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From YouTube: Focus On #08 | stkMKR: Staking & Tokenomics Revision
Description
For the 8th episode of Focus On, we host @monet-supply, Risk Core Unit and Delegate, to discuss his proposed revisions to MKR Staking & Tokenomics.
Addressing Maker’s criticisms of having weak tokenomics, stkMKR attempts to fix the project’s challenges by introducing incentives to governance participation, while also increasing governance security and resiliency to credit losses.
The proposal borrows economic mechanisms from other successful ecosystems, utilizing inspiration from Cosmos governance and stkAAVE & xSUSHI tokenomics.
The three primary components focused on in this approach are:
stkMKR Token
Surplus Action Changes
Governance System Changes
A
Today,
we're
going
to
be
discussing
possible
staking
and
tokenomic
revisions,
as
proposed
by
monet.
The
the
initiative
is
being
branded
as
staker
maker
and
we
will
discuss
changes
to
the
token
itself.
I'm
sorry
changes
to
the
surplus
auction
as
well
as
possible
changes
to
the
governance
system.
There'll
be
a
q
a
at
the
end,
so
please
feel
free
to
submit
any
questions
to
chat
and
we'll
address
them
at
the
end
and
from
there
we'll
hand
it
over
to
money
flow.
Is
yours.
B
B
The
the
primary
change
versus
our
current
governance
system
is
that,
under
this
proposal,
when
you
put
your
tokens
into
governance,
they're
not
like
fully
liquid
as
they
are
now,
they
would
be
locked
up,
so
you
wouldn't
be
able
to
transfer
them
when
they're
staked
in
governance.
And
then,
if
you
wanted
to
get
your
your
liquid
mkr
tokens
back,
you
would
need
to
wait
through
an
unbonding
period.
B
B
B
So
that's
that's.
The
main
benefit
here
is
that
you'd
be
locked
up
for
two
three
weeks,
so
somebody
could
still
try
and
pass
a
malicious
proposal,
but
they
wouldn't
be
able
to
recoup
the
funds.
It's
you
know
kind
of
similar
to
how
our
emergency
shutdown
works
now,
where
they
can't
just
like
pull
those
funds
back
out
and
then
sell
them
back
to
the
market,
so
that
that
should
give
us
a
much
much
greater
sense
of
like
deterrence
against
governance
attacks.
B
B
So
the
the
concept
here
is
that
we
would
kind
of
take
a
specific
percentage
of
whatever
that
buyback
is
maybe
like
20
30.
What
have
you
and
instead
of
burning
it?
We
would
deposit
it
into
that
mkr
staking
contract,
and
ideally
this
would
work
somewhat
kind
of
like
sushi,
where,
basically,
we
add
more
tokens.
So
whenever
people
who
are
staking
want
to
withdraw,
they
might
have
put
in
10
mkr.
B
B
You
know,
basically,
just
whenever
the
protocol
is
profitable,
they
would
be
sharing
a
little
bit
of
that
that
yield
and
it
would
be
concentrated
to
to
people
who
are
participating
in
governance
or
staking
more
more
precisely,
rather
than
being,
you
know,
with
with
the
buy
and
burn
it's
being
shared
equally
among
everyone.
So
this
kind
of
focuses
the
incentives
on
the
people
who
are
likely
to
be
providing
the
most
the
most
value
as
token
holders
to
governance.
B
B
A
concept
called
conditional
delegation
where,
when
you
are
participating
in
cosmos
governance,
for
instance,
by
default,
whoever
you're
delegating
to
as
a
validator,
they
vote
for
you.
But
you
also
have
the
option
of
voting
yourself.
So
let's
say
my
validator
votes,
yes
on
something,
but
I
disagree
and
I
want
to
vote
no.
I
can
go
ahead,
put
in
a
vote
and
then,
whatever
you
know
my
share
of
tokens
that
were
we're
delegating
to
that
validator.
B
That's
going
to
be
counted
as
a
no
rather
than
just
following
the
delegates
or
the
validators
vote,
choice
that
wouldn't
wouldn't
really
work
with
executive
proposals,
because
you
know
once
you
pass
the
proposal
and
you
lift
the
hat
like
it's
already
kind
of
there's
not
really
any
like
latency,
where
we'd
be
able
to
like
have
delegates
overrule
their
or
delegators
overrule
their
delegates.
