►
From YouTube: Open Decentralized Voter Committee | 12.21.22
A
There
we
go
all
right,
welcome
everyone
to
Rune,
Radio
holiday
special,
where
we
cover
whatever
random
stuff.
We
we
can
can
sort
of
follow
up
on
of
all
the
different
pieces
we've
been
discussing
over
the
past
couple
of
weeks,
obviously,
with
the
in-game
Constitution
being
sort
of
the
major
piece
and
I
think
as
I
started
when
I
wanted
I'll
just
give
it
like
a
little
bit
of
a
status
update
on
the
in-game
Constitution
right,
so
I've
been
as
a
as
I
described.
A
And
that's
really
great
in
terms
of
kind
of
clarity,
of
like
the
complex,
like
sort
of
of
where
all
the
complexity
is
stored
in
a
sense.
But
then
it's
also
a
bit
more
difficult,
because
now
the
Constitution
has
to
contain
like
it
basically
has
to
actually
play
a
role
not
too
different
from,
like
those
giant
original
walls
of
text.
A
Right
because
it's
really
in
a
sense,
it's
like
it's
taking
the
more
abstract
concept
like
a
plan
that
is
sort
of
lose
in
a
sense
right,
not
exactly
feel
like.
It
contains
many
different
elements
or
something
and
then
like
condensing
all
that
into
actually
it's
this
thing
called
in-game
Constitution.
It's
like
a
single
proposal.
It's
like
a
single
MIP.
A
Basically
that,
when
past
implements
all
the
rules
and
there's
like
nothing
outside
of
the
constitution
in
the
sense
that,
like
anything,
that's
not
covered
either
directly
or
indirectly
through
like
sort
of
Delegation
in
a
sense
like
you
know,
such
as
the
scope,
Frameworks
right,
where
the
in-game
Constitution
defines
Cisco
Frameworks
and
the
scope
Frameworks
defines
a
whole
bunch
of
stuff,
but
there's
nothing.
That
would
be
like
sort
of
standing
separately
from
the
in-game
Constitution
right,
like
some
Standalone
myths
or
something
other
than
like
a
temporary
temporary
structures.
A
A
A
A
Yeah
but
I
think
that's,
it's
actually
really
exciting
to
be
able
to
make
that
sort
of.
For
me,
it's
like
a
mental
simplification
that
you
just
have
this
one
document.
Basically
that
ends
up
becoming
like
the
entirety
of
like
it's
almost
like
this.
One
document
replaces
the
entire
myth
system
are
more
like,
like
the
myths
will
just
be
they'll,
be
MIP
zero,
which
is
kind
of
like
the
infrastructure
and
then
there'll
be
the
in-game
Constitution
and
then
the
end
game.
A
A
Then
there
will
be
no
more
like
rules
to
do
like
no
more
sort
of
high-level
documents
to
worry
about,
but
on
the
other,
on
the
other
hand,
like
tons
and
tons
of
LinkedIn,
there's
like
sub
components
to
the
scope,
Frameworks
right
and
there's
these
like
sort
of
off
I'm,
just
called
like
off
MIP
documents
that
the
scope,
Frameworks
kind
of
refer
out
to
and
other
stuff
like
that.
So
there's
still
going
to
be
obviously
tons
of
content.
A
Yeah,
let
me
I
mean
I've
wrote
this
on
the
forums
like
I
was
discussing.
This
will
look
long
for
wisdom
and
some
others
commented
right
that
it's
not
so
great
that
the
constitution
is
like
really
huge
and
complex,
which
is,
of
course,
I
mean,
of
course,
the
more
simple
it
can
be.
The
better-
and
this
is
of
course
true
about
anything
within
game
like
the
simpler
any
design
or
anything
can
be
made.
A
It's
always
better,
but
the
massive
upside
of
kind
of
actually
defining
all
these
crucial
pieces
in
the
Constitution
itself
is
that
it
just
helps
really
like
lock
in
the
effect
of
like
some
of
the
in-game
effect
right
of
immutability,
because
I
mean
authorized
sort
of
the
original
kind
of
intention
was.
There
would
be
like
multiple
sort
of
constitutional
myths.
A
Right
there'll
be
multiple
different
documents
that
each
have
this
kind
of
core
role,
so
there'll
be
something
that
defines
the
tokenomics
and
there's
something
going
to
find,
delegate
pay
and
there's
and
so
on
right.
The
problem
is,
then,
you
just
have
a
like
it
doesn't.
In
the
end,
it
doesn't
really
matter
if
it's
one
document
or
multiple
documents,
I
mean
it's
not
like
nobody's
going
to
read
it
anyway,
right
unless
they're,
like
governance,
nerds
regardless.
A
Is
that
you'll
be
able
to
like
break
the
Constitution
without
without
making
it
look
like
you're
breaking
it
so
much
right,
because
you
could
I
mean
the
same
limit
right
is
that
if
you
have
togonomics
separate
from
daily
compensation,
then
you
may
have
something
where
like?
If
you
go
in
and
you
change
the
document
where
the
tokenomics
are
are
located
and
try
to
make
changes
to
that,
then
you'll
be
setting
the
president
that
that
document
can
be
changed
and
that's
the
one
thing
we
know
all
term
holders
will
always
lose
lose
it
about.
A
Right
is,
if
there's
some
tokenomics
that
have
been
like
these
other.
This
is
what
we
agreed
on.
This
is
how
it
works,
and
we
agree
to
never
change
this,
and
this
is
the
foundation
of
like
the
reason
why
people
hold
the
token
the
reason
why
it
has
value
right
and
then
you
give
them
a
bunch
of
tools
to
sort
of
resist
any
attempt
to
make
changes
there.
A
Then
we
should
expect
a
big
backlash
to
something
like
that,
because
there's
something
that's
easy
to
Rally
tongue
holes
around
right,
but
what
you
could
end
up.
Having
is
like
the
delays
going
in
and
messing
with
that
sort
of
a
very
the
happy
path
towards
corruption
in
in
the
end,
game
is
basically
delegates
excluding
other
delegates
from
the
voter
incentives
and
then,
as
a
result,
just
getting
all
the
votes
because
they
end
up
showing
up.
A
A
Cynical
kind
of
like
look
as
to
what
is
the
basic
incentive
is
for
people
to
control
emissions
to
make
sure
they
can
get
some
tokens.
They
can
emit
some
tokens
to
themselves
that
just
keep
you
know
the
system
keeps
going,
but
they
keep
getting
some
tokens,
that's
just
for
them
and
that's
impossible
to
remove
right.
That's
kind
of
the
that's
some
of
the
most
dangerous
form
of
kind
of
drift
in
governance
rules
over
time.
A
A
A
That
is
like
the
kind
of
more
wall
of
texts
like
with
a
bunch
of
stuff
some
intentions
and
purpose
and
values
and
stuff,
and
then
they're
like
hot
rules,
so
you
could
think
of
it
being
structured
like
that,
although
I
mean-
and
it
could
even
be,
we
could
split
it
up
into
like
two
myth
components,
for
instance
and
I.
Don't
think
that
would
really
make
a
that
would
matter
so
much
right,
because,
of
course,
the
stuff
people
will
want
to
to
edit
are
the
hard
rules.
A
The
point
is
just
that
all
the
like,
all
the
immutable
rules
of
the
system
needs
to
all
be
written
in
one
document,
so
you
can't
so
kind
of.
