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From YouTube: Viktor TrĂ³n Part 2 // An Ethereum Interview Series
Description
We sat down with Viktor Tron, one of the first employees of the Ethereum Foundation, to discuss the Swarm project. This series focuses on trying to explain Ethereum to a non-technical audience.
A
Obviously,
our
focus
with
swirl
so
far
and
so
on,
researched
them
in
the
Muslim
innovative
part
was
exactly
what
I've
talked
about
the
incentive
system.
This.
This
has
been
our
focus
because
the
actual
technology
for
data
distribution
and
retrieval
as
I
said,
have
been
available,
and
research
has
been
very
you
know,
by
progressive
in
the
in
that
field,
in
that
in
the
past
decades,
but
went
remained
and
sold
so
far
was
wasn't
incentivizing
a
set
of
nodes
or
that
network
of
nodes
to
provide
reliable
service.
A
There's
two
major
components
in
in
reliability
which
have
we
have
to
take
care
of
one
is
the
polished,
concerns
the
half
the
operation
of
the
network,
meaning
to
serve
content
in
a
low
latency
fashion.
This
this
this
is
necessary
for
to
provide
the
in
the
web
experience
that
users
are
used
to
basically
real-time
interactive
web
applications.
A
Bittorrent
is
not
capable
of
doing
that,
so
it
gave
us
there
was
a
very
important
or
grasp
this
concerns
basically
compensating
notes
for
their
bandwidth
contribution.
Now.
Bandits
contribution
is
relatively
easy
to
solve,
because
once
you
get
some
data
and
you
diet,
you
can
directly
pay
for
it.
It's
a
it's
it's
like
when
you,
when
you
buy
a
glass
of
lemonade
and
you
pay
for
it.
It's
it's
relatively
easy
exchange
of
foods.
A
You
really
want
to
make
sure
that
content
is
there
even
after
years
of
not
using
or
not
retrieving
and
bandwidth
incentivisation
can
incentivize
popular
content
to
be
replicated
and
therefore
securely
stored,
because
nodes
will
be
motivated
to
keep
them
because
they
can
earn
money
type
so
having
them
to
two
nodes
that
are
interesting.
I
have
a
four
unpopular
content.
The
story
is
much
more
much
more
complex.
A
First
of
all,
you
have
to
have
this
other
type
of
incentive,
which
basically
compensates
nodes
for
the
for
the
opportunities
for
gun
to
not
store
more
popular
content,
so
it
made
his
decision
comes
for
node
2
to
get
to
either
delete
your
family
album
for
N
or
or
or
serve
something
that's
potentially
more
popular.
Then
if
you,
if
you
don't
take
care
that
they
motivated
not
to
keep
your
content,
your
content
to
a
big
say,
garbage
collector,
deleted
again
and
that
sort
of
incentive
system
is
a
little
bit
more
complex.
Then
he
went
with
incentive.
A
Why
is
that?
It's
because
you're
basically
dealing
with
the
promise
at
the
point
of
you
know,
you
uploading
a
family
album
and
you
wanting
to
make
sure
that
this
family
album
is
preserved
in
the
network
for
a
longer
period
of
time
to
basically
buying
a
promise
and
promises
are
a
bit
difficult
because
there's
less
immediacy
of
conflict
when,
when
you
settle
the
payment,
if
you,
if
you
settle
the
payment
in
advance,
then
you
want
your
store,
a
node
that
promised
it
might
just
disappear.
And
then
you
can
just
you
know
shout
in
the
Eastern.
A
You
know
where
is
my
data
and
if
they
disappear,
and
what
can
you
do
or
if
you
defer
payment
until
the
the
promises
fulfilled
and,
of
course
the
other
part
is,
is
taking
the
risk
and
someone
stores
your
data,
but
in
the
say,
okay
I
stored
your
data
after
a
year,
and
now
you
can
pay,
but
you
said
it's
not
so
important.
I
have
replicas
anyway,
it's
just
deleted,
and
so
they
miss
the
payment.
A
The
way
it's
working
in
in
swarm
is
is
that
you
you,
when
you
when
you,
when
you
pay
for
for
the
long
term,
storage,
basically
lock
up
a
particular
amount
of
money
in
a
smart
contract,
a
giant
buy,
try
to
simplify
the
stories,
but
and
that
that
particular
money
is
released
in
installments
at
particular
times
when
you,
when
your
counterparty
is
providing
a
proof
that
they
still
have
the
data.
Now,
how
do
they
prove
the
date?
Does
this?
Do
you
have
the
data?
A
We
don't
have
to
go
into
technical
details,
but
obviously
there's
much
better
ways
to
prove
it.
Then
you
downloading
the
whole
staff.
This
is
this.
This
construct
is
called
proof
of
custody
of
proof
of
storage.
It's
a
crypto,
very
hipster
graphic
construct
which
allow
you
to
have
a
compact
proof
proving
to
to
any
third
party
that
you
store
blob
of
data
without
transferring
the
whole
data
and
without
revealing
the
actual
contents,
and
we
worked
quite
a
lot
on
on
on
such
scheming
how
to
how
to
optimize
such
a
scheme-
and
that
was
quite
a
challenge.