So
this
would
only
really
apply
to
poll
votes.
B
But
I
think
that
this
hopefully
will
make
people
more
comfortable
in
delegating
you
know
they
still
have
a
voice
and
if
they're
disagreeing
with
somebody's
poll
vote
that
they've
delegated
to
they
can
still
overrule
it.
So
I'm
hoping
that
we'd
see
more
participation
and
then,
secondly,
you
know
it
also
keeps
voters
kind
of
engaged
because
they
still
rather
than
currently
where
they
you
know.
B
So
this
would
be
useful
as
an
example.
If,
let's
say
the
tariff
people
come
in
and
they
they
try
and
stage
a
governance
attack
on
maker,
we
could
permanently
lock
the
withdrawals
and
then
you
know,
basically,
we
wouldn't
have
any
risk
of
them,
unbonding
their
tokens
and
dumping
it
to
the
market
and
commingling
it
with
other
funds,
and
then
in
the
future.
We
could
set
up
like
a
a
migration,
essentially
for
mkr,
where
anybody
who
was
you
know
permanently
locked
in
governance,
excluding
the
attackers
could
claim
from
like
an
airdrop
contract.
B
Anybody
who
was
not
in
governance
at
the
time
you
know
in
uniswap
or
on
coinbase,
or
what
have
you
they
could
claim
from
a
migration
contract,
and
this
makes
it
basically
a
lot
more
credible
of
deterrence,
knowing
that
we
can
cleanly
remove
the
stake
of
attackers
in
governance.
Without
you
know,
nuking
amm,
pools
or
lending
pools
if
we
did
like
a
snapshot,
style
migration,
where
we
just
say:
okay,
every
every
address
that
has
a
token
at
this
block
gets
the
new
make
maker
token.
B
And
then,
of
course,
you
know
the
lending
pools
and
the
amm
pools
would
would
get
wrecked,
because
all
of
their
tokens
are
now
worthless.
So
yeah,
I
think
that's
that's
kind
of
the
gist
of
it
and
the
you
know.
The
principles
are
basically
like,
hopefully,
greater
governance,
security
and
better
deterrence
against
attacks
concentrating
some
of
the
the
benefits
financial
benefits
of
the
mkr
system
back
to
the
people
who
are
most
likely
to
be
providing
value
to
governance.
B
So
that's
like
concentrating
the
returns
to
stakers
and
then
doing
all
this
in
a
way
that
doesn't
create
returns
to
scale,
which
you
know
basically
is
like.
We
don't
want
people
who
own
10,
000
mkr,
to
be
sort
of
like
having
a
higher
rate
of
return
than
people
who
are
you
know
having
just
10
mkr
we'd
want
to
be
that
have
that
be
as
equal
as
possible,
so
that
we're
not
incentivizing
centralization.
B
A
So
just
reminder
for
anyone.
If
you
have
any
questions,
please
feel
free
to
write
them
in
the
q
a
or
I
can
also
bring
you
on
stage
if
it's
a
a
complicated
counter
argument.
So
I
have
a
couple
questions
that
I
stole
from
the
forum
post,
one
of
them.
I
think
it
was
from
joey
santoro
and
he
asks
what's
the
what's
the
benefit
of
making
the
tokens
non-transferable.
B
Yeah
the
the
concept
there
is
that,
if
the,
if
the
like
stake
maker
tokens
were
transferable,
they
would
be
integrated
across
various
like
d5
protocols
like
okay
you'd
have
a
you
know,
you
know,
swap
pool
you'd
have
a
curve
pool.
Maybe
lending
protocols
would
use
it
as
collateral,
which,
on
first
look
seems
good,
because
okay
you're
having
more
utility
for
your
maker
people
can
even
earn
you
know
higher
returns
or
what
have
you?
So
it's
like
you're,
allowing
third
parties
to
kind
of
subsidize
your
token
with
more
utility.
B
I
think
it's
probably
a
net
negative,
though,
because
you
lose
that
deterrence
aspect
where,
if
your
token
is
really
immovable
and
locked,
there's
no
way
that
you
can,
you
know,
sell
it
really
quickly
after
you've
done
a
malicious
vote.