If
you
start
adding
in
that
document,
you're
putting
all
the
immutable
rules
at
risk,
you
can't
be
like
Oh
I'm
only
putting
these
immutable
rules
at
risk
by
you
know
overturning
the
the
convention
that
they're
immutable
over
here,
but
I'm,
not
touching
your
tokenomics
I,
think
that
won't
be
possible
if
they're
all
located
in
one
document.
A
Okay,
so
code,
nice
asks
again
referring
to
the
delegate
takeover.
That
seems
less
dangerous
due
to
how
obvious
it
is.
How
do
we
handle
people
extracting
value
indirectly
through
giving
themselves
cheap
loans
or
directing
flows
to
a
Rangers?
They
have
a
financial
interest
in
I
mean
that's
exactly
the
problem
right,
but
this
is
I
mean
once
delegates
get
powerful
enough.
They
can
do
anything
like
this.
B
A
Because
and
every
single
time
there's
a
problem
like
this,
because
you
could
actually
sort
of
you
could
really
kind
of
break
it
down
like
any
problem,
can
be
broken
down
to
something
like
how
to
prevent
MK
holders
from
making
bad
decisions
and
the
answer
to
how
to
prevent
them
from
making
bad
decisions.
Is
you
have
to
first
of
all
control
what
decisions
can
they
even
make?
So
you
can?
They
can
make
arbitrary
decisions,
because
once
you
go
into
like
some
unknown
arbitrary
decision,
it's
impossible.
A
But
if
you,
if
you
know
what
decisions
they're
going
to
be
they're
like,
if
sort
of
a
fixed
amount
of
decisions
that
can
be
made,
then
what
you
have
to
do
is
you
have
to
build
these
basically
processes
for
how
to
make
you
know
decision
making
processes
for
how
to
make
decisions
for
each
of
these
known
decisions
that
we
know
are
going
to
come
right
and
then
the
heuristic
to
figure
out
whether
decision
is
bad.
I
mean
you
can
sort
of
automatically
say.
A
decision
is
bad.
A
If
a
government
has
some
new,
you
know
Corona
project
or
something
related
to
Corona,
and
they
need
to
do
a
bunch
of
Corona
tests,
and
then
they
just
hire
the
first,
the
best
company.
It
happens
to
be
the
cousins
something
uncles.
Whatever
of
the
guy
who
made
the
decision
and
then
later
turns
out
that
the
company
they
picked
wasn't.
Actually
you
know
they
didn't
pick
them
through
a
public
tender
process.
They
just
picked
them
directly
and
that's
against
the
law
that
you
have
to.
A
When
you
pick
a
supplier
or
a
government
supplier,
you
have
to
go
through
the
public
tender
process
and
then
there's
you
know,
then
you
sort
of
you
don't
have
to
prove
that
it
was
nepotism
or
something
like
that.
All
you
have
to
prove.
Is
they
didn't
follow
the
process,
which
is
you
can't
just
pick
anyone
at
random?
You
have
to
pick,
you
know
a
bunch.
A
A
A
A
A
So
the
map
series
needs
to
be
edited
to
like
basically
be
sort
of
I
mean
the
bootstrapping
mechanism
for
like
something
I
mean,
and
it's
sort
of
I
was
considering
whether
we
should
change
the
name
of
like
mips
into
something
else,
because
it
becomes
sort
of
stuff's
been
I
mean
it
just
makes
less
sense
to
think
of
it
as
mips
unless
it's
in
the
context
of
like
it's
a
sort
of
historical
explanation
of
how
we
got
there
right.
But
there
was
these
things
called
maker
proposals
and
then
eventually
you
make
a
proposal.
A
It
may
improve
proposal
that
stops
anymore
from
occurring,
but
but
also
what
they've
actually
become
in
practice
right
I
mean
the
way
we
ended
up
using
these
mips
is
we
didn't
really
use
the
mips
directly
so
much
right?
We
used
to
sub
proposals,
so
I
was
thinking.
Another
way
to
think
of
what
the
maps
actually
are
is
something
like
like
it's
like
it's
in
like
it's.
It's
basically
documents
that
Define
the
infrastructure
of
governance
right.
A
So
that's
what
miff0
ultimately
is
at
the
very
bottom,
like
the
bottom
layer
infrastructure.
That
makes
all
the
kind
of
weird
moving
parts
of
major
dominance
run
right
so
anyway,
so
Step
One
is
MIP,
zero
and
basically
edited
to
support
this
stuff
right
and
then,
basically
with
MIP
zero,
you
can,
you
can
implement
the
endgame
Constitution
and
now
this
is
kind
of
I,
don't
I
mean
so
maybe
in
the
in
this
context
of
like
splitting
up
or
whatever
splitting
up,
not
splitting
up
whatever.
A
This
is
maybe,
like
you
can
think
of
as
a
game
Constitution
and
like
a
vision,
a
purpose
or
something
like
that
right,
like
the
intention
of
what
we
are
of
of
you
know,
of
what
we
want
to
achieve
right
and
the
really
really
basic
way
to
I
mean,
if
you're,
to
really
kind
of
summarize,
what
the
end
game
aims
to
do.
It's
basically
Salient
scalability
right,
so
I
think
you
can
really
think
of
like
resilient
I
mean
and-
and
maybe
this
basically
the
best
way
to
think
about
this.
A
The
best
way
to
think
about
it
is
to
sort
of
kind
of
narrative
like
what
happens
with
maker
right
and
what
I
think
a
lot
of
people
are
like
surprised
and
frustrated
by
right.
We're
having
this
sort
of
first
time
around
is
that
we
had
this
like
a
makers
out
of
with
build
and
and
then
sort
of
started.
A
On
the
other
hand,
it
was
more
like
we
got
so
stuck
like
I
think
some
some
people
think
of
it.
As
like
the
the
it's
an
ossified
or
or
maybe
even
like
we
got
complacent,
we
got
plenty
of
we
had
so
much
income
so
much
cash
flow.
We
could
easily
pay
like
a
huge
budget,
don't
really
have
to
think
about
what
are
we
actually
paying
for
and
then
right
there's
no
like.
Basically
it
was
it
was
like
it
wasn't.
A
You
know
the
system
wasn't
able
to
to
basically
protect
its
own
Integrity
as
it
started
growing
and
that's
like
way
more
money-
and
this
is
like
such
a
typical
failing
mode,
and
it's
actually
like
a
really
common
story.
Is
you
know
this
is
what
happened
to
what
happens
to
decentralized
organizations
right
and
I.
A
Think,
like
some
reason,
just
one
random
story,
I
remember
is
the
the
story
of
like
the
green
party
and
the
green
parties
in
Europe
and
their
sort
of
system
where
there
used
to
be
these
like
flat
organizations
and
and
all
that
kind
of
similar
to
dials
Maybe
and
then
once
they
started
getting
real.
They
started
getting
actual
voters
and
so
on
then
very
quickly.
A
We
need
to
have
basically
a
mechanism
that
can
you
know,
keep
the
growth
going
like
the
green
party
was
able
to
the
green
parties
were
able
to
when
they
restructured
into
a
hierarchy,
but
just
without
and
restructuring
into
a
hierarchy,
because
the
problem
with
that,
of
course,
is
it's.
