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From YouTube: Open Decentralized Voter Committee | January 11, 2023
Description
A
Hello,
everyone
and
welcome
today
is
January
11th
2023..
My
name
is
Peyton
I'm,
one
of
the
governance
facilitators
at
maker,
now
I
go
by
Pros,
11
online
and
we're
here
for
another
DVC
call.
These
are
the
calls
where
we
get
together,
talk
about
end
game
kind
of
what
it's
going
to
take
to
transition
and
reorganize
and
come
out
to
a
stronger
and
more
resilient.
Now
so
huge
thanks
to
those
of
you
that
we
have
here
today
reminder
to
you
use
the
chat.
A
B
Yeah
welcome
everyone,
and
thanks
for
joining
so
I
think
I
mean
so
today,
I
will
kind
of
follow
up
on
the
bigger
picture.
You
know
kind
of
updates.
I
talked
about
last
week,
where
you
know
really.
The
biggest
sort
of
change
to
the
the
approach
is.
First
of
all,
it's
like
focus
on
constitutionalism
right
that
really
the
in-game
plan
becomes
the
in-game
Constitution,
because
kind
of
from
a
sort
of,
in
a
sense,
physical
perspective,
of
like
sort
of
essential
essentialist
perspective.
That's
what
it
is
right.
B
It's
a
single
MIB
called
the
endgame
Constitution
that
implements
everything,
including
some
of
the
other
maps
that
are
the
scope
Frameworks
and
together
it
all
like
everything
is
covered
on
under
this
one
proposed
we'll
call
the
end
game
Constitution
and
then
there's
actually
going
to
be
two
in-game
constitutions
to
sort
of
think
about,
or
rather
there's
going
to
be,
two
like
two
iterations.
So
there's
the
pre-game
Constitution,
which
is
this,
like
short,
run,
focused
proposal
that
acts
in
this
way
right.
B
You
have
a
single
proposal
and
then
it
controls
everything
and
it
sort
of
controls.
The
pregame,
essentially,
which
is
then
this
process
leading
up
to
the
endgame
Constitution
being
proposed,
which
then
controls
the
end
game
essentially
and
the
Indian
constitution
is
going
to
be
irreversible,
but
just
because
of
the
sheer
sort
of
power
of
voter
incentives.
B
So
it
has
to
be
really
well
made
because
it
is
almost
going
to
be
it's
going
to
be
almost
impossible
to
change
it,
but
and
sort
of
another
reason.
You
know:
there's
some
small
like
this
there's
a
you
know,
expected
six-month
delay
to
the
rollout
of
the
plan
right
so
that
the
the
roadmap
we'd
get
another
six
month
of
preparation
because
of
the
the
finality
of
the
in-game
Constitution.
B
The
actual
endgame
Constitution
that
can
be
really
really
focused
on,
like
short-term
execution
and
short-term
value
creation,
fundamental
value
equation
right
and
then
the
Indian
constitution
delivers
on
all
the
intangible
value
to
economics,
meta
engineering
and
it's
on
a
long
term
resilience
and
all
that
good
stuff.
Okay,
any
questions
to
that
minus
part
of
that.
That's
where
some
people
still
need
like
there's
some
of
it,
that
just
needs
to
be
spelled
out
a
little
bit
more
as
context
for
it.
I
mean
you're,
not
supposed
to
obviously
understand
the
details,
but
foreign.
B
From
that
tiny
little
monologue
right,
but
basically
what
I
want
to
focus
on
today
is
entirely
sort
of
the
Practical
short-term
stuff.
So
basically
the
pre-game
Constitution,
right
and
kind
of,
like
I,
did
I
think
maybe
one
or
two
months
ago,
I'm
I'm
going
to
give
a
rundown
of
like
the
like
the
articles
of
the
pregame
Constitution
as
it
currently
as
I'm,
currently
working
on
it,
which
is
something
that
is
very
close
to
being
being
done.
B
And
it's
really
in
the
face
in
the
it's
in
the
face
where
it
it's,
you
know,
I'm,
going
I'm
sharing
it
with
various.
You
know
key
stakeholders
and
basically
want
to
make
sure
that
everything
is
sort
of
a.
There
are
no
surprises
among
just
like
the
really
key
stakeholders
you
want
to
make
sure
are
on
board
right
and
then,
as
soon
as
possible.
B
We
will
be
actually
following
the
rules
of
the
Constitution
because
they
will
be
in
effect
at
this
time
right.
So
they
will.
They
will
change
a
lot
of
stuff
right,
they'll
change,
the
fundamental
governance
process.
The
governance
cycle,
like
the
monthly
cycle,
will
disappear.
The
governance
and
risk
calls
would
disappear.
The
all
the
fundamental
stuff
will
will
change.
For
the
most
part,
some
MIP
will
still
be
in
effect,
but
mostly
everything
will
work.
B
How
to
contribute
to
scope?
Writing
basically
I
mean
wait
until
the
end
of
this
month
and
they
will
be
public
and
then
it'll
be
a
matter
of
proposing
changes
to
to
those
Scopes
right,
and
we
were
super
useful
to
brainstorm
ideas
of
what
should
be
covered
like
when
you
think
of
he
said
it
was
collateral.
B
So
it's
it's
just
it's
you
know
you
have
to
like
once
you
see
the
way
they
they
work,
which
again
is
almost
ready.
Then
I
think
it'll
be
a
lot
easier
to
then
understand
like
how
to
use
this
toolkit
right.
So
once
that's
out
then,
and
yeah
I
mean
then
ideas
will
switch
to
like
three
calls
a
week
right
and
there'll
be,
like
small
calls,
open
calls
that
are
in
entire.
B
Nice
questions
is
there
going
to
be
a
distinct
date
when
we
switch
between
using
the
Constitution
and
the
mips,
so
the
pregame
Constitution
doesn't
get
rid
of
all
mips.
For
instance,
core
units
will
still
function
and
SPF
Source
the
function
and
other
stuff
was
the
function,
but
so
like
the
pregame
Constitution
is
a
MIP
by
itself
and
the
idea
is,
it
will
be
proposed
in
February
right.
So
that
means
the
earliest.
You
can
go
into
effect
if
it's
approved
is
April.
B
B
B
So
it
will
like
this
is
all
something
I
mean
the
the
you
know,
the
the
kind
of
the
the
governance
cycle
of
the
the
in-game
Constitution
is
based
around
continuously
changing
and
improving
the
school
Frameworks
right.
So,
of
course
anything
where
it
makes
sense
we
want
to
get.
We
want
to
get
some
really
good
skill,
Frameworks
done
in
q1
already,
but
what's
more
important
is
we
simply
get
this
process
started
of
continuous
Improvement?
B
So
we
can
make
you
know
so
we
we
know
that
Q2
improvements
will
happen
in
Q3,
approvals
will
happen
and
so
on
right.
So
that's
the
more
kind
of
so
it's
better
to
get
it
sort
of
broadly
get
a
grip
of
it
and
understand
the
moving
Parts
than
it
is
to
try
to
make
individual
ones
perfect.
At
this
point,
foreign.
B
Yeah
and
then
just
in
case
this
there's
still
value
in
revising
existing
Maps
until
they
were
done
yeah.
