►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk | Ep. 163
Description
Agenda:
Introduction -
@prose11 : Hosting, Introduction, Agenda.
@Davidutro : Slides
Governance Round-Up -
Poll + Executive Status - @prose11
MIPs Update - @blimpa
Forum at a Glance - @gov-comms-core-unit
Selected Updates / Discussions -
This week’s discussions will center around topics brought forward in a couple recent signal requests:
PSM tin and tout settings - @Protocol-Engineering + @Risk-Core-Unit
[Signal request] Set PSM fees to 0% - https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-set-psm-fees-to-0/10894
ESM Threshold + GSM Pause Delay - @rune + @Protocol-Engineering (https://makerdao.world/en/learn/governance/param-gsm-pause-delay)
*Restarted poll* [Signal Request] Raise the ESM threshold to 15% and increase the Governance Delay to 4 days 1 (https://forum.makerdao.com/t/restarted-poll-signal-request-raise-the-esm-threshold-to-15-and-increase-the-governance-delay-to-4-days/10896)
A
A
This
is
our
weekly
meeting,
where
we
talk
about
what's
going
on
in
the
protocol,
as
well
as
some
key
issues,
things
we're
debating
and
would
like
some
community
kind
of
input
on.
So
we
appreciate
everyone
joining
us
live
and
watching
the
recording
later
a
couple
housekeeping
measures
before
we
get
started.
We
do
want
to
encourage
this
to
be
an
open
meeting.
A
A
So
as
far
as
agenda
goes,
we
got
a
few
things
on
our
plate.
We'll
start
with
our
traditional
governance
roundup,
before
heading
into
a
couple
community
discussions
this
week,
the
things
we're
discussing
are
also
up
for
signal
requests,
so
it'll
be
cool
to
see
how
today's
discussions
kind
of
carry
over
there
and
maybe
or
maybe
don't
influence
the
vote
and
if
there's
time
after
those
topics
we'll
have
an
open
discussion
at
the
end.
A
A
I
think
that
should
about
do
it
for
ground
rules,
we'll
try
to
keep
this
about
an
hour
and
I'll
kick
us
off
here
with
our
general
vote.
Governance
update
words
all
right,
so
lots
of
bowling
activity.
This
week
we
had
four
polls
pass
and
one
poll
be
rejected.
The
four
polls
that
passed
we're,
adding
the
state
d,
philadelphia,
vault,
the
nexto
institutional,
vault
onboarding,
the
direct
direct
deposit,
die
module
or
d3m,
and
an
increase
to
the
g-uni
usdc
debt
ceiling.
A
A
Awesome
that
does
it
for
the
polls.
As
far
as
the
executive
proposals,
we
did
have
an
executive
proposal
passed
last
week
that
concerned
off-warding
particular
vaults,
mkr,
investing
and
core
budget
a
core
unit
budget
distribution.
So
that
has
been
passed
and
executed.
You
can
see
its
effects
on
chain
his
announcement
that
we
will
not
be
having
an
executive
proposal
tomorrow.
A
The
only
thing
that
would
have
been
ready
was
the
g-uni
debt
ceiling
increase
and
we
decided
especially
given
a
lot
of
the
travel
schedules
with
with
people
going
to
lisbon.
I
would
be
best
to
skip
the
executive
for
this
weekend
and
bundle
that
one
change
in
with
the
others
the
following
friday,
so
that
should
do
it
for
me
and
the
update
on
the
votes.
Next,
I'm
going
to
kick
it
over
to
pablo
our
mip
editor.
To
give
you
an
update
on
the
world
of
maps,
hello.
B
B
B
B
B
We
have
two
budgets:
it's
a
proposal
for
having
a
special
purpose
found
it's
a
proposal
where
I
mean
the
map6
application
template
into
coordinated
proposal
sets
these
proposals
can
make
it
into
november's
governance
cycle
in
the
formal
submission
window
for
that
cycle
will
open
in
18
days
on
monday
monday.
The
first
that's
pretty
much
it.
I
don't
have
any
more
right
now,
so
let
me
go
to
the
last
slide,
so
I
can
say
bye
bye.
Thank
you.
A
C
D
Cool
got
it
yeah,
so
it's
to
do
a
real
world
asset
visibility
study
in
singapore
and
to
examine
the
the
different
legal
scenarios
and
hurdles
that
one
would
find
whenever
dealing
within
this
jurisdiction.
So
it's
a
bit
too
to
improve
how
how
things
are
dealt
with
real
world
assets
wise
in
that
region.
D
E
All
right
welcome
everybody
to
the
forum
on
a
glance,
a
weekly
review
of
what's
happening
on
the
forums
this
week
for
the
week
of
october,
7th
to
october
14th.
Let's
begin
with
the
week's
top
announcements,
following
up
on
last
week's
presented
initiative
for
clean
money,
roon
submits
a
comprehensive
thread
on
the
design
for
the
sagittarius
injury,
which
will
better
direct
the
value
flows
of
the
maker
protocol
towards
long-term
governance
participants.
However,
this
is
just
one
of
many
mentioned
benefits
of
design,
checking
out
the
whole
post
for
a
deeper
understanding
of
the
sagittarius
agenda.
E
Next
up
paper,
imperium
circles
back
to
a
recent
discussion
on
the
impact
of
u.s
based
financial
regulations
towards
the
crypto
economy.
However,
this
time
paper,
imperium,
presents
potentially
good
news.
Gaining
favor
in
some
circles
is
the
notion
that
an
unrepealed
section
of
the
1933
glass
steagle
act
provides
a
more
clear
direction
for
making
doubt
there
are
three
exceptions
to
the
act
which
can
well
position
maker
dao
if
the
payload
guarantee
protocol
next
set
ventures
follows
up
on
a
previous
poll
and
this
week's
rw
rwa
committee
discussion
on
investing
in
financial
assets.
E
E
Paper
imperium
builds
a
discussion
thread
to
promote
community
brainstorm
on
what
we
see
as
significant
challenges
and
how
to
address
them
april
imperium
presents
his
response
to
the
issue,
along
with
potential
solutions,
to
start
to
kick
it
off
all
right.
Next
up,
there's
been
a
lot
of
discussion
around
mitigation
of
legal
tail
risk
for
maker
as
a
dow.