That
is
by
itself
also
fragile
right
because
of
centralization,
which
is
something
we
saw
in
a
sense
uniquely
understand
in
crypto
right
that
centralization
itself
is
like
it's.
A
A
That
is
like
proper
resilient
meaning
it
is
also
decentralized
and
when
it
is
also,
you
know
resilient
to
you
know,
Global
risks
and
Regulatory
risks
and
economic
crashes
and
any
type
of
risk
right,
including
also
centralization
risk
and
then
scalability.
It's
able
to
it's
able
to
scale
up
if
it
gets
a
huge
influx
of
uses
and
demand
and
so
on,
but
it
also,
of
course,
itself
reinforces
its
own
ability
to
grow
as
well
right.
A
Okay,
so
with
that
right,
so,
basically
in
at
what
is
the
first
thing,
you
need
to
be
able
to
realize
resilient
scalability,
and
so
this
is
where
it
actually
gets
to
sort
of
the
end.
Game
really
becomes
kind
of
like
it
is
a
direct
success
to
clean
money
in
this
sense,
because
of
this
basically
mixed
realization
right,
which
is
that
you
can't
even
you
know
you
can't
get
started
with
resilient
I
mean
the
first
thing
you
need
before
you
can
have
resilience.
A
A
So
the
number
one
thing
is
like
figuring
out:
how
can
we?
How
can
we
be
resilient
and
the
Very
the
first
place
to
start
is
like
the
fundamental
contradiction
of
like
token
holders
and
voting
and
governance
and
vows
and
so
on,
right,
which
is
basically
spark
and
Corruption
right,
so
so,
like
yeah
I
would
call
something
like
Dao
purposes.
I
mean
right,
so
this
is
like
this
yeah.
Actually,
actually
it's
it's
actually
like
another
way.
To
think
of
this
is
like
it's
regulation
of
tone
holders.
A
Actually,
so
so
the
problem
is
that,
like
a
Dao,
that
is
like
a
kind
of
economic
mechanism,
that's
just
a
bunch
of
people
getting
together
voting
with
tokens
to
all
these,
so
they
can
get
rich.
They
can
make
some
economic
activity
and
they
can
all
get
rich.
The
problem
with
that
is
that
that
just
inherently
completely
not
resilient,
because
in
that
scenario
you
just
always
it's
like
a
prisoner's
dilemma
and
if
you
can
defect
you're
going
to
do
it.
If
your
goal
is
to
make
money
right,
it's
ultimately
not
a
shared
goal.
A
Actually
right
is
this
sort
of
term
I
came
up
with
for
this
right,
but
there
has
to
be
some
kind
of
reason
for
people
to
be
involved
and
some
kind
of
intangible
value
for
people
to
be
involved,
Beyond,
just
the
economic
upside
of
participating
it
now,
and
if
you
don't
have
that,
then
you'll
never
be
able
to
be
resilient.
You'll
just
always
fall
apart,
and
you
can
also
look
at
sort
of
nation
states
and
basically
the
you
know
the
like.
A
It's
sort
of
the
big
difference
between
the
successful
countries
and
the
failing
countries
is
like
the
level
of
kind
of
General
cooperation
and
sort
of
unincentivized
cooperation
between
people
right.
So
in
countries
that
are
just
like
you
know,
bad
countries
that
are
falling
apart.
You
have
a
much
lower
level
of
kind
of
basic
trust
between
any
people
in
that
Society,
basically,
and
then
countries
that
are
doing
really
well.
A
And
basically
Real
World,
Companies
and
real
world
like
stock
corporations
and
so
on,
they're
really
lucky,
because
they
can
rely
on
the
sort
of
spark
of
of
the
the
nation-states
they're
built
within
right.
The
legal
systems
they
build
with
it.
So
they
can
rely
on
having
like
judges
that
are
actually
not
corrupt
and
legislators.
That
are
also
you
know,
to
some
extent
working
in
the
in
the
nation's
best
interest
and
making
Fair
rules
that
can
attract
business
and
make
good
make
a
good
economic
environment
and
so
on.
A
A
A
But
of
course
we
have
to
like
very
strongly
require
that
that
characteristic
stays
in
place
and
and
that
somehow
over
time
there
isn't
a
kind
of
drift
towards
like
a
biased
currency
or
whatever
right
other
kind
of
governance
rights
over
people's
money
or
any
stuff
like
that.
That
that's
related
to
like
somebody
who
wants
to
just
hold
their
savings
and-
and
you
know,
don't
have
to
jump
through
hoops
to
not
be
at
risk
of
seizure
or
whatever
so
yeah.
B
A
There's
basically
like
there's
just
not
really
a
guarantee
by
itself
that
we'll
be
able
to
sort
of
regulate,
I
mean
we'll
be
able
to
to
get
people
that
are
less
mercenary,
because
we
have
this
by
itself
and
of
course,
there's
no
way
you
can
actually
guarantee
that.
But
it
just
like
I
mean
in
general.
A
The
goal
is
to
to
capture
some
like
really
strong
kind
of
heuristics.
Basically,
that
just
make
the
overall
likelihood
of
success
much
higher
right
and
you
just
you
kind
of
maximize
the
maximize.
The
possibility
that
some
kind
of
spark
exists
in
maker
governance
so
that
it
doesn't
just
collapse
right,
so
so
the
second
sort
of
like
meta
engineering
for
dial
purpose
is
and
the
purpose
system,
which
maybe
needs
to
be
called
something
else.
A
You
know
Financial
product
or,
and
some
of
our
competitive
opportunity
in
a
Dao
for
someone
to
participate
in
the
Dow.
That's
doing
any
kind
of
Charity
at
all
right,
because
it's
just
like
purely
sort
of
throwing
away
marginal
gains,
basically
and
and
but
then,
on
the
flip
side.
What
that
means
is
also.
A
It
just
means
that
it
forces
the
token
holders
to
to
basically
be
people
that
are
able
to
realize
intangible
Bailey
themselves
right
so
that
the
people
are
just
like
I
mean
that
has
actual
spark
and
their
their
motivation
isn't
just
money.
But
it's
also
like
how
you
get
that
money
or
which
is
or
just
as
useful
people
that
basically
are
able
to
like
generate
a
like,
basically
build
a
brand
and
build
a
kind
of
a
funnel
and
a
meta.
A
Essentially,
that's
able
to
turn
entangle
value
like
this
into
real
value,
I
mean
because
it's
actually
possible
to
do
charity
and
have
it
be
profitable
if
it
just
benefits
your
kind
of
overall,
your
meta
and
your
sort
of
intangible
value
funnels
enough
right.
So,
for
instance,
maybe
it
in
the
very
basic
way
to
think
about
it.
Is
that
it's
a
it's
a
it's
a
form
of
marketing.
Basically,
and
of
course,
it
also
needs
to
be
regulated
so
that
it's
not
just
it
doesn't
just
become
cynical
charity.
A
That
is
just
marketing,
because
then
you
fall
back
into
the
same
problem
of
of
sort
of
PVP
down
members
and
then
the
final
Third
Leg
of
this
is
is
basically
the
kind
of
iteration
of
the
original
like
of
the
of
the
original
clean
money.
But
this
one
I
basically
want
to
I
think
it.
We
should
move
past
that
and
then
so.
I've
call
this
scientific
sustainability
instead,
and
this
is
sort
of
a
it's
a
it's
like
significantly
different
than
the
original
clean
money,
Vision
and
I.