Some
of
them
had
like
something
like
enabling
some
kind
of
SPF
like
process
that
can
pay
NPR
or
something
we've
talked
about
before
and
I.
Think
there's
actually
some
proposals
in
that
I
mean
being
done
so
that
that's
that's
needed.
B
Oh,
this
is
actually
so
it's
kind
of
written
in
the
sort
of
yeah
actually
I'm,
gonna,
okay,
okay,
now
the
number's
wrong,
because
I
missed
that
part,
so
just
ignore
these
numbers,
but
basically
that
I
mean
the
idea.
Is
that
there's
kind
of
like
the
pregame
Constitution
mostly
is
like
it's
a
stripped
like
I
said
it's
a
it's
a
simplified
version
of
The,
in-game
Constitution
and
it
actually.
B
This
was
actually
an
earlier
kind
of
established
strategy
right
of
having
simple
die
first
and
then
have
the
metadata
Paradigm
later,
which
then
got
sort
of
scrapped,
because
it
just
it's
just
not
really
realistic.
At
I
mean
we
sort
of
all
the
knowledge
we
have
related
to
the
insane
complexity
of
preventing
corruption.
Even
you
know,
with
all
the
tools
we're
using
in
the
end
game
right,
then
the
symbol
like
a
simple
solution
is
it's
unlikely
to
become.
You
know
to
resist
centralization?
B
That's
gonna
make
you
know,
really
get
us
a
long
way
in
like
improving
the
dynamic
of
governance,
really
sort
of
solidify
some
specific
core
features
and
then
just
focusing
on
executing
on
those
rather
than
having
this
sort
of
open
question
of
like
what
do
you
guys
feel
like
doing
and
having
a
lot
of
you
know
wasted
efforts
on
on
stuff
that
just
isn't
really.
You
know
needed,
because
the
base
the
core
product
is
already
so
strong
right
and.
B
Yeah
so
so
the
cons
like
so
the
Constitution
is
basically
based
around.
First
of
all,
it's
got.
The
kind
of
I
mean
I
still
I'm,
not
sure
what
to
call
is
like
at
this
in
some
I
think
some
people
would
actually
call
this
park.
This
is
the
Constitution
itself,
and
then
this
other
stuff
is
like
the
Bill
of
Rights
or
something
right.
B
And
then
there
are
these
kind
of
like
core
articles
or
something
you
know
that
that
are
at
that
are
defined
at
the
Constitutional
level,
meaning
this
is.
These
are
rules
that
I
mean
in
the
pre-game.
They
can
change
so
in
some
they're
they're
it
doesn't
mean
as
much
in
the
pre-game
as
it
does
in
the
end
game
right,
but
basically
I
mean
so
these
are
rules.
These
are
like
sets
of
rules
that
are
like
articles
that
are
directly
defined
in
the
Constitution
and
then
over.
Here
we
got
the
scope
Frameworks
right.
B
So
then
what
the
Constitution
does
is
defines
each
of
the
Scopes
and
then
gives
them
these
things
that
gives
them
their
constitutional
boundaries.
Basically,
so
it
a
lot
of
of
information
about
what
the
Constitution
says
about
how
things
are
supposed
to
work
goes
in
here.
In
fact,
most
of
the
information
goes
in
there,
like
the
only
the
stuff
that
goes
over
here
is
simply
the
kind
of
stuff
that
needs
to
be
extremely
hard
to
impossible
to
change.
B
B
So
you
end
up,
you
know
you
end
up
having
no
no
force
that
basically
drives
people
to
act
in
the
greater
good
rather
than
in
their
own
interest
right.
So,
in
order
to
have
some
kind
of
to
have
some
kind
of
a
force
that
you
know
increases
likelihood
that
the
sort
of
the
average
person
will
choose
to
be,
you
know,
choose
spark
or
corruption.
Basically,
right,
we'll
choose
to
sort
of
do
the
thing,
that's
better
for
everyone
and
then
indirectly
benefit
from
that.
B
There's
basically
threefold
as
I'm
proposing
it
right.
The
first
one
is
this
like,
like
you
know
the
commitment
to
to
decentralization,
which
is
the
fundamental
purpose
of
of
die
right
in
the
city,
centralized
stable
coin
that
is
uncensorable
and
permissionless,
and
and
that
anyone
can
use
it.
It
can't
be
stopped.
This
is
even
engineered
into
the
code.
B
So
that's
really
that's
really
great
right,
and
that
is
ultimately
like
the
number
one
reason
why
people
are
involved
and
why
people
can
be
trusted
to
try
to
safeguard
the
system,
but
by
itself
is
still
I
mean
you
want
layers
and
layers
of
protections
right.
You
want
resilient
scalability.
So,
even
when
you
go
to
massive
sizes,
you
want
to
make
sure
that
there
is.
B
B
That
maker
is
always
going
to
be
no
matter
how
sort
of
greedy
makers
run
the
more
money
it
makes,
the
more
it
will
allocate
funds
towards
charity
in
an
actual
and
actually
like
efficient
way,
so
that
just
means
that
there
will
always
be
kind
of
value
in
in
it
right,
but
but
yeah
again,
it's
it's
a
very
long
run
thing.
So
the
the
sort
of
the
charity
system
is
kind
of
how
to
deal
with
it
in
the
long
run
marginally
right
and
then
the
last
thing
is
scientific
sustainability.
So
that's
kind
of
clean
money.
B
At
the
time
all
we
had
to
do
was
say:
oh
we're
going
to
make
some
solar
or
something,
and
then
people
thought
that
was
really
interesting
and
now
you
know
nuclear
and
actual
Solutions
are
less
exciting
for
most
people,
but
instead
by
sort
of
putting
money
on
the
table
and
and
sort
of,
you
know
like
taking
some
real
like
actually
doing
something,
rather
than
just
announcing
Our
intention
to
do
something.
Is
it's
going
to
to
create
more
I
mean
good
to
create
another
signal
to
different
sorts
of
different
types
of
people,
though
right?
B
But
one
of
the
kind
of
you
know
upsides
of
this
approach
is
this
also
means
we
no
longer
have
to.
You
know
worry
about
or
be
sort
of
subjective
and
emotional
about.
How
do
we
allocate
our
collateral
right?
Because
that's
the
the
fortunate
upside
of
scientific
sustainability?
Is
it
doesn't
really
matter
how
you
allocate
your
Capital
if
you're
just
making
a
return
and
you're
you
ensure
you
know
you're
fighting
the
misinformation
around
sustainability,
then
you
know
you
don't
have
to
it
doesn't
have
to
be
so
complicated.
B
There's
there's
some
kind
of
like
real
purpose
behind
the
project
that
that
shouldn't
drive
them
to
to
to
care
about
making
it
better,
rather
than
simply
the
kind
of
financial
motivation
of
the
mkr
or
you
know
in
some
sense
of
the
lack
of
it
right
because
it's
a
it's
a
it's
an
attempt
to
deal
with
the
free
rider
problem
right
and
as
long
as
it
works
for
just
a
tiny
amount
of
people.
It's
actually
enough!
That's
how
the
you
know.