E
To
help
better
understand
the
community's
opinions
paper
imperium
asks
how
important
is
it
for
a
dow
like
ours
to
have
decentralized
governance
and
finally,
next
up
with
3
billion
usdc
in
the
psm
dallin
addressed
concern
on
revenues
and
associated
risks.
He
proposes
to
deploy
a
new
leveraged
etf
product
that
is
scalable
dallin,
provides
some
objectives
and
examples
within
the
thread.
E
Moving
on
to
our
signal
requests,
we
have
four
active
signals
in
reaction
to
the
initiative
for
clean
money.
Long
for
wisdom
creates
an
initial
signal
asking
the
community
whether
they
would
like
to
see
maker
down
moving
in
the
general
direction
indicated
by
the
post.
The
case
for
clean
money
so
definitely
go
and
put
your
vote
in
next
step.
Long
for
wisdom
believes
the
best
the
best
path
forward
with
recognized
delegate
compensation
is
to
run
it
run
a
three-month
trial
period.
According
to
the
system
proposed
by
sakhanat
by
psychonaut
in
midfield.
E
A
A
So
those
are
going
to
be
our
kind
of
two
discussions,
we'll
try
not
to
spend
too
terribly
long
on
them,
but
at
the
same
time,
if
there's
good
discussion,
I'd
rather
not
cut
it
off.
I
think
the
plan
is
to
start
with
the
discussion
of
dye,
the
psms
and
what
the
tenant
out
fees
should
be
or
could
be
there.
F
Yeah,
I
think
I
don't
have
too
much
to
say
because
I
didn't
prepare
anything.
Thirdly,
but
I
guess
the
signal
request
was
quite
quite
well
structured
and
there
was
a
pro
and
cons
and
there
was
some
quite
interesting
discussions,
and
so
I
guess
it's
more
to
get
questions
and
let
the
discussion
happen.
F
F
Obviously
that's
only
until
we
depleted
3
billion
of
usdc
so
still
quite
a
liquidity
buffer,
and
so
the
idea
is
to
put
it
as
an
art
peg,
where
one
dollar
would
be
always
equal
to
one
die
or
most
of
the
time
equal
to
one
die
with
no
contractual
guarantee
whatsoever,
but
still
the
best
effort.
I
would
say
by
having
the
three
million
usdc
by
having
the
possibility
to
deposit
one
usdc
or
one
usdp
or
one
other
back
regulator,
stable
coin
into
a
psm
and
get
one
die
in
exchange
and
do
the
opposite
as
well.
F
There
are
a
lot
of
prone
coins,
but
in
my
perspective
it's
really
and
I
draw-
I
thought
that
in
the
scenery
request,
it's
just
like
at
some
point:
there
were
banknotes
from
different
banks
and
that
was
not
traded
at
path
and
the
financial
system
way
before
the
central
banks
and
all
the
regulations
fixed.
This
issue,
because,
obviously
we
want
to
use
the
dollar.
F
F
It's
always
better
to
have
a
fixed,
peg
and
yeah
last
difference
last
part
that
I
think
it
was
important
is
that
if
there
is
some
cost
to
go
on
to
die
or
to
trade
from
dye
to
another,
stable
coin,
it's
a
customer,
so
the
die
holder
or
the
die
has
die
order
at
some
point.
Who
is
paying
for
them?
So
we
are
making
your
user
pay
for
the
benefit
of
using
die,
which
doesn't
make
any
sense.
H
Yeah
so
I'll
say
just
from
the
technical
side,
I'm
not
really
sure
why
pe
is
listed
here.
Some
individual
members,
I
think,
have
opinions
on
this,
but
from
like
just
a
purely
technical
standpoint,
there's
no
issue,
I
think,
with
lowering
this.
So
as
the
pe
group,
it
would
be
fine
to
make
this
change
unless
somebody
else
on
the
team
wants
to
counter
that,
but
I
believe
that's
the.
I
Case
yeah,
I
just
want
to
echo
what
sam
said
there
from
the
technical
perspective.
You
know
this.
This
is
not
really
an
issue,
so
the
the
pe
core
unit,
you
know,
really
can't
have
an
opinion
on
this
other
than
to
tell
you
that
there's
no
technical
risk
members
have
their
personal
opinions
or
opinions
as
mkr
holders,
but
when
they
express
them
they're
just
that
the
opinions
of
those
individuals.
C
I
had
a
quick
question
so
with
the
psm
in
out
fees
being
zero.
I
think
another
part
of
this
conversation
is
trying
to
move.
You
know
markets
participants,
perception
of
die
towards
this
idea
that
diet
can
be
treated
at
par
and
I
saw
in
the
forums
some
of
the
engineering
team
talked
about
how
that
might
be
a
problem
for
some
protocols
to
actually
treat
die
at
par
like
hard-coding
values,
rather
than
taking,
like
you
know,
the
actual
floating
rate
on
the
market
and
I'm
curious
about
that
perspective.
I
Introduces
risk
for
the
other
protocols.
Basically,
you
know,
I
guess,
strictly
speaking,
it's
helpful
to
make
her
because
it,
you
know,
sort
of
enforces
the
peg
in
more
places,
but
like
right,
if
you,
if
you
imagine
that
you
know
you're
of
a
say
and
you
commit
to
always
treating
die
as
a
dollar
and
like
collateral
factor
calculations,
you
know
what
if
die
like,
actually
depends
significantly,
you
know,
basically
all
they
could
become.
I
You
know
have
some
sort
of
solvency
problem
in
relation
to
that,
you
know
where
people
could
be
protected
from
liquidation,
so
they
really
shouldn't
be
right,
like
if
dye
is
actually
trading
at
50
cents
on
the
market
and
always
counting
it
as
a
dollar.
People
can
borrow
a
lot
more
than
they
should
and
it
starts
to
create
risk
for
that
protocol.
I
So
you
know
that's
that's
a
protocol
by
protocol
decision
basis.
You
know
for
them
to
make
based
on
maybe
whatever
benefits
might
be
offered
to
them
for
for
making
such
a
commitment
like
partnerships
with
maker,
and
it's
you
know,
it's
really.
I
think
it's
really
more
like
a
financial
risk
question
than
anything.
J
J
I
do
understand
that
there
are.
There
is
the
desire
to
take
on
as
much
of
this
as
possible
to
to
grow
and
expand
by
telling
partners
that
we
can.