Think
so.
A
A
A
Is
it's
sort
of
the
I
mean
the
reason
why
this
is
relevant
for
us
it's
the
same
as
the
original
sort
of
clean
money
rationale
right,
which
is
that
there's
no
first
of
all
like
money
and
monetary
systems
and
financial
system
is
like
the
most
powerful
stuff
that
exists
in
the
world.
So
that's
when
you
need
to
apply
to
the
most
critical
challenge
that
humanity
is
facing,
and
then
it's
also
just
like
it's
actually
like
related
to
unbiased
world
currency,
because
you
basically
can't
have
kind
of
currency
without
stability.
A
B
A
Inherently
self-eroding
their
own
Base
by
just
like
being
designed
incorrectly,
basically
and
not
being
able
to
take
into
account
negative
externalities
right
and
then
yeah.
The
quiz
is
always
an
understanding
of
like
then.
Actually
the
places
where
things
are,
attempts
are
being
made
at
improving
sustainability
or
actually
just
making
the
problems.
The
problem
worse
and
the
real
solution,
which
is
nuclear
energy
and
other
like
science-based
Solutions,
has
almost
like
zero
constituency
or
support
like
so
there's.
A
Barely
any
effort
being
spent
on
what
actually
matters
and
there's
like
nothing
even
remotely
comparable
to
to
to
like
what
maker
can
can
actually
do
on
this
front
right
because
making
that
would
be
like
it's
completely
unbiased
sort
of
like
third-party.
You
know,
source
of
support
essentially
anyway.
So
the
basic
idea
of
like
how
to
implement
this
right
is
that
the
the
most
important
is
that
what
really
is
needed
is
to
just
like
educate
people
on
what
I
mean
it's
sort
of
it's
scientific
education.
Basically
right
that.
A
That
is
that
all
it
takes
to
achieve
that
stuff
is,
is
money,
so
you
don't
need
to
also
like
complicated
scoring
Frameworks
or
all
sorts
of
stuff
right,
which
is
sort
of,
in
contrast
to
the
original
clean
money
Vision,
which
was
to
make
this
like
super
complicated
thing
that
would
regulate
all
the
collateral
and
then
make
sure
the
collateral
is
like
funneled
in
the
right
directions,
which
then
ultimately
is
based.
I
mean
sort
of
emulating.
A
Yeah,
it's
I
mean
nobody,
cares
about
learning
about
nuclear
energy
or
learning
about
that.
Like
the
you
know,
variable
energy
output
doesn't
work
its
own,
but
what
people?
What
what
people
care
about
is
like.
This
is
how
you
get
cheap
electricity
right.
This
is
how
you
prevent
the
world
from
collapsing
and
and
the
goal
is
to
basically
I
mean
not
more
than
anything
else.
A
A
Right
that
then
has
been
sort
of
projected
onto
nuclear
energy.
So
the
the
publication
loves
it
when,
even
if
it's
like
I
mean
it's
just
nuclear
energy
is
just
considered
to
be
like
of
the
devil.
Basically,
and-
and
that's
really
I
mean
that
if
the
world
can't
change
that,
then
we
just
screwed
like
there's
no
other
way
to
survive
in
the
way
and
sort
of
hyper
consumerist,
modern,
capitalist
Society
without
access
to
energy
density
so
and
so
Nicholas.
The
only
thing
can
I
can
offer
that
anyway.
A
So
anyway,
but
the
point
is
the
solution
needs
money.
It
doesn't
need
complicated,
Behavior
but
maker
that
reshapes
the
whole
the
way
the
whole
way,
World
works
and,
and
somehow,
like
all
this
crazy
stuff
right,
which
just
simplifies
our
governance,
because
one
of
the
things
one
of
the
things
to
derive
from
this
is
that
we
don't
have
to
we
can
we
can
invest
our
collateral
in
almost
any
type
of
real
asset
like
even
like.
A
According
to
Scientific
sustainability,
I
mean
I
think
this
is
my
based
on
my
incomplete
knowledge,
but,
like
even
investments
into
oil
and
gas
is
completely
scientifically
sustainable.
If
you're
sort
of
you
know
basically
yeah
like
actually
like,
looking
at
it
from
first
principles
and
not
from
some
kind
of
religious
perspective
and
and
the
reason
for
that
is
I
mean.
Actually.
The
really
simple
reason
is
that,
like
so
gas
is
like
I
mean
if
we
assume
the
existing
ESG
sort
of
scam
Paradigm
whatever
we
want
to
call
it.
A
The
the
solar
wind
battery
dominance,
kind
of
Paradigm
right,
then
you
need
gas
to
do
load
following
so.
Solar,
wind
and
batteries
needs
gas
anyway
for
the
for,
when
it's
winter,
for
instance,
and
there's
no
solar
power
at
all.
If
there's
like
a
long
period
of
no
wind
energy,
so
you
need
gas
anyway,
so
that's
like
actually
a
part
of
it.
A
So
it's
so
actually,
if
you
invest
in
those
things
and
you
profit
off
massively,
because
the
sort
of
Rube
Goldberg
built
tons
of
windmills
and
and
solar
panel
thing
that
everyone
wants
to
earn
money
at
that's,
creating
massive
demand
for
diesel,
then
you
can
actually
invest
in
a
diesel
to
sell
it
to
them.
Make
really
high
profits
from
that
and
then
invest
those
profits
into
basically
nuclear
advocacy.
A
A
And
by
the
way,
so
people
talk
about
investing
in
nuclear.
So
look
so.
This
is
not
about
investing
in
nuclear
at
all,
like
I
I
think
I
mean
so
I
think
that
could
make
some
like
if
you
can
fix
all
the
broken
regulations
and
so
on.
You
could
make
some
really
really
interesting,
basically
Financial
products
out
of
like
exposure
to
to
nuclear
power
and
has
some
interesting
characteristics
and
so
on
which
we
can
talk
about
another
time.
A
So
we
funnel
more
money
into
the
the
religious
object
in
a
sense
right
or
some
kind
of
like
cargo
cult
type
of
thing
of
like
let's
build
a
solar
and
then
we
believe
that's
going
to
solve
the
problem
right
and
so
scientific
sustainability
means
we
need
to
donate
money
to
nuclear
advocacy,
and
then
we
need
to
focus
on
it
on
maximizing
our
profits.
So
there's
no
prescription
at
all
about
using
what
anything.
A
For
the
collateral
other
than
like
the
basic
basic
Financial
models,
so
like
there's
absolutely
no
like
I
mean
there
would
be
some
Banning
of
like
you
can't
do
coal
and
then
actually
over
here
with
sort
of
the
moral
principles
or
something
right
that
could
be
like
you
want
to
avoid.
You
want
to
maybe
also
ban
investment
in
like
allocating
collateral
into
like
gambling
and
pawn
and
I.
Don't
know
other
like
stuff.
That
sort
of
by
not
explicitly
ruling
that
stuff
out.
A
Then
you
might
somehow,
like
you,
might
attract
the
wrong
type
of
tone.
Holder
that
thinks.
There's
tons
of
I
mean
it's
kind
of
it's
a
little
bit
out
there,
but
like
something
like
that
might
make
sense,
but
but
from
the
the
point
is
that
from
the
scientific
sustainability
point,
the
only
thing
it
would
say
about
the
collateral
is
something
along
the
lines
of
don't:
invest,
don't
fund
coal.