That's
the
whole
kind
of
philosophy
of
the
end
game,
Constitution
right
But.
B
Ultimately,
we
don't
it's
extremely
hard
to
extreme
that
people
have
spark,
and
so
we
need
to
build
a
system
that
just
requires
very
few
of
them,
and
then
we
need
to
put
a
lot
of
effort
into
generating
a
lot
of
it.
So
if
we
generate
a
lot
of
it-
and
we
only
need
a
little
of
it-
then
we
get
this
type
of
resilience
where
the
likelihood
of
of
you
know
it
failing
where
we
certainly
don't
have
enough.
It's
going
to
be
extremely
low
foreign.
B
The
kind
of
fundamental
crazy
challenge
is
this
problem
of
creating
a
constitutionally
regulated
and
designed
website.
Essentially
that
determines
the
user
experience
when
you
vote
through,
and
you
know
an
official
voting
front
end
that
is
provided
by
maker
itself,
and
that
gives
you
access
to
motor
incentives.
B
What
do
you
then
see?
Because
what
you
see
in
that
front
end
is
going
to
determine
how
the
kind
of
everything
works,
how
the
politics
Works,
how
the
governance
Works
how
decisions
occur
and
whether
the
project
lives
lives
or
dies
as
a
result,
so
that
needs
to
be
like
very
clearly
defined
and
understood.
Why
Alexa
what's
important?
Another
thing
is
also
I
mean
we
need
to
have
that
done
as
quickly
as
possible
in
the
pre-game,
because
we
need
to
test
that
we
can't
design
it
in
theory
and
then
only
Let.
B
It
Loose
when
you
know
when
it
when
it
immediately
becomes
a
reversible,
but
I
mean
but
really
fundamentally
right.
The
easy
voting
front
end.
That's
where
kind
of
the
the
actually
should
we
should
well
I'll,
just
take
it
I'll
just
call
it
vertic
reasons
right,
but
that's
where
the
Constitutional
voter
committees,
which
are
these
like
recognized
versions
of
voter
committees,
where
they
show
up
and
where
the
Constitutional
delegates,
which
is
the
recognized
delegates
where
they
show
up
and
and
those
are
the
two
fundamental
forces
that
keep
each
other
and
check.
B
So
rev
asks
for
how
are
we
defining
interfaces
or
writing
a
requirement
list
for
the
easy
voting
front
end
and
so
yeah?
It
has
to
be
like
absolutely
completely
defined,
with
no
ambiguity,
because
any
kind
of
room
for
interpretation
will
be
abused
right.
This
is
the
single
most
dangerous
place
to
allow
people
to
be
subjective
right,
because
this
is
where
you
know
like
delegates
will
try
to
change
it,
so
it
somehow
benefits
them
and
they
show
up
more
at
the
top
or
whatever,
or
they
get
emphasized
more
whatever
possible
way
they
can.
B
They
can
use
to
to
to
have
it
benefit
them
more.
They
will
do
that.
Nothing
would
be
more
in
their
in
their
their.
You
know,
they're
interested
in
doing
that
right
and
same
for
the
voter
committees
actually
to
an
even
more
greater
extent,
although
at
least
the
vote
of
committees
are
not
really
getting
monetary
compensation,
so
they
would
be
more
like
the.
A
B
B
We
we
lose
all
control.
Basically,
right,
like
we
like
everything,
will
be
run
by
the
delegates,
and
so
we
can't
change
the
Constitution.
So
we
can't
like
lock
something
down
later
than
we
didn't
lock
down.
That's
not
going
to
be
possible,
because
if
you
can
lock
things
down
later,
then
you
can
also
unlock
things
later
right
and
then
you
know
the
delegates
are
going
to
unlock
compensation
because
they
would
really
like
to.
You
know,
make
the
compensation
more
fair
for
them
right.
B
So
so
yeah
like
any
you
know,
so
so
we
need
to
really
come
up
with
something
that
is
as
future
proof
as
possible
during
a
pregame,
but
it
is.
It
is
a
very
odd
thing
right
because
we're
we
have
to
make
something
that
we
know
will
be
so
just
be
really
stupid
in
the
far
future,
but
in
even
in
the
far
future
it
will
still
be
like.
Maybe
eventually
there
will
be
some
kind
of
I,
don't
know,
maybe
a
VR
version
or
something
right,
and
then
that
provides
some
opportunity
to
reinterpret
it.
B
Yeah
then,
there's
a
motor
committees
which
are
basically
just
like
at
the
basic
form
they're
just
sort
of
like
an
encouragement
of
public
coordination
by
mklers
right.
But
then
the
Constitutional
voter
committees
is
then,
when
they
become
more
formalized
and
have
certain
rules
around
who's,
a
member
of
a
voter
committee,
and
they
also
get
infrastructure.
Support
by
the
I
mean
the
sort
of
the
the
the
decentralized
workforce
and
also
compensation
and
I
still
I
mean
I.
B
Don't
have
a
good
I,
don't
have
a
good
sense
of
what
sort
of
compensation
for
an
individual
constitutional
voter,
Committee
Member
should
be
other
than
it
should
not.
It
should
be
more
symbolic
than
it
should
not
be
a
career
or
a
job
like
it
specifically
is
meant
to
be
something
where
it's
for
Mk
holders.
B
But
it
shouldn't
be
more
than
that
right
because
if
they
start
to,
if
that
becomes
becomes
sort
of
a
power
struggle
for
for
for
resources,
then
it
stops
functioning
for
its
intended
role,
which
is
to
be
the
exact
sort
of
the
best
stuff
where
you
have
people
that
are
actually
joining
out
of.
You
know,
out
of
semi,
altruism
right,
like
Journey
for
the
sake
of
the
project,
but
right
now
the
the
allocated
compensation
for
it
is
set
at
500
mkr
in
emissions.
B
So
that
means
delegates
can't
just
like
be
really
shitty
and
sort
of
kind
of
kick
out
the
voter
committees
in
a
sense
and
then
get
have
free
reign
on
the
country.
If
the
voter
committees
don't
have
enough
kind
of
you
know
interest
in
the
project
to
show
up,
then
the
delegates
have
a
big
problem.
Then
suddenly
they're
gonna
they're
gonna
not
get
the
compensation,
so
they
have
to
the
delegates.
Ultimately,
their
biggest
job
in
the
world
is
to
somehow
make
it
feel
good
to
be
an
active
and
get
older.
B
That's
actually
following
the
project
and
making
decisions
and
participating
in
the
in
the
governance
process
but
yeah.
But
then
we
got
the
delegates
right.
So
that's
basically
I
mean
that's
like
I
said:
that's
their
job
right
to
make
it
to
they're,
basically
like
a
user
experience,
enhancement
for
employers
right,
but
they
also
the
kind
of
recipient
of
the
voter
incentives
through
the
easy
mode
front
end.
B
But
then
they
have
to
really.
You
know,
just
like
the
voter
committees.
They're
completely.
You
know,
they're
cursed,
I
mean
sorry
they're
constitutional
I'm,
talking
about
delegates
or
anyone
can
make
a
delegate
right.