We
can
in
provide
usdc
in
exchange
for
these
loans
that
they'd
be
taking,
but
we
don't
have
those
solutions
yet
so,
in
the
meantime,
we're
just
taking
on
piles
of
usdc,
and
I
I
disagree
with
the
risk
assessment
that
it
would
take
250
million
usdc
to
get
to
peg.
J
As
as
we
approach
the
peg
value,
the
the
amount
of
usdc
that
we
would
have
to
take
on
actually
increases
almost
exponentially
to
get
down
to
that
level,
and
it's
taken
3
billion
usdc
at
this
point
to
get
us
down
from.
I
think
an
800
million
spread
last
year
to
a
250
million
spread
now
so
so
like
there
are
wider
considerations
than
that,
but
but
again
like
from
the
the
pe's
team
perspective,
we
will
do
whatever
makers
holders
want.
J
It
seems
like
we
might
want
to
consider
how
we
can
get
this
usdc
off
the
books
and
and
from
a
personal
opinion.
From
another
personal
standpoint.
I
am
an
american.
I
think
a
lot
of
the
americans
in
the
dao
are
more
concerned
about
the
usdc
risk
than
the
non-americans.
I
don't
know
why
that
is,
but
america
does
have
a
history
of.
J
K
I
D
I
K
I
just
want
to
make
a
point
that
you
know
the
idea
of
setting
this
to
zero.
It
does
have
implications,
many
of
which
might
be
unintended,
and
so,
if
anything,
I
would
leave
the
leave
the
bottom
side
open
make
you
know
buy.
Basically,
you
know
sell
die
for
a
little
bit
above
usdc1
right,
don't
bracket
dessert
to
zero
directly
just
leave.
If
you
wanna,
I
think
the
band
is
tight
enough.
Personally,
what's
the
actually
here's
the
question?
K
L
L
You
can
utilize
sucking
in
tons
of
usdc,
which
dye
will
basically
almost
always
have
a
premium
because
of
this.
This
almost
like
yield
farming
premium
compared
to
usdc
and
because
there's
kind
of
less
of
it.
So
we
can
use
this
to
bootstrap
the
dye
supply
growth
and
because
the
all
the
usdc
in
the
psm
is
protocol
owned.
We
can
then
just
reallocate
the
uscc
to
wherever
we
want
to
reallocate
it
to
right.
So
you
have
some
optimal
mix
of
how
you
want
to
have
the
portfolio
backing
diet.
L
Okay,
great,
you
know,
just
use
the
uscc
in
there
to
do
that.
You
know
one
side
of
it
is
okay,
fine!
You
know
you
can
promise
real
world
asset
originators
right.
You
know
if
we
have
4
billion
or
5
billion
of
usdc
in
the
protocol
right.
This
is
the
you
know,
order
of
magnitude
of
deal
that
we
can
accomplish
right
with
with
zero
slippage
right.
So
I
would
argue
against
that.
You
want
this.
L
1.0001,
like
no,
you
just
want
the
one
to
one,
so
you
can
be
like
one
die,
is
one
usdc,
which
is
one
dollar,
no
slippage,
no
fees.
This
is
what
you
get
right
like
I,
in
in
terms
of
okay,
have
we
been
like
scheming
for
ways
to
get
uscc
off
the
books
like
sure,
but
I
don't
think
it's
like
a
short-term
problem.
I
think
we're
more
just
kind
of
like
like
panicking
a
bit,
and
I
want
to
push
back
a
little
bit
on
what
brian
said.
Like
I'm
an
american
too.
L
I
know
how
america
has
dealt
with
stuff
in
the
past.
I
don't
think
that
they're
agile
enough
to
pull
anything
like
that
off
like
remotely
soon.
We
have
plenty
of
time
to
do
this
right
and
in
terms
of
the
kind
of
clean
money
kind
of
initiative.
We
could.
We
would
basically
just
park
our
money
in
esg
bonds,
right
in
a
trust
somewhere
right
in
some
friendly
jurisdiction
or
or
multiple
trusts
and
multiple
friendly
jurisdictions
right.
So
you
just
convert
all
the
usdc
into
esg
bonds.
Great
now,
you've
parked
your
money
in
those.
L
Those
are
you've,
got
the
uscc
off
your
books,
you've
monetized
it
a
little
bit
and
the
esg
bonds
are
still
fairly
liquid
enough
right
that
you
can
then
invest
in
these
kind
of
larger
green
projects.
So
when
we
say
oh,
we
we
should,
you
know,
increase
psm
fees
to
zero.
The
point
entirely
is
to
suck
up
as
much
usdc
as
we
can.
So
we
can
use
that
as
kind
of
a
slingshot
for
for
the
next
steps.
L
A
G
G
If
we
make
this
change,
we
are
going
to
suck
on
this
existential
risk
beyond
anything
we
could
fix
in
the
short
term
and-
and
I
think
that's
going
to
have
like
a
really
bad
consequence
for
pr
for
people
to
be
like
well
maker's,
not
even
trying
to
solve
this.
I
mean
if
you
look
at
the
like
pie,
charts
today,
they're
actually
rebalancing
like
really
nicely
with
pacs
with
usdc.
G
We
pulled
on
a
lot
of
wbbc
and
f.
I
mean
we
are
actually
balancing
and
the
other
thing
is.
We
don't
have
yet
this
this
capital,
sync,
that
we
want
to
stick
this
stuff
into
so
the
esg
bonds
or
any
of
the
real
world
assets,
we're
still
sort
of
bootstrapping
that
I
I
guess
I
would
argue.
I
don't
disagree
with
the
approach
of
like
trying
to
have
this
sort
of
capital
battery.
I
just
don't
think
that
we
need
to
do
it
right
this.
G
Second,
I
think
that
we
can
wait
until
we
have
until
we
start
like
flowing
funds
into
these
other
projects
and
and
then
we
do
it
and
to
do
it
in
the
short
term.
I
think
is
gonna
cause
us
to
take
a
huge
pr
hit,
because
the
I
mean
it's
basically,
the
the
the
die
is
is
wrapped
usdc
memes
just
right
themselves.
At
this
point,
I.
L
Yeah,
so
why
fight
it?
It's
like
we're
getting
the
negative
externalities
without
getting
the
benefits.
I
that
that's
what
I
don't
understand.