A
We
actually
wrote
two
research
papers
on
the
solution.
One
is
about
this
generic
pattern
of
how
we
do
the
incentivization.
The
second
one
is
a
little
bit
more
former
at
the
actual
proof
of
custody
construct.
The
interesting
properties
of
it
is
how
how
you
can
efficiently.
You
know
prove
that
you
stored
the
data
in
even
large
collections.
A
It's
just
passing
like
really
little
bits
of
data
among
a
few
nodes
and
can
prove
beyond
arbitrary
level
of
certainty
that
you
want
that
that
the
entire
Wikipedia
is
was
there
we're
very
family
album
is?
Is
there
an
end
preset
without
you
having
to
retrieve
the
old
stuff?
Have
you
ever
encountered
a
situation
when,
when
your
favorite
service
of
yours
was
was
down
now
in
in
in
in
a
proper
decentralized
Network,
when
content
is
stored,
redundant
leave
across
many
nodes,
this
is
almost
impossible.
A
There's
very
little
chance
that
we'll
all
the
nodes
that
redundantly
store
your
data
are
down
or
compromised
at
the
same
time.
So
these
centralized
solutions
were
proposed
already
in
like
few
decades
ago
and
they've
proved
extremely
robust
against.
You
know
you
know
various
attack
vectors
so
to
say
one
attack,
factories,
censorship,
so
in
general,
decentralized
storage
solutions
offer
kind
of
zero
downtime
completely
for
torrent
operation
and,
at
the
same
time,
promise
you
no
censorship
resistance
and
therefore
they
they
can.
A
So
what
adage
that
you
know
if
the
product
is
freed
and
you're
the
product-
and
this
is
exactly
what
happens
at
the
broken
internet
at
the
moment-
that
the
way
to
solve
scalability
and
Buddhist
conference
properties
in
in
web
to
data
providers
offer
you
the
you
know:
free
scalable
services
with
a
huge
data
centers,
but
at
the
same
time
they
can.
They
can
do
this
by
making
you
your
products,
they
do
a
user
profiling.
They
have
the
say
who
accesses
your
content
and
what's
accessed.
A
Also,
this
is
relatively
strong
sheep,
so
to
say-
and
this
might
not
be
relevant
to
to
a
lot
of
us
in
in
countries
like
with
with
progressive
governments,
but
it's
a
huge
problem.
For
example,
China
the
Great
Firewall
like
really
makes
life
very
difficult
and
anthem
Shh.
She
adds
a
lot
of
content
and
information
from
them,
and
you
know
decentralized
solutions.
Are
you
know
extremely
powerful
countermeasures
to
do
this?
These
restrictions
that
we
who
suffer
a
lot
of
today's
businesses
are
intermediaries.
A
A
So
what
am
I
talking
about
I
put
the
examples
you
can
have
taxi
services
without
a
taxi
company,
so
you
buried
at
uber
company.
We
have
Airbnb
with
other
Airbnb.
You
have
takeaway
services
without
the
actual
takeaway
service,
aggregator
company,
because
would
directing
interactions
become
possible
and
the
automated
you
know,
market
making
is
possible
on
the
blockchain
and
most
and
most
importantly,
value
transfer
possible
without
intermediary
banks.
A
Make
sure
the
you
know
the
first
really
successful
application.
Blockchain
was
I
should
be
Center
eyes,
money,
currency,
so
Bitcoin
successful,
based
in
exactly
this
premise
that
you
can
get
round
the
the
need
for
people
for
centralized
trusted
third-party,
and
you
can
still
do
it's
very
secure.
Direct
value
transfer,
just
lessly.
A
You
know
what
their,
what
their,
what
the
remit
would
be
and
they're
there
for
the
end.
They
are,
usually
you
know
very
easily
corruptible
day,
they
so
to
say
single
points
of
failure
in
the
system
and
the
the
reason
why
this
centrist
consensus
is
so
exactly
so
powerful.
Is
that
it
it
can
do
away
with
the
window
in
the
centuries
of
practice
that
simple,
simply
because
of
of
the
logistics.
So
historically,
a
lot
of
coordination
problems.
A
A
lot
of
you
know:
consensus
problems
had
to
be
solved
by
having
having
you
know,
centralized,
Oracle's
and
and
and
and
third
parties,
because
simply
logistically
was
not
possible
to
disseminate
information
to
collect
information
and
that's
why
a
lot
of
these
entities
accrued
incredible
power
and
concentrated
power
in
the
in
the
hands
of
individuals
or
weather
or
certain
organizations,
and
that
led
to
a
lot
of
abuse
of
power.
Now
the
potential
that
the
decentralized
consensus
does
away
with
this
with
the
need
for
this
is
extremely
powerful.
A
I,
truly
believe
that
this
is
a
this
is
a
very
significant
civilization
and
accomplishment
that
this
innovation
makes
it
possible
to
be
centralized
in
Oracle's.
You
can
have
sale
and
registries
without
having
a
land
registry
institution
which
was
always
like
throughout
history,
very
quiet,
very
close
to
the
Roy
Roy
Accords,
exactly
because
because
of
the
power
data,
but
you
know,
the
orders
of
truths
can
have.