A
The
point
is
that
we
donate
some
of
it
to
nuclear
everything
sort
of
early
on
actually
right,
so
they
so,
and
so
this
idea
is.
The
idea
is
kind
of
that.
You
know
so
scientific
sustainability.
You
know
you
got
these
rules
around.
You
can't
put
you
can't
allocate
Clara
to
call
and
I
guess
that'll
that
would
not
actually
be
written
into
the
you
know
the
the
end
game.
Constitution
itself,
wouldn't
you
know,
wouldn't
like
specify
anything
like
that.
It
would
say
that
the
ecosystem
scope,
maybe
even
the
rubrics.
A
And
so
the
idea
is
that,
like
this
purpose
system
thing
over
here,
that's
you
know
that's
linked
to
the
tokenomics
and
there's
going
to
be
this,
like
emissions
of
2000
mkr
per
year
right
perpetually,
going
to
like
the
charity,
competition
thing
going
to
the
subtitles
and
blah
blah,
but
that
will
not
be
in
place
initially
so
initially
that,
like
that,
MPR
goes
into
this
thing
instead.
So
some
like
some
kind
of
protocol
control
account
that
has
a
bunch
of
MPR
in
it.
A
That's
going
to
be
earmarked
for
for
basically
yeah
like
under
under
the
ecosystem
scope.
Basically,
you're
like
be
used
to
to
fund
yeah
I,
don't
know,
I
mean
we'll
have
to
figure
out
how
to
do
that
effectively
right,
something
like
funding
like
Outreach
groups
that
take
crypto
like
there's
already
one
example
of
a
bunch
of
them
that
do
that.
There's.
Actually
this,
like
I,
actually
donated
for
like
a
German
nuclear
organization
that
was
involved
in
preventing
the
shutdown
of
the
last
three
German
nuclear
power
plants
in
the
middle
of
the
energy
crisis.
A
Basically,
the
parts
that
are
not
allocated
for
the
for
the
the
workforce
bonus
pool
because
that's
another
part
of
the
tokenomics
right
is
that
there's
like
this
allocation
of
how
much
of
the
current
NPR
that's
remaining,
is
actually
going
to
go
into
the
pockets
of
the
the
workforce
and
a
significant
part
of
it
is
not
needed
to
do
that
because
of
kind
of
the
transition
plan.
Of
of
how
how
sort
of
big
we
want
the
the
overhead
to
be.
A
And
yeah,
so
that
means
that
we
can
well,
and
so
the
original
thought
was
to
then
you
to
like,
sell
that
with
the
anti-reflexivity
mechanic
and
do
a
bunch
of
like
liquidity
here
and
stuff
with
with
this,
but
that,
for
you
know,
the
latest
iteration
is
also
optimizing
for
regulatory
risk
right
so
they'll.
You
know
we
don't
want
to
do
any
kind
of
like
selling
of
MPR
or
anything
like
that
right.
A
So
that
is
actually
a
really.
It
fits
really
nicely
then,
just
like
put
all
the
excess
mkr
that
doesn't
fit
into
anywhere
else
in
the
in
sort
of
the
the
the
the
budget
plan,
basically
like
the
the
MPR
plan
and
then
just
like,
be
the
have
that
be
like
the
seed
funding
for
this
like
this
is
I
guess
under
this
we're
gonna
have
this
like
a
sub,
but
by
far
like
the
biggest
sub
component
of
this
would
be
scientific
sustainability
fund,
which
is
then
like
it's
by
itself.
A
A
Okay,
there's
these
MPR
tokens,
they're
being
used
to
fund
nuclear
stuff
got
to
make
sure
it
doesn't
turn
corrupt.
So
the
value
gets
eroded
right,
which
is
like
the
basic
logic
of
doll
purpose
right
that
you
have
to
have
people
like
that,
trying
to
look
out
for
the
value
not
getting
eroded,
rather
than
looking
for
how
can
I
erode
the
value
for
my
own
benefit
Okay,
so
that's
basically
I
mean
so
this
is
the
I
mean
this
is
the
stuff
that
wasn't
really
discussed
too
much
last
time
right.
A
A
A
We
get
about
I
mean
out
of
this.
What
we
get
is
that
not
every
token
holder
is
going
to
be
selfish
and
greedy.
Hopefully,
if
we
have
all
of
these
pieces
in
place,
right
we'll
have
at
least
a
few
that
actually
care,
and
we
don't
need
that.
Many,
because
the
average
selfish
and
greedy,
like
the
average
way
that
everybody's
going
to
be
selfish
and
greedy,
is
just
to
be
free.
Write
us
do
nothing
right
like
no.
A
It
will
be
absolutely
very
limited
that
people
would
go
out
of
their
way
to
somehow
attack
the
system
or
anything
like
that
really
like.
It
will
manifest
itself
as
nobody's
watching
as
somebody
everyone's
being
lazy,
and
then
somebody
lazily
tries
to
attack
the
system
right
and
then
just
by
having
just
a
few
lists
back,
you
can
completely
shut
that
down
foreign
yeah,
so,
like
really,
people
will
try
to
extract
value
from
system.
But
the
point
is
that
you
know
it'll
be
it's
more
like
if
nobody's
looking
out
for
it.
A
Absolutely
nobody
and
you
can
do
it
in
the
complete
open
without
any
sort
of
real
thought.
Then
it
starts
to
be
like
a
serious
risk
if
you
have
just
a
few
people
that
are
actually
looking
out
for
the
well-being
of
the
system
and
you're
setting
it
up
so
that
just
if
I
mean
with
dvcs,
basically
all
this
stuff,
you
set
it
up
correctly,
so
that
they
can
actually
take
action.
B
A
They're
all
being
facilitated
and
supported
by
these,
like
professional
actors.
Right
and
with
is
stuff,
like
you
know,
mandated
actors
that
create
specialized
Frameworks
and
professional
output
and
data
and
so
on,
but
also
like
delegates
and
a
whole
bunch
and
even
like
the
the
sub-dials
as
well.
Right,
also
like
sort
of
players
in
this
Indian
game.
A
And
basically
yeah,
that's
like
the
really
simple
way
to
to
to
sort
of
simplify
it
all
down
is
the
problem
was
that
what
happened
with
maker
was
that
the
sort
of
the
this
the
link
between
the
mkr
holders
and
then,
like
the
the
professionals,
started
breaking
right?
You
got
this
principal
Asian
problem
so
anyway,
so
this
and
so
and
creating
that
link
and
making
it
super
super
strong
and
making
super
self-reinforcing.
A
That's
really
that's
like
the
next
layer
of
the
goal
of
of
of
the
Constitution
right,
so
you
establish
sort
of
the
doubt
purpose.
Now
you
need
to
establish.
How
is
it
going
to
actually
happen
and-
and
that
is
the
con
I
mean-
that
is
the
end
game,
Constitution
itself
and
the
scope
Frameworks,
and
that
was
what
we
were
discussing
a
little
bit
earlier.
That
is
all
about
that
basic
stuff
like
how
do
you
make
sure
that
they
then
actually
do
stuff?
That's
beneficial
for
the
Dao
and
not
what's
beneficial
for
them
themselves?
A
A
Kind
of
service,
which
is
like
yeah
I'm,
still
looking
for,
maybe
there's
going
to
be
an
even
better
name
for
that
right.