It's
it's
like
we've
already
we're
already
so
far
in
this
direction,
so
let's
at
least
get
the
upside.
Instead
of
only
the
downside,
you're
not
going
to
change
the
narrative
by
reducing
the
usdc
psm,
even
by
a
billion
people,
will
say
that
it's
still
wrapped
ustc.
L
G
Users,
users
are
going
to
care
nick
it
once
once
and-
and
there
is
already
some
type
of
regulatory
action
happening
against
usdc
right,
like
the
the
sec
is
not
just
investigating
usdc
their
actual,
like
enforcement
division
is
discussing
actions
with
them,
so
the
second
we
take
on
like
the
second
usdc
takes
on
some
sort
of
like
regulatory
action.
All
of
a
sudden
die
is
going
to
look
a
lot
riskier
now
now
there
is
like
an
interesting
play.
G
If
that
regulatory
action
is
not
been
like
not
banning,
let's
say
protocols,
let's
say
it's
just
kyc
for
individual
participants,
but
like
the
psm
wouldn't
get
banned
or
blacklist
blacklisted
then
die
does
stand
to
inherit
the
entire
market.
If,
if
the
regulatory
action
comes
down,
that
basically
stops,
you
know
non-kyc
parties
from
and
die,
but
but
but
usdc
can
still
I'm
sorry
transferring
usdc,
but
usdc
can
still
like
go
into
protocols.
If
that
happens,
then
we
basically
act
as
a
giant
like
trade.
G
G
So
I
could
definitely
see
an
angle
there,
but
that's
a
huge
gamble
and
I
I
still
feel
like
you
know
we
don't
need
to
like
take
that
risk
on
into
the
present
we
can.
We
can
make
these
changes.
There's
no
urgency
to
make
these
changes
if
we
just
put
them
off
until
we're
like
capable
of,
like
you
know,
actually
like
exiting
some
of
that
balance
on
our
books
so
I'll
yield.
Now
that's
a
lot
of
like
talking.
Other
people
can
talk.
N
Yes,
I
I
wanted
to
add
that
I
I
understand
where
this
come
from
and
I
understand
why
why
seb
is
asking
for
this,
because
in
the
past,
as
the
bd
team
and
now
in
growth,
we
have
seen
this
as
a
problem,
because
actually
we
had
an
opportunity
in
the
past
where
it
this
this
organization
needed
a
decentralized
stablecoin,
which
is
like
very
rare
because,
like
you
always
heard
that,
like
that
people
just
don't
care
about
decentralization.
But
well.
N
In
that
case
that
was
an
important
feature,
but
because
we
called
them,
we
couldn't
offer
to
them.
They
wanted
one
from
die
to
usd.
That
was
a
problem
because
they
were
at
some
point
like
losing
a
money
in
the
in
the
flow.
So
I
understand
why
percep
this
is
important,
because
when
you
are
going
outside
the
crypto
world
that
one
to
one
it's
really
really
important
and
when
you're
talking
about
millions
in
one
transaction
losing
10
basis,
points
or
20
basis,
points
is
a
lot
of
money.
N
So
yes,
like
actually
at
that,
a
for
that
opportunity
in
the
past,
but
we
we
we
couldn't
do
it
and
we
lost
that
opportunity
and
that
went
through
usdc,
although
they
were
looking
for
a
decentralized
stable
coin.
So
yeah
is
the
venezuelan
aid
project
exactly
exactly
right.
That's
the
one
I'm
talking
about!
N
But
on
the
other
side,
I
understand
that
if
we
want
like
we
really,
if
we
really
want
to
do
business
with
real
companies,
they
are
expecting
the
one-to-one
from
dai
to
usd
and
the
only
way
to
to
offer
to
them.
That
is
to
have
the
psm
with
serapis,
because
in
that
way
we
are
using
the
psm
as
an
on
operand
solution
using
the
paxos
rails
and
the
usdc
rails.
A
O
Just
something
to
consider.
I
I'm
personally
I
like
being
able
to
externalize
some
of
that
blacklisting
risk
and
yeah.
We.
We
might
end
up
sort
of
closing
that
door
on
ourselves
and
then
yeah.
I
mean
the
only
other
thing.
I'd
comment
is
that
it'll
I
I
think
it
would
have
like
a
pretty
big
impact
on
uniswap
and
then
also
curve
and
like
where
people
hold
their
die
for
lp
purposes.
So
yeah,
just
just
another
kind
of
general
consideration.
K
God,
great
thanks.
I
want
to
echo
what
monet
supply
said:
you're
gonna
complete.
We
can
externalize
this
risk
by
using
lp
pools
right
and
our
usdc
is
already
creating
dye.
You
know,
if
you
think
about
this,
you
can
actually
match
it
with
dye
and
throw
it
into
the
lp
pools
right.
So
we
crush
these
markets.
These
lp
pools
are
dead
for
us
to
externalize
this
risk.
It's
a
bad
idea
in
principle.
K
Another
question
you
know
when
somebody
wants
to
convert
100
million
of
whatever
into
100
100
million
equivalent
to
something
else.
I
don't
know
any
bank
that
will
not
charge
a
fee
for
that,
and
so
you
know:
okay
usdc.
You
know
if
I
come
to
circle
with
100
million
usd
they're
going
to
give
me
100
or
100
usdc
they're,
going
to
give
me
100
million
usd,
but
there's
only
the
the
supporters.
The
only
one
that's
going
to
do
that.
Nobody
else
is
gonna.
K
Give
you
a
hundred
million
usd
for
a
hundred
million
usdc,
no
one,
and
so
you
look
at
these
stable
coins
on
the
markets.
They
do
not
trade
at
one.
I
don't
care
how
good
the
stable
coin
is.
There
isn't
one
that
trades
at
one
on
every
market
everywhere,
and
so
this
idea,
you
know,
I
understand
growth
here.
You
know
and
markets
basically
kind
of
want
this
and
and
there's
lots
of
things
we
want,
but
sometimes
they're,
not
good,
and
so
I
really
want
to
reiterate.
We
really
don't
want
to
close
this
gap.
K
A
Thank
you.
I
don't
know
nick
if
you
sell
something
to
add,
if
not,
it
might
be
good
to
use
from
seb.
I
know
a
lot
of
the
reward
assets.
Originators
have
have
talked
about
the
importance
of
of
dye
being
exactly
on
peg.