Constitutional
delegates
are
the
ones
that
are
regulated
through
the
the
Constitution
and
that
get
compensation
and
also
get
privileged
positions
in
official
Precision
in
the
easy
voting
front
end
and
as
a
result,
huge
amounts
of
incentivized
votes
and
yeah.
B
So
so
because
they're
I
mean
they're
heavily
regulated
by
the
Constitution
and
as
a
result
they
have
a
huge
amount
of
power,
but
they
don't.
You
know
they
lose
that
power.
If
they
step
out
of
line
and
one
of
the
ways
is
that
they're,
like
shitties
and
the
voter
committees,
don't
bother
participate
anymore
and
then
they
just
don't
get
compensated
anymore.
That
one
that's
one!
B
That's
one
way
it
happens
right
and
then
it's
a
bunch
of
sort
of
a
bunch
of
other
ways
to
Define
such
as
something
like
attempting
to
like
you
know,
modify
the
constitution
in
a
way.
That's
not
that
is
itself
not
constitutional
right,
which
again
is
like
I
mean
their
incentive
would
be
to
use
their
voting
power
to
try
to
change
their
own
compensation
right
or
prevent
the
other
delegates
from
being
paid
or
something
right.
B
B
And
so
the
parameters
for
the
delegates
that
I'm
proposing
is
that
so
it
was
a
little
well.
Oh,
so
most
of
the
parameters
that
that
are
permanent
is
that
they're,
the
two
types
of
delegates
that
I
mean
I
need
a
better
word
names
of
them,
but
right
now
just
call
them
full-time
delegates
and
part-time
delegates
right
and
so
the
full-time
delegates,
yeah
full-time,
like
the
sort
of
these
I,
think
at
one
point,
I
call
them
executive
delegates,
I
probably
have
other
names
for
them
right,
but
but
they
are
basically
yeah.
B
B
But
it's
going
to
be
like
a
ranked
competition
with
like
X
available
spots
and
then
whoever
in
those
tough
spots
they
become
these
full-time
constitutional
tones
and
then
to
create
job
security.
There's
a
kind
of
voting
election
season
which
I
think
initially
maybe
permanent,
yeah
I
I,
think
I
mean
I
think
in
most
national
constitutions.
B
B
Maybe
not
all
delegations
reset
the
server,
but
all
NPR
holders
stop
receiving
voter
incentives
until
they
go
and
go
through
the
easy
voting
front
again
and
go
through
sort
of
the
same
cycle
of
making
some
basic
gamified
decisions,
and
so
that's
kind
of
election
teaching
right.
It's
MPI
holders
are
compelled
to
go
and
and
vote
again
or
they
or
they
lose
their
their
vote
on
centers
and
then
that's
kind
of
the
beginning
of
the
election
season.
B
But
if
we're
able
to
surface
information
like
actually,
this
is
how
they
performed
or
something
compared
to
blah
blah,
then
maybe
would
give
some
people
a
reason
to
be
like.
Okay,
maybe
I
should
try
this
guy.
Instead,
this
year
or
maybe
I
should
try
another
strategy.
Then
maybe
growth
wasn't
so
great
and
we
wasted
a
bunch
of
budget.
Now
we
should
go
with
Surplus
and
focus
on
on
just
like
accumulating
capitalism
right.
B
So
there
could
be
a
chance
for
some
small
adjustments
and
decisions
to
be
made
by
voters
based
on
kind
of
a
summary,
a
high
level
summary
of
the
key
effects
and
sort
of
data
about
what
occurred
in
the
last
year.
Right
and
then
this
sort
of
election
season
is
done
and
the
snapshot
occurs
in
a
sense
and
that
snapshot
then
captures
who
are
the
top
delegates
at
the
end
of
the
election
season
and
those
are
the
ones
that
become
a
full-time
delegates
and
then
the
job
security
thing
occurs
through.
B
So
you
have
to
really
you
know,
perform
badly
to
to
lose
your
your
compensation
if
you
win
during
the
election
season
and
and
that
combined
with
with
a
a
good
level
of
compensation
for
delegates,
should
make
this
like
full-time
constitutional
delegate,
position
very,
very
attractive,
right
and
and
attract
some
like
real
professionals,
especially
over
time
right
and
the
actual
like
this.
The
kind
of
the
specific
numbers
for
the
conversation
that
I'm
I'm
proposing
is
yeah.
Actually
I
would
say
that
2000
mkr
for
the
full-time
Constitution
delegates
in
in
fixed
emissions.
B
If,
if
a
delegate
like,
if
the,
if
the
full
time
comes,
a
full-time
constitutional
delegates
are
falling
significantly
below
that,
then
they
get
like
a
temporary
cash
stipend
to
push
them
up
to
that
level.
So
there
is
this
like
compensation
flaw
which
further
exists
to
provide.
You
know
job
security
basically
and
provide
like
you
know,
make
the
role
attractive
and
make
sure
that
if
the
mkr
price
takes
too
much,
you
don't
have
people
like
checking
out
and
then
suddenly
the
whole
the
Constitution
sort
of
falling
apart
right.
B
And
yeah,
and
then
I
mean-
and
so
like
so
so.
My
kind
of
my
my
my
the
kind
of
heuristic
is
that
if
you
pay
about
200k
in
the
worst
case
scenario,
but
it
has
could
have
significantly
higher
upside
than
that,
and
the
idea
is
basically
that
I
mean
to
attended
so
before.
Christmas
I
was
talking
about
these
compensation
models
and
like,
and
it
was
too
common.
B
B
That's
what
I've
ultimately
think
is
like
the
the
ideal
number
as
like
the
starting
point,
and
then
the
idea
is
that
every
single
cycle,
so
before
the
next
election
cycle,
if
you
know
like,
if,
if
the
compensation
that
is
actually
being
paid
out
to
active
full-time
constitutional
delegates,
is
significantly
Above,
This
sort
of
flaw
right
of
of
200k
equivalent
and
whatever
point
in
time.
This
is
happening,
then
some
additional
spots
will
get
added.
B
So
then,
if
if
NPR
like
doubles
in
price,
then
maybe
it'll
go
from
seven
to
nine
and
then,
if
it
stays
double
in
price,
then
maybe
we'll
go
from
9
to
11
and
then
we'll
keep
actually
growing
until
it
stabilizes
then
around,
like
I,
don't
know
well,
actually
maybe
11
12
right
so
so
over
time.
The
compensation
for
full-time
constitutional
delegates
should
always
go
up,
but
it
shouldn't.
You
know
it
should
go
up
with
a
small
amount
when
the
MPR
price
goes
up
with
a
with
a
large
amount
amount.
B
And
and
then
of
course,
when
you
have
the
contraction
of
the
protocol,
then
what
you
do
is
you
you,
you
I
mean
in
the
short
run,
you
provide
this
kind
of
stipend,
so
you
you
you,
you
hold
up
the
the
compensation,
but
then
you
eliminate
positions,
so
you,
you
shrink
the
size
of
the
full-time
constitutional
delegates
all
the
way
down
to
seven
at
which
is
then
the
lowest
amount,
at
which
point
you
have.
No,
you
can
only
use
this
diamond.
