
but
a
recommendation
along
with
that
those
audit
results.
So
I
guess
first
question:
if
you
don't
mind
it
would
be.
E
D
G
Finding
in
the
report
that
our
office
makes-
and
some
of
those
recommendations
are
more
detailed
than
others,
so
I
don't
know
if
they
would
be
exactly
what
you
envision
as
an
action
plan,
but
we
certainly
do
provide
recommendations
to
address
each
of
the
issues
that
is
identified
in
our
audit
findings.
And
you
know
I
noted
in
a
few
instances
some
of
those
that
were
repeat
findings
from
2020
to
2021,
which
obviously
indicates
that
the
recommendations
at
least
weren't
fully
followed
right.
But
you
know
we
don't.
G
We
don't
have
the
authority
to
go
in
and
make
management
decisions
and
tell
them
how
to
do
things.
But
we
certainly
when
we
spot
something
that
that
is
an
internal
control
finding
or
a
compliance
finding.
We
do
always
make
recommendations
for
how
to
address
that
going
forward
as
part
of
the
finding.
Yes.
E
E
That
would
make
even
the
I
just
couldn't
imagine
if
you
pull
26
out.
25
of
them
are
fraudulent.
It
looks
to
me,
like,
I
think,
that's
third
quarter
fraudulent
activity.
There
was
2455
claims
that
were
found.
If
you
pull
out
25,
you
know,
why
would
do
you
know
what
the
other
ones
got
followed
up
on?
I
guess
is
my
obvious
question.
G
I
I
would
certainly
hope
so
we
did
not
pull
all
2400
claims
and
that
actually
the
2400
claims
was
narrowed
further
to
the
category
of
claims
that
only
received
two
weeks
worth
of
payment
during
that
quarter.
So
it
could
have
been
more,
I
think.
Well
there
there
is
certainly
a
possibility.
There
were
some
claims
that
were
fraudulent,
that
were
paid
more,
but
if
a
payment
was
stopped
after
two
weeks,
I
think
it
would
be.
E
G
To
indicate
to
someone
or
some
system
that
a
stop
needed
to
be
put
on
that
particular
claim,
so
certainly
you
know,
we
would
all
hope
that
that
all
of
these
would
be
followed
up
on
to
try
to
see
if
there
is
action
that
can
be
taken,
whether
that
be
to
recoup
or
to
prosecute,
depending
on
on
what
the
case
might
be
as
to
each
individual
one.
Last
one.
E
E
I
realized
that,
because
of
the
volume
you
get,
more
activity
leads
to
more
issues,
but
the
type
of
fraudulent
activity
that
you
saw
here
is
that
similar
or
is
that
something
new
than
what
you've
seen?
Are
there
examples
here
where
you
thought
you
know
what
we
really
have
never
seen,
even
though
we
audit
it
every
year
in
prior
years,
there's
some
new
type
of
fraudulent
activity
going
on
here
that
we
picked
up
on.
Is
there
anything
new.
G
E
G
C
Thank
you,
mr
chairman,
thank
you
all
for
your
presentation
today,
I'm
looking
at
the
out
of
state
claimants
that
slide.
C
So
there
were
28
377
out
of
state
claimants
and
paid
out
more
than
195
million.
The
next
bullet
there
says
out
of
a
sample
of
34
claims.
15
were
fraudulent,
that
34.
That
sample
of
34
was
that
from
the
28
377.
That's.
G
C
So
just
quick,
quick
math
here,
that's
a
44
fraudulent
rate.
If
you
look
at
that
is,
is
that
I
mean?
Is
that?
Can
you
extrapolate
that
to
the
28
377
or
is
that
a
pretty
big?
Is
that
a
pretty
big
assumption
that
of
that
28
377,
the
44
percent
of
that's
going
to
be
fraudulent.
G
D
G
Us
to
be
able-
probably
appropriately
I'm
not
the
statistics,
major
that
would
be
auditor
harmon
who's,
not
he's
not
at
the
table,
but
I
I
don't
think
that
that
we
could
confidently
say
we
did
the
statistical
analysis
to
say
you
know
you
should
expect
44
of
the
total
claims
to
be
fraudulent,
but
I
will
agree
absolutely
with
you,
representative
branskin.
When
I
see
those
numbers,
I
have
the
same
concern
if
44
of
a
randomly
selected
sample
were
fraudulent
claims.
G
A
Welcome
representative
roberts.
B
Thank
you.
Thank
you
for
your
presentation,
given
sort
of
the
extraordinary
nature
of
the
year
years
that
you're
presenting
on
here,
I'm
wondering
in
your
in
your
findings.
Did
you
compare
the
fraud
rates
here
to
other
states
or
national
averages
just
so
we
have
an
idea
of
how
we
did
compared
to
everybody
else.
In
these
extraordinary
circumstances,.
G
That
that's
another
great
question
and
another
answer
I
would
also
like
to
have,
but
no
that
was
not
part
of
the
audit
work,
obviously
in
just
seeking
to
form
an
opinion
on
the
financial
statements
of
the
commonwealth.
It
would
be
beyond
the
scope
of
the
audit
work
that
we
were
doing
to
make
those
sorts
of
comparisons
to
other
states,
but
I
mean
we've.
We've
all
read
enough
media
reports
to
know
that
this
was
not
a
unique
to
kentucky
problem
that
there
were
fraudulent
claims
rampant
in
many
states.