But
these
are
basically
like
I
mean
this
is
a
basically
it's
a
combination
of
so
it's
I
mean
that's
actually
I
mean.
Is
this
stuff
on
the
list
up
here
right?
So
it's
like
designs,
voting
committees,
delegates
mandated
actors.
A
A
And
I
think
I
mean
the
potential
I
mean
there's
all
this
like
internal
stuff
of
like
kind
of
dvcs,
oh
yeah,
and
that
actually
also
another
just
put
it
here
and
then
we'll
see
people's
right,
but
so
like,
but
generally
I
created
this
little.
Standardization
of
the
language
of
everything
is
like
constitutionalist
constitutional,
that
if
it's
something
that's
regulated
under
the
Constitution
right,
so
you
have
like
constitutional
voter
committees.
A
That
is
like
the
new
word
for
recognized,
recognized
DBC,
and
you
have
like
constitutional
delegate,
which
is
recognize
delegate
basically,
and
the
point
is
that
the
constitution
is
the
only
place
and
the
Constitution
is
a
place
where
you
get
paid
and
the
place
where
you
get
your
special
powers
and
if
you're
getting
special
powers
and
you're
getting
paid
out
of
the
Constitution.
You
have
this
like
fundamental
number.
One
role
is
to
protect
it
from
getting.
You
know
protected
from
being
broken
by
somebody
else
like
someone
else
in
the
neighborhood
right.
A
And
then
there's
also
there's
also
stuff.
Like
the
you
know,
then
there
are
the
and
there's
a
sub-dial
Administration
teams
right,
so
actually
the
sub-dials
themself,
like
the
internal,
like
the
teams
that
administer
the
sub-dials,
they
also
are
like
they're
holding
to
the
the
major
the
end
game,
Constitution,
not
to
the
same
I
mean
not
in
the
same
way
that
others
are,
but
ultimately
they're,
also
like
not
like
a
sub-dial
is
not
allowed
to.
A
A
It's
like
what
does
it
mean
to
protect
the
Constitution
and
what
does
it
mean
to
it
to
break
the
Constitution
and
so
on
right,
but
that's
sort
of
the
basic
point
right
that
that
it
should
be
really
really
like.
So
you
just
need
like
one
guy
or
two
guys
or
something
up
here
that
have
some
Spark
and
then
they
just
need
to
see
someone
down
here.
A
Them
to
be
like
look,
there's
basic
evidence.
This
is
this
person
is,
you
know,
is,
is
trying
to
like
break
the
Constitution,
so
we
need
to
basically
penalize
them
for
doing
that,
and
then
that
penalty
comes
out
of
the
government.
Yes,
I
want
to
get
it
further.
You
know
the
government
of
those
the
governor
said
that
was
coming
into
the
picture
here.
A
So
that's
a
crazy
rabbit
hole,
but
basically
there's
collateral
right,
like
these
actors
are
collateralized,
and
so
as
a
result,
if
you
whistleblow,
essentially
somebody
gets
a
penalty
and
you
can
then
get
a
cut
of
that
penalty.
So
now
there's
actually
this
like
end-to-end
Loop
of
like
you
know
you
just
if
you
find
somebody
breaking
the
Constitution
and
you
stop
them
from
doing
it.
You
go
you
get
made,
you
get,
you
get
paid
money,
and
that
starts
to
create
this
like
strong
reinforcement
of
like
the
Constitution.
A
Actually,
you
know
self-sustains
right,
because
now
you
really
have
to
have
a
lot
of
pieces
of
the
puzzle,
sort
of
breaking
for
for
something
to
fall
through
and
then.
Finally,
of
course,
there's
demanded
electors
which
have
a
little
bit
of
like
a
weird
like
they
will.
They
start
off
as
something
we're
very
useless
used
to,
but
then
later
on,
they
become
much
much
stranger
right
because
they
become
more
like
dials
or
even
AIS
or
something
over
time,
and
then
Peyton
asks
any
tools
other
than
the
front
end.
A
So
I,
don't
really
understand,
I
mean
so
it's
more
like
it's
all
like
one
big.
Everybody
has
a
bunch
of
tools
to
check
each
other
right
so,
but
the
front
end
is
like
the
Battleground
for
all
this
stuff
to
play
out
right,
but
so
there's
this
like
there's
the
dynamic
between
cvcs
and
CDs
right
where
constitutional
delegates
they
get
shown
at
the
top
of
the
of
the
easy
voting
front
end
if
they
support
multiple
vote
like
this
constitutional
voter
committee
strategies.
A
A
Basically,
but
there's
this
much
more,
you
know
there's
this
like
mini
game,
almost
like
mini
interaction
like
what's
called
a
marginal
interaction
between
the
delegates
and
voter
committees,
where
the
delegates
can
basically
ban
the
voter
committees
and
say
all
the
votes
that
people
delegate
to
me
to
follow
your
strategy.
I'm.
Taking
this
back
and
saying
this
is
now
just
my
own
rules,
because
your
your
Crooks,
basically
so
I'm
protecting
my
voters
from
being
scammed
by
you,
because
you
said
you
were
going
to
vote
for
growth
and
actually
your
vote.
Whatever
are
you
doing
something
else?
A
But
then
the
problem
is
that
the
Constitutional
delegate
will
lose
their
spot
in
the
easy
voting
front
if
they
don't
have
at
least
two
cbcs
right
that
they're,
so
they'll
they'll
eliminate
one
of
the
two
CBC
strategies.
They
only
have
one
left,
so
they'll
immediately
have
to
pick
another
CVC
to
follow,
but
if
they
do
that,
then
actually
they're
fine.
So
if
they
like
ban
a
constitutional
voter
committee
because
it's
they
screwed
whether
they
screwed
around
and
then
they
pick
another
one,
then
they
just
keep
their
spot
in
the
front
end.
A
So
they
can
also
do
the
same
thing
and
when
they
then
the
same
thing
happens
that,
like
the
votes
that
were
supposed
to
be
growth,
votes
for
the
like.
The
growth
strategy
for
the
Constitutional
delegate
become
independent,
Independence
ready
for
the
Constitutional
delegate.
So
it
doesn't
do
anything
about
like
the
losing
votes
or
something
like
that.
A
Is
you
can
very
easily
get
banned
by
all
the
cdcs,
for
instance
right
they'll,
although
can
be
like
yeah
he's
a
liar,
we're
all
gonna
ban
it
right
and
then
you
won't
be
able
to
you'll
have
to
wait
until
some
new
CVC
comes
around
and
they
for
some
reason,
thinks
that
there's
a
reason
to
believe
you're,
not
a
liar.
That's
a
constitutional,
it's
a
CD
right
so
and
then-
and
if
you
don't
do
that,
then
you
can
lose
your
spot
in
the
front
end.
A
Okay,
so
the
whole
yeah
and
then
I
mean
and
there's
and
then
there's
like.
Finally,
there's
like
the
the
admission
manufacturers
and
and
the
subtitles
basically
also
then
like
on
top
of
this
regulating
this
right.
So
they
also
can
like,
if
there's
like
stuff
that
is
more
black
and
white,
then
becomes
the
arbitration
scope
stuff
right.
So
then
it
becomes
a
matter
of
like
losing
your
constitutional
conservative
status
right.
A
And
then
you
lose
your
constitutional
conservative
status
and
then
you
instantly
you
lose
your
your
pay.