I
don't
know
if
you'd
want
to
speak
to
that
a
little
bit,
I
was
noticing
some
questions
in
chat
as
to
how
much
it
really
affects
things.
L
G
You
made
a
good
point,
though,
nick
about
about,
if
uscc
does
get
banned
by
regulators
in
the
psm,
it's
likely
going
to
be
banned
by
regulators
and
in
the
lp
pools
as
well
right,
and
in
that
case
the
lp
pools
aren't
really
going
to
like
save
maker
at
all
they're,
all
just
going
to
become
usdc
or
whatever
else,
and
so
the
risk
is
still
sitting
there
and
and
those
funds.
We
could
move
the
lps
off
our
books,
but
those
funds
will
be
trapped
anyway.
So.
H
J
Well,
can
I,
from
a
technical
perspective,
g
uni
can
still
be
liquidated
in
an
auction,
whereas
a
frozen
token
cannot.
So
those
would
stay
on
our
books
forever,
whereas
like
an
a
usd
c
or
c
usdc
or
just
a
general
wrapped
usdc.
If
we
were
to
to
use
that
we
could
still
liquidate
off
and
you
know,
presumably
they
would
have
some
market
value
that
that
an
auction
would
that
a
keeper
would
pay
for.
G
A
D
A
Not
hearing
anything
like
you
said
there
are
signals
on
both
of
these
topics
today,
so
I
do
very
much
encourage
people
to
to
go
to
the
forums
and
continue
this
conversation
there.
That's
a
lot
of
the
thoughts.
We're
sharing
today
would
benefit
from
being
preserved,
all
right,
so
moving
on,
we
have
a
different
signal
that
that
highlighted
a
couple
different
aspects
we
thought
would
be
valuable
to
talk
about,
and
that
was
rune
signal
to
increase
the
emergency
shutdown
module
mkr
threshold,
as
well
as
the
governance
pause
delay.
A
The
gsm
duration
roon
said
on
chat
that
he
was
unable
to
make
it
today.
Unfortunately,
but
I
thought
this
is
still
a
very
good
topic
to
have.
We
thought
it
might
be
valuable
to
have
someone
from
p
talk
about,
like
kind
of
the
trade-offs
here,
also
happy
to
have
risk
or
oracles,
or
I
can
spin
on
it
for
a
little
bit
as
well.
So
I
don't
know
if
anyone's
comfortable
kicking
us
off.
C
I
think,
maybe
also
for
the
recording
I'll
just
quickly
explain
what
esm,
threshold
and
governance
pause.
What
those
two
things
are
the
governance
puzzle
delay.
So
the
esm
threshold
is
the
amount
of
mkr
that's
needed
to
trigger
an
emergency
shutdown
at
maker,
and
this
is
an
extremely
disruptive
process.
Dye
becomes
redeemable
for
a
pro
rata
portion
of
the
underlying
collateral
and,
generally
speaking,
this
is
kind
of
like
a
game.
Theoretical
functionality.
C
That's
meant
to
be
there
to
to
stop
any
sort
of
worse
things
from
happening,
so
it's
kind
of
like
an
escape
hatch,
gracefully
winds
down
the
system,
whereas
the
governance
pause
delay
has
to
do
with
the
amount
of
time
between
the
passing
of
a
vote
and
the
execution
of
the
contents
of
that
vote,
so
so
yeah.
So
at
the
moment
I
believe
it's
a
48
hour
delay
and
there's
also
office
hours
built
into
those
and
feel
free
to
correct
me.
G
They
have
to
take
into
consideration
the
fact
that
a
minority
might
shut
the
protocol
down
and
then
sort
of
an
extension
of
that
is
you
know.
Where
do
you
distinguish
between
like
an
unpopular
or,
let's
say,
a
popular
nkr
action,
but
unpopular
with
a
minority
versus
like
a
governance
attack
right?
So
so?
The
second
scenario
is
that
there's
a
proper
governance
attack-
it's
clearly
malicious,
like
you
know,
is
effectively
going
to
steal
all
the
collateral
from
everybody
in
the
system
and
the
esm.
G
If,
if
mkr
holders
can't
overcome
the
hat
and
and
drop
that
malicious
action,
the
esm
exists,
as
an
instantaneous
like
you
know,
cage
the
system
in
in
case
of
emergency
before
the
malicious
action
comes
through.
So
that's
the
that's,
the
sort
of
and
and
the
two
sort
of
play
together
right,
so
the
gsm
delay.
It
also
gives
us
more
time
to
not
take
that
sort
of
catastrophic
nuke
the
system
button
and
actually
allows
us
to
like
intervene
in
the
case
of
governance
attack.
G
You
know
find
consensus
that
sort
of
thing
right,
so
it
makes
sense
that
if
you're
going
to
increase
one
like
the
threshold
of
the
esm,
that
you'd
also
want
to
increase
the
the
governance
delay.
The
pause
between
when
things
can
execute,
because
you're
probably
going
to
need
that
time
to
like
find
more
consensus
in
order
to
get
end
care
holders
to
actually
like
burn
their
mkr
to
shut
the
system
down.
So.
C
One
question
I
had
about
the
signal
request:
was
you
know,
a
doubling
of
the
threshold
from
75k
to
150k
seems
like
seems
like
a
lot,
because
even
presently
like
who,
how
much
mkr
do
we
even
have
in
the
governance
contract?
I
think
it's
something
like
less
than
200k
but
actively
participating
like
40
to
50k
a
week.
G
Yeah,
so
why
don't
we
take
it
in
two
parts?
Let's
talk
about
the
esm,
because
these
really
are
like
two
complicated
features
so
yeah.
If
we
took
the
esm
first,
there
is
obviously
having
it
exist
for
all
the
game.
Theory
that
I
had
mentioned
earlier
seems
to
make
sense
at
a
certain
point,
though,
like
if
we
were
to
just
make
the
change-
and
let's
say
we
made
it
a
million
mkr.
G
Well,
there's
there's
not
a
million
mkr
in
existence
right
so
like
it
would
be
worthless,
but
you
know:
there's
a
lot
of
mkr,
that's
like
either
encumbered
or
lost
or
just
would
would
not
like
burn
in
the
case
of
emergency
shutdown.
So
there
is
some
threshold,
that's
sort
of
unknowable
to
us
where
that
minority
threat
the
game
theory
of
that
minority
threat
disappears.