B
B
Other
just
one
more
companies,
so
the
part-time
constitutional
dialects
are
more
like
reserves
that
are
basically
ready
to
like
jump
in.
If
some
major
Scandal
happens
with
a
with
one
of
the
the
seven
full-time
constitutional
failures
right,
and
so
they
are
also,
they
also
get
500
between
them
right.
So
that's
significantly
less
and
they
also
don't
have
this
stipend
thing
and
they
also
don't
have
well
I'm,
not
sure,
but
I'm
I'm
thinking
they
shouldn't,
have
the
job
security
kind
of
mechanics
either.
B
Okay,
I'll
start
with
the
questions
from
the
top
all
right.
What
about
delegates
gaining
voting
power
outside
the
election
season?
Do
they
need
another
delegate
to
drop
out
of
full-time
to
be
entitled?
Conversation?
Yes,
I
mean
science
doesn't
read,
but
but
yeah
like,
so
they
need
to
so
a
part-time
constitutional
delegate.
Well,
so
anyone
can
for
now.
This
is
what
I'm
thinking
right
that
anyone
can,
at
any
time,
jump
into
being
a
part-time
constitutional
delegate
so
make
their
relatively
small
share.
I
mean!
B
So
that's
a
seventh
of
five
I
guess
it's
like
80
80
MPR
per
year
right,
which
is
not
really
that
much
at
least
I
mean
the
current
prices.
But
it's
like
it's
enough
that
it's
like
a
sort
of
part-time
gig
right,
and
it
also
gives
you
some
resources
that
you
can
then
use
just
to
kind
of
try
to
create
a
kind
of
a
campaign
for
the
following
election
season.
Basically
or
from
there
you
may
be
able
to.
B
If
any
sitting
full-time
constitutional
delegate
becomes
very
unpopular,
you
may
be
able
to
flip
them
by
achieving
twice
as
many
modes
as
them.
And
if
you
do
that,
then
you
say
take
over
there
their
current
seat
in
the
remaining
cycle.
So
you
still
have
to
like
compete
in
the
actual
election
following
election
season.
B
But
if
you
get
in
there
and
you
you
know
like
yeah
like
during
the
last
three
months
before
the
next
election
season
begins,
then
you'll
get
three
months
of
like
the
very
high
compensation
to
give
you
a
large
amount
of
resources
to
sort
of
do
your
campaign
and
and
sort
of
get.
You
know
prove
yourself
that
you're
able
to
do
the
work.
B
B
It
has
to
be
extremely
simple
and
gamified
and
the
other
issue
is
they
have
to
be
anonymous
so
like
to
a
large
extent
it
just
in
the
end
delegates
actually
don't
like
they're,
not
really
actually
meant
to
do
that
much
other
than
protect
the
Constitution,
basically
and
and
then
carry
out
the
strategies
defined
by
the
Constitutional
voter
committees.
So
it's
like
it's
more
like
I
mean
so
it's
it's.
B
And
then
that
becomes
a
problem
and
as
a
delegate,
then
you
have
to
kind
of
you
know
either
you
you
keep
it
going,
in
which
case
the
voters
that
were
delegating
to
you,
they're,
actually
sort
of
being.
You
know,
defrauded
almost
out
of
their
their
right
to
to
you
know
to
choose
what
they
think
benefits
them
the
most
or
you
can
then,
like
sort
of
you
can
use
your
own
ability
to
kind
of
to
what
I
call
Ben,
which
is
then
this
kind
of
weird.
This
is
so
there's
this.
B
So
voter
committees,
they
ban
delegates
when
the
delegates
are
saying
they'll
follow
their
strategy,
but
they
don't
or
maliciously
they
ban
them
if
they
follow
what
the
strategy
should
be
doing,
but
they're
not
doing
that
because
they're
doing
it
wrong
and
they're
basically
lying
to
those
who
who
want
to
follow
their
strategy
right
and
delegates
banned
voter
committees
when
they
see
that
the
voter
committee
is
like
incompetent
or
even
sort
of
near
fraudulent,
at
which
point
they
say.
Look
we
can't
have
this.
B
We
can't
have
voters
that
are
delegated
through
us,
contributing
to
this
voter
committee
accumulating
points
in
the
front
end
and
getting
a
higher
ranking
in
the
front
end
when
they're
actually
causing
you
know,
they're
being
unconstitutional
right
in
that
being,
like
you
know,
just
not
smart
enough
or
good
enough
for
the
job
or
fraudulent
or
negligent
or
whatever
patrolling
whoever.
It
is
right
so
then,
if
you're
delegate-
and
you
don't
react
to
that-
then
you
could
later
get
you
know,
get
get
in
trouble
for
that.
B
You
know
you
get
this
like
real.
You
know,
you
know
decentralized,
reputation
right,
because
then
people
that
have
the
credentials
ready.
They
can
then
help
identify
others
who
don't
have
the
credentials,
but
you
can
output
the
work
that
is
at
the
level.
You
know
you
know
where
that
it
needs
to
be
at
right,
so
that
will
be
and
that
of
course,
kind
of
stuff
can
show
up
in
the
easy
building
front.
End.
B
Now,
okay,
okay,
I'm
completely
misunderstood
the
question:
it's
something
like
should:
delegate
the
votes
or
something
yeah.
So
that's
completely
out
of
I
mean
what
you're
talking
about
here
is
absolutely
unworkable
right,
because
you
would
have
to
either
you
have
to
constitutionally
fix
that.
So
you
have
a
single
permanent
system
that
never
changes
or
you
get.
You
know
that
becomes
the
battlefield
and
everything
becomes
about
trying
to
game
and
break
whatever
mechanism.
You
know
exists
for
this,
so
that
you
can,
you
know,
prevent
any
other
delegates
from
making
any
decisions
around
you
know.
B
A
B
The
answer
is
that
the
interface
scope
I
mean
so
the
interface
scope,
kind
of
also
implements
and
and
and
sort
of
defines
it.
But
the
big
difference
is
that
the
interface
scope
I
mean
the
difference
between
the
Constitution
and
the
Scopes
is
that
the
Scopes
can
change
within
some
boundaries
and
the
Constitution
can't
so
the
easy
vote
in
front.
B
It
has
to
be
defined
at
a
constitutional
level,
because
it's
something
that's
simply
cannot
be
allowed
to
change
right,
because
any
change
to
that
will
be
malicious
and
and
hostile
and
used
for
power.
Consolidation
right
that
has
to
I
mean
that's
what
you
have
to
assume
so,
like
I,
mean
I,
think
actually
the
interface
scope
would
probably
like
you
could
also
you
could
like
it's.
B
It's
also
just
a
question
of
like
formatting
and
and
kind
of
Sanity
or
something
right,
because
you
could
Define
the
easy
voted
front
end
in
the
interface
scope
and
then
create
a
sort
of
you
could
create
a
constitutional
boundary
around
how
it's
defined
in
interview
school.
That
is
so
strict
that
there
is
actually
no
like.
You
just
force
the
interface
scope
to
just
copy.
B
B
So
over
time,
you'll
have
you
know
you
know.
I
would
expect
that
you
would.