A
Thank
you,
rep
jim
callaway,.
D
Yes,
thank
you
for
the
presentation
today.
I
did
have
a
couple
questions.
If
it's
okay
with
chairman
my
first
question,
I
was
trying
to
follow
your
numbers
and
I'm
assuming
that
you
didn't
come
to
an
estimation
total
of
fraudulent
claims
in
an
amount,
but
with
your
samples
that
you
did.
What
was
that
total
from
the
samples.
G
So
the
total,
just
from
the
the
samples
that
we
did
was
a
little
over
a
hundred
and
eighteen
thousand
dollars
that
was
paid
on
claims
that
were
identified
as
fraudulent
and
you're
correct.
We,
we
did
not,
as
part
of
this
audit
process,
attempts
to
calculate
a
total,
a
total
amount
of
fraudulent
claims
or
payments.
G
D
D
Okay
and
then,
with
the
findings
that
you
have,
do
you
have
any
type
of
rating
system
that
you
utilize
in
severity
and
with
that
being
said,
if
there
are
things
that
you
find
in
found
in
the
previous
year,
that
showed
up
again,
would
those
be
rated
any
different
if
it's
the
same
consistent
issue.
G
So
there
there
are
different
classifications
of
findings
and
I'm
not
the
audit
expert
to
speak
to
like
what's
a
significant
deficiency
versus
what's
a
material
weakness.
But
there
are
categories
that
findings
are
are
rated
in.
All
of
the
findings
that
that
we
make,
as
to
federal
programs,
are
ultimately
uploaded
into
a
federal
clearinghouse
database
that
go
to
the
appropriate
federal
cognizant
agencies
so
that,
if
there's
a
programmatic
need
for
those
agencies
to
follow
up,
they
have
the
opportunity
to
do
that
and
we
do
follow
up
always
on
our
prior
year
findings.
G
So
if
it
was
a
finding
in
in
fiscal
year
2021,
you
can
trust
that
that
topic
will
have
some
follow-up
in
fiscal
year.
2022
to
be
looked
at,
and
and
certainly
an
assessment
would
then
be
made
in
fiscal
year,
2022,
whether
the
the
categorization
of
the
finding
should
be
different
or
whether
it's
still
a
problem
that
rises
to
the
level
of
a
finding
in
the
next
year.
Did
you
want
to
add
anything
to
that
or.
H
Yeah,
I
can
add
a
little
bit.
I
just
want
to
add
that
any
of
the
findings
that
you
see
in
the
report,
we,
the
authors,
have
determined
that
they're
at
least
a
significant
level,
what
we
call
an
audit
language
or
a
level
higher
than
that.
We
consider
several
different
things.
A
Thank
you
all
right,
I'm
going
I
get
now.
It's
my
turn,
the
I.t
security
and
data
processing
issue.
As
someone
owns
a
company
on
the
back
page,
one
admin
account
that
several
people
access
don't
get
around.
My
office
has
five
people
in
it
and
we
all
have
our
own
password,
so
you
can
track.
Who
does
what
and
how
and
why?
That's
amazing
and
you
know
again.
I
know
she
said
that
you
know
the
passwords
weren't
being
changed
as
all
of
us
here
in
this
room
have
passwords
that
are
18
long.
A
If
you
walk
out
to
get
a
cup
of
coffee
and
come
back,
the
daggone
thing
you
got
to
punch
it
back
in.
That's
quite
concerning
I'll,
be
honest
and
it's
quite
aggravating
I'll.
Tell
you
from
time
to
time
when
I
step
out
for
five
minutes
and
come
back
and
have
to
reprocess
the
fact
that
you're,
just
not
following
clt
guidelines,
is
very
concerning
to
me.
Those
are
simple.
I
mean
that's,
not
a
computer
system.
That's
this
lack
of
oversight
from
somebody
saying
these
are
the
security
protocols.
A
You
have
to
follow
again
that
that's
just
amazing
all
said
and
done.
I
also
addressed
one
of
the
comments
earlier
talking
about
again.
A
Let's,
let's
talk
about,
you
know
fact
that
they
had
the
officers
what
had
gotten
a
lot
smaller
of
people
working
there-
and
I
did
my
homework
on
this-
make
sure
that
understand
that
was
actually
started
under
steve
beshear
would
continued
under
bevin's
and
they
actually
had
went
to
centralized
because
of
the
ui
number
kept
coming
down,
and
you
know-
and
I
am
concerned
with
this
report
from
the
fact
that
now
they
say
the
ui
I
believe,
is
at
4.2
percent.
A
A
That's
amazing.
I
mean
here
at
state
capitol,
like
I
said,
all
of
us
have
our
own
little
password
you
go
out
and
get
a
cup
of
coffee
come
back
and
you'll
be
logged
out.
So
that's
that
that's
amazing.
So
thank
you
guys
for
your
testimony.
I
appreciate
it
again.
I
realize
you
guys
are
required
by
law
to
do
this
here.
You
have
a
second
report
coming
out
too.
I
understand.
G
A
We
look
forward
to
hearing
from
you
guys
appreciate
what
you
do
for
the
commonwealth.
Again,
they
audit
several
counties,
our
cities.
They
make
sure
the
public
you're,
basically
one
of
the
watchdogs
of
the
public
dollars.
Thank
you
guys
for
everything
you
do
and
if
there's
no
more
questions,
look
for
a
motion
for
adjournment
so
moved.
Thank
you.
Thank
you.