G
D
G
Know
the
the
question
is
like
have:
has
that
game
theory
actually
prevented
active
attacks
in
the
past
right?
Has
there
been
somebody
with
the
capacity
to
run
like
a
governance
attack
or
to
push
like
some
sort
of
minority
will
through,
but
they
haven't
done
it
because
they
were
actually
threatened
by
the
esm,
and
so
I
think
those
are
kind
of
unknowable
but
yeah.
Does
anybody
want
to
make
a
really
strong
argument
for
not
changing
it
or
changing
it?
Like?
Does
anybody
feel
strongly.
M
Okay
on
the
hat,
I
think
we
have
seen
it
a
few
times,
but
but
not
recently
for
sure.
So
I
wonder
like
yeah,
I
don't
know,
I
think
the
minority
like
at
that
point
it's
kind
of
equivalent
to
what
we
would
normally
take
to
pass
an
exact.
So
we
would
in
order
for
that,
to
be
useful.
We'd
have
to
see,
like
you
know,
hundreds
of
thousands
more
make
a
like
appear
and
become
governors
active
and
then
want
something
which
I
think
is
unlikely.
M
D
G
D
G
Unless
they
are,
this
is
like
a
spiteful
move
right.
Unless
they
are
a
competitor,
then
there
would
be
a
strategic
advantage
to
triggering
shutdown
and
and
then
in
the
worst
case
scenario,
you're
a
nation-state,
actor
competitor
and
a
nation
state
actor
may
be
able
to
coerce
like
large
enough
fm
care
holders
to
trigger
shutdown,
and
they
would
find
that
beneficial.
M
I
Think
if
you
could
short
other
things
than
mkr
right
like
right
like
if
like
we're,
assuming
that
only
like
the
only
way
they're
profiting
is
through
an
mkr
short
like
there
might
be
right,
there
might
be
other
ways
like
to
profit
as
well.
You
know,
like
you
can
imagine
you
can
imagine
it's
going
to
do
things
right
to
die
like
the
price
of
dye
is
probably
going
to
trade
somewhat
below
par,
even
if
esm
is
triggered,
because
there's
a
cost
to
doing
all
the
redemptions,
and
so
there's
it's
right.
I
It's
going
to
be
bought
at
a
discount
after
emergency
shutdowns.
So
you
know
imagine
that,
like
you
go
ahead
and
you
like
that,
you
know
you
can
probably
say,
like
short,
buy
to
some
extent
or
I
I
would
need
to
think
through
it
more.
But
I'm
just
saying
you
know
you
could
probably
profit
in
more
ways
than
just
crash
in
the
price
of
mkr,
with
with
an
esm
attack.
D
M
I
think
it's
where
they,
I
think
it's,
whether
like
you,
can
guarantee
like
profit
from
it
right,
because
no
one's
going
to
want
to
do.
Well,
I
don't
know,
but,
like
I
don't
know,
malicious
actors
would
go
to
that
much
trouble
unless
they
were
like
sure
they
could
profit
from
it,
and
I
think
I
think
it's
definitely
possible
that
they
could.
A
O
O
I
K
Yeah,
I
was
gonna,
say
so:
leverage
exposure
right.
We
I've
already
written
on
this
a
year
ago,
right
that
I
considered
this
an
attack
vector
as
d5
grows.
You
get
look.
Dydx
allows
pretty
significant
leverage
to
pick
your
centralized
exchange
and
then
couple
in
any
sort
of
analysis
about
how
strongly
correlated
the
markets
are.
So
you
can
get
a
huge
short
depth
in
f
right
and
you
crash
maker
by
by
locking
all
the
assets
in
there
and
basically
forcing
all
die
to
be
hitting
up
for
those
assets
which,
most
of
which
are
usdc.
K
You've
got
a
real
nice
leverage
short
position,
both
in
f
and
you
can
do
maker
and
you're
definitely
going
to
have
to
pony
up
to
buy
some
maker
to
try
to
pull
this
off
because
you're
going
to
need
some.
I
agree
with
monet
that
these
markets
aren't
deep
enough
to
be
able
to
buy
it
straight
up.
You're
going
to
have
to
borrow
it,
you
have
to
buy
some
accumulate,
and
then
you
set
up
your
short
positions,
because
the
thing
that
isn't
going
to
crash
that
you're
going
to
make
money
on
isn't
just
maker.
K
It's
s
because
you're
going
to
basically
shock
the
whole
defy
system
doing
this,
you
can
short
die
potentially,
although-
and
you
would
do
this
only
if
we
pull
the
usdc
from
the
psm
by
the
way,
you
leave
that
as
like
100
million
exposure,
that's
going
to
get
ripped
out
in
an
instant
during
this
whole
scenario,
and
so
basically,
if
that's
set
up
to
go,
you
short
die
leveraged.
You
short
that's
leveraged
and
you
short
make
your
leverage
to
boot,
and
then
you
drop
it
in
the
es
m
and
watch
what
happens
and
seriously.
K
You
can
make
enough
money
off.
That
now
is
that
profitable,
based
on
accumulating
make
enough
maker.
You
need
to
pull
it
off
now.
I
don't
know,
but
if
you
find
one
or
two
well-heeled
maker
players
that
are
willing
to
run
with
you
on
that
you're,
it's
a
game
over.
So
I
basically
posed
a
long
time
ago
that
maker
going
into
the
system
to
do
stuff
should
have
to
sit
in
a
wallet
for
a
while,
so
that
you
can't
flash
the
stuff
out.
You
can't
do
it
instantly.
You
have
to
do
it
with
maker.
K
That
was
sitting
there
ready
to
go
and
that's
a
different
game,
and
then
the
question
is
how
long
and
what
are
the
implications
of
making
it
so
that
people
have
to
wait
to
get
into
either
the
esm
or
governance,
or
that
maker
has
to
sit
and
kind
of
simmer.
You
know
the
season
is
what
I
called
it
before.
It
can
actually
do
stuff
of
this
kind
of
importance
in
the
system.
That's
all
I
got.
A
A
D
I
Do
want
to
talk.
I
would
just
say
that
I
that's
kind
of
my
my
feeling
too
of,
like
I
think
it's
the
net.