You
would
graduate
from
like
the
extremely
extremely
small
whales
to
you
know
to
bigger
Impalas,
but
then
also
you
would
have
people
like
me,
for
instance,
who
would
not
even
take
any
conversation
out
of
this
right
once
you
have
like
a
yeah
I,
don't
know
if
I
would
ever
bother
do
it
initially
but
like
I?
B
B
You
know
this
Fair
reward
for
their
participation
right,
like
that's,
going
to
create
more
value
for
whales
like
me
than
getting
some
tiny
pointless
return
on
on
my
MPR
from
I
mean
relative
to
how
heavy
my
backs
are.
Basically,
so
three
other
dials
have
opted
for
more
flexibility
and
have
the
option
of
having
delegates
same
as
maker
or
having
an
executive
team,
I'm,
actually
sure
about
delegates
being
part
of
the
Constitution
yeah
they're,
not
Dallas.
So
like
it's
not
about
as
an
exchange.
B
Nobody
is,
nobody
has
managed
to
create
decentralized
organizations
and
every
they
all
just
companies,
and
nobody
has
even
tried
it
because
it
simply
it's
not
been.
You
know
it
has
never
worked.
There's
no
example
of
it
actually
functioning
for,
like
I
mean
it
can
well,
it's
never
worked
in
a
scalable
way
right.
So
there's
many
examples
of
it
of
this
functioning
at
small
scale.
But
there's
you
know
like
it.
B
B
B
How
excited
to
set
up
ratio
I'm,
not
sure
right
in
a
forum,
but
but
it's
not
going
to
hit
like
it,
is
practically
impossible
to
see
that
happening.
Like
the
you
know,
it's
so
much
more
important
that
we
don't
get
for
I
mean
if,
if
the
possibility
exists
for
you
know
like
bad
changes
to
occur,
and
then
that's
a
guaranteed
death
sentence.
Basically,
so
we
have
to
I
mean
what
we're
yeah.
B
B
We
can't
rely
on
the
constitution
of
any
real
country
to
protect
us
or
the
kind
of
national.
You
know,
Integrity
of
of
a
of
a
legal
system
to
protect
us
right
from
Bad
actors.
So
we
have
to
fully
protect
I
mean
we
have
no
other
way
to
fight
bad
areas,
Bad
actors
than
by
directly
dealing
with
the
problem
myself
with
no
Reliance
whatsoever
on
any
sort
of
external
support.
Right
because
we're
that's
what
a
decentralized
autonomous
organization
is,
and
the
only
way
that
can
be
done
is
through
this.
B
Like
complete
lockdown
of
the
rules
and
there's
a
good
chance,
it's
impossible,
in
which
case
dials
are
impossible,
like
the
entire
space
is
a
is
a
joke,
in
that
case,
right,
like
everyone's
just
basically
scamming
people
by
pretending.
This
is
something
where
it's
totally
not
a
company
and
totally
works
when
there's
no
legal
protection,
but
in
practice
you
know
you
end
up
with
scams
in
all
cases,
because
you
know
if
it
turns
out
that
it's
not
possible
to
keep
principles
safe
without
legal
protections
right
and
so
there's
like
a
chance.
B
And
what
shows
up
in
these
like
front
ends
that
people
get
unsentimized
to
go
to
and
so
on.
Right
and
that's
gonna.
All
those
rules
will
just
keep
all
of
them
in
check
to
basically
kind
of
most
critically
sort
of
enforce
the
the
perspective
that
any
attempt
to
change
the
Constitution
is
corruption
right
and
there's
just
no
way
to
distinguish
between
genuine
improvements
and
Corruption
other
than
very
high
super
majority.
B
But
then
in
practice
like
MPL
voters,
will
they
don't
they
don't
have
time
to
worry
about
this
stuff
right,
so
they'll
figure
the
exact
same
terms,
which
is
any
attempt
to
change
the
Constitution,
is
corruption
so
right
and
and
and
that's
also
sort
of
the
culture
we
need
to
induce
right
because,
of
course,
if
the
voters
are
like,
oh,
this
is
exciting.
Let's
do
something
right:
let's
do
some
experiment,
then,
of
course
we
also
just
die
like
then
it
again
it
just
turns
out
you
can't.
B
You
can't
provide
protection
against
Bad
actors
without
a
legal
system.
Basically,
in
that
case
right,
if
you
can't
have
a
culture
of
if
I
don't
know
exactly,
what's
going
on,
I'm
going
to
shut
it
down,
right
I
mean
that
has
to
be
the
kind
of
default
like
ammo
of
MCL,
for
the
for
a
dow
to
be
have
any
sort
of
chance
of
long-term
survival.
B
Yeah,
so
why
seven
delegates
I
mean
basically
it's
just
like
it's
I
mean
it's
an
it's.
You
know
it's:
what's
it
called
it's
uneven
number
I
mean
that
that
shouldn't
exactly
matter
right,
but
but
that's
just
kind
of
that's
how
you
compose
boards,
for
instance,
often
right
or
sort
of
this,
like
committees
or
whatever.
B
So
it's
just
it's
it's
and
then
it's
just
it's
like
low,
but
it's
it's
like
it's.
At
the
same
time,
it's
like
comparable
to
a
board.
Basically
I,
think
it's
a
big
board.
Well,
maybe
not
big
board,
maybe
medium-sized
board
or
something
so
I,
don't
I
mean
I,
I,
think
basically,
I
think
I
wouldn't
take
an
even
number
just
because
I
think
this,
just
it's
better
to
have
an
uneven
number
and
I.
Think
five
is
like
yeah
I.
B
Think
five
is
too
low
and
I
don't
see
the
benefit
of
adding
more
on
taking
it
tonight.
I
mean
we
should
do
that
when
we
can
afford
it
right,
but
we
should.
We
should
wait
until
we
can
afford
it.
It's
the
seed
right,
so
we
would
need
a
higher
MPR
price
before
we
go
to
nine
and
then
I
mean
hopefully
eventually
get
to
to
hundreds
potentially
right
if
Mega
gets
really
really
huge.
A.
B
A
B
B
You
know
pollution
right
with
that.
That's
that's
already
managed
to
to
appropriate
a
lot
of
the
resources
in
the
system,
for
instance,
and
and
sort
of
turn
it
against
the
system
itself
so
from
in
that
sense,
I
think
it's
really
like.
Unfortunately,
there's
just
no
way,
we
can
prove
that
this
is
what
will
happen
with
the
delegates
right.
B
So
there's
a
there's
a
chance
that
the
delegates
will
just
like
sort
of
burn,
like
any
money
handed
over
to
delegates
will
be
so
just
like,
go
into
the
pockets
and
will
just
sort
of
be
wasted
in
a
sense
and
and
they're
like
they're.
Just
not
really
gonna
like
they'll
just
do
whatever
it
takes
to
get
the
money,
so
they
will.
If
they
spend
any
money,
it
will
be
on
like
politics
and
and
promotion,
or
something
like
that,
but
they'll
never
actually
use
the
resources
to
benefit
the
system.
B
But
then
the
the
great
thing
about
having
this
fixed
amount
of
emissions
is,
then
you
just
then
you
just
know
like
the
worst
case
scenario
of
how
much
value
is
going
to
be
wasted
on
these
like
greedy
political
delegates.