You
can't,
you
know,
put
it
into
ave
and
then
borrow
a
bunch
of
tokens
out
of
it,
so
it
makes
it
impossible
for
people
to
you
know
get
out
without
waiting
through
that
on
bonding
period.
B
If
it's,
if
it
is
transferable,
then
you
know
basically
they
could
commingle
their
funds
with
d5
protocols
and
then
we
wouldn't
any
longer
be
able
to
like.
Actually
burn
them
so
yeah.
I
think
that
I
think
it's
could
go
either
way,
but
in
my
view
I
think
the
the
like
deterrence
aspects
and
security
aspects
are
they'd
be
compromised.
If
you
let
it
be
transferable.
A
Nice
yeah
thanks
for
that
payton
rose.
The
facilitator
for
govalfa
asks
how
do
we
weight
the
costs,
namely
the
developer
labor,
so
anything
that
has
to
do
with
the
protocol
engineering
team
with
the
benefits
to
this
design
along
those
lines?
What
are
some
metrics
or
things
that
we
can
expect
to
see?
That
would
indicate
that
this
model
is
working
towards
better
governance.
B
That's
that's
tough.
I
mean,
like
I
think,
there's
been
a
fair
amount
of
comments
in
the
forum
thread
as
well
saying
like
okay.
Maybe
this
is
a
good
idea,
but
is
it
a
priority?
And
I'm
pretty
receptive
to
that?
Like
you
know,
I
think
improving
the
core
businesses,
you
know
should
take
precedent,
so
you
wonder
how
much
development
work
it
would
take.
I
think
in
some
respects
it.
B
As
far
as
success
metrics,
I
mean
it's
kind
of
amorphous,
but
I
think
ideally,
we'd
have
a
higher
share
of
mkr
and
governance.
I
think
right
now,
we've
got
like
200,
000
or
less,
and
you
know
I
think
it
would
be
great
if
we
could
get
50
staked.
That
would
be
awesome,
and
that
would
be
you
know.
A
lot
of
those
people
would
probably
be
sort
of
like
idle
voters.
It's
not
like
we're.
B
Suddenly
gonna,
you
know
get
people
to
get
off
their
butt
and,
like
you
know,
care
about
governance
just
because
we
have
a
staking
module,
but
but
I
think
it
would
still
kind
of
on
on
net.
It
would
still
improve
security
of
governance.
So
that
would
be
a
you
know,
mechanism
to
look
at.
I
think
you
know
I
hate
to
say
it,
but
like
price,
it's
probably
like
a
success
metric
somewhat
as
well.
Like
you
know,
people
are
flogging
maker
because
it's
just
boring
and
it
you
know.
B
Basically
it's
just
like
holding
a
stock
so
yeah,
I
think
supply
restriction
type
stuff.
It
could
have
a
positive
impact
who
knows,
but
that
could
be
another
sort
of
success
metric,
even
though
it's
tough
to
say
like
okay,
is
it
our
business,
improving,
that's
driving
that
or
is
it
tokenomics
in
reality?
It'd?
Probably
be
mostly
the
business
improving,
but
yeah.
B
I
think
maybe
one
other
thing
is
like
if
there's,
if
there's
like
a
time
frame
that
we'd
be
looking
at,
we
might
be
considering
like
okay.
I
know
delegations
expire
after
a
period
of
time
and
you
have
to
like
reset
up
a
delegation
contract.
So
as
we
get
closer
to
that
point,
which
I
I
think
is
like
kind
of
the
end
of
this
year-ish
when.
B
These
delegation
contracts
are
gonna
start
rolling
over.
That
might
be
more
of
like
a
crunch
time
of
like
okay.
Do
we
wanna,
try
and
like
push
this
through
by
then
or
do
we
wanna,
like
basically
have
everyone
kind
of
recycle
through
the
delegation
contract
re-up
it
and
then
maybe
end
up
kind
of
like
having
some
lock-in
for
the
next
few
months,
because
we've
already
put
people
through
this
work
to
to
redo
their
delegation.
A
Yeah
make
sense,
frank,
cruz.