You
is
like
immediately,
you
lose
your
your
money
and
immediately
you
lose
your
position
in
the
front
end
and
then
there's
like
a
bunch
of
like
front-end
stuff,
where
there's
more
than
one
front
end.
So
actually
it's
not
that
simple,
because
there
could
even
be
a
con.
You
know,
then
these
guys.
Could
you
know
the
minute
actors
could
be
corrupt
and
yeah
don't
have
time
to
go
more
into
that.
A
But
the
last
thing
I
want
to
talk
about
is
how
do
you
become
these
things
right?
Because
that's
of
course
the
most
important
right,
and
so
the
answer
is
basically
that
if
you're
like,
if
you're
this
thing,
then
it's
extremely
easy
to
become
CBC
and
CD
yeah.
Actually
as
a
like.
Actually
it's
probably
you
don't
really
like
like.
A
If
you
have
like
so
being
a
constitutional
conserver
requires
you
make
some
kind
of
basically
like
a
public
pledge
to
not
overthrow
the
Constitution
or
something
like
that,
and
then
it
also
requires
that
you're
not
like
connected
to
some
other
identity,
which
of
course,
is
not
like.
You
can't
prove
that
you
can't
prove
a
negative.
So
it's
more
like
that's
a
way
to
lose
the
status.
It's
not
a
way
to
like
gain
the
status
right
but
yeah.
A
Basically,
then
it's
like,
then,
if
you
want
to
be
a
constitutional
delegate,
then
you
just
that
just
that's!
Just
a
constitutional
conservative
with
an
active
delegate
contract
and
if
you
want
to
be
on
a
constitutional
voter
committee,
it's
a
little
bit
more
complicated
because
then
you
have
to
have
some
NPR
that
you
have
to
verify
which
somehow,
right
to
you,
establish
your
constitutional
conservative
identity.
And
then
you
verify
some
MPR
that
you
know
you
tie
some
Empire
to
that
identity.
And
then
you
also
have
this
little
lack
of
title
any
other.
A
A
Then
you
can
well,
then
you
can
create
a
constitutional
voter
committee
yourself.
If
you
want
to,
you,
can
actually
do
that.
A
single
person
with
MPR
and
a
constitutional
conservative
status
can
create
their
own
CBC.
It
just
requires
a
lot
of
work,
because
the
requirement
for
like
a
CVC,
functional
CBC
is
that
it
has.
A
It's
like,
basically,
nothing.
It's
not.
You
know
like
you're
not
going
to
do
it
like,
and
this
is
kind
of
this
is
the
check
on
the
whole
like
this
is
where
Spark
is
introduced
to
the
Constitutional
conservatives.
Basically
right
but
like
the
CBC
members
are
not
going
to
be
doing
that
for
the
money,
it's
totally
impossible
and
it's
like
it
would
it
wouldn't
work
if
they
were
doing
it.
A
So
I
was
talking
about
this,
like
creating
your
own,
the
other
option.
Of
course,
you
get
you
get
invited
into
an
existing
one,
but
in
order
to
get
invited
into
the
system
one,
the
existing
members
have
to
vote
using
their
verified
MPR
to
like
let
you
in,
and
they
can
also
kick
you
out
again
and
they
can
also
like
split,
which
is
some
kind
of
special
mechanic
that
I
haven't
fully
figured
out.
A
So
then
they'll
immediately
start
to
get
incentivized
Motors
right
from
from
the
moment
that,
like
anyone,
can
do
that.
But
the
problem
is,
if
you
do
that,
and
you
then
don't
actually
vote
properly
according
to
the
CVC
strategies
that
you're
following
then,
those
cbcs
will
basically
be
pissed
off
and
they'll
ban.
You
and
that's
a
big
part
of
what
they
do
right
is
that
they
they
protect.
A
They
protect
against
grifters
that
are
basically
abusing
the
system
by
just
like
trying
to
be
value
extracting
by
setting
up
a
constitutional
delegate
and
then
following
some
CBC
strategies
and
then
getting
a
bunch
of
incentivized
builds.
Of
course,
they'll
want
the
Constitutional
delegate.
Most
of
them
aren't
going
to
get
paid
anything
because
the
system
is
like
a
cut
off
like
it's
the
top
15,
for
instance,
that
get
paid.
So
if
you're,
tough
16,
you
get
nothing.
A
B
A
And
then
final
question
before
we
ended
is:
can
delegates
can
be
Anon
and
actually
it's
more?
The
the
better
questions
can
constitutional
conservatives
be
anonymous
and
the
answer
is
first
of
all?
Yes,
and
it's
really
encouraged
and
eventually
is
required
so
like
eventually,
it
will
not
be
like
the
requirement
for
constitutional
conserver.
A
Is
that
you're,
an
anonymous
identity
that
yeah,
like
and
and
having
your
identity
discovered,
becomes
a
way
to
lose
your
status
as
constitutional,
conservative,
and
that's
of
course,
I
mean
that's
also
I
mean
big
reason,
for
that
is,
of
course,
the
the
regulatory
risk,
basically
that
it's
just
like
it's
not
a
if
maker
becomes
big
enough.
It's
a
really
bad
idea
to
be
like
reachable
and
be
a
constitutional
conserver
which
is
sort
of
how
they
you're
defined.
A
As
someone
that's
really
working
at
the
dealing
with
the
inner
workings
right,
I
mean
nobody's
doing
anything
nobody's
being
an
agent.
It's
only
people
giving
advice
effectively
right
and
there's
all
these
like
checks
and
balances,
ensuring
that,
if
somebody
oversteps
the
boundaries
and
tries
to
be
an
agent
rather
than
giving
advice
to
these
guys
up
here,
then
that
gets
shut
down
through
all
these
checks
and
balances
right.
B
A
So
initially
it
will
not
be
required,
although
I
think
that
there's
going
to
be
actually
quite
a
significant
amount
of
I
mean
I've,
really
been
sort
of
banging
the
drum
for
long
enough
time
around
Anonymous.
You
know
core
Workforce
that
there
are
quite
a
lot
that
are
that
are
basically
been
attracted
by
that
right,
because
I
mean
that's
like
a
whole
thing
like
an
unfriendly
workplace
right.
A
So
that's
one
thing,
then
another
thing
is
once
you
have
this
like
Anon
setup
right,
then
you
can
do
something
called
identity,
cycling
right,
so
you
can
have
somebody
basically
take
their
current
identity,
which
maybe
they
feel
the
upset
is
starting
to
be
compromised
and
then
they
switch
to
a
new
one.
The
problem
is,
then
you
just
you
all.
A
Your
reputation
was
in
the
old
one,
and
how
do
you
then,
like
transfer
reputation
across
the
right,
and
you
can
actually
build
the
system
for
that
using
like
a
Serial
knowledge
proofs
right,
which
is
basically
something
like
some
kind
of
system
that
will
ultimately
be
regulated
by
the
ecosystem,
scope?
That
would
be
about
creating
different
kind
of
a
classes
of
experience
or
reputation.
A
So
you
can
have
the
reputation
as
being
at
you
know,
skilled
developer
or
very
skill,
developer
or
a
lead
developer,
or
you
can
have
a
you
know,
have
skilled
governance
operator
or
very
skill,
or
something
like
that
right,
a
bunch
of
like
levels
or
something,
and
so
so.