If
that's
what
it
ends
up,
it
ends
up
being
like
the
natural
long-term
equilibrium.
B
Then
we
just
know
we
can't
with
the
maximum
amount
of
Empire.
We
can
burn
like
we
can
work,
I
mean
a
value
we
can.
We
can
waste
will
be
2
500
MPR
per
year
and
because
the
token
Embassy
is
set
up
to
equilibrate
towards
you
know
a
total
Supply.
That's
a
you
know,
that's
that's!
Maybe
twice
of
the
current
Supply
as
a
million
then
it'll
the
amount
like
in
percentage
terms,
the
inflation
that
goes
to
waste.
Will
this
be
less
and
less
our
time
right,
so
yeah?
B
So
in
that
sense,
you
don't
risk
what
you
would
have
like.
You
don't
risk
the
situation
where
not
only
are
they
super
corrupt
and
wasting
all
the
money,
but
they
keep
voting
to
increase.
You
know
that
conversation
right,
which
is
then
where
you
can
actually
die
from
fat
delegates
and
in
this
case,
or
like
not
bad
delegates
but
selfish
delegates
right
in.
A
B
Let
me
just
talk
about
this.
Like
professional
air,
I,
don't
I
mean
I
kept
going.
We
can't
remember
it
was
a
manufacturers
professional
access,
but
there
was
some
like
the
posts
in
the
last
Forum
like
last
week
for
a
post
about
this
I
just
never
had
time
to
return
into
it
right,
but
basically
so
like
this
thing
about
splitting
up
the
endgame
Constitution
into
pre-game
and
in
the
game.
Basically,
the
pregame
Constitution
just
doesn't
even
look
like
care
about
this.
B
Yet
so
it
it
reuses
the
way
this
works,
like
vegetables,
Workforce
works
in
the
mips
already
right,
so
core
units
are
used
and
spfs
are
reused
and
then
they're,
like
some
new
kind
of
labels,
introduced
like
clusters
and
ecosystem
actors
and
but
they're
not
really
like
they're,
not
well,
I,
guess,
maybe
they'll
be
in
some
cases
referenced,
but
not
not
sort
of
strictly
defined
yet
and
then
in
the
end,
game.
Constitution
it'll
also
switch
to
a
yeah
like
a
different
model
standard
around
facilitated
dials
right.
B
So
that's
somebody
who,
like
does
work,
writes
code.
You
know
just
some
professional
expert
work.
You
know,
provides
expert
advice
and
risk
or
anything
any
kind
of
like
real
work
when
they're
doing
stuff
and
the
output
is
yeah.
Ultimately,
some
kind
of
data
that
the
dial
then
uses
somehow
right
and
then,
on
the
other
hand,
you've
got
core
units,
and
so
these,
like
new
coordinates,
are
just
like
extremely.
B
B
They
are
they're
sort
of
the
core
operating
kind
of
unit.
That
kind
of
like
accesses
all
the
kind
of
levers
and
and
and
mechanisms
that
exist
in
the
Constitution
or
I
mean
or
the
protocol
basically,
and
where
sort
of
the
Constitution
of
the
protocol
meets,
and
then
they
are
the
ones
who
then
are
the
counterparty
to
the
ecosystem
interests
and
even
like
use
like
use
these
constellations
of
multiple
ecosystem
actors.
B
So,
for
instance,
like
a
council
in
this
new
paradigm
is
council
is
made
out
of
ecosystem
actors
and
then
what
the
coordinate
does
when
they
want
to
engage
with
someone
who
is
like
a
counterparty
to
to
you
know,
hire
someone
to
do
some
smart
contract
work.
For
instance
right,
then,
the
core
unit,
like
the
scope
framework,
defines
this
is
what
you
do
when
you
want
to
hire
someone
to
do
something
kind
of
work.
Well,
first,
it
says:
when
do
you
want
to
hire
someone
to
do
some
black
underwear?
B
B
And
so
basically
the
coordinate
the
sort
of
the
council
to
core
unit
to
counterparty
like
to
to
sort
of
a
counterpart.
The
ecosystem
actor
kind
of
process
is
first
according
to
pays.
The
counts
like
pays
some
advices
to
give
advice
on
what
should
we
do?
We
should
redirect
with?
Who
should
how
should
we
set
up
the
bidding
process?
B
So
it's
fair
for
the
for
the
job
and
then
they
take
that
advice,
and
then
they
determine
whether
they
actually
should
go
with
the
advice
or
whether
they
should
dismiss
it,
because
it's
corrupt
or
negligent
or
whatever
right.
But
then
they
might
choose
to
to
take
the
risk
and
go
forward
with
it
and
then
say:
okay,
we'll
follow
these
instructions
and
we'll
make
this
project
that
can
be
bid
on
and
then
they'll
go
and
make
the
project
and
then
other
ecosystem
actors
that
are
independent
from
the
advisors.
B
Of
course
will
embed
on
the
project
and
then
one
of
them
will
be
picked
according
to
sort
of
the
framework
itself
and
according
to
the
advice
of
the
advisors
Zone,
one
of
them
we
picked
and
then
the
coin
will
pay
them
to
actually
do
the
work.
And
so
the
key
is
that,
like
the
core
unit,
is
kind
of
like
almost
like
a
robot
right
like
they're,
not
supposed
to
be
making
judgment,
calls
about.
B
B
If
they
do
something
on
that,
then
the
facilitator
now
gets
like
penalized
big
time,
because
it's
assumed
to
be
corruption
in
that
case
and
then
so
David's
question
so
a
facilitator,
Dao
is
a
sub-dial
that
basically
has
a
unique
feature
that
allows
it
to
be
responsible
for
the
faithful
and
the
complete
and
rigorous
implementation
of
the
in-game
Constitution
and
then
scope
Frameworks,
and
then
a
result
like
in
in
return
for
taking
like
for
receiving
that
responsibility.
They
participate
in
a
kind
of
tokenomic
system
like
a
reward
system.
B
That's
similar
to
how
the
the
reward
for
for
delegates
and
voter
communities
work
where
they're
basically
competing
with
each
other
to
gain
the
most
responsibility.
So
they
can
gain
the
most
MPR
missions
and
that's
the
Dao
so
there's
so.
These
are
terminal
holders
in
a
facility
in
a
dial
competing
with
each
other
to
gain
these
responsibilities
and
then
execute
these
responsibilities
using
their
their
internal
governance
mechanism.
B
It
could
be
anything
as
long
as
you
can
identify
what
it
is.
So
it
has
to
be
a
pseudonymous
right
and
then
the
facilitator
now
can
then
choose
to
delegate
some
of
its
own
permissions
and
some
of
its
own
responsibility
to
this
coordinate
to
allow
for
more
efficient
operations
right.
So
they
should
be
able
to
do
everything
manually
using
token
voting
for
like
everything.
B
But
of
course
that's
like
that's,
not
very
scalable,
so
so
the
core
unit
is
then
this
like
powerful
tool
to
basically
introduce
very
limited
and
very
well
regulated
centralization
into
how
it
all
works.
As
long
as
there
is
a
facilitated
dial,
that's
willing
to
you
know
take
the
entire
risk
for
that
blowing
up
right.