One
of
the
delegates
is
asking:
have
you
had
time
to
perform
an
analysis
of
the
yield
percentage,
staked
mkr
token
owners
can
generate?
If
so,
how
competitive
will
it
be
versus
others?
Taking
protocol
calls
and
you
believe,
having
an
attractive
yield
will
be
key
in
expanding
mkr
ownership.
A
B
B
How
much
of
that
are
we
putting
straight
to
the
reserves?
To
the
you
know,
the
surplus
buffer
just
to
grow
our
capital
base
and
be
more
secure,
and
I
think
at
least
for
the
time
being,
it
seems
like
there's.
I
don't
know
if
consensus
but,
like
generally
people
are
trending
towards
wanting
to
build
up
reserves
more
and
buying
back
less
so
yeah,
it's
all
dependent
on.
Do.
B
We
actually
have
money
for
buybacks,
but
if
you,
you
know,
if
you
used
like
a
quarter
of
of
the
buybacks
that
you're
doing
for
staking
and
then
only
like
50
of
people
are
staked,
you
know
I
would
juice
the
return
by
like
30
to
50
versus
the
existing
return.
So
if
you
were,
you
know
getting
like
two
percent
yield
from
mkr
buybacks
as
a
holder
as
a
staker,
you
might
be
able
to
get
like
a
little
bit
higher
like
two
and
a
half
three
percent.
B
I
think
it
wouldn't,
at
least
in
my
mind.
I
don't
think
that
the
yields
should
be
that
high.
You
know,
I
think
you
know
the
difference
of
like
two
percent
buyback
yield
as
just
like
a
general
holder
versus
like
two
percent
2.5
percent
of
like
the
buyback
and
staking
yield
even
like
a
really
small
change,
would
still
be
pretty
significant
for
for
people
who
are
like
in
it
for
the
long
term.
A
Yeah
and
related
to
that,
maybe
you
can
comment
a
bit
on
the.
There
were
some
comments
in
the
forum
that
we're
arguing
well
a
bit
for
or
against
making
mkr
inflationary.
I
don't
know
if
yeah,
if
you
can
comment
on
that,
I
don't
think
it
will
have
an
impact
or
at
least
a
direct
impact.
But
maybe
I
missed
something.
B
B
Either
the
juice
returns
a
little
bit
when
we
already
are
doing
buybacks
or
to
kind
of
like
keep
at
least
some
level
of
staking
yield
when
we're
not
doing
buybacks-
and
you
know
all
else,
eco
would
go
down
to
zero.
At
that
point,
it's
I
don't
know
it
seems
kind
of
controversial,
because
maker's
existing
meme
is-
and
I
say
mean
but
like
it's,
you
know
it's
the
value
accrual
narrative.
Whatever
is
that
we're
burning
all
the
tokens?
B
You
know,
I
think
profitability
honestly
is
like
really
the
name
of
the
game
and
like
that's,
why
you'd
own
any
sort
of
enterprise
so
yeah
from
a
personal
perspective,
I
I
don't
think
that's
you
know,
minting
mkr
to
like
feed
to
stakers
is
really
problematic
because,
at
least
if,
if
you
are
participating
in
staking
it's
not
diluting
you
at
all,
it's
not
like
us
selling.
You
know
dumping
these
tokens
on
the
market
or
giving
it
to
lps.
B
Or
what
have
you
it's
non-dilutive,
at
least,
if
you're
kind
of
in
that
most
engaged
state
of
being
somebody
who
stakes
in
governance,
so
your
you
know,
share
of
ownership
would
either
stay
the
same
or
go
up.
So
I
think
that's
an
important
kind
of
caveat
where,
yes,
it's
inflationary,
but
it's
not
dilutive.
So
as
somebody
who's
in
it
for
the
long
term,
this
is
still
better
for
you.
A
Yeah
makes
sense.
Some
worry,
I
think
it
was
raised
by
hexagonal
in
the
forum,
and
maybe
the
protocol
engineering
team
is
thinking
about
this.
It's
the
esm
right,
so
the
emergency
shutdown
module,
so
this
new
system
could
potentially
mean
that
we
are
less
reactive
or
that
we
have
less
agility
or
speed
when,
when
reacting
to
to
any
type
of
emergency,
can
you
maybe
comment
a
bit
on
that.