It's
time
to
net
reduce
the
risk
from
this
as
maker
grows,
the
kind
of
the
incentive
to
attack
grows
and
as
right
as
d5
continues
to
financially
immature
and
crypto
markets
financially
mature.
It
becomes
easier
to
attack
as
well,
so
probably
at
some
point
in
the
future.
It
shuts
down.
150K
feels
too
high
to
me
as
well.
I
I
You
know
like
maybe,
if
there's
some
sort
of
critical
bug-
or
you
know,
heaven
forbid-
that
you
know,
as
I
like,
I
think
we're
still
in
a
regime
where
it
makes
where
I
feel
safer
to
have
it
than
not
have
it.
But
150k
sounds
like
it's
high
enough
to
probably
just
effectively
disable
it,
because
just
imagine
how
many
like
different,
like
vc
funds
and
stuff
you
have
to
like.
Actually
mobilize
to
you
know,
move
their
mkr
on
short
notice.
I
Yes,
I'll
give
a
quick
opinion
here,
which
is
that
I
think
at
two
days
the
governance
delay
is
already
far
too
long
to
matter
in
the
event
of
most,
you
know
bugs
or
hacks
like
response
times
for
defy
incidents
are
like
minutes
to
hours.
At
best.
You
know,
like
the
compound
thing
was
basically
completely.
I
It
was
mostly
over
within
the
first
two
hours
and
then
took
took
people
a
little
bit
longer
to
figure
out
the
reservoir
thing,
but
that
was
still
like
within
24
hours
right
and
that
was
a
slow
attack
by
most
d5
standards.
You
know
usually
they're
over
in
a
block,
so
we're
already
in
a
position
where
the
gsm
delay
is
far
too
long
to
effectively
respond
to
any
urgent
issue,
and
we
have
strategies
for
dealing
with
those
called
instant
access
modules.
Right
like
we
can
freeze
the
oracles.
I
You
know
instantly
with
a
governance
vote,
for
example,
and
we
we
have
that
bypass,
because
we
know
that
okay,
the
the
dangers-
you
know-
that's
not
a
riskless
thing,
but
you
know
it's
less
risky
than
full
access
to
the
system,
and
you
know
an
oracle
attack
is
dangerous
enough.
That
we
need
the
ability
to
respond
instantly,
so
we
so
we
already
have
a
solution
for
these
things
that
need
instant
responses
and
it's
called
instant
access
modules,
which
can
you
know,
have
various
logic
for
how
you
trigger
them.
It
can
be
mkr
weighted
voting.
I
I
So
you
know
imagine
malicious
actors
managed
to
overtake
the
hat.
Just
because,
like
mkr,
was
slow
to
move
and
got
spread
out
on
proposals
or
something
and
some
malicious
spells
queued
up.
You
know
there's
going
to
be
some
response
time
for
that.
You
know
you're
going
to
have
to
mobilize
mkr
holders
to
retake
the
hat
and
then
you're
going
to
have
to
do
technical
things
that
allow
you
to
drop
the
malicious
spell,
and
I
think
two
more
days
is
a
meaningful
amount
of
time
to
respond
to
a
threat
like
that.
I
You
know
also
it's
meaningful
in
the
case
that
like
if
I
I
lost
my
train
of
thought
there,
but
it's
meaningful
to
respond
to
to
a
government's
attack
in
that
amount
of
time.
So
you
know,
I
think
it's
a
good
idea
at
this
point
to
lengthen
it
out
a
little
bit
because
it
has
tangible
benefits
and
the
the
downsides
don't
seem
that
bad
all
right.
That's
that's
enough.
Rambling.
P
P
If
we
discuss
usdc
risk
a
regulatory
action
and
so
on
two
days
versus
four
days,
it
could
make
a
very
big
difference
right
and
I
honestly
don't
see
the
need
to
make
it
any
longer.
I
think
the
two
days
are:
it's:
it's
working
so
yeah.
I
I,
I
think
we're
not
doing
the
full
spectrum
analysis
here,
we're
just
changing
it,
because
it
we
haven't
needed
it
in
a
while
and
we
were
not
thinking
the
risks
through.
M
M
H
A
P
You
know
a
recent
memory
of
things
and-
and
I
think
that's
that's
in
this
case-
it's
pretty
bad,
I
mean.
Maybe
chances
are
relatively
low-
that
that
something
would
go
catastrophically
wrong
if
we,
if
we
move
it
from
two
to
four
days,
but
I
do
not
believe
we've.
We
actually
know
that,
like
we
haven't
made
that
analysis
properly,
I
believe
I
I
I
think
I
cannot
I'm.
I
P
P
I
H
G
Yeah
yeah,
I
it's
funny
because
you
guys
like
basically
hit
all
my
points
periodically
while
going
through,
that
it
does
sound
like
first
of
all.
I
I
strongly
agree
with
water
here
that
I-
and
I
think
we
have
some
old
risk
analysis
around
this,
but
we
we
probably
should
like,
have
some
risk
weights
on
it.
We
can
argue
over
specific
probability
weights
and
that
would
maybe
help
inform
us
as
to
whether
or
not
we
wanted
to
make
this
choice.
G
But
in
addition
to
that
there
may
be
some
benefit
in
in
taking
other
parameters
in
the
system.
That
would
need
to
be
changed
and
thinking
about
exactly
like
what
would
be
suitable
for
either
an
instant
access
module
or
a
mom
with
a
multi-sig,
or
something
like
that,
because
we
may
be
able
to
benefit,
we
may
be
able
to
have
our
cake
and
eat
it
too.
G
O
So
if
we
lengthen
the
governance
delay,
then
there's
like
some
of
those
parameters
might
need
to
be
looked
at
again
like
are
we
really
still
comfortable,
adding
up
to
a
billion
dollars
of
stable
coins
a
day
if
it
would
take
us
four
days
to
to
make
any
changes?
Or
would
we
want
to
like
reduce
that
or
yeah.
A
G
M
Yeah,
so
someone
else
can
do
another
better
signal
request,
regardless
of
whether
this
one
passes
or
fails,
we
can
like
follow
it
up
with
the
result
of
the
other
one.
So,
like
worst
case,
we
end
up
doing
this
for
like
a
week.
I
guess
if
it
gets
voted
through
one
chain
as
well,
and
then
we
change
it
to
something
else.
If
people.