B
So
if
any
kind
of
corruption
occurs
from
a
core
unit
that
a
facilitated
dial
has
just
chosen,
which
could
very
easily
happen
because
the
accordion
is
they
don't
have
collateral
right,
they
don't
actually
have
skin
in
the
game
in
that
sense,
but
then
the
facilitator
now
gets
penalized
for
that,
and
so
they
can
like
blow
up
entirely
right.
They
can
lose
everything
and
become
worthless
if
they
kind
of
you
know
sort
of
mess
with
the
Constitution
enough.
Basically,
foreign.
B
You
know
powers
to
freeze
the
oracles,
something
like
that
right.
Anything
like
that
where
you
would
actually
want
to
have
some
kind
of
limited
and
well
regulated
and
well
protected,
centralized
process
in
the
system
to
that
you
know
to
protect
against
risk
and
where
it
makes
sense.
When
you
weigh
the
corruption
risk
of
the
thing
being
abused
as
well.
B
Yeah
so
I
mean
so
SATA
I
mean
so
subtitles
used
to
be
sort
of
professional
teams.
I
mean
not
really
right,
they're
always
supposed
to
be
separate
like
most
of
the
stuff
down,
and
then
there
was
the
cluster
right
or
like
the
administration
team.
But
we
want
to
have
this
like
air
gap
between
the
teams
and
the
stuff.
Now,
like
it's
very
important
that
it
doesn't
become,
the
sub-dial
is
basically
a
bunch
of
investors
supporting
a
team
right.
B
That's
a
that's
a
problem,
that's
a
problem
for
their
liability
and
and
Expectations
by
the
subdials
wealth
right
for
the
terminals,
because
the
terminals
need
to
understand
that
their
they're,
the
ones
who
are
on
the
hook
right,
they're,
not
sitting
back
and
letting
a
team
run
the
show,
because
that's
not
how
that
works
right.
It's
the
other
way
around,
but
they
have
to
do
the
work
and
then
one
of
the
ways
they
can
do.
B
The
work
is
that
they
can
choose
to
pay
professionals
to
to
build
stuff
or
do
stuff
so
protector
can
pay
professionals
to
do
risk
assessments
and
then
act
on
those
risk.
Assessments
to
allocate
funds
to
arrangers
or
Unchained
assets,
or
something
right
and
creators
can
pay
developers
to
develop
cool
features,
and
they
can
of
course,
pay
with
tokens
right,
so
they
pay.
They
can
use
the
sub
that
tokens
to
pay
these
ecosystem
actors.
B
So
practically
it's
not
much
different
than
what's
already
ambition,
but
the
huge
difference
is
that
the
the
subbed
out
teams
no
longer
have
real.
They
don't
have
any
kind
of
formal
position
at
the
center
of
the
subdown
whatsoever
right.
They
have
no
facilitated
rights.
They
have
no
responsibility
for
like
running
the
governance
process.
Anything
like
that.
B
All
of
that
is
done
by
the
facility
of
Dallas
only
and
then
the
coordinates
in
the
facility
of
the
house
that
are
then
subjected
to
this
extremely
strict
requirements
around
operational
security
and
and
here's
the
Constitution
and
Reliance
and
like
evidence-based
decision-making
and
so
on
yeah.
So
clusters
are
like
EA,
so
sometimes
I
mean
so
this,
like
I,
will
explain
this
more
later.
B
Basically,
this
is
it's
actually
extremely
complicated,
so
like
it
takes
it's
difficult
to
do
this
like
mental
switch,
but
the
the
end
result
is
great
because
it
means
that,
like
people
that
don't
you
know
that
don't
want
to
do
the
crazy
Dao
stuff
and
be
these
like
cyberpunk
Dao
operatives
right,
which
is
very
there,
are
very
few
people
that
want
to
do
that.
Some
people
think
it's
super
exciting
right
and
it
definitely
is
like
probably
one
of
the
most
unique
jobs
possible
Right,
but
most
people
who
work
in
maker.
B
They
just
want
to
do
some
work.
They
don't
want
to
be
entangled
into
like
regulation
or
politics
or
process,
or
you
know
mips
or
whatever
right,
and
this
way
now
is
like
the
cleanest
way
and
it's
possible
to
to
ensure
that
the
people
who
just
want
to
do
work,
they
can
just
do
work
and
then
the
people
who
want
to
actually
do
cyber
product
operations
stuff.
B
You
know
they
specialize
in
only
that,
and
then
you
don't
need
that
many
of
them,
but
the
ones
you
do
need
they
then
actually
get
like
every
single
tool.
You
know
necessary
for
them
to
do
this
right
and
really
can
can
kind
of
operate
to
like
to
to
the
sort
of
full
potential,
and
this
will
be
much
better
defined
in
the
in-game
institution.
So
not
the
pre-game
Constitution
right,
which
will
not
touch
on
this
at
all
because
it
won't
be
relevant
initially,
but
in
the
end
game
Constitution.
B
B
Yeah
yeah,
it's
Turtle
I
mean,
unfortunately,
not
all
the
way
down
it.
Sort
of
stuffs
the
buck
steps
somewhere
right,
which
is
with
the
spark
I
actually
need
to
like
nadius
I,
mean
I,
know
that's
what
I'm
saying
right
the
question
of
like.
Are
we
going
to
have
those
volunteers
and
then
voter
communities
are
not
right,
so
it's
Turtles
all
the
way
until
the
volunteers
on
the
voter
committees
and
then
there's
just
a
ton
of
turtles
so
that
it's
really
really.
B
You
have
a
massive
leverage
right.
As
a
guy
sitting
on
the
voter
committees,
volunteering
and
getting
a
small
I
mean
small,
but
but
real
compensation
for
your
work
right,
but
but
we
will
again
we
will
need
very
little
of
that,
and
then
we
will
have
a
lot
of
Charity
a
lot
of
we'll.
Have
this
conversation
we'll
have
a
lot
of
share
any
Mission.
You
know,
growth
right
maker
will
absolutely
explode
as
we
execute
in
real
assets
and
then,
hopefully
that's
enough
to
to
make
the
system
survive.
B
Okay
and
with
that
I
gotta
run
gotta
leave,
but
thanks
everybody
I
think
it
was
a
really
good
questions
and
like
yeah
once
again
getting
a
little
bit
closer
to
the
real,
the
real
operations,
the
real
implementation
and
but
yeah
I'm
very
excited
to
share
the
actual.
You
know
the
actual
text
to
the
stuff,
so
we
can
really
dig
into
it.
A
Concern
we
I
appreciate
you
taking
the
time
and
answering
all
the
questions
today,
one
course.
If
you
have
another
meeting
same
time
next
week,
we
also
have
an
opportunity
to
talk
more
in-game
stuff
tomorrow
during
the
GNR
we'll
be
going
over
the
subdials
and
ecosystem
actor
roles.
So
if
you
had
questions
about
those
or
you
want
to
engage
more,
that's
a
great
time
to
participate
and
engage
and
do
so
yeah.
So
thanks
for
taking
the
time
we'll
be
posting
this
recording
shortly
and
see
you
all
soon,.