B
Yeah,
I
think
I
think
well
personally,
I'm
a
I'm
a
big
supporter
of
keeping
emergency
shutdown
as
like
a
mechanism
in
the
protocol,
like
that
it
seems
like
the
likelihood
of
us
needing
it
for
a
technical
issue
or
something
like
that
is,
is
going
down
over
time.
You
know
the
system
has
survived
several
years
and
not
had
any
blow
ups
or
such
so
I
think
we
are
getting
kind
of
more
and
more
confident.
B
We
don't
need
it
from
like
a
tech
perspective,
but
I
think
it's
still
very
valuable
from
like
the
sort
of
like
governance
and
game
theory
perspective.
Where
you
know
you
can't
you
know,
even
if
you
get
51
of
the
mkr,
you
can't
just
do
what
you
want.
You
know
you
always
need
to
build
consensus
and
and
kind
of
yeah.
So
I
think
that
it's
something
we
shouldn't
abandon.
B
I
think
the
solution's,
probably
like
just
some
sort
of
like
mechanism
where
you
don't
need
to
unstake
your
tokens
and
wait
through
that.
You
know
several
week
period,
which
would
obviously
kill
the
mechanism,
and
you
can
just
do
it
directly
from
stake
tokens
to
emergency
shutdown
and
and
do
it
like
that,
so
exactly
how
that
would
be
set
up
tough
to
say,
but
I
think
we
should.
You
know
basically
try
and
maintain
the
mechanism
in
principle.
B
You
know
kind
of
how
it
is
now
where
you
could
either
immediately
stake
in
the
stake
maker
and
then
emergency
shutdown
or,
if
you're,
already
staked.
You
can
just
go
directly
from
you
know
your
voting
contract
or
your
delegates
voting
contract.
You
can
just
pull
it
out
and
then
put
it
into
shutdown.
B
A
A
B
Or
they're
just
going
to
basically
give
us
like
a
much
worse
deal
on
whatever
other
sort
of
contracts
or
or
sort
of
like
business
that
we're
conducting
with
them,
because
you
know,
basically,
they
need
us
to
give
them
a
better
deal
to
underwrite
them.
Holding
that
mkr
risk
that
they
don't
want.
So
it's
yeah,
I
think,
like
that
sort
of
stuff
feels
like
it's
forcing
utility
into
a
token
when
it,
you
know,
isn't
necessarily
a
fit
but
yeah.
I
need
to
read
it
more
and
kind
of
like
digest
how
that.
A
B
A
B
Yeah,
I
think
mostly
just
see
the
feedback,
so
I
I
don't
have
like
a
timeline
that
I'm
like
looking
to
push
this
for
I'd,
say:
if
anything,
you
know
I'll
just
try
and
keep
building
consensus
figure
out.
If
there's
like
certain
elements
of
it,
that
could
be
changed
a
little
bit
and
then
get
a
lot
more
support
for
it.
So
like
incorporate
feedback
and
then
yeah.
If
there's
a
timeline,
it
would
probably
just
be
like
if
we're
gonna
do
it
in
the
next
year.
B
It
probably
want
to
be
you
know
by
the
end
of
this
year,
so
we
can
align
it
with
when
everyone's
delegates
contracts
are
are
turning
over
already
so
yeah.
No,
no
quick
timeline.
You
know,
I
think
it's
a
big
change.
People
should
have
time
to
like
think
it
over
and
other
other
competing
proposals.
You
know
be
brought
forward
and
all
of
that.
A
A
B
A
Yeah
we
can
say
if
you
didn't
have
time
to
to
review
the
the
threads.
I
think
it's
quite
interesting.
I
really
like
the
the
graphics.
I
thought
you
were
going
to
show
them
during
this
presentation,
so
I
was
a
bit
disappointed
but
yeah
I
will
try
to
add
them
somehow
and
and
yeah.
If
anyone
has
any
comments
about
this,
please
go
to
the
forums,
check
the
proposal
and
and
if
you
have
any
type
of
feedback
post
it
there
money.
As
always,
it
was
very
nice
having
you
and
we'll
see
you
around
yeah
thanks.