Basically,
you
can
prove
that
you're,
a
member
of
that
group,
but
it's
not
possible
to
see
which
one
you
you
are
right.
A
So
that
means
that
if
there's
enough
developers
in
the
overall
ecosystem
and
we'll
want
to
hand
them
out
like
left
and
right
like
anyone,
we
identify
like
this
is
available
over
here.
Do
we
want
to
hand
them
that
ability
to
then
like
bootstrap,
an
anonymous
identity
with
this
pre-existing
reputation?
A
And
of
course,
we
can
like
I
mean
we're
not
going
to
strictly
Define
this
we're
rather
gonna.
More
broadly
give
them
sort
of
the
Mandate
rates
of
the
ecosystem,
scope
to
like
figure
out
how
to
make
a
good
system
for
that,
so
that,
because
it's
such
a
fundamental
support
infrastructure
necessary
for
the
Constitutional
conservatives
to
really
be
like
scalable
and
resilient
in
the
long
run,
and
then
finally
I
mean
so
one
thing
is
like
Risk
and
regulation
about
a
lot
right,
but.
A
Maybe
an
even
more
important
thing
is
this
exact
question
of
like
what
about
civil
attacks
right,
because
the
thing
is-
and
this
is
actually
something
that
like
when
you
start
thinking
about
things
this
way.
This
is
everywhere
in
how
a
dial
functions
right
that
so
the
thing
is
you
could
already
be
like.
We
are
constantly
being
civil
attack
today
right
and
we
do
allow
Anonymous
contributors
today
and
have
Anonymous
participants
already
and
we're
absolutely
getting
civil
attack
already
all
the
time.
A
Probably
right,
and
even
if
we
aren't,
then
we
will
totally
get
civil
attack
to
the
Max
and
attack
on
every
other
possible
way
right,
so
by
sort
of
building
it
into
the
call
that
this
is
just
how
it
is
anyway,
we
just
it
just
forces
ourselves
to
think
in
the
way
that
it's
actually
resilient
right.
So
it's
like,
so
you
can
I
mean
you.
A
A
But
yeah,
like
the
really
basic
control
on
CBC
versus
constitutional
delegate,
is
like
just
some
loan
delegate.
That,
for
some
reason,
is
like
super
lazy
and
too
lazy
to
actually,
you
know,
vote
according
to
the
cbcs
and
then
going
out
there
and
promoting
their
platform
and
saying
they're.
The
best
way
to
represent
to
to
you
know
to
funnel.
You
know
to
like
facilitate
your
desire
to
vote
according
to
this
particular
strategy,
like
if
they're
too
lazy
to
do
that
they're.
A
Definitely
too
lazy
to
like
set
up
a
fake
CBC
with,
like
you,
know,
perfect
upsake,
where
they
write
all
these
like
scope,
framework
reports
and
none
of
those
like
get
caught
in
the
spam
filter.
Basically
so
so
in
some
sense,
it
all
falls
back
to
like
the
spark
thing,
but
like
it's
just
certain
things
in
the
system
that
you
can't
do
for
money
and
we
we
require
people
doing
that
stuff
out
of
out
of
passion
or
purpose
or
whatever,
and
then
finally
I
mean.
This
is
a
kind
of.
B
A
Do
you
call
it
like
after
thought,
but
then
you
have
all
the
Scopes
right.
Well,
let's
go
Frameworks
at
the
bottom
right,
so
with
all
this
other
stuff
functioning,
then
in
the
end,
it's
time
to
like
operate
and
that's
the
mandated
actors
here
at
the
bottom
right.
So
then
they're
sort
of
Innocence
kept
in
check,
but
all
these
other
pieces
and
then
they
operate
all
the
12
scale.
Frameworks
and
there's
also
like
I
mean
this
also
goes
back
up
here
again
to
the
Constitutional
delegate,
like
you
mean
arbitration
ecosystem.
B
A
And
maybe
it's
not
like
I
mean.
Maybe
we
can
call
it
something
different
right.
The
Constitution
itself
is
like
the
vision
statement
right,
which
is
what
we
call
the
Constitution,
and
then
we
have
some
follow-up
thing.
We
call
the
component
of
rules
or
whatever
we
call
it
component
of
elements
or
something
yeah,
and
so
the
final,
it's
like
right,
final
sort
of
thing
from
just
in
case
right,
I,
think
making
the
dvcs
or
cbc's
whatever
too
much.
Work
is
a
bad
path,
so
I
mean
I,
mean
I.
A
A
Is
they
have
to
overcome
some
like
minimal
hurdle
of,
like
a
guarantee
that
a
CBC
is,
is
very
likely
to
be
real
and
not
some
fake,
fake
thing
right
done
by
somebody
who
actually
isn't
interested
in
in
benefiting
the
protocol,
but
who's,
maybe
like
trying
to
extract
money
in
some
Marginal
Way
right,
and
so
the
thing
is
that
in
the
end,
you
just
need
a
single
person
running
a
single
CVC
and
the
whole
thing
works.
If
that
person
is
like
fully
trustworthy,
then
actually
that's
all
I
mean,
of
course.
A
Ideally,
you
want
a
bit
more
than
one
to
be
safe
right,
but
but
what
this
also
means
is
like
is
this
like
the
ultimate,
you
know
power
fantasy
right.
If
nobody
is
running
a
CVC,
then
all
the
Constitutional
delegates
actually
like
out
of
work,
basically
they're,
not
even
going
to
get
paid
in
that
scenario,
so
they're
going
to
be
out
there
with
their
paycheck
and
their
career,
basically
so
their
their
job
security,
depending
on
them.
A
Finding
somebody
who
cares
about
having
a
decentralized
currency,
running
and
they'll
have
to
figure
out
how
to
make
it
safe
right,
they'll
have
to
figure
out
how
to
make
it,
I
mean
how
to
make
it
easy
and
and
safe,
and
all
that
stuff
right.
So
this
CBC
member,
like
this,
is
kind
of
like
in
the
end
they're
supposed
to
kind
of
get
all
their
work
actually
handed
to
them
on
a
silver
platter
and
their
role
is
to
be
like
the
CEO
or
the
king
or
the
pope
or
whatever,
and
then
determine
what
it's
like.
A
A
The
problem
usually
is
doing
anything
about
it
because,
obviously,
in
a
democracy,
it's
impossible
to
create
like
fixed
hard
rules
around
how
everything
is
done,
that
you
can't
change,
because
it's
too
broad,
but
in
our
case
we're
lucky
enough
that
we
can
actually
make
these
like
very
constraint.
Rules
around
so
like
if
you're
like
doing
something
as
your
lower
yield.
Instead
of
something
that's
higher
yield
and
there's
no
way
to
justify
based
on
our
existing
Frameworks.
That
is
lower
risk
or
something
well,
then
you're,
probably
being
corrupt
right.
A
All
right
so
I
hope
some
of
that
made
sense,
but
yeah.
So
basically,
all
of
this
is
coming
out
in,
like
a
document
form
that
actually
implements
all
these
rules,
and
all
this
like
logic,
in
a
self-contained
way
right
and
pen.
When
it's
ready,
it's
going
to
go
on
the
Forum,
and
hopefully
we
can
have
it
passed
by
April
and
then
April.
We
can
start
running
everything
through
this
like
process
of
like
these.
As
like
the
central
component
right,
foreign.