I
Want
yeah,
I
think
a
key
question
is
whether
these
parameters
really
need
to
be
connected
this
closely,
because
I
think,
there's
there's
a
fairly
strong
argument
for
at
least
raising
the
esm
threshold
and
the
question
becomes:
does
that
actually
necessitate
like
lengthening
the
governance
delay
it?
You
know.
It
does
certainly
like
raise
your
response
time
if
you
need
to
trigger
the
sm
in
response
to
like
majority
malicious
majority
governance
attack.
Is
that
strictly
necessary?
You
know,
I
don't
know.
I
M
It's
not
just
like
a
the
like
attack
thing
that
it's
supposed
to
stop
right
like
it's.
It
doesn't
have
to
be
like
a
malicious
majority
that
it's
supposed
to
defend
against.
It
could
be
just
like
a
majority
that
wants
something
that,
like
a
majority,
thinks
is
unreasonable,
like
it's
not
being
an
attack,
it
can
be
something.
I
It's
it's
one
of
the
most
debated
things,
and
it's
all
about
like
how
you
probability
weight
different
pro
different,
like
bad
scenarios,
which
has
made
it
it's
made
it
really
one
of
the
hardest
things
to
reason
about,
because
it's
all
just
based
on
what
your
priors
are
for.
What's
actually
most
likely
to
you
know,
go
wrong.
I
You
know,
I
think,
certainly
the
the
more
the
system
matures
and
bakes
in
the
the
argument
of
like
you,
need
it
for
critical
bugs
decreases,
but
the
like
governance
attacks
and
what
even
is
a
governance
attack
is
it's
very
philosophical
and
I've.
I
think
I've
flip-flopped
a
few
times
in
the
past
on
exactly
how
how
necessary
it
is
how
useful
it
is.
A
Thanks
for
sharing
your
thoughts,
everybody-
and
you
know
these
are
kind
of
complex
topics,
so
appreciate
getting
to
hear
from
so
many
voices
and
getting
so
much
perspective
on
on.
Why
we're
considering
the
things
we
are,
I
know
yeah
bourbon.
You
would
ask
for
a
couple
of
minutes
here,
so
this
might
be
might
be
your
time
to
shine.
Q
D
D
Q
Exponentially
and
our
debt
ceilings
could
start
getting
hit
quite
quickly
as
prices
move
up,
and
I
would
like
to
see
all
of
them
raised
and
maybe
the
instant
access
module
on
them
like
the
time
lock
like
reduced,
potentially
because
I
don't
want
another
like
gsm
delay,
sort
of
thing.
I
think
if
things
like
do
actually
do
like
a
three
five
10x
like
kind
of
quickly
here,
we
wanna
have
die
available
for
me
to
boost
for
whoever
to
boost.
Q
I
don't
know
how
much
people
love
rap,
bitcoin,
there's
a
whole
bunch
of
you
know
contention
about
it.
I
am
long
on
bitcoin
through
defy
saver
using
wbtc,
whether
or
not
I
believe
in
bitcoin
long
term
necessarily
doesn't
really
matter.
I
do
think
it's
gonna
do
its
sort
of
thing
until
the
end
of
the
cycle,
so
I
would
like
to
see
a
wbtc
b
vault
that
is
less
urgent.
Q
A
Yeah
thanks
for
sharing
bourbon,
definitely
in
kind
of
the
spirit
of
the
post,
long
put
up
earlier
this
week,
where
it's
like
yeah,
if
you
have
something
you
believe,
is
right
and
that
the
community
should
be
considering
like
yeah.
Please
do
throw
up
a
signal
request,
because
that's
kind
of
what
the
whole
process
is
about
in
terms
of
the
assets
with
the
debt
ceiling,
instant
access,
module,
there's,
obviously
a
lot
of
different
ways
you
can
play
with
that.
Yeah.
That's
a
good
point,
long
saying!
A
Maybe
we
should
discuss
in
detail
later.
I
just
kind
of
wanted
to
throw
up
from
the
governor's
side
right
like
you
can
mess
with
the
max
line.
You
can
mess
with
the
ttl
the
time
to
increase
again,
you
can
mess
with
the
gap,
parameter
the
how
how
big
we're
targeting
the
gap
between
the
dc
and
the
available
debt.
You
know
so
there's
a
number
of
different
ways.
A
You
could
basically
encourage
broader
access
to
these
funds,
as,
as
dc
start
to
tighten
yeah
so
like
just
fun,
governance
parameters
to
consider
for
a
signal
quest
and,
as
always,
we're
happy
to
help
out
show
templates
or
resources.
If
anyone
is
doing
like
uncomfortable
for
any
reason
on
the
signal
requests,
but
we
do
encourage
people
to
to
make
their
own
requests
when
they're
bringing
the
proposal
forward.
G
When
you
do
make
the
signal
request,
I'll
just
remind
everybody,
that's
going
to
consider
it
or,
if
you're,
going
to
make
it
that
the
the
risk
of
the
instant
access
module
is
that
what
a
price
crashes
in
an
asset
and
that
price
crashes
beyond
the
collateralization
threshold
within
that
time
period,
which
allows
for
the
minting
of
unbacked
dye
and
that
unbacked
I
then
basically
hits
the
surplus
buffer.
So
just
whatever
parameters
you
end
up,
choosing
be
mindful
that
that
is
that's
the
counterbalance
that
that's
the
it's
all
goldilocks.
G
G
Probably
some
combination
between
that
ttl
and
the
gap
is,
you
know,
might
be
worth
thinking
through
those
the
other
side
of
the
scenario
with
the
tt
on
the
gap
so
think
about
what
you
want.
What
we
want
going
into
like
a
rocketing
market
and
what's
gonna
work
and
then
also
think
about
what
happens
if
the
parameters
are
set.
That
way
on
the
downside.
Q
A
Right
now,
well,
there's
been
a
lot
of
great
discussion
today.
Definitely
encourage
everyone
to
bring
it
back
to
the
forums.
As
we
said,
there's
a
couple
signals
we
discussed
heavily
today,
where
you
might
need
to
change
your
vote
or
or
voice
some
of
the
opinions
or
reflections
you've
had
after
the
conversation
today.
That's
what
the
forum's
there
for
for
that
engagement
and
to
document
it.
So
please
do
really
appreciate
everyone
today,
sharing
so
many
different
perspectives
and
yeah
happy
happy
thursday.